BUTLER'S WORKS
GLADSTONE
t VOL. I.
HENRY FROWDE, M.A.
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
THE MACMII.LAN COMPANY
THE WORKS
OF
JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L.
SOMETIME LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM
DIVIDED INTO SECTIONS; WITH SECTIONAL HEADINGS
AN INDEX TO EACH VOLUME ; AND SOME OCCASIONAL NOTES
ALSO PREFATORY MATTER
EDITED BY
THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE
Cuius sacra fero ingcnti perculsus amorc
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. I: ANALOGY, ETC.
Ojforfc
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1897
019S2
PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
BY HORACE HART, M.A.
PRINTER' TO THE UNIVERSITY
THE
ANALOGY OF RELIGION
NATURAL AND REVEALED
TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE
TO WHICH ARE ADDED TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS
I. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY J II. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE
AND
A CORRESPONDENCE WITH DR. SAMUEL CLARKE
BY
JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L.
SOMETIME LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM
EDITED BY
THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1897
EDITOR'S PREFACE
H^HE purpose with which this edition of Bishop
Butler's Works is published, is to give readier
access to the substance and meaning of those works
than the student has heretofore enjoyed.
The reasons why such access should be afforded, and
that in the largest possible degree, are too wide for
statement in a Preface, and will perhaps be sufficiently
understood from a collection of Essays which is meant
promptly to follow the present publication. But it
will be well to set forth the means which have been
adopted.
These are in brief as follows : —
1. The Analogy, and the other works with slight
exceptions, have been broken into sections.
2. Every section has been supplied with a heading,
intended to assist the eye, and, as far as may be, the
mind of the reader, by an indication of its contents.
3. Indexes to each Volume have been provided : and
they are framed upon a separate perusal and following
of the Text, as close as the present Editor could
make it.
4. He has ventured to add a limited number of Notes,
in part explanatory, and in part illustrative.
Vin EDITOR'S PREFACE
5. An Appendix has been added to Vol. II. The
several pieces which it contains are all of them either
by Butler, or associated with his name.
6. The Text of the Analogy has been duly considered
under the supervision of the authorities of the University
Press, and with the aid furnished by Bishop Fitzgerald's
edition of the Analogy (Dublin, 1849), in which many
corrections of the current edition of 1844 were made,
and a collation with the original text of 1736 was
embodied.
And now a few words with respect to some of these
particulars.
First, the labour of the Editor has in the aggregate
been considerable. The smallest and least arduous part
of it has also been that where he feels most sanguine as
to the results. To provide the students of Butler with
this facility for comparison and for reference, appeared
to him nothing less than a glaring necessity.
The embarrassment heretofore felt has been twofold :
it has been experienced alike in perusing Butler, and in
testing what has been written upon him.
Dr. Whewell, in 1848, made a step towards it by pre-
fixing to his edition of the Three Sermons on Human
Nature a brief syllabus in seventy-nine heads. In
1849, publishing an edition of six more of the Fifteen
Sermons, as the Six Sermons on Moral Subjects, he
made a more daring advance, and divided each of
them into a continuous series of paragraphs or articles
regularly numbered, while he prefixed to them a cor-
responding list in 160 sentences, each of a very few
words. They were such as might have been printed as
headings on the margin.
Another editor, Dr. Angus, who has laboured on Butler
with care and ability, perceived that something was
EDITOR'S PREFACE ix
wanted in order to afford easier access to the Analogy,
and was struck by the example of Dr. Whewell, but
concluded that 'this plan seemed a liberty which he
was not justified in taking V And notwithstanding
that this very same liberty has now been taken, and
that on the largest scale, a tribute of sympathy may
still be paid to the temper which made Dr. Angus feel
that the mere body and figure of works such as those
of Butler were to be handled with scruple and with
reverence. It would have been well if the modesty of
Butler had allowed him to anticipate that his leading
productions would become classics in the philosophical
theology of his country, and if he had accordingly
furnished them with all facilities for perusal in the
mode and form which he was of all men by far the best
fitted to determine.
But the dominant consideration with the present
Editor has been this, that for want of an easily available
power of reference from part to part of works so close in
tissue and so profoundly charged with vital matter, the
difficulty of mastering Butler has been seriously aggra-
vated, if not multiplied manifold. Most of the editions
are without index; but an index is an imperfect help,
and the reference to a particular page, good for the
particular edition, is valueless for every other. The
consequence is that it is often necessary to spend half
an hour in looking for a passage. And the further
consequence is that, as a high tariff engenders smuggling,
so readers, and even critics, of Butler are often compelled
or induced to forgo this trouble, and let remote recollec-
tion or vague impression shift for itself. It is indeed
too easy to show how disastrously censors of Butler in
Preface to Angus' s Butler,
X EDITOR'S PREFACE
some instances have failed to represent him correctly,
owing, as I believe, to this cause.
Without sectional divisions, would not our mani-
pulation of the ancient philosophers be hopelessly em-
barrassed? And yet who is there among them, unless
perhaps Aristotle, the tissue of whose thought is closer
than that of Butler?
Secondly, with the plan of sectional division has been
combined that of sectional headings. And here the
Editor must admit that, while the task of framing them
is one of a difficulty not to be wholly overcome (as far
as his experience enables him to speak) by any amount
of labour, the result may probably remain far from
satisfactory. Still, on the one hand, these headings- may
often be useful guides to the eye of a searcher ; and, on
the other hand, they may supply in a form more direct
and easy, if less complete, the same description of help
as is aimed at by a more formal analysis.
Thirdly, as to Indexes.
The Analogy, to which is subjoined the Clarke corre-
spondence as well as the Two Dissertations, has so close
a coherence in itself between every chapter, and indeed
every sentence, that, although at numerous points it
touches the same subject-matter as the Sermons, there
is upon the whole a marked distinction ; and it appeared
desirable therefore to give a separate Index to eacli
Volume.
While perhaps no writer requires an index so much
as Butler, it may be also said that for no writer is it
•more difficult to frame an index which shall answer
its proper purpose. A number of indexes have been
framed for the Analogy. I do not remember any for
the Sermons, which however also require this auxiliary.
But what is the proper basis of an index? Not to
EDITOR'S PREFACE xi
present an exhaustive analysis, but rather to supply an
aid to the memory of the student. The student ought
to find in the several items of an index, under the most
natural and (so to speak) salient heads, every point of
his author's text to which it is likely that, in default
of exact recollection, he may desire to refer. This has
been the conception or plan on which these Indexes
have been constructed ; but the task is difficult, and,
though labour has not been spared, the execution may
be far from perfect.
Fourthly, this edition is also provided with occasional
Notes. Their purpose is limited, and their number not
very large.
Dr. Angus indicates in his brief Preface three, indeed
four, purposes of his notes, which may here be repeated
in substance. First, to give the history of opinions with
which the text has dealt. Secondly, to trace the influ-
ence of Butler himself on later writers. Thirdly, to
question or qualify his arguments, or to explain his
expressions. Fourthly, to make good deficiencies in
point of evangelical tone.
It appears, however, highly desirable that the student
of Butler should not be burdened with unnecessary
or distracting notes. In the case of great works like
these, as in the case of the Ethics of Aristotle, a mass of
notes encumbers and obstructs the road to the author's
meaning, which may be accessible enough with the aid
of close attention and free reference. The student ought
not to find extraneous matter too largely interposed
between it and his mind. The last of the heads above
given is, in the view of the present Editor, illegitimate
and causeless. The second, which would open a very
wide field, does not seem well suited to fragmentary
discussion. The first is useful on account of the amount
xii EDITOR'S PREFACE
of tacit reference to prior writers, which Butler, in his
anxiety to avoid controversy, has embodied without
names in his text; but it should be confined to indi-
cating immediate sources. The third, while requiring
circumspection, is proper, and is directly auxiliary to
the purposes of the student.
Only in a very few cases of reference to the greatest
masters have citations been made for the purpose of
corroborative illustration. But, as a general rule, the
safest basis of annotation upon Butler probably is to
consider not what the text admits, but what it, more
or less, requires.
With regard to the Editor's task at large, he is
impressed with two convictions in particular. The first
of these is, that it was work requisite on broad grounds
to be done. The second is, that it might have been—
perhaps may yet be — better done by others. Nor does
he use the word ' others ' vaguely ; for he has in view
such minds (always of necessity rare) as the mind which
produced the masterly Sermon l by Dean Church on his
illustrious predecessor. The apology for the present
effort is comprised in few words : Better thus, than not
at all.
W. E. GLADSTONE.
HAWARDEN CASTLE :
December, 1895.
1 See the recent Volume, Blaise Pascal and other Sermons (Macmillan).
CONTENTS OF VOL, I
PAGE
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR vii
CHRONOLOGY OF BISHOP BUTLER'S LIFE , , . . . xvii
EPITAPH ASCRIBED TO DR. FORSTER • •-•» — -, ^— ,~ . . xviii
ACCOUNT BY BISHOP HALIFAX OF THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS
SYSTEMS OF BISHOP BUTLER . . . . , . xix
DEDICATION . . * . . , , , . . xxxix
ADVERTISEMENT +' + * • « . . . . . i
INTRODUCTION 3
PART I,
OF NATURAL RELIGION.
CHAPTER I.
Of a Future Life ......... I;
CHAPTER ^1.
Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punishments ;
and particularly of the latter ..... 40
CHAPTER III.
Of the Moral Government of God ......
CHAPTER IV.
Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and
Danger . .........
CONTENTS OF VOL. I>
CHAFIER V.
Of a State of Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline
and Improvement • •.«... 88
CHAPTER VI.
Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing Practice. 114
CHAPTER VII.
Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme or
Constitution, imperfectly comprehended . . . .132
CHAPTER VIII.
Conclusion .... . . , . . . . m t
PART II.
OF REVEALED RELIGION.
CHAPTER I.
Of the Importance of Christianity
CHAPTER II.
Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, considered
as miraculous ......
CHAPTER III.
Of our Incapacity of judging, what were to 1«o expected in a
Revelation ; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it
must contain Things appearing liable to Objections . 182
CHAPTER IV.
Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution im-
perfectly comprehended ..... . .199
CHAFFER V.
Of the particular System of Christianity ; the Appointment of
a Mediator, and the Redemption of the World .by Him . 207
CONTENTS OF VOL. I XV
CHAPTER VI.
Of the Want of Universality in Revelation: and of the
supposed deficiency in the proof of it
CHAPTER VII.
Of the particular Evidence for Christianity ". . • .247
CHAPTER VIII.
Of the Objections which may be made against arguing from
the Analogy of Nature, to Religion .'•... . . 289
CHAPTER IX.
003
Conclusion .
DISSERTATION I.
Of Personal Identity
DISSERTATION II.
Of the Nature of Virtue . * . . .
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DR. BUTLEB AND DR. CLARKE . . 339
• • • • • • ' '359
CHRONOLOGY OF BUTLER'S LIFE
Joseph Butler born . . * ' . . . May 18, 1692
Entered at Oriel College, Oxford . . . . March 17, 1714
Preacher at the Rolls . 1718
B.C.L June 10, 1721
Rector of Haughton ... . * . . . 1722
Rector of Stanhope . . . . . . . . 1725
Publication of the Sermons . . . , . .1 726
D.C.L . . . » . . 1733
Clerk of the Closet to Queen Caroline . . . . . 1736
Publication of the Analogy . . 1 736
Bishop of Bristol . . . , . . , Dec. 3, 1 738
Dean of St. Paul's ". May 23, 1740
Clerk of the Closet to King George II 1746
Bishop of Durham . Oct. 16, 1750
Charge to his Clergy .1751
Death June 16, 1752
VOL. I.
\
EPITAPH ASCRIBED TO DR. FORSTER
The following Epitaph, said to be written by Dr. Nathanael Porster,
is inscribed on a flat marble stone, in the cathedral church of
Bristol, placed over the spot where the remains of Bishop Butler
are deposited ; and which, as it is now almost obliterated, it may
be worth while here to preserve.
H. S.
REVERENDUS ADMODUM IN CHRISTO PATER
JOSEPHUS BUTLER, LL.D.
HUJUSCE PRIMO DIOECESEOS
DEINDE DUNELMENSIS EPISCOPUS.
QUALIS QUANTUSQUE VIR ERAT
SUA LIBENTISSIME AGNOVIT AETAS :
ET SI QUID PRAESULI AUT SCRIPTORI AD FAMAM VALENT
MENS ALTISSIMA,
1NGENII PERSPICACIS ET SUBACTI VIS,
ANIMUSQUE PIUS, SIMPLEX, CANDIDUS, LIBERALS,
MORTUI HAUD FACILE EVANESCET MEMORIA.
OBIIT BATHONIAE l6 KALEND. JULII,
A.D. 1752.
ANNOS NATUS 60.
AN
ACCOUNT BY BISHOP HALIFAX
OF
THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS
OF BISHOP BUTLER1
~j N what follows I propose to give a short account of the Bishop's
moral and religions systems, as these are collected from his
Works.
I. His way of treating the subject of morals is to be gathered
from the volume of his Sermons, and particularly from the three
first, and from the preface to that volume.
' There is/ as our author with singular sagacity has observed,
'a much more exact correspondence between the natural and
moral world, than we are apt to take notice of ».' The inward
frame* of man answers to his outward condition; the several pro-
pensities, - passions, and affections, implanted in our hearts by
the Author of nature, are in a peculiar manner adapted to the
circumstances of life in which he hath placed us. This general
observation, properly pursued, leads to several important con-
clusions. The original internal constitution of man, compared
with his external condition, enables us to discern what course
a Serin, vi.
This portion of the Preface writ- which there is no occasion to displace
ten by Bishop Halifax has been re- from the ground it has long and
tamed as a clear and able summary, usefully occupied.— ED
b2
XX BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S
of action and behaviour that constitution leads to, what is our
duty respecting that condition, and furnishes us besides with the
most powerful arguments to the practice of it.
What the inward frame and constitution of man is, is a question
of fact ; to be determined, as other facts are, from experience,
from our internal feelings and external senses, and from the
testimony of others. Whether human nature, and the circum-
stances in which it is placed, might not have been ordered
otherwise, is foreign to our inquiry, and none of our concern :
our province is, taking both of these as they are, and viewing
the connection between them, from that connection to discover,
if we can, what course of action is fitted to that nature and those
circumstances. From contemplating the bodily senses, and the
organs or instruments adapted to them, we learn that the eye was
given to see with, the ear to hear with. In like manner, from
considering our inward perceptions and the final causes of them,
we collect that the feeling of shame, for instance, was given to
prevent the doing of things shameful ; compassion, to carry
us to relieve others in distress ; anger, to resist sudden violence
offered to ourselves. If, continuing our inquiries in this way,
it should at length appear, that the nature, the whole nature^
of man leads him to and is fitted for that particular course
of behaviour which we usually distinguish by the name of virtue,
we are authorized to conclude, that virtue is the law we are born
under, that it was so intended by the Author of our being ; and
we are bound by the most intimate .of all obligations, a regard
to our own highest interest and happiness, to conform to it in all
situations and events.
Human nature is not simple and uniform, but made up of several
parts ; and we can have no just idea of it as a system or consti-
tution, unless we take into our view the respects and relations
which these parts have to each other. As the body is not one
member, but many ; so our inward structure consists of various
instincts, appetites, and propensions. Thus far there is 'no dif-
ference between human creatures and brutes. But besides these
common passions and affections, there is another principle, peculiar
to mankind, that of conscience, moral sense, reflection, call it
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS Xxi
what you please, by which they are enabled to review their whole
conduct, to approve of some actions in themselves, and to dis-
approve of others. That this principle will of course have some
influence on our behaviour, at least at times, will hardly be
disputed : but the particular influence which it ought to have,
the precise degree of power in the regulating of our internal frame
that is assigned it by him who placed it there, is a point of the
utmost consequence in itself, and on the determination of which
the very hinge of our author's moral system turns. If the faculty
here spoken of be, indeed, what it is asserted to be, in nature and
kind superior to every other passion and affection ; if it be given,
not merely that it may exert its force occasionally, or as our
present humour or fancy may dispose us, but that it may at all
times exercise an uncontrollable authority and government over
all the rest ; it will then follow, that, in order to complete the
idea of human nature, as a system, we must not only take in each
particular bias, propension, instinct, which are seen to belong to
it, but we must add besides the principle of conscience, together
with the subjection that is due to it from all the other appetites
and passions : just as the idea of a civil constitution is formed,
not barely from enumerating the several members and ranks
of which it is composed, but from these considered as acting
in various degrees of subordination to each other, and all under
the direction of the same supreme authority, whether that au-
thority be vested in one person or more.
The view here given of the internal constitution of man, and
of the supremacy of conscience, agreeably to the conceptions
of Bishop Butler, enables us to comprehend the force of that
expression, common to him and the ancient moralists, that virtue
consists in following nature. The meaning cannot be, that it
consists in acting agreeably to that propensity of our nature which
happens to be the strongest ; or which propels us towards certain
objects, without any regard to the methods by which they are to
be obtained : but the meaning must be, that virtue consists in the
due regulation and subjection of all the other appetites and affec-
tions to the superior faculty of conscience ; from a conformity to
which alone our actions are properly natural, or correspondent
XXH BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S
to the nature, to the whole nature, of such an agent as man.
Prom hence too it appears, that the Author of our frame is by no
means indifferent to virtue and vice, or has left us at liberty to
act at random, as humour or appetite may prompt us ; but that
every man has the rule of right within him ; a rule attended in
the very notion of it with authority, and such as has the force
of a direction and a command from him who made us what we
are, what course of behaviour is suited to our nature, and which
he expects that we should follow. This moral faculty implies
also a presentiment and apprehension, that the judgment which
passes on our actions, considered as of good or ill desert, will
hereafter be confirmed by the unerring judgment of God ; when
virtue and happiness, vice and misery, whose ideas are now so
closely connected, shall be indissolubly united, and the divine
government be found to correspond in the most exact proportion
to the nature he has given us. Lastly, this just prerogative or
supremacy of conscience it is, which Mr. Pope has described in his
Universal Prayer, though perhaps he may have expressed it rather
too strongly J, where he says,
' What conscience dictates to be done,
Or warns me not to do,
This teach me more th<in hell to shun,
That more than heaven pursue.'
The reader will observe, that this way of treating the subject
of morals, by an appeal to facts, does not at all interfere with that
other way. adopted by Dr. Samuel Clarke and others, which
begins with inquiring into the relations and fitness of things,
but rather illustrates and confirms it. That there are essential
differences in the qualities of human actions, established by
nature, and that this natural difference of things, prior to and
independent of all will, creates a natural fitness in the agent
to act agreeably to it, seems as little to be denied, as that there
is the moral difference before explained, from which we approve
and feel a pleasure in what is right, and conceive a distaste
to what is wrong. Still, however, when we are endeavouring
1 Among readers of the present day, most, I hope, will in this matter hold
with Pope. — ED.
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS xxiii
to establish either this moral or that natural difference, it ought
never to be forgotten, or rather it will require to be distinctly
shown, that both of these, when traced up to their source, suppose
an intelligent Author of nature and moral Ruler of the world ;
who originally appointed these differences, and by such an ap-
pointment has signified his will that we should conform to them,
as the only effectual method of securing our happiness on the
whole under his government. - And of this consideration our
prelate himself was not unmindful ; as may be collected from
many expressions in different parts of his writings, and par-
ticularly from the following passages in his eleventh Sermon.
' It may be allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue
and religion, that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our
ideas the nearest and most important to us ; that they will, nay,
if you please, that they ought to prevail over those of order, and
beauty, and harmony, and proportion, if there should ever be.
as it is impossible there ever should be, any inconsistence between
them.' And again, ' Though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed
consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good,
as such ; yet, when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither
justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are con-
vinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary
to it."*.1
Besides the general system of morality opened above, our
author in his volume of Sermons has stated with accuracy the
difference between self-love and benevolence— in opposition to
those who, on the one hand, make the whole of virtue to consist
in benevolence c, and to those who, on the other, assert that every
particular affection and action is resolvable into self-love. In
combating these opinions, he has shown, I think unanswerably,
that there are the same kind of indications in human nature, that
we were made to promote the happiness of others, as that we were
made to promote our own : that it is no just objection to this, that
we have dispositions to do evil to others as well as good ; for we
b Serm. xi.
c See the second Dissertation ' Of the Nature of Virtue,' at the end of the
Analogy.
xxiv BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S
have also dispositions to do evil as well as good to ourselves, to our
own most important interests even in this life, for the sake of
gratifying a present passion : that the thing to be lamented
is, not that men have too great a regard to their own real good,
but that they have not enough : that benevolence is not more
at variance with or unfriendly to self-love, than any other
particular affection is : and that by consulting the happiness
of others a man is so far from lessening his own, that the very
endeavour to do so, though he should fail in the accomplishment,
is a source of the highest satisfaction and peace of mind d. He
has also, in passing, animadverted on the phijosopher of Malmes-
bury, who in his book Of Human Nature has advanced, as dis-
coveries in moral science, that benevolence is only the love of
power, and compassion the fear of future calamity to ourselves.
And this our author has done, not so much with the design of
exposing the false reasoning of Mr. Hobbes, but because on so
perverse an account of human nature he has raised a system,
subversive of all justice and honesty e.
II. The religious system of Bishop Butler is chiefly to be
collected from the treatise, entitled, The Analogy of Religion,
Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature.
* All things are double one against another, and God hath made
nothing imperfect f.' On this single observation of the Son
of Sirach, the whole fabric of our prelate's defence of religion,
in his Analogy, is raised. Instead of indulging to idle specula-
tions, how the world might possibly have been better than it is ;
or, forgetful of the difference between hypothesis and fact,
attempting to explain the divine economy with respect to
intelligent creatures, from preconceived* notions of his own ;
he first inquires what the constitution of nature, as made known
to us in the way of experiment, actually is ; and from this, now
seen and acknowledged, he endeavours to form a judgment of
that larger constitution, which religion discovers to us. If the
dispensation of Providence we are now under, considered as
d See Serin, i. and xi. and the Preface to the volume of Sermons.
6 See the Notes to Serm. i, and v. f Ecclus. xlii. 24.
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS XX V
inhabitants of this world, and having a temporal interest to
secure in it, be found, on examination, to be analogous to, and
of a piece with, that further dispensation, which relates to us as
designed for another world, in which we have an eternal interest,
depending on our behaviour here ; if both may be traced up to
the same general laws, and appear to be carried on according
to the same plan of administration : the fair presumption is, that
both proceed from one and the'same Author. And if the principal
parts objected to in this latter dispensation be similar to and
of the same kind with what we certainly experience under the
former ; the objections, being clearly inconclusive in one case,
because contradicted by plain fact, must, in all reason, be allowed
to be inconclusive also in the other.
This way of arguing from what is acknowledged to what is
disputed, from things known to other things that resemble them,
from that part of the divine establishment which is exposed to our
view to that more important one which lies beyond it, is on all
hands confessed to be just. By this method Sir Isaac Newton has
unfolded the system of nature ; by the same method Bishop
Butler has explained the system of grace ; and thus, to use the
words of a writer, whom I quote with pleasure, has ' formed and
concluded a happy alliance between faith and philosophy R.1
And although the argument from analogy be allowed to be
imperfect, and by no means sufficient to solve all difficulties
respecting the government of God, and the designs of his provi-
dence with regard to mankind (a degree of knowledge, which we
are not furnished with faculties for attaining, at least in the
present state) ; yet surely it is of importance to learn from it,
that the natural and moral world are intimately connected, and
parts of one stupendous whole or system ; and that the chief
objections which are brought against religion may be urged with
equal force against the constitution and course of nature, where
they are certainly false in fact. And this information we may
derive from the work before us ; the proper design of which, it
may be of use to observe, is not to prove the truth of religion,
Mr. Mainwaring's Dissertation, prefixed to his volume of Sermons.
xxvi BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S
either natural or revealed, but to confirm that proof, already
known, by considerations from analogy.
After this account of the method of reasoning employed by our
author, let us now advert to his manner of applying it, first to the
subject of natural religion, and secondly to that of revealed.
i. The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a future life ;
and with this the Treatise begins. Neither the reason of the
thing, nor the analogy of nature, according to Bishop Butler,
give ground for imagining, that the unknown event, death, will
be our destruction. The states in which we have formerly existed,
in the womb and in infancy, are not more different from each
other than from that of mature age in which we now exist :
therefore, that we shall continue to exist hereafter, in a state as
different from the present as the present is from those through
which we have passed already, is a presumption favoured by the
analogy of nature. All that we know from reason concerning
death, is the effects it has upon animal bodies : and the frequent
instances among men of the intellectual powers continuing in
high health and vigour, at the very time when a mortal disease is
on the point of putting an end to all the powers of sensation,
induce us to hope that it may have no effect at all on the human
soul, not even so much as to suspend the exercise of its faculties ;
though, if it have, the suspension of a power by no means implies
its extinction, as sleep or a swoon may convince us h.
The probability of a future state once granted, an important
question arises, How best to secure our interest in that state. We
find from what passes daily before us, that the constitution of
nature admits of misery as well as happiness; that both of these
are the consequences of oar own actions ; and these consequences
we are enabled to foresee. Therefore, that our happiness or
misery in a future world may depend on our own actions also, and
that rewards and punishments hereafter may follow our good or
ill behaviour here, is but an appointment of the same sort with
what we experience under the divine government, according to
the regular course of nature !.
h Part I, chap. i. i Chap. ii.
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS xxvii
This supposition is confirmed from another circumstance, that
the natural government of God, under which we now live, is also
moral ; in which rewards and punishments are the consequences
of actions, considered as virtuous and vicious. Not that every man
is rewarded or punished here in exact proportion to his desert ;
for the essential tendencies of virtue and vice, to produce happiness
and the contrary, are often hindered from taking effect from
accidental causes. However, there are plainly the rudiments and
beginnings of a righteous administration to be discerned in the
constitution of nature : from whence we are led to expect, that
these accidental hindrances will one day be removed, and the rule
of distributive justice obtain completely in a more perfect state k.
The moral government of God, thus established, implies in the
notion of it some sort of trial, or a moral possibility of acting
wrong as well as right, in those who are the subjects of it. And
the doctrine of religion, that the present life is in fact a state of
probation for a future one, is rendered credible, from its being
analogous throughout to the general conduct of Providence towards
us with respect to this world ; in which prudence is necessary to
secure our temporal interest, just as we are taught that virtue is
necessary to secure our eternal interest ; and both are trusted to
ourselves l.
But the present life is not merely a state of probation, implying
in it difficulties and danger ; it is also a state of discipline and
improvement ; a/id that both in our temporal and religious capacity.
Thus childhood is a state of discipline for youth ; youth for man-
hood ; and that for old age. Strength of body, and maturity of
understanding, are acquired by degrees ; and neither of them
without continual exercise and attention on our part, not only in
the beginning of life, but through the whole course of it. So
again with respect to our religious concerns, the present world is
fitted to be, and to good men is in event, a state of discipline and
improvement for a future one. The several passions and pro-
pensions implanted in our hearts incline us, in a multitude of
instances, to forbidden pleasures : this inward infirmity is increased
k Chap. iii. ' Chap. iv.
xxviii BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S
by various snares and temptations, perpetually occurring from
without : hence arises the necessity of recollection and self-
government, of withstanding the calls of appetite, and forming
our minds to habits of piety and virtue ; habits, of which we are
capable, and which, to creatures in a state of moral imperfection,
and fallen from their original integrity, must be of the greatest
use, as an additional security, over and above the principle of
conscience, from the dangers to which we are exposed m.
Nor is the credibility here given, by the analogy of nature, to
the general doctrine of religion, destroyed or weakened by any
notions concerning necessity. Of itself it is a mere word, the sign
of an abstract idea; and as much requires an agent, that is,
a necessary agent, in order to effect any thing, as freedom requires
a free agent. Admitting it to be speculatively true, if considered
as influencing practice, it is the same as false : for it is matter of
experience, that, with regard to our present interest, and as
inhabitants of this world, we are treated as if we were free ;
and therefore the analogy of nature leads us to conclude, that,
with regard to our future interest, and as designed for another
world, we shall be treated as free also. Nor does the opinion of
necessity, supposing it possible, at all affect either the general
proof of religion, or its external evidence n.
Still objections may be made against the wisdom and goodness
of the divine government, to which analogy, which can only show
the truth or credibility of facts, affords no answer. Yet even
here analogy is of use, if it suggest that the divine government is
a scheme or system, and not a number of unconnected acts, and
that this system is also above our comprehension. Now the
government of the natural world appears to be a system of this
kind ; with parts, related to each other, and together composing
a whole : in which system, ends are brought about by the use of
means, many of which means, before experience, would have been
suspected to have had a quite contrary tendency ; which is carried
on by general laws, similar causes uniformly producing similar
effects : the utility of which general laws, and the inconveniences
m Part I. chap. v. n Chap. vi.
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS xxix
which would probably arise from the occasional or even secret
suspension of them, we are in some sort enabled to discern ° ; but
of the whole we are incompetent judges, because of the small part
which comes within our view. Reasoning then from what we
know, it is highly credible, that the government of the moral
world is a system also, carried on by general laws, and in which
ends are accomplished by the intervention of means ; and that
both constitutions, the natural and the moral, are so connected,
as to form together but one scheme. But of this scheme, as of
that of the natural world taken alone, we are not qualified to
judge, on account of the mutual respect of the several parts to
each other and to the whole, and our own incapacity to survey
the whole, or, with accuracy, any single part. All objections
therefore to the wisdom and goodness of the divine government
may be founded merely on our ignorance ; and to such objections
our ignorance is the proper, and a satisfactory answer P.
2. The chief difficulties concerning natural religion being now
removed, our author proceeds, in the next place, to that which is
revealed ; and as an introduction to an inquiry into the credibility
of Christianity, begins with the consideration of its importance.
The importance of Christianity appears in two respects. First,
in its being a republication of natural religion, in its native
simplicity, with authority, and with circumstances of advantage ;
ascertaining, in many instances of moment, what before was
only probable, and particularly confirming the doctrine of a future
state of rewards and punishments. Secondly, as revealing a new
dispensation of Providence, originating from the pure love and
mercy of God, and conducted by the mediation of his Son, and
the guidance of his Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of man-
kind, represented in a state of apostasy and ruin. This account
of Christianity being admitted to be just, and the distinct offices
of these three divine persons being once discovered to us, we are
as much obliged in point of duty to acknowledge the relations we
stand in to the Son and Holy Ghost, as our Mediator and Sanctifier,
0 See a Treatise on Divine Benevolence, by Dr. Thomas Balgny, part ii.
P Part I. chap, vii,
xxx BJSHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S
as we are obliged in point of duty to acknowledge the relation
we stand in to G od the Father ; although the two former of these
relations be learnt from revelation only, and in the last we are
instructed by the light of nature ; the obligation in either case
arising from the offices themselves, and not at all depending on
the manner in which they are made known to us <J.
The presumptions against revelation in general are, that it is
not discoverable by reason, that it is unlike to what is so dis-
covered, and that it was introduced and supported by miracles.
But in a scheme so large as that of the universe, unbounded in
extent and everlasting in duration, there must of necessity be
numberless circumstances which are beyond the reach of our
faculties to discern, and which can only be known by divine
illumination. And both in the natural and moral government
of the world, under which we live, we find many things unlike
one to another, and therefore ought not to wonder if the same
unlikeness obtain between things visible and invisible ; although
it be far from true, that revealed religion is entirely unlike the
constitution of nature, as analogy may teach us. Nor is there
any thing incredible in revelation, considered as miraculous ;
whether miracles be supposed to have been performed at the
beginning of the world, or after a course of nature has been
established1. Not at the beginning of the world; for then there
was either no course of nature at all, or a power must have been
exerted totally different from what that course is at present :
all men and animals cannot have been born, as they are now ;
but a pair of each sort must have been produced at first, in a way
altogether unlike to that in which they have been since produced ;
unless we affirm, that men and animals have existed from eternity
in an endless succession : one miracle therefore at least there
must have been at the beginning of the world, or at the time
Part II. chap. i.
1 The argument in this sentence, tains matter which appears to be in
purporting to be Butler's, seems to the nature of expansion and inter-
be founded on Part II. ch. ii. §§ 7-9 polation into the original text. — Eu.
(II.' in the older editions) ; but con-
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS xxxi
of man's creation. Not after the settlement of a course of nature,
on account of miracles being contrary to that course, or, in other
words, contrary to experience ; for, in order to know whether
miracles, worked in attestation of a divine religion, be contrary
to experience or not, we ought to be acquainted with other cases,
similar or parallel to those, in which miracles are alleged to have
been wrought. But where shall we find such similar or parallel
cases'? The world which we inhabit affords none: we know of
no extraordinary revelations from God to man, but those recorded
in the Old and New Testament ; all of which were established
by miracles : it cannot therefore be said, that miracles are in-
credible, because contrary to experience, when all the experience
we have is in favour of miracles, and on the side of religion.
Besides, in reasoning concerning miracles, they ought not to be
compared with common natural events, but with uncommon
appearances, such as comets, magnetism, electricity ; which, to
one acquainted only with the usual phenomena of nature, and
the common powers of matter, must, before proof of their actual
existence, be thought incredible r.
The presumptions against revelation in general being dispatched,
objections against the Christian revelation in particular, against
the scheme of it, as distinguished from objections against its
evidence, are considered next. Now, supposing a revelation to
be really given, it is highly probable beforehand, that it must
contain many things appearing to us liable to objections. The
acknowledged dispensation of nature is very different from what
we should have expected: reasoning then from analogy, the re-
vealed dispensation, it is credible, would be also different. Nor
are we in any sort judges at what time, or in what degree, or
manner, it is fit or expedient for God to instruct us, in things
confessedly of the greatest use, either by natural reason, or by
supernatural information. Thus, arguing on speculation only,
and without experience, it would seem very unlikely that so im-
portant a remedy as that provided by Christianity, for the recovery
of mankind from a state of ruin, should have been for so many
J Chap. ii.
xxxii BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S
ages withheld ; and, when at last vouchsafed, should be imparted
to so few; and, after it has been imparted, should be attended
with obscurity and doubt. And just so we might have argued,
before experience, concerning the remedies provided in nature
for bodily diseases, to which by nature we are exposed : for many
of these were unknown to mankind for a number of ages ; are
known but to few now ; some important ones probably not
discovered yet; and those which are, neither certain in their
application, nor universal in their use : and the same mode of
reasoning that would lead us to expect they should have been so,
would lead us to expect that the necessity of them should have been
superseded, by there being no diseases ; as the necessity of the
Christian scheme, it may be thought, might also have been
superseded, by preventing the fall of man, so that he should not
have stood in need of a Redeemer at all 8.
As to objections against the wisdom and goodness of Chris-
tianity, the same answer may be applied to them as was to the
like objections against the constitution of nature. For here also,
Christianity is a scheme or economy, composed of various parts,
forming a whole ; in which scheme means are used for the
accomplishing of ends ; and which is conducted by general laws,
of all of which we know as little as we do of the constitution of
nature. And the seeming want of wisdom or goodness in this
system is to be ascribed to the same cause, as the like appearances
of defects in the natural system; our inability to discern the
whole scheme, and our ignorance of the relation of those parts
which are discernible to others beyond our view.
The objections against Christianity as a matter of fact, and
against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been obviated
together, the chief of them are now to be considered distinctly.
One of these, which is levelled against the entire system itself, is
of this sort : the restoration of mankind, represented in scripture
as the great design of the gospel, is described as requiring a long
series of means, and persons, and dispensations, before it can
be brought to its completion; whereas the whole ought to have
Chap, iii,
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS xxxm
been effected at once. Now every thing we see in the course
of nature shows the folly of this objection. For in the natural
course of Providence, ends are brought about by means, not
operating immediately and at once, but deliberately and in
a way of progression ; one thing being subservient to another,
this to somewhat further. The change of seasons, the ripening
of fruits, the growth of vegetable and animal bodies, are instances
of this. And therefore, that the same progressive method should
be followed in the dispensation of Christianity, as is observed in
the common dispensation of Providence, is a reasonable expect-
ation, justified by the analogy of nature*.
Another circumstance objected to in the Christian scheme is
the appointment of a Mediator, and the saving of the world
through him. But the visible government of God being actually
administered in this way, or by the mediation and instrument-
ality of others, there can be no general presumption against
an appointment of this kind, against his invisible government
being exercised in the same manner. We have seen already,
that with regard to ourselves this visible government is carried
on by rewards and punishments ; for happiness and misery are
the consequences of our own actions, considered as virtuous and
vicious ; and these consequences we are enabled to foresee. It
might have been imagined, before consulting experience, that
after we had rendered ourselves liable to misery by our own ill
conduct, sorrow for what was jast, and behaving well for the
future, would, alone and of themselves, have exempted us from
deserved punishment, and restored us to the divine favour. But
the fact is otherwise ; and real reformation is often found to be
of no avail, so as to secure the criminal from poverty, sickness,
infamy, and death, the never-failing attendants on vice and
extravagance, exceeding a certain degree. By the course of
nature then it appears, God does not always pardon a sinner on
his repentance. Yet there is provision made, even in nature,
that the miseries, which men bring on themselves by unlawful
indulgences, may in many cases be mitigated, and in some re-
* Chap. iv.
VOL. I. <e
xxxiv BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S
moved ; partly by extraordinary exertions of the offender himself,
but more especially and frequently by the intervention of others,
who voluntarily, and from motives of compassion, submit to
labour and sorrow, such as produce long and lasting incon-
veniences to themselves, as the means of rescuing another
from the wretched effects of former imprudences. Vicarious
punishment, therefore, or one person's sufferings contributing
to the relief of another, is a providential disposition in the
economy of nature : and it ought not to be matter of surprise,
if by a method analogous to this we be redeemed from sin and
misery, in the economy of grace. That mankind at present
are in a state of degradation, different from that in which they
were originally created, is the very ground of the Christian reve-
lation, as contained in the scriptures. Whether we acquiesce
in the account, that our being placed in such a state is owing
to the crime of our first parents, or choose to ascribe it to any
other cause, it makes no difference as to our condition : the vice
and unhappiness of the world are still there, notwithstanding
all our suppositions; nor is it Christianity that hath put us
into this state. We learn also from the same scriptures, what
experience and the use of expiatory sacrifices from the most
early times might have taught us, that repentance alone is not
sufficient to prevent the fatal consequences of past transgressions:
but that still there is room for mercy, and that repentance
shall be available, though not of itself, yet through the medi-
ation of a divine person, the Messiah ; who, from the sublimest
principles of compassion, when we were dead in trespasses and sins n,
suffered and died, the innocent for the guilty, the just for the
unjust *, that we might have redemption through his blood, even the
forgiveness of sinsf. In what way the death of Christ was of
that efficacy it is said to be, in procuring the reconciliation of
sinners, the scriptures have not explained : it is enough that the
doctrine is revealed ; that it is not contrary to any truths which
reason and experience teach us ; and that it accords in perfect
Ephes. ii. i. « i Pet. iii. 18. T Coloss. i. 14.
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS xxxv
harmony with the usual method of the divine conduct in the
government of the world *.
Again it hath been said, that if the Christian revelation were
true, it must have been universal, and could not have been left
upon doubtful evidence. But God, in his natural providence,
dispenses his gifts in great variety, not only among creatures
of the same species, but to the same individuals also at different
times. Had the Christian revelation been universal at first,
yet, from the diversity of men's abilities, both of mind and
body, their various means of improvement, and other external
advantages, some persons must soon have been in a situation,
with respect to religious knowledge, much superior to that of
others, as much perhaps as they are at present : and all men
will be equitably dealt with at last ; and to whom little is given, of
him little will be required. Then as to the evidence for religion
being left doubtful, difficulties of this sort, like difficulties in
practice, afford scope and opportunity for a virtuous exercise of
the understanding, and dispose the mind to acquiesce and rest
satisfied with any evidence that is real. In the daily commerce
of life, men are obliged to act upon great uncertainties, with
regard to success in their temporal pursuits ; and the case with
regard to religion is parallel. However, though religion be
not intuitively true, the proofs of it which we have are amply
sufficient in reason to induce us to embrace it ; and dissatis-
faction with those proofs may possibly be men's own fault a.
Nothing remains but to attend to the positive evidence there is
for the truth of Christianity. Now, besides its direct and funda-
mental proofs, which are miracles and prophecies, there are many
collateral circumstances, which may be united into one view, and
all together may be considered as making up one argument. In
this way of treating the subject, the revelation, whether real or
otherwise, may be supposed to be wholly historical : the general
design of which appears to be, to give an account of the condition
of religion, and its professors, with a concise narration of the
political state of things, as far as religion is affected by it, during
Chap. v. a Chap. vi.
C 2
xxxvi BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S
a great length of time, near six thousand years of which are
already past. More particularly it comprehends an account of
God's entering into covenant with one nation, the Jews, that he
would be their God, and that they should be his people ; of his
often interposing in their affairs ; giving them the promise, and
afterwards the possession, of a flourishing country; assuring them
of the greatest national prosperity, in case of their obedience, and
threatening the severest national punishment, in case they forsook
him, and joined in the idolatry of their pagan neighbours. It
contains also a prediction of a particular person to appear in the
fulness of time, in whom all the promises of God to the Jews were
to be fulfilled : and it relates, that, at the time expected, a person
did actually appear, assuming to be the Saviour foretold ; that he
worked various miracles among them, in confirmation of his divine
authority ; and, as was foretold also, was rejected and put to death
by the very people who had long desired and waited for his coming ;
but that his religion, in spite of all opposition, was established in
the world by his disciples, invested with supernatural powers for
that purpose ; of the fate and fortunes of which religion there
is a prophetical description, carried down to the end of time. Let
any one now, after reading the above history, and not knowing
whether the whole were not a fiction, be supposed to ask, Whether
all that is here related be true ? and instead of a direct answer,
let him be informed of the several acknowledged facts, which are
found to correspond to it in real life ; and then let him compare
the history and facts together, and observe the astonishing coinci-
dence of both : such a joint review must appear to him of very
great weight, and to amount to evidence somewhat more than
human. And unless the whole series, and every particular circum-
stance contained in it, can be thought to have arisen from accident,
the truth of Christianity is proved b.
b Chap. vii. To the Analogy are subjoined two Dissertations, both
originally inserted in the body of the work. One on ' Personal Identity,' in
which are contained some strictures on Mr. Locke, who asserts that con-
sciousness makes or constitutes personal identity ; whereas, as our author
observes, consciousness makes only personality, or is necessary to the idea
of a person, ie. a thinking intelligent being, but presupposes, and therefore
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS xxxvii
The view here given of the moral and religious systems of Bishop
Butler, it will immediately be perceived, is chiefly intended for
younger students, especially for students in Divinity ; to whom it
is hoped it may be of use, so as to encourage them to peruse, with
proper diligence, the original works of the author himself. For
it may be necessary to observe, that neither of the volumes of this
excellent prelate are addressed to those who read for amusement,
or curiosity, or to get rid of time. All subjects are not to be
comprehended with the same ease ; and morality and religion,
when treated as sciences, each accompanied with difficulties of its
own, can neither of them be understood as they ought, without
a very peculiar attention. But morality and religion are not
merely to be studied as sciences, or as being speculatively true ;
they are to be regarded in another and higher light, as a rule of
life and manners, as containing authoritative directions by which
to regulate our faith and practice. And in this view, the infinite
importance of them considered, it can never be an indifferent
matter whether they be received or rejected. For both claim to be
the voice of God ; and whether they be so or not, cannot be known,
till their claims be impartially examined. If they indeed come
from him, we are bound to conform to them at our peril : nor is it
left to our choice, whether we will submit to the obligations they
impose upon us or not; for submit to them we must, in such
a sense, as to incur the punishments denounced by both against
wilful disobedience to their injunctions.
cannot constitute, personal identity ; just as knowledge presupposes truth,
but does not constitute it. Consciousness of past actions does indeed show
us the identity of ourselves, or gives us a certain assurance that we are the
same persons or living agents now, which we were at the time to which our
remembrance can look back : but still we should be the same persons as we
were, though this consciousness of what is past were wanting, though all
that had been done by us formerly were forgotten ; unless it be true, that no
person has existed a single moment beyond what he can remember. The
other Dissertation is ' Of the Nature of Virtue,' which properly belongs to the
moral system of our author, already explained.
TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
CHARLES, LORD TALBOT
BARON OF HENSOL
LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN
THE FOLLOWING TREATISE
IS, WITH ALL RESPECT, INSCRIBED
IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE HIGHEST OBLIGATIONS
TO
THE LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM
AND TO HIMSELF
BY HIS LORDSHIP'S MOST DUTIFUL
MOST DEVOTED
AND MOST HUMBLE SERVANT
JOSEPH BUTLER
ADVEETISEMENT
§ i. TJiis Treatise is to be regarded as a ivliole. Its
subject gives tveigJit to its matter.
IF the reader should meet here with any thing which he
had not before attended to, it will not be in the observa-
tions upon the constitution and course of nature, these being
all obvious ; but in the application of them : in which, though
there is nothing but what appears to me of some real weight,
and therefore of great importance ; yet he will observe several
things, which will appear to him of very little, if he can
think things to be of little importance, which are of any real
weight at all, upon such a subject as religion. However,
the proper force of the following Treatise lies in the whole
general analogy considered together.
§ 2. Case against Christianity is largely assumed to
be clear; but untruly.
\It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, by
many persons, that Christianity is not so much & a subject
of inquiry ; but that it is, now at length, discovered to
be fictitious1. And accordingly they treat it, as if, in the
1 This complaint, uttered in every one.' Besides the decline
1736, Butler repeats in 1751. He of religious influences, the number
opens the Charge to the Clergy of those who profess themselves
of Durham by lamenting ' the unbelievers, he says, ' increases,
general decay of religion in this and with their numbers their
nation, which is now observed by zeal' (Char. § i).
VOL. I. B
2 ADVERTISEMENT
present age, this were an agreed point among all people
of discernment ; and nothing remained, but to set it up as
a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way
of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures
of the worlcL/ On the contrary, thus much, at least, will
be here found, not taken for granted, but proved, that any
reasonable man, who will thoroughly consider the matter,
may be as much assured, as he is of his own being, that it
is not, however, so clear a case, that there is nothing in it.
There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth ; but it is
certain no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied
of the contrary. And the practical consequence to be drawn
from this is not attended to by every one who is concerned
in it.
INTRODUCTION
§ i. Probable evidence, from lowest to highest, is
matter of degree.
"OKOBABLE evidence is essentially distinguished from
£ demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees ; and of
all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the
very lowest presumption. We cannot indeed say a thing
is probably true upon one very slight presumption for it ;
because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a
question, there may be some against it : and though there
be not, yet a slight presumption does not beget that degree
of conviction, which is implied in saying a thing is probably
true.
§ 2. Presumption is admissible ; may be small, or may
rise to moral certainty.
But that the slightest possible presumption is of the
nature of a probability, appears from hence ; that such low
presumption, often repeated, will amount even to moral
certainty. Thus a man's having observed the ebb and flow
of the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though
the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow :
but the observation of this event for so many days, and
months, and ages together, as it has been observed by man-
kind, gives us a full assurance that it will.
B 2
4 INTRODUCTION [§ 3
§ 3. Probability means some likeness to observed
truth or fact.
That which chiefly constitutes probability is expressed in
the word likely, i. e. like some truth a, or true event ; like
it, in itself, in its evidence, in some more or fewer of its
circumstances. For when we determine a thing to be pro-
bably true, suppose that an event has or will come to pass,
it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some
other event, which we have observed has come to pass.
And this observation forms, in numberless daily instances,
a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event
has or will come to pass ; according as the observation is,
that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or
always so far as our observation reaches, come to pass at
like distances of time, or place, or upon like occasions.
Hence arises the belief, that a child, if it lives twenty years,
will grow up to the stature and strength of a man ; that
food will contribute to the preservation of its life, and the
want of it for such a number of days, be its certain destruc-
tion. So likewise the rule and measure of our hopes and
fears concerning the success of our pursuits ; our expectations
that others will act so and so in such circumstances ; and
our judgment that such actions proceed from such prin-
ciples ; all these rely upon our having observed the like to
what we hope, fear, expect, judge ; I say upon our having
observed the like, either with respect to others or ourselves.
And thus, whereas the prince b who had always lived in
a warm climate, naturally concluded in the way of analogy,
that there was no such thing as water's becoming hard,
because he had always observed it to be fluid and yielding :
we, on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that there is no
presumption at all against this : that it is supposable there
may be frost in England any given day in January next ;
probable that there will on some day of the month ; and
tt Verisimile.
b The story is told by Mr. Locke in the chapter of Probability.
[Locke, On the Understanding, Bk. iv. c. 15, § 5.]
§§ 4, 5] INTRODUCTION 5
that there is a moral certainty, i. e. ground for an expecta-
tion without any doubt of it, in some part or other of the
winter.
§ 4. Is imperfect ; and deals ivith limited beings ;
yet is for us the guide of life.
Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an
imperfect kind of information ; and is to be considered
as relative only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing
which is the possible object of knowledge, whether past,
present, or future, can be probable to an infinite Intelli-
gence ; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it
is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But to us,
probability is the very guide of life1.
§ 5. Even on low probabilities, prudence binds to action.
From these things it follows, that in questions of diffi-
culty, or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory
1 Butler's doctrine of Proba- tency between the two ? The con-
bility may by some be considered science, in order that it may
commonplace. But Toland had legitimately command, requires
shortly before taught that in the the state of facts on which it has
absence of demonstration we ought to judge to be ascertained: and
to hold our judgments in suspense. this is ascertained for it by the
See Leslie Stephen, English Thought reason. But Butler's fundamental
in the Eighteenth Century, c. iii. 14. contention is, that probability
In his Place of Christ in Modern Theo- involves moral obligation ; and
logy, Dr. Fairbairn observes (p. n) the two powers deal with the
that Butler's Analogy drew more same process, but at diiferent
attention than his Sermons on stages.
Human Nature, and that < the This able author falls, I think,
fundamental inconsistency 'of the into a casual mistake, when he
supremacy of conscience with the holds that Butler borrowed his
doctrine of probability was never doctrine of probability from Locke,
perceived. In proof of the asser- But is it not the fact that Locke,
tion thus hazarded, Dr. Fairbairn in his Essay on the Understanding,
has supplied the statement that deals with probability (very ra-
the reason deals with probabilities tionally) as it stands apart from
which it analyses, whereas the moral obligation ; while Butler,
conscience commands; the first borrowing nothing from him, sim-
being an operation of the mental ply takes up the question at the
faculty, while the second is in the point where he had laid it down?
domain of religion (pp. 25, 26). (Locke, On the Understanding, Bk,
Is there any shadow of inconsis- iv. cc. 15, 16.)
6 INTRODUCTION [§ 6
evidence cannot be had, or is not seen ; if the result of
examination be, that there appears upon the whole, any
the lowest presumption on one side, and none on the
other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in
the lowest degree greater ; this determines the question,
even in matters of speculation ; and in matters of practice,
will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in
point of prudence and of interest1, to act upon that pre-
sumption or low probability, though it be so low as to
leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth.
For surely a man is as really bound in prudence to do
what upon the whole appears, according to the best of
his judgment, to be for his happiness, as what he certainly
knows to be so.
§ 6. Sometimes, thouyli the chances be less than even,
Nay further, in questions of great consequence, a reason-
able man will think it concerns him to remark lower
probabilities and presumptions than these ; such as amount
to no more than showing one side of a question to be as
supposable and credible as the other : nay, such as but amount
to much less even than this. For numberless instances
might be mentioned respecting the common pursuits of
life, where a man would be thought, in a literal sense,
distracted, who would not act, and with great application
too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much less2,
1 Butler has explained himself place of our destination is infested
elsewhere upon the nature of pru- by robbers, that a party had been
dence. See II. viii. 19, and espe- stopped in the precedingweek, and
cially Dissertation II. § 8 ; where, that the criminals had not been
after explaining the nature of discovered. But another road,
prudence, he goes on, 'it should nearly, though not quite, as coii-
seem that this is virtue, and the venient, was perfectly safe. The
contrary behaviour faulty and odds against our being molested
blamable.' in the first case might be slight, or
2 It is easy to provide illustra- might be (say) three or five to one ;
tions of what may at first view but every prudent person would
seem a paradox. Suppose that in such a case take the safe road,
with a journey in prospect we hear (Jomp. II. vi. 24.
that the ordinary road to the
§ 7] INTRODUCTION 7
and where the probability or chance was greatly against
his succeeding f%.
§ 7. Analogy lias weight in determining judgment,
and practice.
It is not my design to inquire further into the nature,
the foundation, and measure of probability; or whence
it proceeds that likeness should beget that presumption,
opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is
formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily
produce in every one ; or to guard against the errors, to
which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs
to the subject of Logic; and is a part of that subject
which has not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed
I shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent,
compass, and force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced
to general heads and rules; and the whole be formed
into a system. But though so little in this way has been
attempted by those who have treated of our intellectual
powers, and the exercise of them l ; this does not hinder
but that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured,
that analogy is of weight, in various degrees, towards
determining our judgment and our practice*. Nor does
e See Part II. c. vi.
1 This may seem to glance at perfect sort, which do not amount
Locke's discussion of probability, to strict inductions. But, accord-
referred to above, as inadequate. ing to his view, they differ from
a Butler passes from probability induction not so much in kind as
to analogy without describing the in degree.' We may perhaps say :
resemblance between them. to establish a sound analogy, the
Fitzgerald (Butler's Analogy, by resemblance of relations need not
William Fitzgerald, Dublin, 1849) be entire, but ought to be very
says (p. i), ' Analogy is properly substantive and marked,
the resemblance of relations'; and ' in Analogy then (i) is not demon-
the common use of modern meta- strative, but probable ; (2) is not
physical writers, is uted to express to be predicated of mere quantity,
such arguments from resemblance It would mislead were we to say
as fall short of full proof.' And there was an analogy between the
he cites Mill (Logic, ii. 97, 98), do- relation of one foot to two feet, and
scribing Butler : ' The analogies, that of one pound to two pounds,
with which his argument deals, For the relation is absolutely
arc, indeed, in general, of that im- identical. We may perhaps adopt
8 INTRODUCTION [§ 8
it in any wise cease to be of weight in those cases, because
persons, either given to dispute, or who require things
to be stated with greater exactness than our faculties
appear to admit of in practical matters, may find other
cases in which it is not easy to say, whether it be, or be
not, of any weight ; or instances of seeming analogies,
which are really of none. It is enough to the present
purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is
evidently natural, just, and conclusive. For there is no
man can make a question, but that the sun will rise
to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the
figure of a circle, and not in that of a square.
§ 8. From difficulties in nature, Origen infers a likelihood
of similar difficulties in scripture.
Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen d has
with singular sagacity observed, that he who believes the
scripture to have proceeded from him who is the Author of
nature, may ivell expect to find the same sort of difficulties
in it, as are found in the constitution of nature \ And in
d Xprj (j.€V TOI 7€ TUV ct7ra£ irapa5(£afi(vov rov KTIOO.VTOS T^V Koafnov dvat
Tairray TOS ypa<pa.s irfirfiffOai, on oaa irepl TTJS Kriafus dnavra rots farovai
TOV irtpl avrrjs \6yov, ravra /cat ircpl TUV ypcupwv. Philocal. p. 23, cd. Cant.
Fitzgerald's definition thus modi- But, if Berkeley contains the
fied : analogy is the resemblance of germ of Butler, the passage from
qualitative relations. Fitzgerald refers Origen, which Butler himself so
us to Coplestone's Four Discourses, prominently alleges, contains the
and to Whately's Rhetoric, I. iii. 7. main substance of the striking
1 Fitzgerald (Life of Butter, pp. passage from Berkeley. Origen
xxxviii, xlii) quotes the following supplied in all likelihood the mi-
passage from Berkeley's Minute nute *seed, from which grew the
Philosopher, with the observation tree of the Analogy. But there
that it clearly contains the germ of can be little doubt that though
the whole argument of the A nalogy. the Minute Philosopher (1732) ap-
' It will be sufficient, if such peared four years before the
analogy appears between the dis- Analogy (1736), the mind of Butler
p,ensations of grace and nature, had been occupied, arid his subject
as may make it probable (although in hand, for a much longer period ;
much should be unaccountable in probably from the date (1726^, or
both) to suppose them derived soon after the date, of the publica-
from the same Author, and the tion of the Sermons,
workmanship of one and the same (Origen's observation.) 'This
hand.' sagacious remark is strangely mis-
§ 9] INTRODUCTION 9
a like way of reflection it may be added, that lie who denies
the scripture to have been from God upon account of these
difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny the world
to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if there
be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and
dispensation of Providence, which revelation informs us of,
and that system of things and dispensation of Providence,
which experience together with reason informs us of, i. e.
the known course of nature ; this is a presumption, that
they have both the same author and cause ; at least so far
as to answer objections against the former's being from God,
drawn from any thing which is analogical or similar to what
is in the latter, which is acknowledged to be from him ; for
an Author of nature is here supposed.
§ 9. Facts, ivith reasons, give the only just basis for
inference from the known to the less knotvn.
Forming our notions of the constitution and govern-
ment of the world upon reasoning, without foundation for
the principles which we assume, whether from the attri-
butes of God, or any thing else, is building a world upon
hypothesis, like Descartes1. Forming our notions upon
applied by Origen to the estab- bus, quaedam quidem absolvamus
lishmeiit of one of his favourite secundum gratiam Dei, quaedam
theories, that there is a mystical autem commendemus Deo, et non
meaning in every word and even solum in hoc seculo, sed et in
letter of scripture. As a ground future' (Adv. Haer. ii. 47, p. 203).
for his analogy, he assumes that Fitzgerald.
the words of scripture are the work 1 He, says Mr. L. Stephen, deter-
of God, in the same sense as mined the starting-point of much
nature ; or that scripture is, in English speculation. It was theo-
his own phrase, Ofoni/fvcrros ^XPL logical. Questioning all which he
TOV TVX^VTOS 7/>a/tytaros.' Fitz- thought could be doubted, he as-
gerald. sumed the certainty of what he
St. Irenaeus, after adducing in- thought could not. Self- attesting
stances of strange and unaccount- innate ideas were discoverable in
able things in the economy of the the mind (English Thought, i. 9).
world, proceeds : ' Si ergo et in The movements of the world and
rebus creaturae quaedam quidem the heavens he considered to be
adjacent Deo, quaedam autem et due to tourbillons or vortices, the
in nostram venerunt scientiam, spring of which were to be found
quid mali est, si et eorum, quae in in the earth as the centre of the
Scripturis requirantur, universis solarsystem, and in the fixed stars.
Scripturis spiritualibus exisstenti- This scheme it is which Butler
10 INTRODUCTION [§ 10
reasoning from principles which are certain, but applied
to cases to which we have no ground to apply them, (like
those who explain the structure of the human body, and the
nature of diseases and medicines from mere mathematics
without sufficient data,) is an error much akin to the former:
since what is assumed in order to make the reasoning appli-
cable, is hypothesis. But it must be allowed just, to join
abstract reasonings with the observation of facts, and argue
from such facts as are known, to others that are like them ;
from that part of the divine government over intelligent
creatures which comes under our view, to that larger and
more general government over them which is beyond it ;
and from what is present, to collect what is likely, credible,
or not incredible, will be hereafter.
§ 10. Postulating a natural Governor of the world, lie
ivill argue thence for religion.
This method * then of concluding and determining being
practical, and what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act
upon in the common pursuits of life ; being evidently con-
clusive, in various degrees, proportionable to the degree and
exactness of the whole analogy or likeness ; and having so
great authority2 for its introduction into the subject of
religion, even revealed religion ; my design is to apply it
to that subject in general, both natural and revealed : taking
for proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and
natural Governor of the world. For as there is no pre-
sumption against this prior to the proof of it : so it has
been often proved with accumulated evidence ; from this
argument of analogy and final causes ; from abstract reason-
ings ; from the most ancient tradition and testimony ; and
from the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear,
so far as I can find, to be denied by the generality of those
seems to have in view (Biogr. general government 'contemplated
Universelle, vi. 150). by natural and revealed religion.
1 Viz. of proceeding in argu- a For example, John iii. 12: 'If
ment from facts known, that is to I have told you earthly things,
say, the constitution and course and ye believe not, how shall ye
of nature, to those unknown, believe, if I tell you of heavenly
namely ' the larger and more things.? '
§ „] INTRODUCTION "
who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence of
religion.
§ ii. Some build up world-systems of imagined optimism.
As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what
is in fact the constitution of nature, form their notions of
God's government upon hypothesis : so there are others,
who indulge themselves in vain and idle speculations, how
the world might possibly have been framed otherwise than
it is • and upon supposition that things might, in imagining
that they should, have been disposed and carried on after
a better model, than what appears in the present disposition
and conduct of them1. Suppose now a person of such
a turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, till he had at
length fixed upon some particular plan of nature, as appearing
to him the best, One shall scarce be thought guilty of
detraction against human understanding, if one should say,
even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person
would fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men,
probably would not be the very best, even according to his
own notions of lest ; whether he thought that to be so, which
afforded occasions and motives for the exercise of the great-
est virtue, or which was productive of the greatest happiness,
or that these two were necessarily connected, and run up
into one and the same plan. However, it may not be amiss
once for all to see, what would be the amount of these
emendations and imaginary improvements upon the system of
nature, or how far they would mislead us. And it seems there
could be no stopping, till we came to some such conclusions
- as these : that all creatures should at first be made as perfect
and as happy as they were capable of ever being : that nothing,
to be sure, of hazard or danger should be put upon them to
do ; some indolent persons would perhaps think nothing at
all : or certainly, that effectual care should be taken, that
they should, whether necessarily or not, yet eventually and
in fact, always do what was right and most conducive to
i ' I suppose that Butler had ehaeus, Origen, Paulicians), Fitz-
Baylc particularly in his eye in gerald.
this passage ' (jsee Crit. Diet., Mani-
12 INTRODUCTION [§ 12
happiness, which would be thought easy for infinite power
to effect ; either by not giving them any principles which
would endanger their going wrong ; or by laying the right
motive of action in eveiy instance before their minds con-
tinually in so strong a manner, as would never fail of
inducing them to act conformably to it : and that the whole
method of government by punishments should be rejected
as absurd ; as an awkward roundabout method of carrying
things on ; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose, for
which it would be supposed creatures were made, namely,
happiness.
§ 12. But, even if agreed as to ends, we are incompetent
judges of means.
Now, without considering what is to be said in particular
to the several parts of this train of folly and extravagance ;
what has been above intimated, is a full direct general answer
to it, namely, that we may see beforehand that we have not
faculties for this kind of speculation. For though it be
admitted, that, from the first principles of our nature, we
unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be absolutely
in themselves preferable to others, and that the ends now
mentioned, or if they run up into one, that this one is abso-
lutely the best ; and consequently that we must conclude
the ultimate end designed, in the constitution of nature and
conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and happiness
possible : yet we are far from being able to judge what parti-
cular disposition of things would be most friendly and
assistant to virtue ; or what means might be absolutely
necessaiy to produce the most happiness in a system of
such extent as our own world may be, taking in all that
is past and to come, though we should suppose it detached
from the whole of things1. Indeed we are so far from
being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what
1 This is possibly a first glimpse exceeding in an unknown degree
given us of an idea rooted in the breadth of the stage on which
Butler's philosophical specula- they are visibly carried on. See
tions, that the operations of this inf. c. iii. 26, 28.
world are of an eventual scope
§§ i3, 14] INTRODUCTION 13
may be the necessary means of raising and conducting one
person to the highest perfection and happiness of his nature.
Nay, even in the little affairs of the present life, we find men
of different educations and ranks are not competent judges of
the conduct of each other.
§ 13. E. g., as an end, that virtue must be happiness,
and vice misery, for us all,
Our whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection
to God, and to deny all imperfection of him. And this will
for ever be a practical proof of his moral character, to such
as will consider what a practical proof is ; because it is the
voice of God speaking in us. And from hence we conclude,
that virtue must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of
every creature ; and that regularity and order and right
cannot but prevail finally in a universe under his govern-
ment '. But we are in no sort judges, what are the
necessary means of accomplishing this end.
§ 14. Will build on the experienced conduct of nature
to intelligent creatures.
Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent
employment of forming imaginary models of a world, and
schemes of governing it, turn our thoughts to what we
experience to be the conduct of nature with respect to
intelligent creatures ; which may be resolved into general
laws or rules of administration, in the same way as many of
the laws of nature respecting inanimate matter may be
collected from experiments. And let us compare the known
constitution and course of things with what is said to be the
moral system of nature ; the acknowledged dispensations of
Providence, or that government which we find ourselves
under, with what religion teaches us to believe and expect ;
and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece.
1 It must not be supposed that able supposition, sustained by our
this final triumph dispenses with experience, that the inequalities
all rendering of account for the of that period will be subservient
period which precedes it. We to the purposes of discipline in
have here to introduce the reason- the improvement of characters.
14 INTRODUCTION [§§ 15, 16
And upon such a comparison it will, I think, be found, that
they are very much so : that both may be traced up to the
same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of
divine conduct.
§ 15. And so vindicate both religion and its evidences.
The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty
large extent, and consists of several parts, in some, more, in
others, less, exact. In some few instances perhaps it may
amount to a real practical proof ; in others not so. Yet in
these it is a confirmation of what is proved other ways. It
will undeniably show, what too many want to have shown
them, that the system of religion, both natural and revealed,
considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it, is
not a subject of ridicule, unless that of nature be so too. And
it will afford an answer to almost all objections against the
system both of natural and revealed religion ; though not
perhaps an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very con-
siderable degree an answer to the objections against the
evidence of it : for objections against a proof, and objections
against what is said to be proved, the reader will observe are
different things.
§ 1 6. Chapter of summaries : Religion, (a) Natural,
in five heads; (b) Revealed, in six*lieads^.
Now the divine government of the world, implied in the
notion of religion in general and of Christianity, contains in
1 See note on I. ii. 4. Here we have a summary : —
Natural Religion. Revealed Religion.
1. A future life, I. i. i. Sin, ruin, and a blinded sense,
2. Of reward and punishment, required a further plan, II. i.
I. ii. 2. Proved by miracles, II. ii.
3. For good and evil conduct, 3. Contents partly strange and
I. iii. unexpected, II. iii.
4. This life a probation, I. iv. 4. Constituting a scheme or
5. And discipline, I. v. system, II. iv.,
5. Worked by the Messiah for
[Objection of Necessity, I. vi. our recovery, II. v.
Scheme known only in part, I. 6. Partially revealed and with
vii.] partial evidence, II. vi, vii.
§ i7] INTRODUCTION 15
it ; that mankind is appointed to live in a future state e ;
that there every one shall be rewarded or punished f; re-
warded or punished respectively for all that behaviour here,
which we comprehend under the words, virtuous or vicious,
morally good or evil s : that our present life is a probation,
a state of trial h, and of discipline *, for that future one ;
notwithstanding the objections, which men may fancy they
have, from notions of necessity, against there being any such
moral plan as this at all k ; and whatever objections may
appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it
stands so imperfectly made known to us at present1 : that
this wrorld being in a state of apostasy and wickedness, and
consequently of ruin, and the sense both of their condition
and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, this gave
occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence ; of
the utmost importance m ; proved by miracles n ; but con-
taining in it many things appearing to us strange and not
to have been expected ° ; a dispensation of Providence,
which is a scheme or system of things P ; carried on by the
mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the
recovery of the world fi ; yet not revealed to all men, nor
proved with the strongest possible evidence to all those to
whom it is revealed ; but only to such a part of mankind,
and with such particular evidence as the wrisdom of God
thought fif.
§ 17. Will show that both rest on analogies from the
constitution and course of nature.
The design then of the following Treatise will be to
show, that the several parts principally objected against
in this moral and Christian dispensation, including its
scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has
afforded us of its truth ; that the particular parts prin-
cipally objected against in this whole dispensation, are
11 Ch. iv.
P Ch. iv.
* Part I. Ch. i.
f Ch. ii.
* Ch. iii.
1 Ch. v.
k Ch. vi.
1 Ch. vii.
m Part II. Ch. i.
" Ch. ii.
0 Ch. iii.
i Ch. v.
r Ch. vi, vii.
1 6 INTRODUCTION
analogous to what is experienced in the constitution and
course of nature, or Providence ; that the chief objections
themselves which are alleged against the former, are no
other than what may be alleged with like justness against
the latter, where they are found in fact to be inconclusive * ;
and that this argument from analogy is in general unanswer-
able, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion s,
notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against
it, and the real ground which there may be for difference of
opinion, as to the particular degree of weight which is to
be laid upon it. This is a general account of what may
be looked for in the following Treatise. And I shall
begin it with that which is the foundation of all our
hopes and of all our fears ; all our hopes and fears, which
are of any consideration ; I mean a future life.
• Part II. Ch. viii.
1 It is charged by some against it will be observed that, on the
Butler, that he leaves ' the course contrary, even in this contracted
of nature, or Providence,' to meet summary he inserts the express
unprotected the storm of objec- proviso on its behalf, conveyed in
tioiis carried over to it from Reli- the words ' where they are found
gion, which he has in a manner in fact to be inconclusive.' Comp.
exonerated by the transfer. But I. vii. 3.
THK
ANALOGY OF RELIGION ;
TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE
PART I
OF NATURAL RELIGION
CHAPTER I1.
OF A FUTUKE LIFE.
§ i. Let experience test for us the probable effect
of death.
STRANGE difficulties have been raised by some con-
cerning personal identity, or the sameness of living
agents, implied in the notion of our existing now and
hereafter, or in any two successive moments ; which whoever
1 If we set out from the sentence principal hopes and fears, so that
in which Origen has supplied the without it men will not cross the
basis of the Analogy, the natural threshold of this inquiry,
order of the subject would pro- 2. That it had been darkened
bably suggest dealing with the and, so to speak, intercepted, by
phenomena and experience of life speculations then fresh in the
before considering those of death. public mind respecting personal
But the author seems to have identity, a subject lying at the
given precedence to this subject root of the doctrine. (See Locke,
on the special'and double grounds: On the Understanding, II. xxvii. 10.)
i. That the doctrine of a future He however hereby exposed
life is the foundation of all our himself to these inconveniences :
VOL. I. C
i8
OF A FUTURE LIFE
[I.I.
thinks it worth while, may see considered in the first
Dissertation at the end of this Treatise. But without
regard to any of them here, let us consider what the
analogy of nature, and the several changes which we have
undergone, and those which we know we may undergo
without being destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which
death may, or may not, have upon us ; and whether it
(i) That death rather hides than
exhibits the course of nature with
respect to our condition, by shut-
ting off all the evidence of what
follows, so that his argument
works at a disadvantage from
scantiness of material in a nar-
rowed field. (2) That a chapter
purporting to treat ' of a future
life ' seemed to promise a full
discussion of the subject ; whereas
hero the author is confined to a
very partial treatment, and does
not, indeed cannot, present at
all the great moral argument in
favour of our survival, while the
general doctrine of the natural
immortality of the soul (on which
he reserves his opinion) seems to
have no natural place in the dis-
cussion, as it is not derived from
the ' constitution and course of
nature.'
Hence there may arise with
some a sense of disappointment
with the contents of the chapter,
which may perhaps be removed
or mitigated if we bear steadily
in mind that the author was con-
fined by the conditions of his
work to a closely limited and
partial investigation. He has to
leave aside all moral arguments
whatever : and the sum of what
he can do is to rebut adverse
presumptions drawn from the ex-
tinction of our sensuous life ; to
marshal such favourable pre-
sumptions as he can gather from
certain observed facts, while not
venturing to lay great stress
upon them ; and to give as the
main considerations in his favour,
the incapacity of death to destroy
perhaps the corporeal but certainly
the mental life, and the argument
from continuance. Now that last
argument in favour of survival
assumes a great strength when
we can take our stand upon the
moral incompleteness of our
present existence. But this is
for the present a forbidden topic ;
and, in connection with merely
physical considerations, the con-
tention seems hardly corroborated
enough to bear our laying any
very great stress upon it.
On the whole it may seem that
the best mode of conceiving But-
ler's attitude is to treat the two
heads of argument as one ; and
to put it thus. Considering the
disproof which has been given
of any power possessed by death
to destroy mental (and, it might
have been added, still more to
destroy moral) qualities, and find-
ing these indestructible qualities
now actually embodied in a living
subject, it is strictly rational, on
grounds quite apart from religion,
to suggest the survival of that
subject after the change brought
about by death, as at least a mat-
ter of high probability.
Angus (p. 19), citing Chalmers
in aid, observes that while this
chapter cannot be taken as sup-
plying an affirmative proof of the
future life, it is triumphant in the
confutation of objections. Observe
Butler's own claim in § 32.
§§ 2, 3] OF A FUTURE LIFE 19
be not from thence probable, that we may survive this
change, and exist in a future state of life and perception.
§ 2. In us and in other creatures identity survives
great changes.
[I.] From our being born into the present world in
the helpless imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived
from thence to mature age, :we find it to be a general
law of nature in our own species, that the same creatures,
the same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and
perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and
suffering, in one period of their being, greatly different
from those appointed them in another period of it. And
in other creatures the same law holds. For the difference
of their capacities and states of life at their birth (to go
no higher) and in maturity ; the change of worms into
flies, and the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers
by such change : and birds and insects bursting the shell
of their habitation, and by this means entering into a new
world, furnished with new accommodations for them, and
finding a new sphere of action assigned them ; these are
instances of this general law of nature. Thus all the
various and wonderful transformations of animals are to
be taken into consideration here l.
§ 3. Death may be no greater.
But the states of life in which we ourselves existed
formerly in the womb and in our infancy, ara almost
1 Fitzgerald observes that in his may be l almost,' if not altogether,
comparison of states Butler does as great.
not allow for the fact that death Butler is not here dealing with
differs from the others in seeming any objection to a future life
to deprive us. wholly of bodily or- which may be grounded on the
ganisation. On the other hand, phenomenon of death, but only
in the womb we are entirely de- dealing with the novelty of that
prived of any medium in which state to which it may be intro-
to act ; and Butler's comparison ducingus. Death seems to suggest
is one not rigid, but only general. that, if there be a future state, it
It is conceivable that the death- must be very foreign to the present
state may be found to differ from state. It seems legitimate to reply
known life-states, only in such by showing that even within the
a way that the differences be- known limits of existence it ad-
tween one life-state and another mits of enormous diversities.
C 2
20 OF A FUTURE LIFE [l. I.
as different from our present in mature age, as it is
possible to conceive any two states or degrees of life can
be. Therefore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state
as different (suppose) from our present, as this is from
our former, is but according to the analogy of nature ;
according to a natural order or appointment of the very
same kind, with what we have already experienced.
§ 4. Unless it lias a power to destroy, continuance
after it is to be presumed.
[II.] We know we are endued with capacities of action,
of happiness and misery : for we are conscious of acting,
of enjoying pleasure and suffering pain. Now that we
have these powers and capacities before death, is a pre-
sumption that we shall retain them through and after
death ; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to
act upon, 'unless there be some positive reason to think
that death is the destruction of those living powers 1 :
because there is in every case a probability, that all things
will continue as we experience they are, in all respects,
except those in which we have some reason to think they
will be altered. This is that kind0- of presumption or
ft I say kind of presumption or probability ; for I do not mean to
attirm that there is the same degree of conviction, that our living powers
will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will.
1 Dr. Eagar, one of the most the living powers and the bodily
recent writers on the Analogy, and organs. But in § 23 he points
in general a supporter of itsargu- out that the living powers do not
nieiits, holds that this chapter is depend upon the body ' in the
( out of tune with present know- manner' in which perception by
ledge ' : which he explains by our organs of sense does. And
saying that no one would now Dr. Eagar goes on to show (p. 105)
suggest that our reflective powers that the physical changes in the
' might be independent ' of our brain which accompany the act
physical organs (Butler's Analogy of perception 'are yet different
and Modern Thought, c. iv. p. 102). from it,' and to adopt Butler's
The assertion is one which Butler own language, 'we see with our
has nowhere made. The word is eyes as with glasses.' The verbal
indeed, on account of its am- surrender of Butler's argument
biguity, altogether unsuitable. He appears to be a pure mistake,
continually recognises in various See further on §§ 10 and 14.
forms the near relation between
§ 4] OF A FUTURE LIFE 21
probability from analogy, expressed in the very word con-
tinuancc, which seems our only natural reason for believing
the course of the world will continue to-morrow, as it has
done so far as our experience or knowledge of history can
carry us back l. Nay, it seems our only reason for believing,
that any one substance now existing will continue to exist
a moment longer ; the self-existent substance only excepted.
Thus if men were assured that the unknown event, death,
was not the destruction of our faculties of perception and
of action, there would be no apprehension, that any other
power or event unconnected with this of death, would
destroy these faculties just at the instant of each creature's
death ; and therefore no doubt but that they would remain
after it : which shows the high probability that our living-
powers will continue after death, unless there be some
ground to think that death is their destruction b. For,
if it would be in a manner certain that we should sur-
vive death, provided it were certain that death would not
be our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall
survive it, if there be no ground to think death will be
our destruction.
b Destruction of living powers is a manner of expression unavoidably
ambiguous ; and may signify either the destruction of
a living being, so as that the same living being shall be ^istina^sh destruc-
tion absolute from
uncapable of ever perceiving or achng again at all : or the destruction of pre-
destruction of those means and instruments ly which it is scnf con(Hfions
capable of its present life, of its present state of perception
and of action. It is here used in the former sense. When it is used in
the latter, the epithet present is added. The loss of a man's eye is a
destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason
to think the destruction of living powers, in the former sense, to be
possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with
living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to
believe that a stone ever acquires them.
1 Continuance, however, only plished in full, the continuance
raises this presumption in connec- of its existence until the full
tion with purpose ; and while the accomplishment may be reason-
purpose for which the substance ably presumed. See note on
exists remains not yet accom- § i.
22 OF A FUTURE LIFE [I. I.
§ 5. Mere apprehension to the contrary is of
no ivcight.
Now though I think it must be acknowledged, that
prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life
commonly insisted upon, there would arise a general con-
fused suspicion, that in the great shock and alteration
which we shall undergo by death, we, i. e. our living
powers, might be wholly destroyed ; yet even prior to
those proofs, there is really no particular distinct ground
or reason for this apprehension at all, so far as I can find.
If there be, it must arise either from the reason of the thine/,
or from the analogy of nature.
§ 6. (a) In the reason of the thine/ ; for death docs not
suggest the destruction of the living agent.
But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that
death is the destruction of living agents, because we know
not at all what death is in itself ; but only some of its effects,
such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones. And
these effects do in no wise appear to imply the destruction
of a living agent. And besides, as we are greatly in the
dark, upon what the exercise of our living powers depends,
so we are wholly ignorant what the powers themselves
depend upon ; the powers themselves as distinguished,
not only from their actual exercise, but also from the
present capacity of exercising them ; and as opposed to
their destruction : for sleep, or however a swoon, shows
us, not only that these powers exist when they are not
exercised, as the passive power of motion does in inanimate
matter ; but shows also that they exist, when there is no
present capacity of exercising them : or that the capacities
of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual
exercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers
themselves remain undestroyed. Since then we know not
at all upon what the existence of our living powers depends,
this shows further, there can 110 probability be collected
from the reason of the thing, that death will be their
destruction : because their existence may depend upon
§§ 5-8] OF A FUTURE LIFE 23
somewhat in no degree affected by death ; upon somewhat
quite out of the reach of this king of terrors '. So that
there is nothing more certain, than that the reason of the tiling
shows us no connection between death, and the destruction
of living agents.
§ 7. Or (b) in the analogy of nature. It destroys
only the sensible proof of living powers.
Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole analogy
of nature, to afford us even the slightest presumption, that
animals ever lose their living powers ; much less, if it were
possible, that they lose them by death : for we have no
faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or through it, so
as to see what becomes of them. This event removes them
from our view. It destroys the sensible proof, which we
had before their death, of their being possessed of living
powers, but does not appear to afford the least reason to
believe that they are, then, or by that event, deprived
of them.
§ 8. Eepeats arguments of §§ 3 and 4.
And our knowing, that they were possessed of these
powers, up to the very period to which we have faculties
capable of tracing them, is itself a probability of their
retaining them, beyond it. And this is confirmed, and
a sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very
great and astonishing changes which we have experienced ;
so great, that our existence in another state of life, of per-
ception and of action, will be but according to a method
of providential conduct, the like to which has been already
exercised even with regard to ourselves ; according to
a course of nature, the like to which we have already
gone through.
1 We have also probable evi- we know to be affected by death,
dence that their existence does Inf. §§ 14, 16, 29.
not depend upon any thing that
24 OF A FUTURE LIFE [I. I.
§ 9. Warning anainst trespasses of flic imagination \
However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how
difficult it is to silence imagination enough to make the
voice of reason even distinctly heard in this case ; as we
are accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge that forward
delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere ; of some
assistance indeed to apprehension, but the author of all
error : as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude con-
ceptions of things, taking for granted that we are acquainted
with, what indeed we are wholly ignorant of : it may be
proper to consider the imaginary presumptions, that death
will be our destruction, arising from these kinds of early
and lasting prejudices ; and to show how little they can
really amount to, even though we cannot wholly divest
ourselves of them. And,
§ 10. Such apprehension (c) is futile, iinless the liviny
ac/ent be disccrptibk : which it seems not to le.
[I.] All presumption of death's being the destruction of
living beings, must go upon supposition that they are com-
pounded ; and so, discerptible 2. But since consciousness is
1 Butler appears here to charge physiological theory, which np-
upon the imagination all the er- pears to go far in supporting the
ratic whims and fancies of the ideas propounded here and in
brain. These no doubt are regard- § 14. * In the highly organised
less of evidence, and apt, too, to multicellular being, most of the.se
palm themselves upon us as if cells are what are called somatic
they were fact. But imagination cells, i.e. cells that are continually
proper is totally different, and beingchangedandreplacedduring
knows itself to be a denixen of life, whose persistence is not ne-
a world different from the world c-essary to the life of the being,
of fact, and unsuited to masquer- But the cell, that has brought
ad ing in any character other than life, is of a different kind. It is
its own. It seems necessary to never replaced, and never loses
make these allowances in con- itslife. Thecellof the unicellular
sidering the passage. In imagin- animal is of this kind, a genn-ceJI.
ation proper it would appear that From the nature of the case it
Butler was by no means wanting, can have no somatic cells' (Eagar,
if we may judge from the mode p. in). I need hardly add that
in which he treats the subject of these words are quoted by way of
beauty, referring it as he does to illustration only.
fixed principles. See Serm.xi.ai. As regards the text, we must
2 Dr. Eagar refers us to a modern closely observe its terms. This
§§9-n] OF A FUTURE LIFE 25
a single and indivisible power, it should seem that the
subject in which it resides must be so too. For were the
motion of any particle of matter absolutely one and in-
divisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose
part of this motion to exist, and part not to exist, i. e. part
of this matter to move, and part to be at rest ; then its
power of motion would be indivisible ; and so also would
the subject in which the power inheres, namely, the particle
of matter : for if this could be divided into two, one part
might be moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to
the supposition. In like manner it has been argued c, and,
for any thing appearing to the contrary, justly, that since
the perception or consciousness, which we have of our own
existence, is indivisible, so as that it is a contradiction to
suppose one part of it should be here and the other there ;
the perceptive power, or the power of consciousness, is
indivisible too : and consequently the subject in which it
resides ; i. e. the conscious being.
§ ii. And, if not, the 'body is mere foreign matter,
without nisus towards destroying its.
Now upon supposition that living agent each man calls
himself, is thus a single being, which there is at least no
more difficulty in conceiving than in conceiving it to be
a compound, and of which there is the proof now mentioned ;
it follows, that our organized bodies are no more ourselves
or part of ourselves, than any other matter around us. And
0 See Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.
is not an argument to prove the dissolution of the soul, considered
immortality of the soul ; but only as natural processes, nothing
to show that no presumption of whatever ? But Butler is not
its mortality arises out of the fact made responsible by what he has
of death, unless the soul be dis- written for Clarke's doctrine. It
cerptibie, and therefore material. is indivisibility on which he
The passage then does not seek to argues ; and so he escapes the
rule the question of the soul's association with matter which
immortality. May it not be truly attaches to the word < indiscerp-
said, that of the growth and dis- tible/
solution of the body we know On the Natural Immortality of
a little, but of the generation and the Soul, see wf. §§ 21, 31.
26 OF A FUTURE LIFE [I. I.
it is as easy to conceive, how matter, which is no part of
ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the manner which
our present bodies are ; as how we can receive impressions
from, and have power over any matter. It is as easy to
conceive, that we may exist out of bodies, as in them ; that
we might have animated bodies of any other organs and
senses wholly different from these now given us, and that
we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies
variously modified and organized ; as to conceive how we
can animate such bodies as our present '. And lastly, the
dissolution of all these several organized bodies, supposing
ourselves to have successively animated them, would have
no more conceivable tendency to destroy the living beings
ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of
perception and of action, than the dissolution of any foreign
matter, which we are capable of receiving impressions from,
and making use of for the common occasions of life 2.
§ 12. Observation liketvise proves the lody to le no
part of ourselves.
[II.] The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living
agent cannot indeed, from the nature of the thing, be
properly proved by experimental observations. But as
these fall in with the supposition of its unity, so they
plainly lead us to conclude certainly, that our gross organized
bodies, with which we perceive the objects of sense, and
1 This appears a hazardous as- the N. T. to be in bodies ; and the
sertion. May it not even be asked language of St. Paul (2 Cor. xii.
whether the human faculties have 2) : ' whether in the body, or out
ever yet fully conceived an exis- of the body, I cannot tell.'
tence living and active, and yet 2 The impressions from other
wholly discharged from body ? It foreign matter are upon the ex-
is of course, another question terior organs of the body. But
whether there may not actually these organs, we now know, trans-
be existence under such con- mit tidings to the brain, and there
ditions. the body has communications
In Dante the spirits cast no with the soul, as to which we
shadow from the sun, yet are, know that there is nothing similar
as in all other points, absolutely in the contact of ordinary matter,
visible in shapes. Compare the though their nature remains
case of the anxiety of demons in wholly inscrutable to us.
§§ 12-14] OF A FUTURE LIFE 27
with which we act, are no part of ourselves l ; and therefore
show us, that we have no reason to believe their destruction
to be ours : even without determining whether our living
substances be material or immaterial. For we see by ex-
perience, that men may lose their limbs, their organs of
sense, and even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet
remain the same living agents. And persons can trace up
the existence of themselves to a time, when the bulk of
their bodies was extremely small, in comparison of what it
is in mature age : and we cannot but think, that they might
then have lost a considerable part of that small body, and
yet have remained the same living agents ; as they may
now lose great part of their present body, and remain so.
§ 13. As does the fluxion of its particles.
And it is certain, that the bodies of all animals are in
a constant flux, from that never-ceasing attrition, which
there is in every part of them. Now things of this kind
unavoidably teach us to distinguish, between these living
agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in which
we are very nearly interested : since these may be alienated,
and actually are in a daily course of succession, and changing
their owners ; whilst we are assured, that each living agent
remains one and the same permanent being d. And this
general observation leads us on to the following ones.
§ 14. Unless the living agent be bulkier than the atom,
no presumption against its survival.
First, That we have no way of determining by experience,
what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls
himself : and yet, till it be determined that it is larger in
d See Dissertation I.
1 In scripture, the body is in- Butler's assertion we must confine
deed our ' tabernacle ' : but it is it strictly to that which indeed
also the temple of the Holy he is arguing upon, namely, the
Ghost (i Cor. vi. 19), and we are present and natural body as dis-
formed of body, soul, and spirit tinct from the future and spiritual
(i Thess. v. 23). To warrant body.
28 OF A FUTURE LIFE [I. I.
bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter, which
there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve,
there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution
of it, of the living being, even though it should not be
absolutely indiscerptible.
§ 15. If our bodies be not the ego, no ground to think
any other matter is.
Secondly, From our being so nearly related to and
interested in certain systems of matter, suppose our flesh
and bones, and afterwards ceasing to be at all related to
them, the living agents ourselves remaining all this
while undestroyed notwithstanding such alienation; and
consequently these systems of matter not being ourselves :
it follows further, that we have no ground to conclude
any other, suppose internal systems of matter, to be the
living agents ourselves ; because we can have no ground
to conclude this, but from our relation to and interest
in such other systems of matter : and therefore we can
have no reason to conclude, what befalls those systems
of matter at death, to be the destruction of the living
agents. We have already several times over lost a great
part or perhaps the whole of our body, according to certain
common established laws of nature ; yet we remain the
same living agents : when we shall lose as great a part,
or the whole, by another common established law of nature,
death ; why may we not also remain the same ? That the
alienation has been gradual in one case, and in the other
will be more at once, does not prove any thing to the
contrary. We have passed undestroyed through those
many and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly appro-
priated to us ourselves ; why should we imagine death will
be so fatal to us ?
§ 1 6. No proof that the original solid body, if any,
is affected by death1.
Nor can it be objected, that what is thus alienated or lost,
is no part of our original solid body, but only adventitious
1 See note on § 10.
§§ ip-n] OF A FUTURE LIFE 29
matter ; because we may lose entire limbs, which must have
contained many solid parts and vessels of the original body :
or if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that any of
these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though,
by the way, we are very nearly related to that extraneous or
adventitious matter, whilst it continues united to and dis-
tending the several parts of our solid body. But after all ;
the relation a person bears to those parts of his body, to
which he is the most nearly related ; what does it appear
to amount to but this, that the living agent, and those parts
of the body, mutually affect each other? And the same
thing, the same thing in kind though not in degree, may
be said of all foreign matter, which gives us ideas, and which
we have any power over. From these observations the
whole ground of the imagination is removed, that the dis-
solution of any matter, is the destruction of a living agent,
from the interest he once had in such matter.
§ 1 7. Like other instruments, our senses present objects,
lut do not perceive \
Thirdly, If we consider our body somewhat more dis-
tinctly, as made up of organs and instruments of perception
and of motion, it will bring us to the same conclusion.
Thus the common optical experiments show, and even the
observation how sight is assisted by glasses shows, that we
see with our eyes in the same sense as we see with glasses.
Nor is there any reason to believe, that we see with them
in any other sense ; any other, I mean, which would lead
us to think the eye itself a percipient. The like is to be
said of hearing : and our feeling distant solid matter by
means of somewhat in our hand, seems an instance of the
like kind, as to the subject we are considering. All these
are instances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of our
body, being instrumental in preparing objects for, and con-
veying them to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar
or like to the manner in which our organs of sense prepare
1 Plato, Alcibiacles, i. 51 : trtpov tTcpovapaavOpojirts Icm
apa (T/fVToro/io? KOI KtOapiarr)? x(iP^v TOV favrov.
Kal 6(pOa\nwv ols
30 OF A FUTURE LIFE [I. I.
and convey them. Both are in a like way instruments of
our receiving such ideas from external objects, as the Author
of nature appointed those external objects to be the occasions
of exciting in us. However, glasses are evidently instances
of this; namely of matter which is no part of our body,
preparing objects for and conveying them towards the per-
ceiving power, in like manner as our bodily organs do. And
if we see with our eyes only in the same manner as we do
with glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy,
of all our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing
here said, to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or
of perception by any other of our senses, can be traced
through all its steps, quite up to the living power of seeing,
or perceiving : but that so far as it can be traced by experi-
mental observations, so far it appears, that our organs of
sense prepare and convey on objects, in order to their being
perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, without
affording any shadow of appearance, that they themselves
perceive.
§ 18. We can (7™$-) part with them; and act, In dreams,
without them.
And that we have no reason to think our organs of sense
percipients, is confirmed by instances of persons losing some
of them, the living beings themselves, their former oc-
cupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the
experience of dreams ; by which we find we are at present
possessed of a latent, and, what would otherwise be, an
unimagined unknown power of perceiving sensible objects,
in as strong and lively a manner without our external
organs of sense as with them.
§ 19. Limbs are Instruments, and raise no presumption
of one dying with them.
So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing
motion by will and choice : upon the destruction of a limb,
this active power remains, as it evidently seems, unlessened ;
so as that the living being, who has suffered this loss, would
be capable of moving as before, if it had another limb to
§§ 18-20] OF A FUTURE LIFE 31
move with. It can walk by the help of an artificial leg ;
just as it can make use of a pole or a lever, to reach towards
itself and to move things, beyond the length and the power
of its natural arm : and this last it does in the same manner
as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things nearer
and of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance
of our limbs being endued with a power of moving or
directing themselves ; though they are adapted, like the
several parts of a machine, to be the instruments of motion
to each other ; and some parts of the same limb, to be
instruments of motion to other parts of it.
Thus a man determines, that he will look at such an
object through a microscope ; or being lame suppose, that
he will walk to such a place with a staff a week hence. His
eyes and his feet no more determine in these cases, than the
microscope and the staff. Nor is there any ground to think
they any more put the determination in practice ; or that
his eyes are the seers or his feet the movers, in any other
sense than as the microscope and the staff are. Upon the
whole then, our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly
instruments, which the living persons ourselves make use
of to perceive and move with : there is not any probability,
that they are any more ; nor consequently, that we have
any other kind of relation to them, than what we may have
to any other foreign matter formed into instruments of
perception and motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff ;
(I say any other kind of relation, for I am not speaking of
the degree of it ;) nor consequently is there any probability,
that the alienation or dissolution of these instruments is the
destruction of the perceiving and moving agent.
§ 20. If we can survive such matter, wliy not all matter ?
And thus our finding, that the dissolution of matter, in
which living beings were most nearly interested, is not their
dissolution ; and that the destruction of several of the organs
and instruments of perception and of motion belonging to
them, is not their destruction ; shows demonstratively, that
there is no ground to think that the dissolution of any other
32 OF A FUTURE LIFE [I. I.
matter, or destruction of any other organs and instruments,
will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents, from
the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think
we stand in any other kind of relation to any thing which
we find dissolved by death.
§ 21. Obj. Then brutes may come to rational and moral
nature. Answ. May, but need not\
But it is said these observations are equally applicable to
brutes : and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that
they should be immortal, and by consequence capable of
everlasting happiness. Now this manner of expression is
both invidious and weak : but the thing intended by it,
is really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural or
moral consideration. For first, Suppose the invidious thing,
designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied,
as it is not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes ;
namely, that they must arrive at great attainments, and
become rational and moral agents ; even this would be no
difficulty : since we know not what latent powers and
capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior
to experience, as great presumption against human creatures,
as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that
degree of understanding, which we have in mature age.
For we can trace up our own existence to the same original
with theirs. And we find it to be a general law of nature,
that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion
should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are
altogether without the use of them, for a considerable length
of their duration ; as in infancy and childhood. And great
part of the human species go out of the present world, before
they come to the exercise of these capacities in any degree
at all. But then, secondly, The natural immortality of
1 Angus quotes from Clarke's it requires the present ; and after
Reply to Collins: 'Bruges may all there are other and stronger
for all we know become rational arguments for the future life of
agents, as infants do. If not, the man, which do not hold equally
system of the universe may require in the case of brutes.'
the future existence of brutes, as
§§21-23] OF A FUTURE LIFE 33
brutes does not in the least imply, that they are endued
with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature !.
And the economy of the universe might require, that there
should be living creatures without any capacities of this
kind.
§ 22. Our ignorance regarding them no bar to the
argument as it relates to man.
And all difficulties as to the manner how they are to be
disposed of are so apparently and wholly founded in our
ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon
by any, but such as are weak enough to think they are
acquainted with the whole system of things. There is then
absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is so
rhetorically urged, against the greatest part of the natural
proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human minds :
I say the greatest part ; for it is less applicable to the
following observation, which is more peculiar to mankind :
§ 23. No presumption anywhere against survival of reason,
memory, and affections*.
[III.] That as it is evident our present powers and
capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not depend
upon our gross body in the manner in which perception by
our organs of sense does ; so they do not appear to depend
upon it at all in any such manner, as to give ground to
think, that the dissolution of this body will be the de-
1 Disclaiming any positive doc- Dr. Eagar appears to make a vaki-
trine of a rational and moral able addition by producing the
nature for brutes, Butler stops case of the moral powers distinctly
short of disclaiming the argument and apart (Eagar, p. 107) :
for their immortality, as implied ' The moral powers of the man
in a spirit distinct from the body, likewise grow, but they have no
which arises upon §§ 17-19. period of decay, confined within
The natural immortality of the the apparent limits of life. They
human soul mentioned here, is not only last, but maintain their
again noticed in § 31, but in full vigour, and even strengthen,
neither case is there any explicit to the end. The brain, as well as*
acceptance of it. the senses, grows weak ; but the
2 To the whole argument of man does not weaken in truth,
Butler for the survival of the honesty, uprightness, love.'
reason, memory, and affection,
VOL. I. t>
34 OF A FUTURE LITE [I. I.
struction of these our present powers of reflection, as it will
of our powers of sensation ; or to give ground to conclude,
even that it will be so much as a suspension of the former.
§ 24. Our state is dual, (a) of sensation, (b) of reflection.
No sign that death touches (b).
Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and
perception, greatly different from each other ; each of which
has its own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments
and sufferings. When any of our senses are affected or
appetites gratified with the objects of them, we may be said
to exist or live in a state of sensation. When none of our
senses are affected or appetites gratified, and yet we perceive,
and reason, and act ; we may be said to exist or live in
a state of reflection. Now it is by no means certain, that
any thing which is dissolved by death, is any way necessary
to the living being in this its state of reflection, after ideas
are gained. For, though, from our present constitution and
condition of being, our external organs of sense are necessary
for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages,
and levers, and scaffolds are in architecture : yet when these
ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the most
intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and
feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection,
without any assistance from our senses ; and without any
at all, which we know of, from that body which will be
dissolved by death. It does not appear then, that the
relation of this gross body to the reflecting being is, in any
degree, necessary to thinking ; to our intellectual enjoyments
or sufferings : nor, consequently, that the dissolution or
alienation of the former by death, will be the destruction of
those present powers, which render us capable of this state
of reflection.
§ 25. As some mortal diseases leave the ego unaffected,
this may be so with all.
Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do
not at all affect our present intellectual powers ; and this
affords a presumption, that those diseases will not destroy
§§24-26] OF A FUTURE LIFE 35
these present powers. Indeed, from the observations made
above e, it appears, that there is no presumption, from their
mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the
body is the destruction of the living agent. And by the
same reasoning, it must appear too, that there is no presump-
tion, from their mutually affecting each other, that the
dissolution of the body is the destruction of our present
reflecting powers : but instanpes of their not affecting each
other, afford a presumption of the contrary. Instances of
mortal diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers,
evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining such
diseases to be the destruction of them. Several things
indeed greatly affect all our living powers, and at length
suspend the exercise of them ; as for instance drowsiness,
increasing till it ends in sound sleep : and from hence we
might have imagined it would destroy them, till we found
by experience the weakness of this way of judging. But in
the diseases nowT mentioned, there is not so much as this
shadow of probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as
to the reflecting powers which we have at present. For in
thSse diseases, persons the moment before death appear to
be in the highest vigour of life. They discover apprehension,
memory, reason, all entire ; with the utmost force of
affection ; sense of a character, of shame and honour ; and
the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the
last gasp : and these surely prove even greater vigour of
life than bodily strength does. Now what pretence is there
for thinking, that a progressive disease when arrived to such
a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, will destroy
those powers, which were not impaired, which were not
affected by it, during its whole progress quite up to that
degree ? And if death by diseases of this kind is not the
destruction of our present reflecting powers, it will scarce
be thought that death by any other means is.
§ 26. Death may not even suspend its activity.
It is obvious that this general observation may be carried
on further : and there appears so little connection between
e Sup. §§ 15, 1 6.
D 2
36 OF A FUTURE LIFE [I. I.
our bodily powers of sensation, and our present powers of
reflection, that there is no reason to conclude, that death,
which destroys the former, does so much as suspend the
exercise of the latter, or interrupt our continuing to exist in
the like state of reflection which we do now. For suspension
of reason, memory, and the affections which they excite, is
no part of the idea of death, nor is implied in our notion of
it. And our daily experiencing these powers to be exercised,
without any assistance, that we know of, from those bodies,
which will be dissolved by death ; and our finding often,
that the exercise of them is so lively to the last; these
things afford a sensible apprehension, that death may not
perhaps be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise of
these powers, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings which it
implies f. So that our posthumous life, whatever there may
be in it additional to our present, yet may not be entirely
beginning anew ; but going on.
§ 27. Death may resemble a birth, and forthwith enlarge
life.
Death may, in some sort, and in some respects, answer to
our birth ; which is not a suspension of the faculties which
we had before it, or a total change of the state of life in
which we existed when in the womb ; but a continuation of
both, with such and such great alterations.
Nay, for ought we know of ourselves, of our present life
and of death ; death may immediately, in the natural course
of things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of
life, as our birth does s ; a state in which our capacities, and
f There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here
considered : Whether death be the destruction of living
fortiori * agents 5 if not> Whether it be the destruction of their
present powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruc-
tion of their present powers of sensation ; and if not, Whether it be
the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise, of these present
reflecting powers. Now, if there be no reason to believe the last,
there will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still for
the first.
g This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans,
vo(Jii£ttv fjLtv y&p 877 rbv n\v tvOadf 0iov, us &v aKp.rtv
§§27-29] OF A FUTURE LIFE 37
sphere of perception and of action, may be much greater
than at present. For as our relation to our external organs
of sense, renders us capable of existing in our present state
of sensation ; so it may be the only natural hindrance to
our existing, • immediately and of course, in a higher state
of reflection. The truth is, reason does not at all show us,
in what state death naturally leaves us.
§ 28. Distinguish suspension from destruction.
But were we sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive
and active powers ; yet the suspension of a power and the
destruction of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as
we experience from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot
in any wise argue from one to the other ; or conclude even
to the lowest degree of probability, that the same kind of
force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though
it be increased ever so much, will be sufficient to destroy
them.
§ 29. Vegetables, not having living potcers, supply no
. analogy.
These observations together may be sufficient to show,
how little presumption there is, that death is the destruction
of human creatures. However, there is the shadow of an
analogy, which may lead us to imagine it is ; the supposed
likeness which is observed between the decay of vegetables,
and of living creatures. And this likeness is indeed sufficient
to afford the poets 1 very apt allusions to the flowers of the
field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present life.
But in reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that
there appears no ground even for the comparison, as to the
present question : because one of the two subjects compared
is wholly void of that, which is the principal and chief
St. Qavarov, ftveaiv els TW oi>Tca$ fiiov, KOI TOV evoai^ova TOIS (f>i\oao(f>r]craffi .
Lib. xv. p. 1039, ed. Amst. 1707. To which opinion perhaps Antoninus
may allude in these words, a;? vvv irfptpevets, TTOTC epPpvov (K TTJS yamrpbs
TJ}S yvvaiKos aov f£t\0r}, OVTOJS e/{8fXfo-0at T^V wpav Iv y TO
TOV k \vrpov TOVTOV (Kirffffirai. Lib. ix. c. 3.
1 II. vi. 146 ; Moschus, ii. 108.
38 OF A FUTURE LIFE [I. I.
thing in the other, the power of perception and of action ;
and which is the only thing we are inquiring about the
continuance of. So that the destruction of a vegetable is
an event not similar or analogous to the destruction of
a living agent.
§ 30. Basis mainly twofold ; (a) Doctrine of continuance,
(b) Incapacity of death to destroy.
But if, as was above intimated, leaving oif the delusive
custom of substituting imagination in the room of experi-
ence, we would confine ourselves to what we do know and
understand ; if we would argue only from that, and from
that form our expectations ; it would appear at first sight,
that as no probability of living beings ever ceasing to be
so, can be concluded from the reason of the thing ; so none
can be collected from the analogy of nature ; because we
cannot trace any living beings beyond death. But as we
are conscious that we are endued with capacities of per-
ception and of action, and are living persons ; what we are
to go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we foresee some
accident or event, which will endanger those capacities, or
be likely to destroy us : which death does in no wise appear
to be.
§ 31. What is now supernatural may in the new
state be natural
And thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass
into new scenes, and a new state of life and action, just as
naturally as we came into the present. And this new state
may naturally be a social one. And the advantages of it,
advantages of every kind, may naturally be bestowed,
according to some fixed general laws of wisdom, upon
eveiy one in proportion to the degrees of his virtue. And
though the advantages of that future natural state should
not be bestowed, as these of the present in some measure
are, by the will of the society ; but entirely by his more
immediate action, upon whom the whole frame of nature
depends : yet this distribution may be just as natural, as
their being distributed here by the instrumentality of men.
§§ 30, 3' J OF A FUTURE LIFE 39
And indeed, though one were to allow any confused unde-
termined sense, which people please to put upon the word
natural, it would be a shortness of thought scarce credible,
to imagine, that no system or course of things can be so,
but only what we see at present 1] : especially whilst the
probability of a future life, or the natural immortality of
the soul, is admitted upon the evidence of reason l ; because
this is really both admitting and denying at once, a state
of being different from the present to be natural. But the
only distinct meaning of that word is, stated, fixed, or settled :
since what is natural, as much requires and presupposes an
intelligent agent to render it so, i. e. to effect it continually,
or at stated times ; as what is supernatural or miraculous
does to effect it for once. And from hence it must follow,
that persons' notion of what is natural, will be enlarged in
proportion to their greater knowledge of the works of God,
and the dispensations of his Providence. Nor is there any
absurdity in supposing, that there may be beings in the
universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views, may
be so extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation
may to them appear natural, i. e. analogous or conformable
to God's dealings with other parts of his creation ; as
h See Part II. chap. ii. and Part II. chap. iv.
1 This opinion, not explicitly unless and until the Creator, who
adopted by Butler, appears to had given it, should take it away,
come before us from two points of Combined with this, however, is
view : an assumption, for many centuries
1. As built upon the evidence almost universal, that God had
of reason ; revealed to us His design not to
2. As a part of Natural Religion take it away, but to leave it in
made known by a primitive Re- continuing force without end.
relation (see inf. vi. 18, II. ii. 10). Upon this proposition hang grave
The question discussed in the questions of controversy, now
first chapter is properly that of widely spread. They cannot with
suivival (beyond death) rather advantage be touched on here,
than that of immortality, or per- All that belongs to the present
petual survival. This latter ques- occasion is that Butler's argu-
tion is not argued by Butler, but ment in this chapter is really on
(in i. 29) included under the name survival after death and the exist-
of natural immortality. This did ence of some future state. So that
not mean an existence absolutely the subject of perpetual survival
indefeasible, but a life gifted with does not absolutely fall within its
power of perpetual continuance scope.
40 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [I. II.
natural as the visible known course of things appears to us.
For there seems scarce any other possible sense to be put
upon the word, but that only in which it is here used ;
similar, stated, or uniform.
§ 32. Negative presumptions have now been quashed ;
and survival shown to le highly probable.
This credibility of a future life, which has been here
insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity,
seems to answer all the purposes of religion, in like manner
as a demonstrative proof would. Indeed a proof, even
a demonstrative one, of a future life, would not be a proof
of religion. For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as
reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be
accounted for by it, as that we are now alive is : and
therefore nothing can be more absurd than to argue from
that scheme, that there can be no future state. But as
religion implies a future state, any presumption against
such A state, is a presumption against religion. And the
foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that sort,
and prove, to a very considerable degree of probability \
one fundamental doctrine of religion ; which, if believed,
would greatly open and dispose the mind seriously to
attend to the general evidence of the whole.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISH-
MENTS ; AND PARTICULARLY OF THE LATTER.
§ i. Future life : its weight due to our capacity to
enjoy and suffer.
rpHAT which makes the question concerning a future life
to be of so great importance to us, is our capacity of
happiness and misery. And that which makes the con-
1 In the brief summary of the it is there pronounced « palpably
argument in ch. vii. 4, this is absurd to conclude, that we shall
Stated in stronger terms as against cease to be, at death.'
the absolutely negative conclusion:
§§ T, 2] BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS 41
sideration of it to be of so great importance to us, is the
supposition of our happiness and misery Hereafter, depending
upon our actions Here. Without this indeed, curiosity could
not but sometimes bring a subject, in which we may be so
highly interested, to our thoughts ; especially upon the
mortality of others, or the near prospect of our own. But
reasonable men would not take any further thought about
Hereafter, than what should happen thus occasionally to
rise in their minds, if it were 'certain that our future interest
no way depended upon our present behaviour : whereas on
the contrary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any
thing else, to think it does ; then there is reason also for
the most active thought and solicitude, to secure that
interest ; to behave so as that we may escape that misery,
and obtain that happiness in another life, which we not only
suppose ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend also
is put in our own power. And whether there be ground
for this last apprehension, certainly would deserve to be
most seriously considered, were there no other proof of
a future life and interest, than that presumptive one, which
the foregoing observations amount to.
§ 2. Here, enjoyment, and suffering, are mainly set in
our own power.
Now in the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great
part of what we suffer, is put in our own power. For pleasure
and pain are the consequences of our actions : and we are
endued by the Author of our nature with capacities of fore-
seeing these consequences. We find by experience he does
not so much as preserve our lives, exclusively of our own
care and attention, to provide ourselves with, and to make
use of, that sustenance, by which he has appointed our lives
shall be preserved ; and without which, he has appointed,
they shall not be preserved at all. And in general we
foresee, that the external things, which are the objects of
our various passions, can neither be obtained nor enjoyed,
without exerting ourselves in such and such manners : but
by thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects,
in which our natural good consists ; or by this means
42 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF COD [I. II.
God gives us the possession and enjoyment of them. I know
not, that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but
by the means of our own actions. And by prudence and
care, we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable
ease and quiet : or, on the contrary, we may, by rashness,
ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by negligence, make
ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And many do please
to make themselves extremely miserable, i. e. to do what
they know beforehand will render them so. They follow
those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction,
example, experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and
sickness, and untimely death. This every one observes to
be the general course of things ; though it is to be allowed,
we cannot find by experience, that all our sufferings are
owing to our own follies.
§ 3. Possible reaswts for this. It operates as a fore-
warning.
Why the Author of nature does not give his creatures
promiscuously such and such perceptions, without regard
to their behaviour ; why he does not make them happy
without the instrumentality of their own actions, and
prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves ; is
another matter. Perhaps there may be some impossibilities
in the nature of things, which we are unacquainted with a.
Or less happiness, it may be, would upon the whole be pro-
duced by such a method of conduct, than is by the present. Or
perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we
make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare single
disposition to produce happiness ; but a disposition to make
the good, the faithful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an in-
finitely perfect Mind may be pleased, with seeing his creatures
behave suitably to the nature which he has given them ; to
the relations which he has placed them in to each other ;
and to that, which they stand in to himself: that relation
to himself, which, during their existence, is even necessary,
and which is the most important one of all : perhaps, I say,
11 Part I. chap. vii.
§§3,4] BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS 43
an infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased with this moral
piety of moral agents, in and for itself; as well as upon
account of its being essentially conducive to the happiness
of his creation. Or the whole end, for which God made,
and thus governs the world, may be utterly beyond the
reach of our faculties : there may be somewhat in it as
impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind
man to have a conception of colours. But however this be,
it is certain matter of universal experience, that the general
method of divine administration is, forewarning us, or giving
us capacities to foresee, with more or less clearness, that if
we act so and so, we shall have such enjoyments, if so and
so, such sufferings ; and giving us those enjoyments, and
making us feel those sufferings, in consequence of our
actions.
§4. Due to nature; that is, to the Author of nature*.
' But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of
nature.' True. This is the very thing which I am observing.
It is to be ascribed to the general course of nature : i. e. not
surely to the words or ideas, course of nature ; but to him
who appointed it, and put things into it : or to a course of
operation, from its uniformity or constancy, called natural1';
and which necessarily implies an operating agent. For
when men find themselves necessitated to confess an Author
of nature, or that God is the natural governor of the world ;
• they must not deny this again, because his government is
Sup. i. 30.
1 We have to observe that there See Introcl. § 16. This idea of a
are three stages in Butler's argu- governing agency anterior to and
ment, viz. — apart from direct moral govern-
1. The constitution and course ment, as a constitution and course
of nature ; of nature, finds perhaps a con-
2. Natural Religion ; venient illustration in the laws
3. Revealed Religion ; , of political economy, by following
and that we are introduced to the or neglecting which wealth is
existence and governing activity produced or wasted, without any
of God, not as a part of natural direct reference to moral con-
religion, but as included in the siderations.
constitution and course of nature.
44 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [I. II.
uniform ; they must not deny that he does things at all,
because he does them constantly; because the effects of his
acting are permanent, whether his acting bo so or not ;
though there is no reason to think it is not. In short,
every man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the
forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining
good1: and if the natural course of things be the appoint-
ment of God, and our natural faculties of knowledge and
experience are given us by him ; then the good and bad
consequences which follow our actions, are his appointment,
and our foresight of those consequences, is a warning given
us by him, how we are to act.
§ 5. These pleasures and pains guide us ; but in a general
ivay.
'Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying every
particular gratification of passion, intended to put us upon
gratifying ourselves in every such particular instance, and
as a reward to us for so doing ? ' No, certainly. Nor is it
to be said, that our eyes were naturally intended to give us
the sight of each particular object, to which they do or can
extend ; objects which are destructive of them, or which,
for any other reason, it may become us to turn our eyes
from. Yet there is no doubt, but that our eyes were
intended for us to see with. So neither is there any doubt,
but that the foreseen pleasures and pains belonging to the
passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind to
act in such and such manners.
§ 6. So that God already rewards and punishes.
Now from this general observation, obvious to every one,
that God has given us to understand, he has appointed
satisfaction and delight to be the consequence of our acting
in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of our acting in
another, and of our not acting at all ; and that we find the
consequences, which we were beforehand informed of, uni-
1 Comp. Tldffa T(\vrj KOI iraffa pfais, dyaOov TWOS e<pif.oQai 8o/rff.
, ofjioiasot irpdtis rf ttal irpoai- Aristot. Eth. Xic. i. I.
§§ 5-7] BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS 45
formly to follow ; we may learn, that we are at present
actually under his government in the strictest and most
proper sense ; in such a sense, as that he rewards and
punishes us for our actions. An Author of nature being
supposed, it is not so much a deduction of reason, as a matter
of experience, that we are thus under his government : under
his government, in the same sense, as we are under the
government of civil magistrates. Because the annexing
pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our power
to do or forbear, and giving notice of this appointment
beforehand to those whom it concerns ; is the proper formal
notion of government.
§ 7. Whether by propelled or l>y self-acting laws.
Whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon
our behaviour, be owing to the Author of nature's
acting upon us every moment which we feel it ; or to his
having at once contrived and executed his own part in the
plan of the world ; makes no alteration as to the matter
before us. For if civil magistrates could make the sanctions
of their laws take place, without interposing at all, after
they had passed them ; without a trial, and the formalities
of an execution : if they were able to make their laws
execute themselves, or every offender to execute them upon
himself ; we should be just in the same sense under their
government then, as we are now ; but in a much higher
degree, and more perfect manner \
1 Fitzgerald observes that But- replies, that on this principle a
ler here differs from Clarke and king so superlatively good that
agrees with Leibnitz (see the he could arrange all matters on
Correspondence between them). behalf of his subjects in a way so
For Clarke holds as follows : ' The admirable that he should never
notion of the world's being a need to interfere with them would
great machine, going on without be only a nominal king. So far
the interposition of God, as a Fitzgerald. The two combatants,
clock continues to go without the however, agreed that God was the
assistance of the clock-maker, is Continuator as well as the Maker,
the notion of materialism and — See Corresp. of Clarke and
fate, and tends ... to exclude Leibnitz (London, 1717), pp. 21,
Providence.' To which Leibnitz 45, 67.
46 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [I. II.
§ 8. Ami ly small pains as well as great.
Vain is the ridicule with which, one foresees, some
persons will divert themselves, upon finding lesser pains
considered as instances of divine punishment. There is no
possibility of answering or evading the general thing here
intended, without denying all final causes. For final causes
being admitted, the pleasures and pains now mentioned
must be admitted too as instances of them. And if they
are ; if God annexes delight to some actions, and uneasiness
to others, with an apparent design to induce us to act so
and so ; then he not only dispenses happiness and misery,
but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for example,
the pain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the
destruction of our bodies, suppose upon too near approaches
to fire, or upon wounding ourselves, be appointed by the
Author of nature to prevent our doing what thus tends to
our destruction ; this is altogether as much an instance of his
punishing our actions, and consequently of our being under
his government, as declaring by a voice from heaven, that
if we acted so, he \vould inflict such pain upon us, and
inflicting it, whether it be greater or less.
§ 9. God is (a) Governor, (b) Moral Governor.
Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of the
Author of nature, is that of a master or governor, prior to
the consideration of his moral attributes. The fact of our
case, which we find by experience, is, that he actually
exercises dominion or government over us at present, by
rewarding and punishing us for our actions, in as strict and
proper a sense of these words, and even in the same sense,
as children, servants, subjects, are rewarded and punished
by those who govern them.
And thus the whole analogy of nature, the whole present
course of things, most fully shows, that there is nothing
incredible in the general doctrine of religion, that God will
reward and punish men for their actions hereafter : nothing
incredible, I mean, arising out of the notion of rewarding
and punishing. For the whole course of nature is a present
§§8-12] BY PUNISHMENTS 47
instance of his exercising that government over us, which
implies in it rewarding and punishing.
§ 10. Punishment will here l)e chiefly considered, because
most cavilled at.
BUT as divine punishment is what men chiefly object
against, and are most unwilling to allow ; it may be
proper to mention some circumstances in the natural course
of punishments at present, which are analogous to what
religion teaches us concerning a future state of punishment ;
indeed so analogous, that as they add a farther credibility
to it, so they cannot but raise a most serious apprehension
of it in those who will attend to them.
§ ii. Of human miseries, a large part are self-inflicted.
It has been now observed, that such and such miseries
naturally follow such and such actions of imprudence and
wi If ulness, as well as actions more commonly and more
distinctly considered as vicious ; and that these conse-
quences, when they may be foreseen, are properly natural
punishments annexed to such actions. For the general
thing here insisted upon, is, not that we see a great deal of
misery in the world, but a great deal which men bring
upon themselves by their own behaviour, which they might
have foreseen and avoided.
§ 12. Often (a) following after pleasure reaped, (b) exceeding
it, (c) long delayed, (d) hard to foresee.
Now the circumstances of these natural punishments,
particularly deserving our attention, are such as these ;
That oftentimes they follow, or are inflicted in consequence of,
actions, which procure many present advantages, and are
accompanied with much present pleasure : for instance, sick-
ness and untimely death is the consequence of intemperance,
though accompanied with the highest mirth and jollity :
That these punishments are often much greater, than the
advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions, of which
48 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [I. II.
they are the punishments or consequences : That though
we may imagine a constitution of nature, in which these
natural punishments, which are in fact to follow, would
follow, immediately upon such actions being done, or very
soon after ; we find on the contrary in our world, that they
are often delayed a great while, sometimes even till long after
the actions occasioning them are forgot ; so that the consti-
tution of nature is such, that delay of punishment is no
sort nor degree of presumption of final impunity : That
after such delay, these natural punishments or miseries
often come, not by degrees, but suddenly, with violence,
and at once ; however, the chief misery often does : That as
certainty of such distant miseiy following such actions, is
never afforded persons ; so perhaps during the actions, they
have seldom a distinct full expectation of its following0:
and many times the case is only thus, that they see in general,
or may see, the credibility, that intemperance, suppose, will
bring after it diseases ; civil crimes, civil punishments ;
when yet the real probability often is, that they shall escape ;
but things notwithstanding take their destined course, and
the misery inevitably follows at its appointed time, in very
many of these cases.
§ 13. May le due to habits contracted in yotttJi.
Thus also though youth may be alleged as an excuse for
rashness and folly, as being naturally thoughtless, and not
clearly foreseeing all the consequences of being untractable
and profligate ; this does not hinder, but that these conse-
quences follow, and are grievously felt throughout the
whole course of mature life. Habits contracted even in that
age, are often utter ruin : and men's success in the world,
not only in the common sense of worldly success, but their
real happiness and misery, depends, in a great degree, and
in various ways, upon the manner in which they pass their
youth ; which consequences they for the most part neglect to
consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said to believe,
beforehand.
See Part II. chap. vi.
§§ i3-i6] BY PUNISHMENTS 49
§ 14. Note that lost opportunities rarely recur.
It requires also to be mentioned, that in numberless cases,
the natural course of things affords us opportunities for pro-
curing advantages to ourselves at certain times, which we
cannot procure when we will ; nor ever recall the oppor-
tunities, if we have neglected them. Indeed the general
course of nature is an example of this. If, during
the opportunity of youth, persons are indocile and self-
willed ; they inevitably suffer in their future life, for want
of those acquirements, which they neglected the natural
season of attaining. If the husbandman lets his seedtime
pass without sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond
recovery. In like manner, though after men have been
guilty of folly and extravagance up to a certain degree, it is
often in their power, for instance, to retrieve their affairs, to
recover their health and character ; at least in good measure :
yet real reformation is, in many cases, of no avail at all
towards preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy,
naturally annexed to folly and extravagance exceeding that
degree. There is a certain bound to imprudence and mis-
behaviour, which being transgressed, there remains no place
for repentance in the natural course of things.
§ 15. Neglect often operates as misbehaviour.
It is further veiy much to be remarked, that neglects
from inconsiderateness, want of attention d, not looking
about us to see what we have to do, are often attended with
consequences altogether as dreadful, as any active mis-
behaviour, from the most extravagant passion.
§ 16. Civil punishments, being natural, ojten also final.
And lastly, civil government being natural, the punish-
ments of it are so too : and some of these punishments
are capital ; as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure
are often mortal. So that many natural punishments are
J Part II. chap. vi.
VOL. I. E
50 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [I. II.
final e to him, who incurs them, if considered only in his
temporal capacity : and seem inflicted by natural appoint-
ment, either to remove the offender out of the way of being
further mischievous ; or as an example, though frequently
a disregarded one, to those who are left behind.
§ 17. All tlds is not accidental, Iwt constant, and
confirmed by religion.
These things are not, what we call accidental, or to be
met with only now and then ; but they are things of every
day's experience : they proceed from general laws, very
general ones, by which God governs the world, in the
natural course of his providence. And they are so ana-
logous to what religion teaches us concerning the future
punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece with it, that
both would naturally be expressed in the very same words,
and manner of description. In the Book of Proverbs f, for
e The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most
evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion.
Pet-elation is dis- But if any of these reflections should be thought to
I'teMm'v^wr relate more P6™11^1? to this doctrine, as taught in
next state" scripture ; the reader is desired to observe, that
Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak
of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and
degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the
scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be
matter of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be,
that the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall
be made at the end of this world ; that each shall then receive ac-
cording to his deserts. Keason did, as it well might, conclude that it
should, finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and
ill with the wicked : but it could not be determined upon any
principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been
appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before that
distributive justice should finally and effectually take place. Kevela-
tion teaches us, that the next state of things after the present is
appointed for the execution of this justice ; that it shall be 110 longer
delayed ; but the mystery of God, the great mystery of his suffering vice
and confusion to prevail, shall then be finished; and he will take to him
his great power and will reign, by rendering to every one according to
his works.
1 Chap. i.
§§ i7, 1 8] BY PUNISHMENTS 51
instance, Wisdom is introduced, as frequenting the most
public places of resort, and as rejected when she offers
herself as the natural appointed guide of human life. How
long, speaking to those who are passing through it, how
long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly? and the scorncrs
delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge ? Turn ye
at my reproof : behold, I ivill pour out my spirit upon you,
I ic ill make known my ivords unto you. But upon being
neglected, Because I have called, and ye refused; I have
stretched out my hand, and no man regarded ; but ye have set
at nought all my counsel, and ivould none of my reproof :
I also will laugh at your calamity ; I will mock when your fear
cometh; when your fear cometh as desolation, and your
destruction cometh as a whirlwind; when distress and anguish
cometh upon you. Then shall they call upon me, but I will
not answer; they shall seek me early, but they shall not find
me. This passage, every one sees, is poetical, and some
parts of it are highly figurative ; but their meaning is
obvious. And the thing intended is expressed more
literally in the following words ; For that they hated know-
ledge, and did not choose the fear of the Lord : therefore
shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with
their own devices. For the security of the simple shall slay
them, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them. And
the whole passage is so equally applicable, to what we
experience in the present world, concerning the consequences
of men's actions, and to what religion teaches us is to be
expected in another, that it may be questioned which of
the two was principally intended.
§ 1 8. The force of the topics ought to bring the
subject home.
Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper proofs
of a future state of rewards and punishments, nothing
methinks can give one so sensible an apprehension of the
latter, or representation of it to the mind ; as observing,
that after the many disregarded checks, admonitions and
warnings, which people meet with in the ways of vice and
folly and extravagance ; warnings from their very nature ;
£ 2
52 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, ETC, [I. II. §§ 19, 20
from the examples of others; from the lesser incon-
veniences which they bring upon themselves ; from the
instructions of wise and virtuous men : after these have
been long despised, scorned, ridiculed : after the chief bad
consequences, temporal consequences, of their follies, have
been delayed for a great while ; at length they break in
irresistibly, like an armed force : repentance is too late to
relieve, and can serve only to aggravate, their distress : the
case is become desperate : and poverty and sickness, remorse
and anguish, infamy and death, the effects of their own
doings, overwhelm them, beyond possibility of remedy or
escape. This is an account of what is in fact the general
constitution of nature.
§ 19. Operation of the scheme not uniform, lut sufficient
to establish a warning likelihood,
It is not in any sort meant, that according to what
appears at present of the natural course of things, men are
always uniformly punished in proportion to their mis-
behaviour : but that there are very many instances of
misbehaviour punished in the several ways now mentioned,
and very dreadful instances too ; sufficient to show what
the laws of the universe may admit ; and, if thoroughly
considered, sufficient fully to answer all objections against
the credibility of a future state of punishments, from any
imaginations, that the frailty of our nature and external
temptations, almost annihilate the guilt of human vices :
as well as objections of another sort ; from necessity ; from
suppositions, that the will of an infinite Being cannot be
contradicted ; or that he must be incapable of offence and
provocation P.
§ 20. And rebuke the audacity of this age.
Eeflections of this kind are not without their terrors to
serious persons, the most free from enthusiasm, and of the
greatest strength of mind ; but it is fit things be stated
and considered as they really are. And there is, in the
g See chaps, iv. and vi.
§ si; III. § i] OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD 53
present age, a certain fearlessness, with regard to what
may be hereafter under the government of God, which
nothing but an universally acknowledged demonstration on
the side of atheism can justify ; and which makes it quite
necessary, that men be reminded, and if possible made to
feel, that there is no sort of ground for being thus pre-
sumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles.
§ 21. There may he persons lorn only to serve as
imrn'mg examples.
For, may it not be said of any person upon his being
born into the world, he may behave so, as to be of no
service to it, but by being made an example of the woful
effects of vice and folly ? That he may, as any one may,
if he will, incur an infamous execution, from the hands
of civil justice ; or in some other course of extravagance
shorten his days ; or bring upon himself infamy and
diseases worse than death ? So that it had been better for
him, even with regard to the present world, that he had
never been born. And is there any pretence of reason, for
people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had
certain proof, that, let them act as licentiously as they
will, there can be nothing analogous to this, with regard
to a future and more general interest, under the providence
and government of the same God ?
CHAPTER III.
OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.
§ i. Government, like Creation, may be proved refer-
able to design.
A S the manifold appearances of design and of final causes,
•*+• in the constitution of the world, prove it to be the
work of an intelligent Mind ; so the particular final causes
of pleasure and pain distributed amongst his creatures,
54 OF THE MORAL [I. HI.
prove that they are under his government ; what may be
called his natural government of creatures endued with
sense and reason. This, however, implies somewhat more
than seems usually attended to, when we speak of God's
natural government of the world. It implies government
of the very same kind with that, which a master exercises
over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects.
These latter instances of final causes, as really prove an
intelligent Governor of the world, in the sense now
mentioned, and before a distinctly treated of ; as any other
instances of final causes prove an intelligent Maker of it.
§ 2. Where reward and punishment are just, the
government is moral.
But this alone does not appear at first sight to determine
any thing certainly, concerning the moral character of the
Author of nature, considered in this relation of governor ;
does not ascertain his government to be moral, or prove
that he is the righteous judge of the world. Moral govern-
ment consists, not barely in rewarding and punishing men
for their actions, which the most tyrannical person may
do : but in rewarding the righteous, and punishing the
wicked ; in rendering to men according to their actions,
considered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral
government consists in doing this, with regard to all
intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to their personal
merits or demerits.
§ 3. Just; that is, not simply benevolent, but righteous1.
Some men seem to think the only character of the
Author of nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence.
This, considered as a principle of action and infinite in
degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possible
a Chap. ii.
1 See Dissertation on Virtue, §§ 12-16.
§§ 2, 3] GOVERNMENT OF GOD 55
happiness, without regard to persons' behaviour, otherwise
than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it.
And supposing this to be the only character of God,
veracity and justice in him would be nothing but benevo-
lence conducted by wisdom. Now surely this ought not
to be asserted, unless it can be proved ; for we should
speak with cautious reverence upon such a subject. And
whether it can be proved or no, is not the thing here to be
inquired into ; but whether in the constitution and conduct
of the world, a righteous government be not discernibly
planned out : which necessarily implies a righteous governor.
There may possibly be in the creation beings, to whom the
Author of nature manifests himself under this most
amiable of all characters, this of infinite absolute benevo-
lence ; for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as
perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice : but he
manifests himself to us under the character of a righteous
governor. He may, consistently with this, be simply and
absolutely benevolent, in the sense now explained : but he
is, for he has given us a proof in the constitution and
conduct of the world that he is, a governor over servants,
as he rewards and punishes us for our actions. And in
the constitution and conduct of it, he may also have given,
besides the reason of the thing, and the natural presages
of conscience, clear and distinct intimations, that his
government is righteous or moral : clear to such as think
the nature of it deserving their attention; and yet not to
every careless person, who casts a transient reflection upon
the subjectb.
b The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being
universal, nor so strong as might possibly have
been, may be urged against natural religion, as Insufficiency of proof.
well as against revealed. And therefore the Lie! ^afinst Rd^ion
..... ,, ., , , iii r. , , » in ootn forms.
consideration of them belongs to the first part of
this Treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are
chiefly urged against revealed religion, I chose to consider them in
the second part. And the answer to them there, chap, vi, as urged
against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as
urged against the religion of nature ; to avoid repetition, the reader
is referred to that chapter.
56 OF THE MORAL [l. III.
§ 4. This government is moral, not absolutely, but in degree.
But it is particularly to be observed, that the divine
government, which we experience ourselves under in the
present state, taken alone, is allowed not to be the perfection
of moral government. And yet this by 110 means hinders,
but that there may be somewhat, be it more or less, truly
moral in it. A righteous government may plainly appear
to be carried on to some degree : enough to give us the
apprehension that it shall be completed, or carried on to
that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall ;
but which cannot appear, till much more of the divine
administration be seen, than can in the present life. And
the design of this chapter is to inquire, how far this is the
case : how far, over and above the moral nature c which God
has given us, and our natural notion of him as righteous
governor of those his creatures, to whom he has given this
nature d ; I say how far besides this, the principles and
beginnings of a moral government over the world may be
discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion and
disorder of it.
§ 5. The balance in favour of virtue not invariable :
nor always clear. t
Now one might mention here, what has been often urged
with great force, that in general, less uneasiness and more
satisfaction, are the natural consequences6 of a virtuous"
than of a vicious course of life, in the present state, as an
instance of a moral government established in nature ; an
instance of it, collected from experience and present matter
of fact. But it must be owned a thing of difficulty to weigh
and balance pleasures and uneasinesses, each amongst them-
selves, and also against each other, so as to make an
estimate with any exactness, of the overplus of happiness on
the side of virtue. And it is not impossible, that, amidst
the infinite disorders of the world, there may be exceptions
Dissertation II. a Chap. vi.
See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.
§§4-8] GOVERNMENT OF GOD 57
to the happiness of virtue ; even with regard to those
persons, whose course of life from their youth up has been
blameless :
§ 6. Especially in cases of reformed life.
And more with regard to those, who have gone on for
some time in the ways of vice, and have afterwards reformed.
For suppose an instance of the latter case ; a person with
his passions inflamed, his natural faculty of self-government
impaired by habits of indulgence, and with all his vices
about him, like so many harpies, craving for their accus-
tomed gratification : who can say how long it might be,
before such a person would find more satisfaction in the
reasonableness and present good consequences of virtue,
than difficulties and self-denial in the restraints of it?
Experience also shows, that men can, to a great degree, get
over their sense of shame, so as that by professing them-
selves to be without principle, and avowing even direct
villainy, they can support themselves against the infamy of
it. But as the ill actions of any one will probably be more
talked of, and oftener thrown in his way, upon his reforma-
tion ; so the infamy of them will be much more felt, after
the natural sense of virtue and of honour is recovered.
Uneasinesses of this kind ought indeed to be put to the
account of former vices : yet it will be said, they are in part
the consequences of reformation.
§ 7. But clear as a whole, and as initial.
Still I am far from allowing it doubtful, whether virtue,
upon the whole, be happier than vice in the present world.
But if it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous administra-
tion may beyond all question be found in nature, if we will
attentively inquire after them. And,
§ 8. God, then, being Governor, may be also moral
Governor.
[I.] In whatever manner the notion of God's moral
government over the world might be treated, if it did not
appear, whether he were in a proper sense our governor at
58 OF THE MORAL [I. III.
all : yet when it is certain matter of experience, that
he does manifest himself to us under the character of
a governor, in the sense explained f ; it must deserve to be
considered, whether there be not reason to apprehend, that
he may be a righteous or moral governor. Since it appears
to be fact, that God does govern mankind by the method of
rewards and punishments, according to some settled rules
of distribution ; it is surely a question to be asked, What
presumption is there against his finally rewarding and
punishing them according to this particular rule, namely,
as they act reasonably or unreasonably, virtuously or
viciously ?
§ 9. The moral rule of award is more natural than any
other.
Since rendering men happy or miserable by this rule,
certainly falls in, much more falls in, with our natural
apprehensions and sense of things, than doing so by, any
other rule whatever : since rewarding and punishing actions
by any other rule, would appear much harder to be ac-
counted for, by minds formed as he has formed ours. Be
the evidence of religion then more or less clear, the expecta-
tion which it raises in us, that the righteous shall, upon the
whole, be happy, and the wicked miserable, cannot however
possibly be considered as absurd or chimerical ; because it is
no more than an expectation, that a method of government
already begun, shall be carried on, the method of rewarding
and punishing actions ; and shall be carried on by a parti-
cular rule, which unavoidably appears to us at first sight
more natural than any other, the rule which we call dis-
tributive justice. Nor,
§ io. Mental states attaching to good and evil conduct, and
the forecast allowed by fixed laws, all go to affirm it.
[II.] Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquillity,
satisfaction, and external advantages, being the natural
consequences of prudent management of ourselves, and our
affairs ; and rashness, profligate negligence, and wilful folly,
f Chap. ii.
§§9-n] GOVERNMENT OF GOD 59
bringing after them many inconveniences and sufferings ;
these afford instances of a right constitution of nature : as
the correction of children, for their own sakes, and by way
of example, when they run into danger or hurt themselves,
is a part of right education. And thus, that God governs
the world by general fixed laws, that he has endued us with
capacities of reflecting upon this constitution of things, and
foreseeing the good and bad consequences of our behaviour ;
plainly implies some sort of moral government : since from
such a constitution of things it cannot but follow, that
prudence and imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue
and vice P, must be, as they are, respectively rewarded and
punished.
§ ii. As do civil punishments, and the fear of them.
[III.] From the natural course of things, vicious actions
are, to a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to
society ; and besides punishment actually inflicted upon this
account, there is also the fear and apprehension of it in
those persons, whose crimes have rendered them obnoxious
to it, in case of a discovery ; this state of fear being itself
often a very considerable punishment. The natural fear
and apprehension of it too, which restrains from such
crimes, is a declaration of nature against them. It is
necessary to the very being of society, that vices destructive
of it, should be punished as being so ; the vices of falsehood,
injustice, cruelty : which punishment therefore is as natural
as society ; and so is an instance of a kind of moral govern-
ment, naturally established and actually taking place. And,
since the certain natural course of things is the conduct of
Providence or the government of God, though carried on by
the instrumentality of men ; the observation here made
amounts to this, that mankind find themselves placed by
him in such circumstances, as that they are unavoidably
accountable for their behaviour, and are often punished, and
sometimes rewarded under his government, in the view of
their being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to society.
« See Dissertation II. (§ 8).
60 OF THE MORAL [I. III.
§ 12. Good acts are sometimes punished ; but never
as being good.
If it be objected that good actions, and such as are
beneficial to society, are often punished, as in the case of
persecution and in other cases ; and that ill and mischievous
actions are often rewarded : it may be answered distinctly ;
first, that this is in no sort necessary, and consequently not
natural, in the sense in which it is necessary, and therefore
natural, that ill or mischievous actions should be punished :
and in the next place, that good actions are never punished,
considered as beneficial to society, nor ill actions rewarded,
under the view of their being hurtful to it. So that it stands
good, without any thing on the side of vice to be set over
against it, that the Author of nature has as truly directed, that
vicious actions, considered as mischievous to society, should
be punished, and put mankind under a necessity of thus
punishing them ; as he has directed and necessitated us to
preserve our lives by food.
§ 13. Regard is had not to acts owTy, lut to their quality as
virtuous or vicious.
[IV.] In the natural course of things, virtue as such is
actually rewarded, and vice as such punished : which seems
to afford an instance or example, not only of government,
but of moral government, begun and established ; moral in
the strictest sense ; though not in that perfection of degree,
which religion teaches us to expect. In order to see this
more clearly, we must distinguish between actions themselves,
and that quality ascribed to them, which we call virtuous or
vicious. The gratification itself of every natural passion
must be attended with delight : and acquisitions of fortune,
however made, are acquisitions of the means or materials of
enjoyment. An action then, by which any natural passion
is gratified or fortune acquired, procures delight or advan-
tage ; abstracted from all consideration of the morality of
such action. Consequently, the pleasure or advantage
in this case, is gained by the action itself, not by the
morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of it ; though it be,
§§ 12, i3] GOVERNMENT OF GOD 6l
perhaps, virtuous or vicious. Thus, to say such an action or
course of behaviour, procured such pleasure or advantage, or
brought on such inconvenience and pain, is quite a different
thing from saying, that such good or bad effect was owing
to the virtue or vice of such action or behaviour. In one
case, an action abstracted from all moral consideration,
produced its effect : in the other case, for it will appear that
there are such cases, the morality of the action, the action
under a moral consideration, i. e. the virtuousness or vicious-
ness of it, produced the effect. Now I say virtue as such,
naturally procures considerable advantages to the virtuous,
and vice as such, naturally occasions great inconvenience and
even misery to the vicious, in very many instances. The
immediate effects of virtue and vice upon the mind and
temper, are to be mentioned as instances of it. Vice as
such is naturally attended with some sort of uneasiness,
and, not uncommonly, with great disturbance and appre-
hension. That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser
matters, and in familiar speech, we call being vexed with
oneself, and in matters of importance and in more serious
language, remorse ; is an uneasiness naturally arising from
an action of a man's own, reflected upon by himself as wrong,
unreasonable, faulty, i. e. vicious in greater or less degrees :
and this manifestly is a different feeling from that uneasiness,
which arises from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is
more common, than to hear a man lamenting an accident or
event, and adding but however he has the satisfaction
that he cannot blame himself for it ; or on the contrary, that
he has the uneasiness of being sensible it was his own doing ?
Thus also the disturbance and fear, which often follow upon
a man's having done an injury, arise from a sense of his
being blameworthy ; otherwise there would, in many cases,
be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear resent-
ment or shame. On the other hand, inward security and
peace, and a mind open to the several gratifications of life,
are the natural attendants of innocence and virtue. To
which must be added the complacency, satisfaction, and
even joy of heart, which accompany the exercise, the real
exercise, of gratitude, friendship, benevolence.
62 OF THE MORAL [I. m.
§ 14. Reckon in, too, the fears and hopes of a future life ;
And here, I think, ought to be mentioned, the fears of
future punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in
those who fully believe, or have any serious apprehension of
religion : because these hopes and fears are present uneasi-
ness and satisfaction to the mind, and cannot be got rid of
by great part of the world, even by men who have thought
most thoroughly upon that subject of religion. And no one
can say, how considerable this uneasiness and satisfaction
may be, or what upon the whole it may amount to.
§ 15. And the favour and disfavour especially of the good;
In the next place comes in the consideration, that
all honest and good men are disposed to befriend honest
good men as such, and to discountenance the vicious as
such, and do so in some degree ; indeed in a considerable
degree : from which favour and discouragement cannot but
arise considerable advantage and inconvenience. And
though the generality of the world have little regard to the
morality of their own actions, and may be supposed to have
less to that of others, when they themselves are not con-
cerned ; yet let any one be known to be a man of virtue,
somehow or other he will be favoured, and good offices will
be done him, from regard to his character without remote
views, occasionally, and in some low degree, I think, by the
generality of the world, as it happens to come in their way.
Public honours too and advantages are the natural conse-
quences, are sometimes at least the consequences in fact, of
virtuous actions ; of eminent justice, fidelity, charity, love
to our country, considered in the viewr of being virtuous.
And sometimes even death itself, often infamy and external
inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice as vice.
For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny,
injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear
of misery, has doubtless been instrumental in bringing
about revolutions, which make a figure even in the history
of the world. For it is plain, men resent injuries as
implying faultiness, and retaliate, not merely under the
§§ 14-17] GOVERNMENT OF GOD 63
notion of having received harm, but of having received
wrong ; and they have this resentment in behalf of others,
as well as of themselves. So likewise even the generality
are, in some degree, grateful and disposed to return good
offices, not merely because such an one has been the
occasion of good to them, but under the view, that such good
offices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer.
§ 1 6. And the moral quality seen in (a) civil government, (b)
care of children, (c) in virtues per se, never in vices, (d) in
pardons given in absence of guilt.
To all this may be added two or three particular things,
which many persons will think frivolous ; but to me
nothing appears so, which at all comes in towards de-
termining a question of such importance, as, whether there
be, or be not, a moral institution of government, in the
strictest sense moral, visibly established and begun in nature.
The particular things are these : That in domestic govern-
ment, which is doubtless natural, children and others also
are very generally punished for falsehood and injustice and
ill-behaviour, as such, and rewarded for the contrary; which
are instances where veracity, and justice, and right be-
haviour as such, are naturally enforced by rewards and
punishments, whether more or less considerable in degree :
That, though civil government be supposed to take cogni-
zance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to
society, without respect to the immorality of them ; yet as
such actions are immoral, so the sense which men have of
the immorality of them, very greatly contributes, in differ-
ent ways, to bring offenders to justice : and that entire
absence of all crime and guilt in the moral sense, when
plainly appearing, will almost of course procure, and cir-
cumstances of aggravated guilt prevent, a remission of the
penalties annexed to civil crimes, in many cases, though by
no means in all.
§ 17. Sum of results on behalf of well-doing as such,
Upon the \vhole then, besides the good and bad effects of
virtue and vice upon men's own minds, the course of the
64 OF THE MORAL [I. III.
world does, in some measure, turn upon the approbation
and disapprobation of them as such, in others. The sense
of well and ill-doing, the presages of conscience, the love of
good characters and dislike of bad ones, honour, shame,
resentment, gratitude ; all these, considered in themselves,
and in their effects, do afford manifest real instances of
virtue as such naturally favoured, and of vice as such
discountenanced, more or less, in the daily course of human
life ; in every age, in every relation, in every general
circumstance of it. That God has given us a moral nature h,
may most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his
moral government : but that he has placed us in a condition,
which gives this nature, as one may speak, scope to operate,
and in which it does unavoidably operate ; i. e. influence
mankind to act, so as thus to favour and reward virtue, and
discountenance and punish vice ; this is not the same, but
a further, additional proof of his moral government : for it
is an instance of it. The first is a proof, that he will
finally favour and support virtue effectually : the second is
an example of his favouring and supporting it at present, in
some degree.
§ 18. This regard to the quale is due to (a) our moral
nature, (b) its effect upon related destinies.
If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, that
virtue as such is often rewarded, and vice as such is punished,
and this rule never inverted : it will be found to proceed, in
part, immediately from the moral nature itself, which God
has given us ; and also in part, from his having given us,
together with this nature, so great a power over each other's
happiness and miseiy. For first, it is certain, that peace and
delight, in some degree and upon some occasions, is the
necessary and present effect of virtuous practice ; an effect
arising immediately from that constitution of our nature.
We are so made, that well-doing as such gives us satisfaction,
at least, in some instances ; ill-doing as such, in none. And
secondly, from our moral nature, joined with God's having
put our happiness and misery in many respects in each
h See Dissertation II. (§§ 1-3).
§§ i8-2o] GOVERNMENT OF GOD 65
other's power, it cannot but be, that vice as such, some kinds
and instances of it at least, will be infamous, and men will
be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable ; and the
villain will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that
infamy, any more than he will be able to escape this further
punishment, which mankind will be disposed to inflict upon
him, under the notion of his deserving it.
§ 19. Any like regard to vice a dream or a monster.
But there can be nothing on the side of vice, to answer
this ; because there is nothing in the human mind contra-
dictory, as the logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue consists
in a regard to what is right and reasonable, as being so ; in
a regard to veracity, justice, charity, in themselves : and
there is surely no such thing, as a like natural regard to
falsehood, injustice, cruelty. If it be thought, that there
are instances of an approbation of vice, as such, in itself, and
for its own sake, (though it does not appear to me, that
there is any such thing at all ; but supposing there be, ) it is
evidently monstrous : as much so, as the most acknowledged
perversion of any passion whatever. . Such instances of
perversion then being left out as merely imaginary, or,
however, unnatural ; it must follow, from the frame of our
nature, and from our condition, in the respects now described,
that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but be, favoured
as such by others, upon some occasions ; and happy in
itself, in some degree. For what is here insisted upon, is
not the degree in which virtue and vice are thus distinguished,
but only the thing itself, that they are so in some degree ;
though the whole good and bad effect of virtue and vice as
such, is not inconsiderable in degree. But that they must
be thus distinguished in some degree, is in a manner
necessary : it is matter of fact of daily experience, even in
the greatest confusion of human affairs.
§ 20. Perverse rules intrude, but not so as to drown
the voice of nature in Providence.
It is not pretended but that in the natural course of
things, happiness and misery appear to be distributed by
VOL. i. F
66 OF THE MORAL [I. III.
other rules, than only the personal merit and demerit of
characters. They may sometimes be distributed by way of
mere discipline. There may be the wisest and best reasons,
why the world should be governed by general laws, from
whence such promiscuous distribution perhaps must follow ;
and also why our happiness and misery should be put in
each other's power, in the degree which they are. And
these things, as in general they contribute to the rewarding
virtue and punishing vice, as such : so they often contribute
also, not to the inversion of this, which is impossible ; but
to the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked ; afflicted,
though righteous ; and, which is worse, to the rewarding
some actions, though vicious, and punishing other actions,
though virtuous. But all this cannot drown the voice of
nature in the conduct of Providence, plainly declaring
itself for virtue, by way of distinction from vice, and pre-
ference to it. For our being so constituted as that virtue
and vice are thus naturally favoured and discountenanced,
rewarded and punished respectively as such, is an intuitive
proof of the intent of nature, that it should be so : other-
wise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus
immediately and directly proceeds, would be absurd. But
it cannot be said, because virtuous actions are sometimes
punished, and vicious actions rewarded, that nature intended
it. For, though this great disorder is brought about, as all
actions are done, by means of some natural passion ; yot
this may lc, as it undoubtedly is. brought about by the
perversion of such passion, implanted in us for other, and
those very good purposes. And indeed these other and
good purposes, even of every passion, may be- clearly
seen.
§ 21. God takes the side of tltc vir bonus.
We have then a declaration, in some degree of present
effect, from him who is supreme in nature, which side he is
of, or what part he takes : a declaration for virtue, _and
against vice. So far therefore as a man is true to virtue,
to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and the right
§§ 21, 22] GOVP;RNMENI^ OF GOD 67
of the case, in whatever he is concerned ; so far he is on the
side of the divine administration, and cooperates with it :
and from hence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret
satisfaction and sense of security, and implicit hope of some-
what further. And,
§ 22. The tendencies of virtue and vice run ahead of the
present facts.
[V.] This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies
of virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet are at
present discernible in nature ; and so aiford an instance of
somewhat moral in the essential constitution of it. There
is, in the nature of things, a tendency in virtue and vice
to produce the good and bad effects now mentioned, in a
greater degree than they do in fact produce them. For
instance ; good and bad men would be much more rewarded
and punished as such, were it not, that justice is often
artificially eluded, that characters are not known, and many,
who would thus favour virtue and discourage vice, are
hindered from doing so by accidental causes. These ten-
dencies of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to
individuals. But it may require more particularly to be
considered, that powder in a society, by being under the
direction of virtue, naturally increases, and has a necessary
tendency to prevail over opposite power, not under the
direction of it ; in like manner as power, by being under
the direction of reason, increases, and has a tendency to
prevail over brute force. There are several brute creatures
of equal, and several of superior strength, to that of men ;
and possibly the sum of the whole strength of brutes may
be greater than that of mankind : but reason gives us the
advantage and superiority over them ; and thus man is
the acknowledged governing animal upon the earth. Nor
is this superiority considered by any as accidental ; but as
what reason has a tendency, in the nature of the thing,
to obtain. And yet perhaps difficulties may be raised
about the meaning, as well as the truth, of the assertion,
that virtue has the like tendency.
F 2
68 OF THE MORAL [l. III.
§ 23. Compare, the tendency of reason to overcome Irutc
force ly union, or with time; this too not uniform.
To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly,
how the case stands with regard to reason ; which is so
readily acknowledged to have this advantageous tendency.
Suppose then two or three men, of the best and most im-
proved understanding, in a desolate open plain, attacked by ten
times the number of beasts of prey : would their reason secure
them the victory in this unequal combat ? Power then,
though joined with reason, and under its direction, cannot
be expected to prevail over opposite power, though merely
brutal, unless the one bears some proportion to the other.
Again : put the imaginary case, that rational and irrational
creatures were of like external shape and manner : it is
certain, before there were opportunities for the first to
distinguish each other, to separate from their adversaries,
and to form an union among themselves, they might be
upon a level, or in several respects upon great disadvantage ;
though united they might be vastly superior : since union
is of such efficacy, that ten men united, might be able to
accomplish, what ten thousand of the same natural strength
and understanding wholly ununited, could not. In this
case then, brute force might more than maintain its ground
against reason, for want of union among the rational
creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon an
island inhabited only by wild beasts ; a number of men
who, by the regulations of civil government, the inventions
of art, and the experience of some years, could they be
preserved so long, would be really sufficient to subdue the
wild beasts, and to preserve themselves in security from
them : yet a conjuncture of accidents might give such ad-
vantage to the irrational animals, as that they might at
once overpower, and even extirpate, the whole species of
rational ones. Length of time then, proper scope and
opportunities, for reason to exert itself, may be absolutely
necessary to its prevailing over brute force. Further still :
there are many instances of brutes succeeding in attempts,
which they could not have undertaken, had not their
§§ 23, 24] GOVERNMENT OF GOD 69
irrational nature rendered them incapable of foreseeing the
danger of such attempts, or the fury of passion hindered
their attending to it ; and there are instances of reason
and real prudence preventing men's undertaking what, it
hath appeared afterwards, they might have succeeded in by
a lucky rashness. And in certain conjunctures, ignorance
and folly, weakness and discord, may have their advantages.
So that rational animals have not necessarily the superiority
over irrational ones : but, how improbable soever it may be,
it is evidently possible, that, in some globes, the latter may
be superior. And were the former wholly at variance and
disunited, by false self-interest and envy, by treachery and
injustice, and consequent rage and malice against each other,
whilst the latter were firmly united among themselves by
instinct ; this might greatly contribute to the introducing
such an inverted order of things. For every one would
consider it as inverted : since reason has, in the nature of
it, a tendency to prevail over brute force ; notwithstanding
the possibility it may not prevail, and the necessity, which
there is, of many concurring circumstances to render it
prevalent.
§ 24. So virtue tends to the acquisition of potuer ;
Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to
procure superiority and additional power : wrhether this
power be considered as the means of security from opposite
power, or of obtaining other advantages. And it has this
tendency, by rendering public good, an object and end, to
eveiy member of the society ; by putting every one upon
consideration and diligence, recollection and self-government,
both in order to see what is the most effectual method, and
also in order to perform their proper part, for obtaining
and preserving it ; by uniting a society within itself, and so
increasing its strength; and, which is particularly to be
mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice. For
as these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence or
public spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody
knows what.
7o
OF THE MORAL
[I. III.
§ 25. And is likely to prevail, if ii'itli a fair field.
And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible dis-
pensations of Providence, to be, in any sort, analogous to
what appears : or that both together make up one uniform
scheme, the two parts of which, the part which we see, and
that which is beyond our observation, are analogous to each
other : then, there must be a like natural tendency in the
derived power, throughout the universe, under the direction
of virtue, to prevail in general over that, which is not under
its direction ; as there is in reason, derived reason in the
universe, to prevail over brute force. But then, in order
to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually produce,
what it has a tendency to produce ; the like concurrences
are necessary, as are, to the prevalence of reason. There
must be some proportion, between the natural power or
force which is, and that which is not. under the direction of
virtue : there must be sufficient length of time ; for the
complete success of virtue, as of reason, cannot, from the
nature of the thing, be otherwise than gradual : there must
be, as one may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and
extensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities, for
the virtuous to join together, to exert themselves against
lawless force, and to reap the fruit of their united labours.
Now indeed it is to be hoped, that the disproportion between
the good and bad, even here on earth, is not so great, but
that the former have natural power sufficient to their pre-
vailing to a considerable degree, if circumstances would
permit this power to be united. For, much less, very much
ss, power under the direction of virtue, would prevail over
tich greater not under the direction of it.
26. Virtue, hindered and militant here, may have full
scope hereafter;
However, good men over the face of the earth cannot unite ;
as for other reasons, so because they cannot be sufficiently
ascertained of each other's characters. And the known
course of human things, the scene we are now passing
through, particularly the shortness of life, denies to virtue
§§25-28] GOVERNMENT OF GOD 71
its full scope in several other respects. The natural
tendency which we have been considering, though real, is
hindered from being carried into effect in the present state :
but these hindrances may be removed in a future one.
Virtue, to borrow the Christian allusion, is militant here ;
and various untoward accidents contribute to its being often
overborne : but it may combat with greater advantage
hereafter, and prevail completely, and enjoy its consequent
rewards, in some future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps
unknown, perhaps despised and oppressed here ; there may
be scenes in eternity, lasting enough, and in every other
way adapted, to afford it a sufficient sphere of action ; and
a sufficient sphere for the natural consequences of it to
follow in fact. If the soul be naturally immortal J, and this
state be a progress towards a future one, as childhood is
towards mature age ; good men may naturally unite, not
only amongst themselves, but also with other orders of
virtuous creatures, in that future state.
§ 27. Is, per se, a bond of union ;
For virtue, from the very nature of it, is a principle and
bond of union, in some degree, amongst all who are endued
with it, and known to each other ; so as that by it, a good
man cannot but recommend himself to the favour and
protection of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole
universe, who can be acquainted with his character, and can
any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his duration.
§ 28. And may far hence win over sitirits capable of
improvement.
And one might add, that suppose all this advantageous
tendency of virtue to become effect, amongst one or more
orders of creatures, in any distant scenes and periods, and to
be seen by any orders of .vicious creatures, throughout the
universal kingdom of God ; this happy effect of virtue would
have a tendency, by way of example, and possibly in other
1 Natural immortality of the soul is put liypothetically here, as
j>. i. 21, 31.
72
OF THE MORAL [I. HI,
ways, to amend those of them, who are capable of amend-
ment, and being recovered to a just sense of virtue. If our
notions of the plan of Providence were enlarged in any sort
proportionable to what late discoveries have enlarged our
views with respect to the material world ; representations of
this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant. How-
ever, they are not to be taken as intended for a literal
delineation of what is in fact the particular scheme of the
universe, which cannot be known without revelation : for
suppositions are not to be looked on as true, because not
incredible : but they are mentioned to show, that our nnd-
ing virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such
superiority and advantages, is no objection against its
having, in the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to
procure them. And the suppositions now mentioned do
plainly show this : for they show, that these hindrances are
so far from being necessary, that we ourselves can easily
conceive, how they may be removed in future states, and full
scope be granted to virtue. And all these advantageous
tendencies of it are to be considered as declarations of God
in its favour. This however is taking a pretty large com-
pass : though it is certain, that, as the material world appears
to be, in a manner boundless and immense ; there must
be some scheme of Providence vast in proportion to it.
§ 29. Suppose an ideal state.
But let us return to the earth our habitation ; and we
shall see this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an
instance not so vast and remote : by supposing a kingdom
or society of men upon it, perfectly virtuous, for a succession
of many ages ; to which, if you please, may be given a
situation advantageous for universal monarchy. In such
a state, there would be no such thing as faction : but men
of the greatest capacity would of course, all along, have the
chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to them ; and
they would share it among themselves without envy. Each
of these would have the part assigned him, to which his
genius was peculiarly adapted : and others, who had not
any distinguished genius, would be safe, and think them-
§§ 29, 30] GOVERNMENT OF GOD 73
selves very happy, by being under the protection and guidance
of those who had. Public determinations would really be
the result of the united wisdom of the community : and
they would faithfully be executed, by the united strength of
it. Some would in a higher way contribute, but all would
in some way contribute, to the public prosperity : and in it,
each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as in-
justice whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among
themselves ; so they would be sufficiently secured from it
in their neighbours. For cunning and false self-interest,
confederacies in injustice, ever slight, and accompanied
with faction and intestine treachery ; these on one hand
would be found mere childish folly and weakness, when set
in opposition against wisdom, public spirit, union inviolable,
and fidelity on the other : allowing both a sufficient length
of years to try their force.
§ 30. Such a state would acquire immense
Add the general influence, which such a kingdom would
have over the face of the earth, by way of example parti-
cularly, and the reverence which would be paid it. It
would plainly be superior to all others, and the world must
gradually come under its empire : not by means of lawless
violence ; but partly by what must be allowed to be just
conquest ; and partly by other kingdoms submitting them-
selves voluntarily to it, throughout a course of ages, and
claiming its protection, one after another, in successive
exigencies. The head of it would be an universal monarch,
in another sense than any mortal has yet been ; and the
eastern style would be literally applicable to him, that
all people, nations, and languages should serve him. And
though indeed our knowledge of human nature, and the
whole history of mankind, show the impossibility, without
some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here
on earth, should unite in one society or government, in the
fear of God and universal practice of virtue ; and that such
a government should continue so united for a succession of
ages : yet admitting or supposing this, the effect would be
as now drawn out. And thus, for instance, the wonderful
74
OF THE MORAL [I. III.
power and prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the
scripture, would be, in a great measure, the consequence of
what is predicted of them ; that the people should be all
righteous, and inherit the land for ever'1 ; were we to under-
stand the latter phrase of a long continuance only, sufficient
to give things time to work. The predictions of this kind,
for there are many of them, cannot come to pass, in the
present known course of nature ; but suppose them come to
pass, and then, the dominion and preeminence promised
must naturally follow, to a very considerable degree.
§ 31. If these anticipations seem trifles for virtue, what,
if they ivere far vice ?
Consider now the general system of religion : that the
government of the world is uniform, and one, and moral ;
that virtue and right shall finally have the advantage, and
prevail over fraud and lawless force, over the deceits, as
well as the violence of wickedness, under the conduct of
one supreme governor : and from the observations above
made, it will appear, that God has, by our reason, given us
to see a peculiar connection in the several parts of this
scheme, and a tendency towards the completion of it arising
out of the very nature of virtue : which tendency is to be
considered as somewhat moral in the essential constitu-
tion of things. If any one should think all this to be of
little importance ; I desire him to consider, what he would
think, if vice had, essentially, and in its nature, these advan-
tageous tendencies ; or if virtue had essentially the direct
contrary ones.
§ 32. His aim is to show tvhithcr the facts of nature
point.
But it may be objected, that, notwithstanding all these
natural effects and these natural tendencies of virtue ; yet
things may be now going on throughout the universe, and
may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here at
present upon earth : virtue sometimes prosperous, some-
times depressed ; vice sometimes punished, sometimes
1 Isa. Ix. 21.
§§ 31-34] GOVERNMENT OF GOD 75
successful. The answer to which is, that it is not the
purpose of this chapter, nor of this Treatise, properly to
prove God's perfect moral government over the world, or
the truth of Religion ; but to observe what there is in the
constitution and course of nature, to confirm the proper
proof of it. supposed to be known : and that the weight
of the foregoing observations to this purpose may be thus
distinctly proved.
§ 33. But this mixed state, if continued, would not
conclude in favour of vice.
Pleasure and pain are indeed to a certain degree, say to
a very high degree, distributed amongst us without any
apparent regard to the merit or demerit of characters. And
were there nothing else 'concerning this matter discernible
in the constitution and course of nature ; there would be
no ground from the constitution and course of nature to
hope or to fear, that men would be rewarded or punished
hereafter according to their deserts : which, however, it
is to be remarked, implies, that even then there would be
no ground from appearances to think, that vice upon the
whole would have the advantage, rather than that virtue
would. And thus the proof of a future state of retribution
would rest upon the usual known arguments for it : which
are I think plainly unanswerable ; and would be so, though
there were no additional confirmation of them from the
things above insisted on. But these things are a very
strong confirmation of them. For,
§ 34. For God is shown to have taken sides already
in the contest.
First, They show, that the Author of nature is not in-
different to virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration
from him, determinate and not to be evaded, in favour
of one, and against the other : such a declaration, as there
is nothing to be set over against or answer, on the part of
vice. So that were a man, laying aside the proper proof
of religion, to determine from the course of nature only,
whether it were most probable, that the righteous or the
76 OF THE MORAL [I. ill.
wicked would have the advantage in a future life ; there
can be no doubt, but that he would determine the proba-
bility to be, that the former would. The course of nature
then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real
practical proof of the obligations of religion.
§ 35. The change ice hope is in degree only, not in kind.
Secondly, When, conformably to what religion teaches us,
God shall reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so
as that every one shall, upon the whole, have his deserts ;
this distributive justice will not be a thing different in kind,
but only in degree, from what we experience in his present
government. It will be that in effect, toward which we
now see a tendency. It will be no jinoro than the completion
of that moral government, the principles and beginning of
which have been shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in
the present constitution and course of nature. And from
hence it follows,
§ 36. The lower degree warrants hope of the higher.
Thirdly, That, as under the natural government of God,
our experience of those kinds and degrees of happiness and
misery, which we do experience at present, gives just
ground to hope for and to fear, higher degrees and other
kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state
admitted : so under his moral government, our experience,
that virtue and vice are, in the manners above mentioned,
actually rewarded and punished at present, in a certain
degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear, that they
may le rewarded and punished in an higher degree here-
after. It is acknowledged indeed that this alone is not
sufficient ground to think, that they actually mil le rewarded
and punished in an higher degree, rather than in a lower :
but then,
§ 37. Essential tendency supplies a firmer basis than
accidental hindrance.
Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the
good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these
§§ 35-38l GOVERNMENT OF GOD 77
tendencies are essential, and founded in the nature of
things : whereas the hindrances to their becoming eifect
are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but artificial only.
Now it may be much more strongly argued, that these
tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and punishments,
of virtue and vice, which arise directly out of the nature
of things, will remain hereafter, than that the accidental
hindrances of them will. And if these hindrances do not
remain ; those rewards and punishments cannot but be
carried on much further towards the perfection of moral
government : i. e. the tendencies of virtue and vice will
become eifect : but when, or where, or in what particular
way, cannot be known at all, but by revelation.
§ 38. Sum of tlte foregoing arguments.
Upon the whole : There is a kind of moral government
implied in God's natural government k : virtue and vice are
naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and mis-
chievous to society 1 ; and rewarded and punished directly
as virtue and vice in. The notion then of a moral scheme
of government is not fictitious, but natural ; for it is
suggested to our thoughts by the constitution and course
of nature : and the execution of this scheme is actually
begun, in the instances here mentioned. And these things
are to be considered as a declaration of the Author of
nature, for virtue, and against vice : they give a credibility
to the supposition of their being rewarded and punished
hereafter ; and also ground to hope and to fear, that they
may be rewarded and punished in higher degrees than they
are here. And as all this is confirmed, so the argument
for religion, from the constitution and course of nature, is
carried on further, by observing, that there are natural
tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial
hindrances, to this moral scheme's being carried on much
further towards perfection, than it is at present". The
notion then of a moral scheme of government, much more
perfect than what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural
k Sup. §§ 8-1 1. ! IbUJ. m Sup. §§ 12, 13.
" Sup. §§ 22-26,
78 PROBATION, [I. IV.
notion ; for it is suggested to our thoughts, by the essen-
tial tendencies of virtue .and vice. And these tendencies
are to be considered as intimations, as implicit promises
and threatenings, from the Author of nature, of much
greater rewards and punishments to follow virtue and
vice, than do at present. And indeed, every natural
tendency, which is to continue, but which is hindered
from becoming effect by only accidental causes, affords
a presumption, that such tendency will, some time or
other, become effect : a presumption in degree propor-
tionable to the length of the duration, through which such
tendency will continue. And from these things together,
arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme of govern-
ment established in nature, shall be carried on much further
towards perfection hereafter ; and, I think, a presumption
that it will be absolutely completed. But from these
things, joined with the moral nature which God has given
us, considered as given us by him, arises a practical proof °
that it will be completed : a proof from fact ; and therefore
a distinct one from that, which is deduced from the eternal
and unalterable relations, the ntness and unfitness of
actions.
CHAPTER IV.
OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFI-
CULTY. AND DANGER.
§ i. Tins probationary life involves trial, difficulty, danger,
and future account.
general doctrine of religion, that our present life is
a state of probation for a future one, comprehends
under it several particular things, distinct from each other.
But the first, and most common meaning of it seems to be,
that our future interest is now depending, and depending
upon ourselves ; that we have scope and opportunities here,
0 Sec this proof drawn out briefly, chap. vi.
§§ i, 2] AS IMPLYING TRIAL 79
for that good and bad behaviour, which God will reward
and punish hereafter ; together with temptations to one, as
well as inducements of reason to the other. And this is, in
great measure, the same with saying, that we are under
the moral government of God, and to give an account of
our actions to him. For the notion of a future account and
general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations
to what is wrong : otherwise there would be no moral
possibility of doing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or
discrimination. But there is this difference, that the word
probation is more distinctly and particularly expressive of
allurements to wrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly
to what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying by such
temptations, than the words moral government. A state ot
probation then, as thus particularly implying in it trial,
difficulties, and danger, may require to be considered
distinctly by itself.
§ 2. Docs the like for this world by natural government,
And as the moral government of God, which religion
teaches us, implies, that we are in a state of trial with
regard to a future world : so also his natural government
over us implies, that we are in a state of trial, in the like
sense, with regard to the present world. Natural government
by rewards and punishments, as much implies natural trial,
as moral government does moral trial. The natural govern-
ment of God here meant a consists in his annexing pleasure
to some actions, and pain to others, which are in our power
to do or forbear, and in giving us notice of such appoint-
ment beforehand. This necessarily implies, that he has
made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to depend
in part upon ourselves. And so far as men have temptations
to any course of action which will probably occasion them
greater temporal inconvenience and uneasiness, than satis-
faction ; so far their temporal interest is in danger from
themselves, or they are in a state of trial with respect to it.
Now people often blame others, and even themselves, for
Chap. ii.
8o PROBATION, [I. IV.
their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And we find
many are greatly wanting to themselves, and miss of that
natural happiness, which they might have obtained in the
present life : perhaps every one does in some degree. But
many run themselves into great inconvenience, and into
extreme distress and misery : not through incapacity of
knowing better, and doing better for themselves, which
would be nothing to the present purpose ; but through
their own fault And these things necessarily imply
temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater or
less degree, with respect to our worldly interest or happi-
ness. Every one too, without having religion in his thoughts,
speaks of the hazards which young people run, upon their
setting out in the world : hazards from other causes, than
merely their ignorance, and unavoidable accidents. And some
courses of vice, at least, being contrary to men's worldly
interest or good ; temptations to these must at the same
time be temptations to forego our present and our future in-
terest. Thus in our natural or temporal capacity, we are
in a state of trial, i. e. of difficulty and danger, analogous,
or like to our moral and religious trial.
§ 3. This probation, in both spheres, is twofold : (a) by
temptation ab extra ;
This will more distinctly appear to any one, who thinks
it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, what it is
which constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe,
how mankind behave under it.
And that which constitutes this our trial, in both these
capacities, must be somewhat either in our external circum-
stances, or in our nature. For, on the one hand, persons
may be betrayed into wrong behaviour upon surprise, or
overcome upon any other very singular and extraordinary
external occasions ; who would, otherwise, have preserved
their character of prudence and of virtue : in which cases,
every one, in speaking of the wrong behaviour of these
persons, would impute it to such particular external cir-
cumstances.
§§3,4] *4S IMPLYING TRIAL 8l
§ 4. And (b) l>y ill habits contracted, and passion*.
And on the other hand, men who have contracted habits
of vice and folly of any kind, or have some particular
passions in excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it were,
go out of their way, to gratify themselves in these respects,
at the expense of their wisdom and their virtue ; led to it,
as every one would say, not by external temptations, but
by such habits and passions. And the account of this last
case is, that particular passions are 110 more coincident1
with prudence, or that reasonable self-love2, the end of
which is our worldly interest, than they are with the
principle of virtue and religion ; but often draw contrary
ways to one, as well as to the other : and so such particular
passions are as much temptations, to act imprudently
with regard to our worldly interest, as to act viciously1'.
However, as wTheii we say, men are misled by external
circumstances of temptation • it cannot but be understood,
that there is somewhat within themselves, to render those
circumstances temptations, or to render them susceptible of
impressions from them : so when we say, they are misled
by passions ; it is always supposed, that there are occasions,
circumstances, and objects, exciting these passions, and
b See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726, 2nd ed. p. 205, &c.
Prof. p. 25, &c. Serin, p. 21, &c. [I have no means of tracing this
reference exactly, but I think it contemplates Preface § 30, and
perhaps Serin. III. §§ 3, 4. ED.]
1 In the Sermons Butler has ' Self-love then, though confined
set forth that self-love is entirely to the interest of the present
distinct from particular passions world, does in general perfectly
and affections. Serm. i. 6, xi. 8; coincide with virtue:' 'though'
also Serm. ii. 15. being equivalent to 'even if,' 'even
2 I understand Butler here to when.' It may be admitted that
mean no more than his words the grammatical form is awkward:
actually convey, namely, that but the alternative interpretation
there is a form or attitude of self- seems to be nothing less than
love which addresses itself to our absurd. For Butler associates
worldly interest, and that it is reasonable self-love with con-
reasonable : but not that this science as the 'chief or superior
interest is the only one content- principles ' in our nature. Serm.
plated by self-love. There is a iii. 13 sub fin.
parallel passage in Serm. iii. 12 :
VOL. I. G
82 PROBATION, [I. IV.
affording means for gratifying them. And therefore,
temptations from within, and from without, coincide, and
mutually imply each other. Now the several external
objects of the appetites, passions, and affections, being
present to the senses, or offering themselves to the mind,
and so exciting emotions suitable to their nature ; not
only in cases where they can be gratified consistently
with innocence and prudence, but also in cases where they
cannot, and yet can be gratified imprudently and viciously :
this as really puts them in danger of voluntarily foregoing,
their present interest or good, as their future ; and as really
renders self-denial necessary to secure one, as the other :
i. e. we are in a like state of trial with respect to both, by
the very same passions, excited by the very same means.
§ 5. The trial is identic : lut -is, in the femoral sphere,
of our prudence ;
Thus mankind having a temporal interest depending upon
themselves, arid a prudent course of behaviour being neces-
sary to secure it ; passions inordinately excited, whether by
means of example, or by any other external circumstance,
towards such objects, at such times, or in such degrees, as
that they cannot be gratified consistently with worldly
prudence ; are temptations, dangerous, and too often suc-
cessful temptations, to forego a greater temporal good for
a less ; i. e. to forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal
interest, for the sake of a present gratification.
§ 6. I)i the religious, of our virtue \
This is a description of our state of trial in our temporal
capacity. Substitute now the word future for temporal, and
1 Inasmuch as prudence is here it draws to itself and assimilates
so clearly distinguished from vir- virtuous elements, while it like-
tue, he appears, when he says wise has regard to other indue*--
elsewhere that it has the nature ments not in themselves virtuous,
of virtue (see Diss. II. 8), to mean though allied with virtue, and
that it has a share of that nature, consequent upon it.
In its reckoning with the future
§§ 5-8] AS IMPLYING TRIAL 83
virtue fox prudence ; and it will be just as proper a description
of our state of trial in our religious capacity ; so analogous
are they to each other.
§ 7. Some arc deceived into wrong ; others face it with
deliberate intent, and for both spheres.
If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in
both capacities, we go on to observe further, how mankind
! behave under it ; we shall find there are some, who have
so little sense of it, that they scarce look beyond the passing
day : they are so taken up with present gratifications, as to
have, in a manner, 110 feeling of consequences, no regard
to their future ease or fortune in this life ; any more than
to their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded
and deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly concerns,
as much as in religion. Others are, not deceived, but, as
it were, forcibly carried away by the like passions, against
their better judgment, and feeble resolutions too of acting
butter. And there are men, and truly they are not a few,
who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their mere
will and pleasure, to be their law of life : and who, in open
defiance of every thing that is reasonable, will go on in
a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse
and little fear, that it will be their temporal ruin ; and some
of them, under the apprehension of the consequences of
wickedness in another state. And to speak in the most
moderate way, human creatures are not only continually
liable to go wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that
they often actually do so, with respect to their temporal
interests, as well as with respect to religion.
§ 8. Our state in each is analogous to the other.
Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials, in our
temporal and our religious capacity, as they proceed
from the same causes, and have the same effect upon
men's behaviour, are evidently analogous, and of the same
kind.
a 2
84 PROBATION, [I. IV.
§ 9. Our dangers aggravated by (a) ads of other*, (b) ill
training, (c) corruptions in religion, (d) our own prior
acts.
It may be added, that as the difficulties and dangers of
miscarrying in our religious state of trial, are greatly
increased, and one is ready to think, in a manner wholly
wade, by the ill behaviour of others ; by a wrong education,
wrong in a moral sense, sometimes positively vicious ; by
general bad example ; by the dishonest artifices which are
got into business of all kinds ; and, in veiy many parts of*
the world, by religion's being corrupted into superstitions \
which indulge men in their vices : so in like manner, the
difficulties of conducting ourselves prudently in respect to
our present interest, and our danger of being led aside from
pursuing it, are greatly increased, by a foolish education ;
and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance and
carelessness of others, whom we have intercourse with ;
and by mistaken notions, very generally prevalent, and
taken up from common opinion, concerning temporal happi-
ness, and wherein it consists. And persons, by their own
negligence and folly in their temporal affairs, no less than
by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties ;
and, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go
through them : and one irregularity after another, embar-
rasses things to such a degree, that they know not where-
about they are ; and often makes the path of conduct so
intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult to trace it out ;
difficult even to determine what is the prudent or the moral
part. Thus, for instance, wrong behaviour 2 in one stage of
life, youth ; wrong, I mean, considering ourselves only in
1 Here Butler evidently looks himself from § 4. Our ill conduct
beyond the Christian pale. In impairs our subsequent position
other passages he specially re- 5tx<£j—
gards it. See II. i. 13, vi. 5. In i. By the habits formed, bias-
Six Sermons, i. 4, he points out sing us «?> infra (§ 4).
the provision of the Divine word, 2. By marring our environment
whereby, with the corruption, the al extra, e.g. by ill repute,
confutation is transmitted. The second is what he here deals
a Butler is not here repeating with exclusivelv.
§§9 -ii] AS IMPLYING TRIAL 85
our temporal capacity, without taking in religion ; this, in
several ways, increases the difficulties of right behaviour
in mature age ; i. e. puts us into a more disadvantageous
state of trial in our temporal capacity.
§ 10. In neither sphere are the demands on us extravagant.
We are an inferior part of the creation of God. There are
natural appearances of our being in a state of degradation c.
And we certainly are in a condition, which does not seem,
by any means, the most advantageous we could imagine or
desire, either in our natural or moral capacity, for securing
either our present or future interest. However, this con-
dition, low and careful and uncertain as it is, does not afford
any just ground of complaint. For, as men may manage
their temporal affairs with prudence, and so pass their days
here on earth in tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a moderate
degree of care : so likewise with regard to religion, there is
no more required than what they are well able to do, and
what they must be greatly wanting to themselves, if they
neglect. And for persons to have that put upon them, which
they are well able to go through, and no more, we naturally
consider as an equitable thing ; supposing it done by proper
authority. Nor have we any more reason to complain of it,
with regard to the Author of nature, than of his not having
given us other advantages, belonging to other orders of
creatures.
§ ii. The religious part is accredited by the natural part.
But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state of trial
\vhich Religion teaches us we are in, is rendered credible,
by its being throughout uniform and of a piece with the
general conduct of Providence towards us, in all other
respects within the compass of our knowledge. Indeed if
mankind, considered in their natural capacity, as inhabitants
of this world only, found themselves, from their birth to
their death, in a settled state of security and happiness,
c Part II. chap. v.
86 PROBATION, [I. IV.
without any solicitude or thought of their own : or if they
were in no danger of being brought into inconveniences and
distress, by carelessness, or the folly of passion, through
bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful appear-
ances of things : were this our natural condition, then it
might seem strange, and be some presumption against the
truth of religion, that it represents our future and more
general interest, as not secure of course, but as depending
upon our behaviour, and requiring recollection and self-
government to obtain it. For it might be alleged, 'What
you say is our condition in one respect, is not in any wise of
a sort with what we find, by experience, our condition is in
another. Our whole present interest is secured to our hands,
without any solicitude of ours ; and why should not our
future interest, if we have any such, be so too ? ' But since,
on the contrary, thought and consideration, the voluntary
denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a course
of behaviour, far from being always agreeable to us ; are
absolutely necessaiy to our acting even a common decent,
and common prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfac-
tion through the present world, and be received upon any
tolerable good terms in it : since this is the case, all pre-
sumption against self-denial and attention being necessary
to secure our higher interest, is removed. Had we not
experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged, that it
is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be
put upon us by an infinite Being ; when eveiy thing which
is hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and will
end in error, confusion, and misery, is now already certain
in his foreknowledge.
§ 12. Though tcliy u'e arc put in hazard ire cannot say.
And indeed, why any thing of hazard and danger should
be put upon such frail creatures as we are. may well be
thought a difficulty in speculation 1 ; and cannot but be so,
1 This mystery, however, like mitted introduction of evil into
most others, seems to run up into the universe, through the creation
the one grand mystery, the per- of free wills.
§§ is, 13] AS IMPLYING TRIAL 87
till we know the whole, or, however, much more of the
case. But still the constitution of nature is as it is. Our
happiness and misery are trusted to our conduct, and made
to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, in many circumstances,
a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do, or to suffer, as
we choose. And all the various miseries of life, which
people bring upon themselves \>y negligence and folly, and
might have avoided by proper care, are instances of this :
which miseries are beforehand just as contingent and unde-
termined as their conduct, and left to be determined bv it.
§ 13. In rcl-if/ion, as in nature, we do not aeecpt,
but acquire.
These observations are an answer to the objections against
the credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations,
and real danger of miscarrying with regard to our general
interest, under the moral government of God : and they
show, that, if we are at all to be considered in such a
capacity, and as having such * an interest ; the general
analogy of Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves
in danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this
interest, by our neglecting to act the proper part belonging
to us in that capacity. For we have a present interest,
under the government of God which we experience here
upon earth. And this interest, as it is not forced upon us,
so neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisi-
tion ; in such sort, as that we are in danger of missing it,
by means of temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it ;
and without attention and self-denial, must and do miss of
it. It is then perfectly credible, that this may be our case,
with respect to that chief and final good, which religion
proposes to us.
88 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. V.
CHAPTER V.
OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL
DISCIPLINE AND IMPRO^7EMENT.
§ i. We cannot supply fully the why of our condition.
FROM the consideration of our being in a probation-state,
of so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the
question, how we came to be placed in it. But such
a general inquiry as this would be found involved in
insuperable difficulties. For, though some of these diffi-
culties would be lessened by observing, that all wickedness
is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion ; and that
many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects :
yet, when we consider other circumstances belonging to
both, and what must be the consequence of the former in
a life to come ; it cannot but be acknowledged plain folly
and presumption, to pretend to give an account of the
whole reasons of this matter : the whole reasons of our
being allotted a condition, out of which so much wickedness
and misery, so circumstanced, would in fact arise. Whether
it be not beyond our faculties, not only to find out, but
even to understand, the whole account of this ; or, though
we should be supposed capable of understanding it, yet,
whether it would be of service or prejudice to us to be
informed of it, is impossible to say.
§ 2. No proof lies against this why : and religion shows
its aim to be our improvement.
But as our present condition can in no wise be shown
inconsistent with the perfect moral government of God :
so religion teaches us we were placed in it, that we might
qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, for another state
which is to follow it. And this, though but a partial
answer, a very partial one indeed, to the inquiry now
mentioned ; yet, is a more satisfactory answer to another,
§§ i-4] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT 89
which is of real, and of the utmost importance to us to have
answered : the inquiry, What is our business here ? The
known end then, why we are placed in a state of so much
affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our improvement in
virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future
state of security and happiness.
§ 3. That this life is to a future one as youth to manhood,
is credible.
Now the beginning of life, considered as an education for
mature age in the present world, appears plainly, at first
sight, analogous to this our trial for a future one : the
former being in our temporal capacity, what the latter is in
our religious capacity. But some observations common to
both of them, and a more distinct consideration of each,
will more distinctly show the extent and force of the
analogy between them ; and the credibility, which arises
from hence, as well as from the nature of the thing, that
the present life was intended to be a state of discipline for
a future one.
§ 4. Our environment corresponds with our selves.
[I.] Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for
a particular way of life ; to which, the nature, the capacities,
temper, and qualifications of each species, are as necessary,
as their external circumstances. Both come into the notion
of such state, or particular way of life, and are constituent
parts of it. Change a man's capacities or character to the
degree, in which it is conceivable they may be changed ;
and he would be altogether incapable of a human course
of life, and human happiness : as incapable, as if, his
nature continuing unchanged, he were placed in a world,
where he had no sphere of action, nor any objects to answrer
his appetites, passions, and affections of any sort. One
thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer
expresses it. Our nature corresponds to our external con-
dition. Without this correspondence, there would be no
possibility of any such thing as human life and human
happiness : which life and happiness are, therefore, a rcsuU
90 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [l. v.
from our nature and condition jointly : meaning by human
life, not living in the literal sense, but the whole complex
notion commonly understood .by those words. So that,
without determining what will be the employment and
happiness, the particular life of good men hereafter ; there
must be some determinate capacities, some necessary
character and qualifications, without which persons cannot
but be utterly incapable of it : in like manner, as there
must be some, without which men would be incapable of
their present state of life. Now.
§ 5. Our powers of storage, self-adaptation, attain iw/
fitness and facility by use.
[II.] The constitution of human creatures, and indeed of
all creatures which come under our notice, is such, as that
they are capable of naturally becoming qualified for states
of life, for which they were once wholly unqualified. In
imagination we may indeed conceive of creatures, as incap-
able of having any of their faculties naturally enlarged, or
as being unable naturally to acquire any new qualifications :
but the faculties of every species known to us are made for
enlargement ; for acquirements of experience and habits.
We find ourselves in particular endued with capacities, not
only of perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving
truth, but also of storing up our ideas and knowledge by
memory. We are capable, not only of acting, and of having
different momentary impressions made upon us ; but of
getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled
alterations in our temper or character. The power of the
two last is the power of habits. But neither the perception
of ideas, nor knowledge of any sort, are habits ; though
absolutely necessary to the forming of them. However,
apprehension, reason, memory, which are the capacities of
acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise.
Whether the word habit is applicable to all these improve-
ments, and in particular how far the powers of memory and
of habits may be powers of the same nature, I shall not
inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds readily
and of course, by means of their having been there before.
§J 5_7] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT 91
seems a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any particular
kind of action, proceeding from being accustomed to it.
§ 6. Habits, bodily and mental, are both passive and active.
And aptness to recollect practical observations of service
in our conduct, is plainly habit in many cases. There are
habits of perception, and habits of action. An instance of
the former, is our constant and even involuntary readiness,
in correcting the impressions of our sight concerning magni-
tudes and distances, so as to substitute judgment in the
room of sensation imperceptibly to ourselves. And it seems
as if all other associations of ideas not naturally connected
might be called passire habits ; as properly as our readiness
in understanding languages upon sight, or hearing of words.
And our readiness in speaking and writing them is an in-
stance of the latter, of active habits. For distinctness, we
may consider habits, as belonging to the body, or the mind :
and the latter will be explained by the former. Under the
former are comprehended all bodily activities or motions,
whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to use :
under the latter, general habits of life and conduct ; such as
those of obedience and submission to authority, or to any
particular person ; those of veracity, justice, and charity ;
those of attention, industry, self-government, envy, revenge.
And habits of this latter kind seem produced by repeated
acts ', as well as the former.
§ 7. These last begot by inward principles carried into act.
And in like manner as habits belonging to the body are
produced by external acts : so habits of the mind are pro-
duced by the exertion of inward practical principles, i. e. by
carrying them into act, or acting upon them ; the principles
of obedience, of veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can
those habits be formed by any external course of action, v
otherwise than as it proceeds from these principles : because
1 Comp. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. II. <3/Wo>j/ tvfpyftwv at t^c/s yivovrai.
7, 8 : teal li't ST) Ao^o; €/f TWJ/ 5(t ras tvfpydas
92 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. V.
it is only these inward principles exerted, which are strictly
acts of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity. So
likewise habits of attention, industry, self-government, are
in the same manner acquired by exercise ; and habits of
envy and revenge by indulgence, whether in outward act,
or in thought and intention, i. e. inward act : for such inten-
tion is an act. Resolutions also to do well are properly acts.
And endeavouring to enforce upon our own minds a practical
sense of virtue, or to beget in others that practical sense of
it, which a man really has himself, is a virtuous act. All
these, therefore, may and will contribute towards forming
good habits.
§ 8. Passive habit loses in power />// tvpctitioH, active (fains.
But going over the theory of virtue in one's thoughts,
talking well, and drawing fine pictures, of it ; this is so far
from necessarily or certainly conducing to form an habit of
it, in him who thus employs himself, that it may harden
the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually more
insensible, i.e. form an habit of insensibility, to all moral
considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, passive
impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by
often passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly : being
accustomed to danger, begets intrepidity, i. e. lessens fear ;
to distress, lessens the passion of pity ; to instances of others'
mortality, lessens the sensible apprehension of our own.
And from these two observations together ; that practical
habits are formed and strengthened by repeated acts, and
that passive impressions grow weaker by being repeated
upon us ; it must follow, that active habits may be gradually
forming and strengthening, by a course of acting upon such
and such motives and excitements, whilst these motives and
excitements themselves are, by proportionable degrees, grow-
ing less sensible, i. e. are continually less and less sensibly
felt, even as the active habits strengthen. And experience
confirms this : for active' principles, at the very time that
they are less lively in perception than they were, are found
to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into the temper
§§8-io] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT 93
and character, and become more effectual in influencing
our practice. The three things just mentioned may afford
instances of it.
§ 9. Though perhaps icitli diminished emotion.
Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive
fear, and active caution : and by being inured to danger,
habits of the latter are gradually wrought, at the same time
that the former gradually lessens. Perception of distress
in others is a natural excitement, passively to pity, and
actively to relieve it : but let a man set himself to attend
to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot
but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various
mi-series of life, with which he must become acquainted ;
when yet, at the same time, benevolence, considered not
as a passion, but as a practical principle of action, will
strengthen : and whilst he passively compassionates the
distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively
l<> assist 'and befriend them. So also at the same time that
the daily instances of men's dying around us give us daily
a less sensible passive feeling or apprehension of our own
mortality, such instances greatly contribute to the strengthen-
ing a practical regard to it in serious men ; i. e. to forming an
habit of acting with a constant view to it.
§ io. The passive may give aid in forming the active.
And this seems again further to show, that passive im-
pressions made upon our minds by admonition, experience,
example, though they may have a remote efficacy, and a very
great one, towards forming active habits, yet, can have this
efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us to such a course
of action : and that it is not being affected so and so, but
acting, which forms those habits : only it must be always
remembered, that real endeavours to enforce good impres-
sions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous action. Nor
do we know how far it is possible, in the nature of things,
that effects should be wrought in us at once, equivalent to
habits, i. e. what is wrought by use and exercise. However,
94 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. V.
the thing insisted upon is, not what may be possible, but
what is in fact the appointment of nature : which is, that
active habits are to be formed by exercise.
§ ii. The formation hard to tracc^ but proved by
experience.
Their progress may be so gradual, as to be imperceptible
of its steps : it may be hard to explain the faculty, by which
we are capable of habits, throughout its several parts ; and
to trace it up to its original, so as to distinguish it from all
others in our mind : and it seems as if contrary effects were
to be ascribed to it. But the thing in general, that our
nature is formed to yield, in some such manner as this, to
use and exercise, is matter of certain experience.
§ 12. J lubit gives readiness, case, pleasure.
Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action,
we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often
pleasure, in it. The inclinations which rendered us averse
to it grow weaker : the difficulties in it, not only the
imaginary but the real ones, lessen : the reasons for it offer
themselves of course to our thoughts upon all occasions :
and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go on,
in a course of action, to which we have been accustomed.
And practical principles appear to grow stronger, absolutely
in themselves, by exercise ; as well as relatively, with regard
to contrary principles ; which, by being accustomed to sub-
mit, do so habitually, and of course. And thus a new
character, in several respects, may be formed ; and many
habitudes of life, not given by nature, but which nature
directs us to acquire.
§ 13. Without habit, nothing in us would mature.
[III.] Indeed we may be assured, that we should never
have had these capacities of improving by experience, ac-
quired knowledge, and habits, had they not been necessary,
and intended to be made use of. And accordingly we find
them so necessary, and so much intended, that without them
§§ 11-14] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT 95
we should be utterly incapable of that, which was the end
for which we were made, considered in our temporal capacity
only: the employments and satisfactions of our mature state
of life.
§ 14. Mature powers given at birth would embarrass
and disable.
Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at
once, for this mature state of life. Even maturity of under-
standing and bodily strength, are not only arrived to
gradually, but are also veiy much owing to the continued
exercise of our powers of body and mind from infancy. But
if we suppose a person brought into the world with both
these in maturity, as far as this is conceivable ; he woidd
plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life of
mature age, as an idiot1. He would be in a manner dis-
tracted, with astonishment, and apprehension, and curiosity,
and suspense : nor can one guess, how long it would be,
before he would be familiarized to himself and the objects
about him enough, even to set himself to any thing. It
may be questioned too, whether the natural information of
his sight and hearing would be of any manner of use at all
to him in acting; before experience. And it seems, that
men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and
disposed to exert themselves with an impetuosity, which
would render society insupportable, and the living in it
impracticable ; were it not for some acquired moderation
and self-government, some aptitude and readiness in restrain-
ing themselves, and concealing their sense of things. Want
of every thing of this kind which is learnt would render
a man as uncapable of society, as want of language would ;
or as his natural ignorance of any of the particular employ-
ments of life would render him uncapable of providing
himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the
necessary wants of it.
1 This argument (perhaps some- argued above (§ 4) as to the cor-
what succinctly expressed) ad- rospon donee between self and the
mirably illustrates what lie has environment.
96 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. V.
§ 15. Nature leaves us unfurnished,
In these respects, and probably in many more, of which
we have no particular notion, mankind is left, by nature, an
unformed, unfinished creature ; utterly deficient and un-
qualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience,
and habits, for that mature state of life, which was the end
of his creation, considering him as related only to this world.
§ 16. But w/M a capacity for furnishing,
But then, as nature has endued us with a power of
supplying those deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, ex-
perience, and habits : so likewise we are placed in a condition,
in infancy, childhood, and youth, fitted for it ; fitted for our
acquiring those qualifications of all sorts, which we stand in
need of in mature age. Hence children, from their very
birth, are daily growing acquainted with the objects about
, them, with the scene in which they are placed, and to have
/ a future part ; and learning somewhat or other, necessary
to the performance of it. The subordinations, to which they
are accustomed in domestic life, teach them self-government
in common behaviour abroad, and prepare them for subjec-
tion and obedience to civil authority.
§ 17. By effort, and progress of life.
What passes before their eyes, and daily happens to
them, gives them experience, caution against treachery and
deceit, together with numberless little rules of action and
conduct, which we could not live without ; and which are
learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as to be mistaken
perhaps for instinct : though they are the effect of long
experience and exercise ; as much so as language, or
knowledge in particular business, or the qualifications and
behaviour belonging to the several ranks and professions.
Thus the beginning of our days is adapted to be, and is,
a state of education in the theory and practice of mature
life. We are much assisted in it by example, instruction,
and the care of others ; but a great deal is left to ourselves
to do. And of this, as part is done easily and of course ;
§§ 15-^9] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT 97
so part requires diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing
many things which we desire, and setting ourselves to what
we should have no inclination to, but for the necessity or
expedience of it. For, that labour and industry, which
the station of so many absolutely requires, they would be
greatly unqualified for, in maturity ; as those in other
stations would be, for any other sorts of application ; if
both were not accustomed to them in their youth. And
according as persons behave themselves, in. the general
education which all go through, and in the particular ones
adapted to particular employments ; their character is
formed, and made appear ; they recommend themselves
more or less ; and are capable of, and placed in, different
stations in the society of mankind.
§ 18. Analogy between preparation for matwityy and
for survival.
The former part of life then is to be considered as an
important opportunity, which nature puts into our hands ;
and which, when lost, is not to be recovered. And our
being placed in a state of discipline throughout this life,
for another world, is a providential disposition of things,
exactly of the same kind, as our being placed in a state of
discipline during childhood, for mature age. Our condition
in both respects is uniform and of a piece, and compre-
hended under one and the same general law of nature.
§ 19. Which miyht hold ccen were the how of this
p reparation u ndisco verable.
And if we were not able at all to discern, how or in what
way the present life could be our preparation for another ;
this would be no objection against the credibility of its
being so. For we do not discern, how food and sleep
contribute to the growth of the body : nor could have any
thought that they would, before we had experience. Nor do
children at all think, on the one hand, that the sports and
exercises, to which they are so much addicted, contribute to
their health and growth ; nor, on the other, of the necessity
VOL. I. H
98 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. V.
which there is for their being restrained in them : nor are
they capable of understanding the use of many parts of
discipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go
through, in order to qualify them for the business of mature
age. Were we not able then to discover, in what respects
the present life could form us for a future one : yet nothing
would be more supposable than that it might, in some
respects or other, from the general analogy of Providence.
§ 20. Is corroborated, if we take God's moral
government into view.
And this, for ought I see, might reasonably be said, even
though we should not take in the consideration of God's
moral government over the world. But,
[IV.] Take in this consideration, and consequently, that
the character of virtue and piety is a necessaiy qualification
for the future state ; and then we may distinctly see, how,
and in what respects, the present life may be a preparation
for it : since we ivant, and are capable of, improvement in that
character, ~by moral and religious habits ; and the present life is
fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement : in like
manner as we have already observed, how, and in what
respects, infancy, childhood, and youth, are a necessary
preparation, and a natural state of discipline, for mature
age.
§21. The future life is probably active; common; and more
sensibly under divine government.
Nothing which we at present see would lead us to the
thought of a solitary unactive state hereafter : but, if we
judge at all from the analogy of nature, we must suppose,
according to the scripture account of it, that it will be a com-
munity. And there is no shadow of any thing unreasonable
in conceiving, though there be no analogy for it, that this
community will be, as the scripture represents it, under the
more immediate, or, if such an expression may be used, the
more sensible government of God. Nor is our ignorance,
what will be the employments of this happy community, nor
§ 20-23] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT 99
our consequent ignorance, what particular scope or occasion
there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity,
amongst the members of it with regard to each other ; any
proof, that there will be no sphere of exercise for those
virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance
any proof, that there will be no occasion for that frame of
mind, or character, which is formed by the daily practice
of those particular virtues here, and which is a result from
it. This at least must be owned in general, that, as the
government established in the universe is moral, the cha-
racter of virtue and piety must, in some way or other, be
the condition of our happiness, or the qualification for it.
§ 22. Habits are the fitting antidote for our liability
to lapse,
Now from what is above observed, concerning our natural
power of habits, it is easy to see, that we are capable of
moral improvement by discipline. And how greatly we
want it, need not be proved to any one who is acquainted
with the great wickedness of mankind ; or even with those
imperfections, which the best are conscious of. But it is
not perhaps distinctly attended to by every one, that the
occasion which human creatures have for discipline, to
improve in them this character of virtue and piety, is to be
traced up higher than to excess in the passions, by indul-
gence and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps all finite
creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, before
habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating
from what is right : and therefore stand in need of virtuous
habits, for a security against this danger \
§ 23. Which arises because we have propensions not
subjected to virtue.
For, together with the general principle of moral under-
standing, we have in our inward frame various affections
towards particular external objects. These affections are
1 Inf. § 29,
H 2
100 PROBATION, AS INTENDED t>OR [l. V.
naturally, and of right, subject to the government of the
moral principle, as to the occasions upon which they may
be gratified ; as to the times, degrees, and manner, in which
the objects of them may be pursued : but then the principle
of virtue can neither excite them, nor prevent their being
excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt, when the
objects of them are present to the mind, not only before
all consideration, whether they can be obtained by lawful
means, but after it is found they cannot. For the natural
objects of affection continue so ; the necessaries, conveni-
ences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally desirable ;
though they cannot be obtained innocently : nay, though
they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the
objects of any affection whatever cannot be obtained with-
out unlawful means ; but may be obtained by them : such
affection, though its being excited, and its continuing some
time in the mind, be as innocent as it is natural and
necessary ; yet cannot but be conceived to have a tendency
to incline persons to venture upon such unlawful means :
and therefore must be conceived as putting them in some
danger of it.
§ 24. Habit (fives us a security ab intra.
Now what is the general security against this danger,
against their actually deviating from right ? As the danger
is, so also must the security be, from within : from the
practical principle of virtue11. And the strengthening or
a It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually
Sense of interest, as restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by
mere pleasure in- a Sense °^ tnterest is meant a speculative conviction
sufficient; as com- °r belief> that such and «ucn indulgence would
prehensive regard occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole,
to happiness, is than satisfaction ', it is contrary to present expe-
part of virtue! nence to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient
to restrain them from thus indulging themselves.
And if by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to what is iqwu
the whole our happiness : this is not only coincident with the prin-
ciple of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And
it is evident this reasonable sclf-love wants to be improved, as really
§§ 24, 25] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT IOI
improving this principle, considered as practical, or as a
principle of action, will lessen the danger, or increase the
security against it. And this moral principle is capable
of improvement, by proper discipline and exercise : by
recollecting the practical impressions which example and
experience have made upon us : and, instead of following
humour and mere inclination, by continually attending
to the equity and right of the case, in whatever we are
engaged, be it in greater or less matters ; and accustoming
ourselves always to act upon it ; as being itself the just
and natural motive of action : and as this moral course of
behaviour must necessarily, under divine government, be
our final interest. Thus the principle of virtue, improved into
an habit, of which improvement we are thus capable, will plainly
be, in proportion to the strength of it, a security against the
danger which finite creatures arc in, from the -very nature of
propension, or particular affections.
§ 25. May have place in a future life ; is anyhow an
advance in virtue.
This way of putting the matter, supposes particular
affections to remain in a future state ; which it is scarce
possible to avoid supposing. And if they do ; we clearly
see, that acquired habits of virtue and self-government may
be necessary for the regulation of them. However, though
we were not distinctly to take in this supposition, but to
speak only in general ; the thing really comes to the same.
For habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are im-
provement in virtue : and improvement in virtue must
be advancement in happiness, if the government of the
universe be moral.
as any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, net
only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love
of imitation, by any thing, even indolence: especially if the interest,
the temporal interest, suppose, which is the end of such self-love,
be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men mistaken, when
they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self-love.
And so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle.
See pp. 80-83.
102 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v.
§ 26. Liberty renders falling possible, Init does not
account for it.
From these things we may observe, and it will further
show this our natural and original need of being improved
by discipline, how it comes to pass, that creatures made
upright fall ; and that those who preserve their upright-
ness, by so doing, raise themselves to a more secure state
of virtue. To say that the former is accounted for by the
nature of liberty, is to say 110 more, than that an event's
actually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of
its happening.
§ 27. It seems explained Inj the nature of partieular
propensions.
But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very nature
of particular affections or propensions. For, suppose crea-
tures intended for such a particular state of life, for which
such propensions were necessary : suppose them endued
with such propensions, together with moral understanding,
as well including a practical sense of virtue, as a speculative
perception of it ; and that all these several principles, both
natural and moral, forming an inward constitution of mind,
were in the most exact proportion possible ; i. e. in a pro-
portion the most exactly adapted to their intended state of
life : such creatures would be made upright, or finitely per-
fect. Now particular propensions, from their very nature,
must be felt, the objects of them being present ; though
they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of
the moral principle. But if they can be gratified without
its allowance, or by contradicting it ; then they must be
conceived to have some tendency, in how low a degree
soever, yet some tendency, to induce persons to such for-
bidden gratification. This tendency, in some one particular
propension, may be increased, by the greater frequency of
occasions naturally exciting it, than of occasions exciting
others. The least voluntary indulgence in forbidden circum-
stances, though but in thought, will increase this wrong
tendency ; and may increase it further, till, peculiar con-
§§ 26-29] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT 103
junctures perhaps conspiring, it becomes effect ; and danger
of deviating from right, ends in actual deviation from it :
a danger necessarily arising from the very nature of propen-
sion ; and which therefore could not have been prevented,
though it might have been escaped, or got innocently
through. The case would be, as if we were to suppose a
strait path marked out for a person, in which such a degree
of attention would keep him steady : but if he would not
attend in this degree, any one of a thousand objects, catching
his eye, might lead him out of it.
§ 28. Disobedience, single, produces disorder, of unde-
fined amount ; if repeated, habit.
Now it is impossible to say, how much even the first
full overt act of irregularity might disorder the inward
constitution ; unsettle the adjustments, and alter the pro-
portions, which formed it, and in which the uprightness of
its make consisted : but repetition of irregularities would
produce habits. And thus the constitution would be
spoiled ; and creatures made upright, become corrupt and
depraved in their settled character, proportionally to their
repeated irregularities in occasional acts.
§ 29. Is the counterpart to that capacity of betterment,
which might raise its up to safety.
But on the contrary, these creatures might have improved
and raised themselves, to an higher and more secure state
of virtue, by the contrary behaviour : by steadily following
the moral principle, supposed to be one part of their nature ;
and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection,
which necessarily arose from propension, the other part of
it. For, by thus preserving their integrity for some time,
their danger would lessen ; since propensions, by being
inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course :
and their security against this lessening danger would
increase ; since the moral principle would gain additional
strength by exercise : both which things are implied in the
notion of virtuous habits. Thus then vicious indulgence is
104 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. V.
not only criminal in itself, but also depraves the inward
constitution and character. And virtuous self-government
is not only right in itself, but also improves the inward
constitution or character: and may improve it to such a
degree, that though we should suppose it impossible, for
particular affections to be absolutely coincident with the
moral principle ; and consequently should allow, that such
creatures as have been above supposed, would for ever
remain defectible ; yet their danger of actually deviating
from right may be almost infinitely lessened, and they
fully fortified against what remains of it : if that may be
called danger, against which there is an adequate effectual
security. But still, this their higher perfection may con-
tinue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a state of
discipline, and this their more complete security remain
to proceed from them. And thus it is plainly conceivable,
that creatures without blemish, as they came out of the
hands of God, may be in danger of going wrong ; and so
may stand in need of the security of virtuous habits, addi-
tional to the moral principle wrought into their natures by
him. That which is the ground of their danger, or their
want of security, may be considered as a deficiency in them,
to which virtuous habits are the natural supply1, And as
they are naturally capable of being raised and improved
by discipline, it may be a thing fit and requisite that they
should be placed in circumstances with an eye to it : in
circumstances peculiarly fitted to be, to them,- a state of
discipline for their improvement in virtue.
§ 30. Need of train inf/ enhanced for us wlto Jiare
'corrupted our natures/
But how much more strongly must this hold with respect
to those, who have corrupted their natures, are fallen from
their original rectitude, and whose passions are become
excessive by repeated violations of their inward constitution?
Upright creatures may want to be improved : depraved
1 Sup. § 22.
§§30-3'] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT 105
creatures want to be renewed. Education and discipline,
which may be in all degrees and sorts of gentleness and
of severity, is expedient for those : but must be absolutely
necessary for these. For these, discipline of the severer sort
too, and in the higher degrees of it, must be necessary, in
order to wear out vicious habits ; to recover their primitive
strength of self-government, which indulgence must have
weakened ; to repair, as well as raise into an habit, the
moral principle, in order to their arriving at a secure state
of virtuous happiness.
§ 31. The varied lessons of tlie present state peculiarly
fit it for discipline.
Now whoever will consider the thing, may clearly see,
that the present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of dis-
cipline for this purpose, to such as will set themselves to
mend and improve. For, the various temptations with
which we are surrounded ; our experience of the deceits
of wickedness ; having been in many instances led wrong
ourselves ; the great viciousness of 'the world ; the infinite
disorders consequent upon it ; our being made acquainted
\vith pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of it, or
from the sight of it in others ; these things, though some
of them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds,
yet when duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct
tendency to bring us to a settled moderation and reasonable-
ness of temper : the contrary both to thoughtless levity,
and also to that unrestrained self-will, and violent bent
to follow present inclination, which may be observed in
undisciplined minds. Such experience, as the present state
affords, of the frailty of our nature ; of the boundless
extravagance of ungoverned passion ; of the power which
an infinite Being has over us, by the various capacities of
misery which he has given us ; in short, that kind and
degree of experience, which the present state affords us,
that the constitution of nature is such as to admit the
possibility, the danger, and the actual event, of creatures
losing their innocence and happiness, and becoming vicious
106 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. V.
and wretched ; hath a tendency to give us a practical sense
of things, very different from a mere speculative knowledge
that we are liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who
knows, whether the security of creatures in the highest and
most settled state of perfection, may not in part arise, from
their having had such a sense of things as this, formed, and
habitually fixed within them, in some state of probation?
And passing through .the present world with that moral
attention, which is necessary to the acting a right part in
it, may leave everlasting impressions of this sort upon our
minds. But to be a little more distinct : allurements to
what is wrong ; difficulties in the discharge of our duty ;
our not being able to act an uniform right part without
some thought and care ; and the opportunities which we
have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we dislike, or
obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when we
either cannot do it at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful
ones ; these things, i. e. the snares and temptations of vice,
are what render the present world peculiarly fit to be a
state of discipline, to those wrho will preserve their integrity :
because they render being upon our guard, resolution, and
the denial of our passions, necessary in order to that end.
§ 32. Wherein habit is confirmed fy/ persistent effort,
and by wariness against temptations.
And the exercise of such particular recollection, intention
of mind, and self-government, in the practice of virtue, has,
from the make of our nature, a peculiar tendency to form
habits of virtue ; as implying, not only a real, but also a
more continued, and a more intense exercise of the virtuous
principle ; or a more constant and a stronger effort of virtue
exerted into act. Thus suppose a person to know himself
to be in particular danger, for some time, of doing any
thing wrong, which yet he fully resolves not to do : con-
tinued recollection, and 'keeping upon his guard, in order
to make good his resolution, is a continued exerting of that
act of virtue in a hinh degree, which need have been, and
perhaps would have been, only instantaneous and weak, had
the temptation been so. It is indeed ridiculous to assert,
§§ 32, 33 ] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT 107
that self-denial is essential to virtue and piety: but it would
have been nearer the truth, though not strictly the truth
itself, to have said, that it is essential to discipline and
improvement \ Tor though actions materially virtuous,
which have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable
to our particular inclinations, may possibly be done only
from these particular inclinations, and so may not be any
exercise of the principle of virtue, i. e. not be virtuous
actions at all ; yet, on the contrary, they may be an exercise
of that principle : and when they are, they have a tendency
to form and fix the habit of virtue, But when the exercise
of the virtuous principle is more continued, oftener repeated,
and more intense ; as it must be in circumstances of danger,
temptation, and difficulty, of any kind and in any degree ;
this tendency is increased proportionably, and a more
confirmed habit is the consequence.
§ 33. This law, even if limited by the latv of a mean
in moral character, is not subverted.
This undoubtedly holds to a certain length : but how far
it may hold, I know not. Neither our intellectual powers,
nor our bodily strength, can be improved beyond such a
degree : and both may be over-wrought. Possibly there
may be somewhat analogous to this, with respect to the
moral character ; which is scarce worth considering. And
I mention it only, lest it should come into some persons'
thoughts, not as an exception to the foregoing observations,
which perhaps it is ; but as a confutation of them, which
it is not. And there may be several other exceptions.
Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold
minutely, and in every case. It is enough that they hold
in general. And these plainly hold so far, as that from
them may be seen distinctlj7', which is all that is intended
by them, that the present world is peculiarly fit to be a state
of discipline, for our improvement in virtue and piety : in the
1 Because if the state of virtue or mortify. Comp. also Aristotle,
be perfect, all the inclinations are Eth. Nic. II. iii. i.
right, and there is nothing to deny
108 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. V.
same sense as some sciences, by requiring and engaging the
attention, not to be sure of such persons as will not, but
of such as will, set themselves to them ; are fit to form the
mind to habits of attention.
§ 34. Life as a discipline of vice to the majority is thereby
enhanced as a discipline of virtue to the good.
Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in event,
a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, that, on the
contrary, they seem to make it a discipline of vice. And
the viciousness of the world is, in different ways, the great
temptation, which renders it a state of virtuous discipline,
in the degree it is, to good men. The whole end, and the
whole occasion, of mankind's being placed in such a state
as the present, is not pretended to be accounted for. That
which appears amidst the general corruption, is, that there
are some persons, who, having within them the principle of
amendment and recovery, attend to and follow the notices
of virtue and religion, be they more clear or more obscure,
which are afforded them ; and that the present world is, not
only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an exercise
of it in ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it : apt
to improve it, in some respects, even beyond what would
be, by the exercise of it, required in a perfectly virtuous
society, or in a society of equally imperfect virtue with
themselves. But that the present world does not actually
become a state of moral discipline to many, even to the
generality, i. e. that they do not improve or growr better in
it, cannot be urged as a proof, that it was not intended for
moral discipline, by any who at all observe the analogy of
nature.
§ 35- The enormous waste in creation, though nnaccountaUc,
does not disprove design.
For, of the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of
animals, which are adapted and put in the way, to improve
to such a point or state of natural maturity and perfection,
we do not see perhaps that one in a million actually does.
§§34-36] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT 109
Far the greatest part of them decay before they are improved
to it ; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet no one,
who does not deny all final causes, will deny, that those
seeds and bodies, which do attain to that point of maturity
and perfection, answer the end for which they were really
designed by nature ; and therefore that nature designed
them for such perfection !. And I cannot forbear adding,
though it is not to the present purpose, that the appearance
of such an amazing tvaste in nature, with respect to these
seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccount-
able, as, what is much more terrible, the present and future
ruin of so many moral agents by themselves, i. e. by vice.
§ 36. Obedience from hope or fear forms habits,
and grows into morality'*.
Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may
be objected, in another way ; that so far as a course of
behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear,
so far it is only a discipline and strengthening of self-love.
But doing what God commands, because he commands it,
is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. And
a course of such obedience will form habits of it. And a
constant regard to veracity, justice and charity, may form
distinct habits of these particular virtues ; and will certainly
form habits of self-government, and of denying our inclina-
tions, whenever veracity, justice or charity requires it. Nor
is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which
some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate
all religion proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity,
justice and charity, regard to God's authority, and to our
own chief interest, are not only all three coincident ; but
each of them is, in itself, .a just and natural motive or
principle of action. And he who begins a good life from
any one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in
some degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more,
1 The waste impairs design as duced, is not destroyed,
a whole : but not as to all the 2 See Shaftesbury, Inquiiy coit-
parts. So the argument, if re- ccniing Virtue, Part III. iii. 3.
110 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. V.
of that character, which is correspondent to the constitution
of nature as moral ; and to the relation, which God stands
in to us as moral Governor of it : nor consequently can he
fail of obtaining that happiness which this constitution and
relation necessarily suppose connected with that character.
§ 37. Passive virtue, or resignation, is also good.
Training in patience may be needful.
These several observations, concerning the active principle
of virtue and obedience to God's commands, are applicable
to passive submission or resignation to his will l : which is
another essential part of a right character, connected with
the former, and very much in our power to form- ourselves
to. It may be imagined, that nothing but afflictions can
give occasion for, or require this virtue ; that it can have no
respect to, nor be any way necessary to qualify for, a state
of perfect happiness : but it is not experience which can
make us think thus. Prosperity itself, whilst any thing
supposed desirable is not ours, begets extravagant and
unbounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as much
a source of discontent, as any thing in our external con-
dition. It is indeed true, that there can be 110 scope for
patience, when sorrow shall be no more : but there may be
need of a temper of mind, which shall have been formed by
patience.
§ 38. Self-love, not always conforming to God's ivill, may
require aid from the habit of resignation '2.
For, though self-love, considered merely as an active
principle leading us to pursue our chief interest, cannot
but be uniformly coincident with the principle of obedience
to God's commands, our interest being rightly understood ;
because this obedience, and the pursuit of our own chief
1 In Serm. xiv. §§ 5, 6, on the Human Nature, § 15, self-love is
love of God, a much larger scope described as a principle superior
is given to resignation : perhaps in kind to passion ; but then it is
one beyond what the word itself self-love under watch and ward,
in ^strictness admits. so to speak : * reasonable ' and
2 In the Second Sermon on ' cool ' self-love.
§§37-39] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT III
interest, must be in every case one and the same thing : yet
it may be questioned, whether self-love, considered merely
as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can, from
its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with
the will of God ; any more than particular affections can b :
coincident in such sort, as not to be liable to be excited
upon occasions and in degrees, impossible to be gratified
consistently with the constitution of things, or the divine
appointments. So that habits of resignation may, upon this
account, be requisite for all creatures : habits, I say ; which
signify what is formed by use. However, in general it
is obvious that both self-love and particular affections in
human creatures, considered only as passive feelings, distort
and rend the mind ; and therefore stand in need of disci-
pline *. Now denial of those particular affections, in a course
of active virtue and obedience to God's will, has a tendency
to moderate them ; and seems also to have a tendency to
habituate the mind, to be easy and satisfied with that
degree of happiness which is allotted us, i. e. to moderate
self-love.
§ 39. Passive obedience is suited to affliction, and
integrates the active.
But the proper discipline for resignation is affliction.
For a right behaviour under that trial ; recollecting our-
selves so as to consider it in the view, in which religion
teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of God ; receiving
it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in his
world and under his government ; this will habituate the
mind to a dutiful submission. And such submission,
together with the active principle of obedience, make up
the temper and character in us, which answers to his sove-
reignty ; and which absolutely belongs to the condition of
our being, as dependent creatures. Nor can it be said, that
this is only breaking the mind to a submission to mere
Sup. § 23.
1 Comp. Serm. xi. 7.
112 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. V.
power ; for mere power may be accidental, and precarious,
and usurped : but it is forming within ourselves the temper
of resignation to his rightful authority, who is, by nature,
supreme over all.
§ 40. Character proper for this life and another depends
upon action.
Upon the whole : Such a character, and such qualifica-
tions, are necessary for a mature state of life in the present
world, as nature alone does in no wise bestow ; but has put
it upon us, in great part, to acquire, in our progress from
one stage of life to another, from childhood to mature age :
put it upon us to acquire them, by giving us capacities of
doing it, and by placing us, in the beginning of life, in
a condition fit for it. And this is a general analogy to our
condition in the present world, as in a state of moral dis-
cipline for another. It is in vain then to object against
the credibility of the present life's being intended for this
purpose, that all the trouble and the danger, unavoidably
accompanying such discipline, might have been saved us,
by our being made at once the creatures and the characters,
which ice were to be. For we experience, that what we were
to be, was to be the effect of what we would do : and that
the general conduct of nature is, not to save us trouble or
danger, but to make us capable of going through them, and
to put it upon us to do so.
§ 41. Attainment of right qualifications parallel to
the supply of legitimate wants.
Acquirements of our own, experience and habits, are the
natural supply to our deficiencies, and security against our
dangers: since it is as plainly natural to set ourselves to
acquire the qualifications, as the external things, which we
stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general
law of nature, that we should, with regard to our temporal
interest, form and cultivate practical principles within us,
by attention, use, and discipline, as any thing whatever is
a natural law; chiefly in the beginning of life, but also
§§ 4o - 4 2 ] DISCIPLINE A ND IMPR O YEMEN T 113
throughout the whole course of it. And the alternative is
left to our choice : either to improve ourselves, and better
our condition ; or, in default of such improvement, to remain
deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly credible,
from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our case,
with respect to the happiness of a future state, and the
qualifications necessary for it.
§ 42. Manifestation of character may be Tr
*• a further purpose of our probation.
There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the
present world's being a state of probation ; that it is a
theatre of action, for the manifestation of persons' charac-
ters, with respect to a future one : not to be sure to an all-
knowing Being, but to his creation or part of it. This
may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being in a
state of probation in the other senses. However, it is not
impossible, that men's showing and making manifest what
is in their heart, what their real character is, may have
respect to a future life, in ways and manners which we are
not acquainted with : particularly it may be a means, for the
Author of nature does not appear to do any thing without
means, of their being disposed of suitably to their charac-
ters ; and of its being known to the creation, by way of
example, that they are thus disposed of. But not to enter
upon any conjectural account of this ; one may just mention,
that the manifestation of persons' characters contributes
very much, in various ways, to the carrying on a great part
of that general course of nature, respecting mankind, which
comes under our observation at present. I shall only add,
that probation, in both these senses, as well as in that
treated of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral
government : since by persons' behaviour under it, their
characters cannot but be manifested, and, if they behave
well, improved.
VOL. I.
1 14 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY [I. VI.
CHAPTER VI1.
OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS
INFLUENCING PRACTICE.
§ i. If this opinion comports until nature, why not also
with religion ?
fTlHROUGHOUT the foregoing Treatise it appears, that
J- the condition of mankind, considered as inhabitants
of this world only, and under the government of God which
we experience, is greatly analogous to our condition, as
designed for another world, or under that further govern-
ment, which religion teaches us. If therefore any assert,
as a fatalist must, that the opinion of universal necessity
is reconcilable with the former2; there immediately arises
a question in the way of analogy, whether he must not also
own it to be reconcilable with the latter, i. e. with the
system of religion itself, and the proof of it The reader
then will observe, that the question now before us is not
absolute, Whether the opinion of fate be reconcilable with
religion ; but hypothetical, Whether, upon supposition of
its being reconcilable with the constitution of nature, it
be not reconcilable with religion also : or, what pretence
1 This chapter may be said not port from the Calvinistic school,
to fall strictly within the lines of most powerfully represented by
the proper argument of the work. Jonathan Edwards, whose work,
It removes, however, out of But- however, did not appear until
ler's way a superficial objection, 1754.
which he shows to be inapplicable a A fatalist holds as such ' the
to the treatment of practical ques- opinion of universal necessity/
tions. He may have done this Mr. Stephen (English Thought, c. v.
because the idea was too promi- § 18) distinguishes fatalism, as
nent among the philosophical an occasional necessity, from nni-
notions of the day to be simply versa! necessity, charges Butler
passed by with safety. For he with confounding them, and hence
tells us (§ 14) that the opinion of infers Butler's weakness as a
necessity was the fashionable plea metaphysician. But we see from
for unbelief. It is to be borne this passage that fatalism is in
in mind that the notions of the Butler's view a synonym for
fatalists received a powerful sup- universal necessity. "
J§ T_3] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE 115
a fatalist, not other persons, but a fatalist, has to conclude
from his opinion, that there can be no such thing as religion.
And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must unavoidably
arise from arguing upon so absurd l a supposition as that
of universal necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen ; it will,
I hope, as easily be excused.
But since it has been all along taken for granted, as a
thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature,
or natural Governor of the world ; and since an objection
may be made against the proof of this, from the opinion
of universal necessity, as it may be supposed, that such
necessity will itself account for the origin and preservation
of all things : it is requisite, that this objection be distinctly
answered ; or that it be shown, that a fatality, supposed
consistent with what we certainly experience, does not
destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of
nature ; before we proceed to consider, whether it destroys
the proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a
state of religion.
§ 2. Fate or no fate, agency by choice is matter of experience.
Now, when it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitu-
tion of nature, and the actions of men, that every thing, and
every mode and circumstance of every thing, is necessary,
and could not possibly have been otherwise ; it is to be
observed, that this necessity does not exclude deliberation,
choice, preference, and acting from certain principles, and
to certain ends: because all this is matter of undoubted
experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may,
every moment, be conscious of.
§ 3. Only alleges an incident of being, no way explains the how.
And from hence it follows, that necessity, alone and of
itself, is in no sort an account of the constitution of nature,
and how things came to l)e and to continue as they are ; but
only an account of this circumstance relating to their origin
1 Comp. § 8.
I 2
Il6 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY [I. VI.
and continuance, that they could not have been otherwise
than they are and have been. The assertion, that eveiy thing
is by necessity of nature, is not an answer to the question;
Whether the world came into being as it is, by an intelligent
agent forming it thus, or not : but to quite another question ;
Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner
which we call necessarily, or in that way and manner which
we call freely. For suppose further, that one who was a
fatalist, and one who kept to his natural sense of things,
and believed himself a free agent, were disputing together,
and vindicating their respective opinions ; and they should
happen to instance in a house : they would agree that it was
built by an architect. Their difference concerning necessity
and freedom would occasion no difference of judgment con-
cerning this ; but only concerning another matter ; whether
the architect built it necessarily or freely. Suppose then they
should proceed to inquire concerning the constitution of
nature : in a lax way of speaking, one of them might say,
it was by necessity ; and the other, by freedom : but if they
had any meaning to their words, as the latter must mean
a free agent, so the former must at length be reduced to
mean an agent, whether he would say one or more, acting
by necessity : for abstract notions can do nothing.
§ 4. God exists l)y a necessity antecedent to design : this is
but a manner of speech.
Indeed we ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused
by any agent. For we find within ourselves the idea of
infinity, i. e. immensity and eternity, impossible, even in
imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to discern
intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be somewhat,
external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype
of it. And from hence (for tins abstract, as much as any
other, implies a concrete) we conclude, that there is and cannot
but be, an infinite, an immense eternal Being existing, prior
to all design contributing to his existence, and exclusive
of it. And from the scantiness of language, a manner of
speaking has been introduced ; that necessity is the founda-
tion, the reason, the account of the existence of God. But
§§4-6] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE 117
it is not alleged, nor can it be at all intended, that ecery thing
exists as it does, by this kind of necessity ; a necessity ante-
cedent in nature to design : it cannot, I say, be meant that
every thing exists as it does, by this kind of necessity, upon
several accounts ; and particularly because it is admitted, that
design, in the actions of men, contributes to many alterations
in nature. For if any deny this, I shall not pretend to reason
with them.
§ 5. Fatalism postulates an agent, as much as freedom.
From these things it follows ; first, That when a fatalist
asserts, that every thing is l)y necessity, he must mean, by an
agent acting necessarily ; he must, I say, mean this, for I am
very sensible he would not choose to mean it : and secondly,
That the necessity, by which such an agent is supposed to
act, does not exclude intelligence and design. So that, were
the system of fatality admitted, it would just as much account
for the formation of the world, as for the structure of an
house, and no more. Necessity as much requires and sup-
poses a necessary agent, as freedom requires and supposes
a free agent, to be the former of the world. And the appear-
ances of design and of final causes in the constitution of
nature as really prove this acting agent to be an intelligent
designer, or to act from choice ; upon the scheme of necessity,
supposed possible, as upon that of freedom.
§ 6. Destroys no proof of religion.
It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not
destroy the proof, that there is an intelligent Author of
nature and natural Governor of the world ; the present
question, which the analogy before mentioned a suggests,
and which, I think, it will answer, is this : Whether the
opinion of necessity, supposed consistent with possibility,
with the constitution of the world, and the natural govern-
ment which we experience exercised over it, destroys all
reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a state of religion :
<v Sup. § i.
Il8 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY [I. VI.
or whether that opinion be reconcilable with religion ; with
the system, and the proof of it.
§ 7. A child, trained as not accountable, would be insupportable,
and would find his own life so.
Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth
up, in his own principles ; that the child should reason upon
them, and conclude, that since he cannot possibly behave
otherwise than he does, he is not a subject of blame or com-
mendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded or punished :
imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame and
commendation out of his mind, by means of this system ; to
form his temper, and character, and behaviour to it ; and
from it to judge of the treatment he was to expect, say,
from reasonable men, upon his coming abroad into the world :
as the fatalist judges from this system, what he is to expect
from the Author of nature, and with regard to a future state.
I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether any one of
common sense would think fit, that a child should be put
upon these speculations, and be left to apply them to practice.
And a man has little pretence to reason, who is not sensible,
that we are all children in speculations of this kind. How-
ever, the child would doubtless be highly delighted to find
himself freed from the restraints of fear and shame, with
which his playfellows were fettered and embarrassed ; and
highly conceited in his superior knowledge, so far beyond
his years. But conceit and vanity would be the least bad
part of the influence, which these principles must have, when
thus reasoned and acted upon, during the course of his educa-
tion. He must either be allowed to go on and be the plague
of all about him, and himself too, even to his own destruc-
tion : or else correction must be continually made use of, to
supply the want of those natural perceptions of blame and
commendation, which we have supposed to be" removed ;
and to give him a practical impression, of what he had
reasoned himself out of the belief of, that he was in fact an
accountable child, and to be punished for doing what he was
forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible, but that the
§§ 7-9 J 4S INFLUENCING PRACTICE lie)
correction which he must meet with, in the course of his
education, must convince him, that if the scheme he AVUS
instructed in wrere not false ; yet that he reasoned incon-
clusively upon it, and somehow or other misapplied it to
practice and common life : as what the fatalist experiences
of the conduct of Providence at present, ought in all reason
to convince him, that this scheme is misapplied when applied
to the subject of religion \ But supposing the child's temper
could remain still formed to the system, and his expectation
of the treatment he was to have in the world be regulated
by it ; so as to expect that no reasonable man would blame
or punish him, for any thing which he should do, because he
could not help doing it : upon this supposition it is manifest
he would, upon his coming abroad into the world, be insup-
portable to society, and the treatment which he would receive
from it would render it so to him ; and he could not fail of
doing somewhat, very soon, for which he would be delivered
over into the hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end.
he would be convinced of the obligations he was under to
his wise instructor.
§ 8. The scheme, however tested, lands in absurdity.
Or suppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way,
applied to practice, such practical application of it will
be found equally absurd ! ; equally fallacious in a practical
sense : for instance, that if a man be destined to live such
a time, he shall live to it, though he take no care of his
own preservation ; or if he be destined to die before that
time, no care can prevent it : therefore all care about pre-
serving one's life is to be neglected : which is the fallacy
instanced in by the ancients.
§ 9. Our entire state is as if ive were free.
But now on the contrary, none of these practical absur-
dities can be drawn, from reasoning upon the supposition,
b Sup. § 21.
1 Comp. § r.
120 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY [I. VI.
that we are free ; but all such reasoning with regard to the
common affairs of life is justified by experience. And
therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of
necessity were speculatively true ; yet, with regard to
practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our experience
reaches ; that is, to the whole of our present life. For, the
constitution of the present world, and the condition in
which we are actually placed, is, as if we were free. And
it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since the whole
process of action, through every step of it, suspense, de-
liberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last
doing as we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we
are so. But the thing here insisted upon is, that under
the present natural government of the world, we find we
are treated and dealt with, as if we were free, prior to all
consideration whether we are or not.
§ 10. It misleads then if true : so may it not ayain
mislead, and in maximis?
Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be
ever so true ; yet such is in fact our condition and the
natural course of things, that whenever we apply it to
life and practice, this application of it always misleads us,
and cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with
regard to our present interest. And how can people think
themselves so very secure then, that the same application of
the same opinion may not mislead them also, in some analo-
gous manner, with respect to a future, a more general and
more important interest ? For, religion being a practical sub-
ject ; and the analogy of nature showing us, that we have not
faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to practical
subjects ; whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion,
and thence conclude, that we are free from its obligations, it
is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There
will still remain just reason to think, whatever appearances
are, that we deceive ourselves ; in somewhat of a like
manner, as when people fancy they can draw contradictory
conclusions from the idea of infinity.
§§ ID-IS] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE 121
§ ii. It being as it false, to entertain it is against reason.
From these things together, the attentive reader will see
it follows, that if upon supposition of freedom the evidence
of religion be conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of
necessity ; because the notion of necessity is not applicable
to practical subjects : i. e. with respect to them, is as if it
were not true. Nor does this contain any reflection upon
reason : but only upon what is unreasonable. For to pre-
tend to act upon reason, in opposition to practical principles,
which the Author of our nature gave us to act upon ; and
to pretend to apply our reason to subjects, with regard to
which, our own short views, and even our experience, will
show us, it cannot be depended upon ; and such, at best,
the subject of necessity must be ; this is vanity, conceit,
and unreasonableness.
§ 12. As it allows of will and character in us, so it
may in our Author.
But this is not all. For we find within ourselves a will,
and are conscious of a character. Now if this, in us, be
reconcilable with fate, it is reconcilable with it, in the
Author of nature. And besides, natural government and
final causes imply a character and a will in the Governor
and Designer0 ; a will concerning the creatures whom he
governs. The Author of nature then being certainly of
some character or other, notwithstanding necessity ; it is
evident this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular
character of benevolence, veracity, and justice in him, which
attributes are the foundation of religion, as with any other
c By will and character is meant l that, which, in speaking of men,
we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words
temper, taste, dispositions, practical principles, that ivhole frame of mind, from
u'hence we act in one manner rather than another.
1 Not that each of the ovva^fis to determine action, they are in-
he proceeds to mention is a syno- eluded in the phrase ' will and
iiym for character or for will ; character ' from which action im-
but that, as powers contributing mediately springs.
122 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY [l. VI.
character : since we find this necessity no more hinders men
from being benevolent, than cruel ; true, than faithless ;
just, than unjust ; or if the fatalist pleases, what we call
unjust. For it is said indeed, that what, upon supposition
of freedom, would be just punishment ; upon supposition of
necessity, becomes manifestly unjust : because it is punish-
ment inflicted for doing that which persons could not avoid
doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy
the injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy
the injustice of punishing it. However, as little to the
purpose as this objection is in itself, it is veiy much to
the purpose to observe from it, how the notions of justice
and injustice remain, even whilst we endeavour to suppose
them removed ; how they force themselves upon the mind,
even whilst we are making suppositions destructive of them :
for there is not, perhaps, a man in the world, but would be
ready to make this objection at first thought.
§ 13. It leaves Intact the relation of God to veracity
and justice,
But though it is most evident, that universal necessity,
if it be reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with
that character in the Author of nature, which is the founda-
tion of religion ; { Yet, does it not plainly destroy the proof,
that he is of that character, and consequently the proof of
religion? ' By no means. For we find, that happiness and
misery are not our fate, in any such sense as not to be
the consequences of our behaviour ; but that they are the
consequences of it <l. We find God exercises the same kind
of government over us, with that, which a father exercises
over his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects.
Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning
liberty and necessity, it evidently appears to us, that
veracity and justice must be the natural rule and measure
of exercising this authority or government, to a Being who
can have no competitions or interfering of interests, with
his creatures and his subjects.
Chap. ii.
§§ i3, 14] 4S INFLUENCING PRACTICE 123
§ 14. And all that shows his government to correspond
with our nature.
But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its
truth, may be perplexed with difficulties, which run up
into the most abstruse of all speculations ; and as the
opinion of necessity seems to be the very basis, upon which
infidelity grounds itself; it may be of some use to offer a
more particular proof of the obligations of religion, which
may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion.
The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author of
nature is not affected by the opinion of necessity ; supposing
necessity a thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with
the constitution of things e. And it is a matter of fact,
independent on this or any other speculation, that he
governs the world by the method of rewards and punish-
mentsf: and also that he hath given us a moral faculty,
by which we distinguish between actions, and approve
some as virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others
as vicious and of ill desert %. Now this moral discernment
implies, in the notion of it, a rule of action, and a rule of
a very peculiar kind : for it carries in it authority and
a right of direction ; authority in such a sense, as that
we cannot depart from it without being self-condemned h.
And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by
nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws
in a sense including sanctions ; may be thus proved. Con-
sciousness of a rule or guide of action, in creatures who
are capable of considering it as given them by their Maker,
not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but also a
sense of security in following it, and of danger in deviating
from it. A direction of the Author of nature, given to
creatures capable of looking upon it as such, is plainly
a command from him : and a command from him neces-
sarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in case
of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedience. But
Sap. §§ i, 2. f Cliap. ii.
Dissert. II. * Serm. ii. at the Kolls.
124 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY [l. vi.
then the sense or perception of good and ill desert ', which
is contained in the moral discernment, renders the sanction
explicit, and makes it appear, as one may say, expressed.
For since his method of government is to reward and
punish actions, his having annexed to some actions an
inseparable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this
surely amounts to declaring, upon whom his punishments
shall be inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed. For he
must have given us this discernment and sense of things
as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter : that is by
way of information beforehand, what we are finally to
expect in his world.
§ 15. As then God governs, we infer the duty of
ivor ship to him.
There is then most evident ground to think, that the
government of God, upon the whole, will be found to
correspond to the nature which he has given us: and that
in he upshot and issue of things, happiness and misery
shall, in fact and event, be made to follow virtue and vice
respectively ; as he has already, in so peculiar a manner,
associated the ideas of them in our minds. And from
lence might easily be deduced the obligations of religious
worship, were it only to be considered as a means of pre-
serving upon our minds a sense of this moral government
(*od, and securing our obedience to it: which yet is
extremely imperfect view of that most important duty.
§ 16. Against this general proof, necessity has
nothing to say.
Now I say, no objection from necessity can lie gainst
this general proof of religion. None against the propoSn
leasoned upon that we have such a moral faulty and
discernment; because this is a mere matter of fact, a
nonega .CTf™nce' that hu™» kind is thus constituted:
none against the conclusion; because it is immediate and
Dissert. II.
§§ I5_I7] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE 125
wholly from this fact. For the conclusion, that God will
finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked, is
not here drawn, from its appearing to us fitk that lie
should; but from its appearing, that he has told us, he
win. And this he hath certainly told us, in the promise
and threatening, which it hath been observed the notion
of a command implies, and the sense of good and ill desert
which he has given us, more distinctly expresses. And
this reasoning from fact is confirmed, and in some degree
even verified, by other facts ; by the natural tendencies of
virtue and of vice*; and by this, that God, in the natural
course of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mis-
chievous to society ; and also vicious actions as such in
the strictest sense '". So that the general proof of religion
is unanswerably real, even upon the wild supposition which
we are arguing upon.
§ 17. Nor against the evidence ab extra afforded ly
long duration.
It must likewise be observed further, that natural religion
hath, besides this, an external evidence ; which the doctrine
of necessity, if it could be true, would not affect. For
k However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is
determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of ^ ^ Q/ ^
the case ; th ough one chooses to decline matters of such .g deiermined
abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when ^ what isflt
one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to
say th-it it is fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness, then
fitness of action, or the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner
of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve
one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his
acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing some-
what prior in that end, to be the ground of the preference ; as to suppose
him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing
somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth
not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to perception
than abstract truth is : or that it is any more improper, to speak of
the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature
of things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded.
i Sup. chap. iii. §§ 22-24. ra S«P. chap. iii. §§ 11-13-
126 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY [I. VI.
suppose a person, by the observations and reasoning
above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion ;
that there is a God, who made the world, who is the
moral Governor and Judge of mankind, and will upon the
whole deal with every one according to his works : I
say, suppose a person convinced of this by reason ; but
to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state
of mankind. It would be natural for such an one to be
inquisitive, what was the history of this system of doctrine ;
at what time, and in what manner, it came first into the
world ; and whether it were believed by any considerable
part of it. And were he upon inquiry to find, that a par-
ticular person, in a late age, first of all proposed it, as
a deduction of reason, and that mankind were before wholly
ignorant of it : then, though its evidence from reason would
remain, there would be 110 additional probability of its truth,
from the account of its discovery. But instead of this
being the fact of the case, on the contraiy, he would find,
what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation
of its truth : First, That somewhat of this system, with
more or fewer additions and alterations, hath been pro-
fessed in all ages and countries, of which we have any
certain information relating to this matter. Secondly,
That it is certain historical fact, so far as we can trace
things up, that this whole system of belief, that there
is one God, the Creator and moral Governor of the world,
and that mankind is in a state of religion, was received
in the first ages.
§ 18. Which "began with a primitive revelation1.
And Thirdly, That as there is no hint or intimation
in history, that this system was first reasoned out ; so
there is no express historical or traditional evidence, as
ancient as history, that it was taught first by revelation.
Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight.
The first of them, general consent, shows this system
On the origin of natural religion comp. II. ii. 10.
§ i8] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE 127
to be conformable to the common sense of mankind.
The second, namely, that religion was believed in the
first ages of the world, especially as it does not appear
that there were then any superstitious or false additions to
it, cannot but be a further confirmation of its truth. For
it is a proof of this alternative : either that it came into
the world by revelation ; or that it is natural, obvious,
and forces itself upon the mind. The former of these is
the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will con-
sider, how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated
minds are, will, perhaps from hence alone, be strongly
inclined to believe it the truth. And as it is shown in
the second part" of this Treatise, that there is nothing
of such peculiar presumption against a revelation in the
beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against
subsequent ones : a sceptic could not, I think, give any
account, which would appear more probable even to himself,
of the early pretences to revelation ; than by supposing
some real original one, from whence they were copied '.
And the third thing above mentioned, that there is express
historical or traditional evidence as ancient as history, o
the system of religion being taught mankind by revelation ;
this must be admitted as some degree of real proof, that
it was so taught. For why should not the most ancient
tradition be admitted, as some additional proof of a fact,
against which there is no presumption? And this proof
is mentioned here, because it has its weight to show, that
religion came into the world by revelation, prior to all
consideration of the proper authority of any book supposed
to contain it ; and even prior to all consideration, whether
the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed down and re-
;C
n Part II. chap. ii.
1 Unless the sceptic (supposed by some, that all approaches to
to be a theist) held it to be im- religion were made by innumer-
possible for the Creator to find able slow and gradual steps, reach-
any means beyond what external ing, after this illimitable series,
nature supplies for conveying his the idea of God : which is against
will to the minds of his creatures: all testimony concerning the
or else held, as is now pretended earliest history of our race.
128 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY [I. VI.
lated, or mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the
historical account, which we have, of the origin of religion,
taking in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its
truth, no way aifected by the opinion of necessity. And
the external evidence1, even of natural religion, is by no
means inconsiderable.
§ 19. Our perceptions, though faulty, are still our guides,
and are not to be superseded ~by fashion.
But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be
recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which are
only general ; that as speculative reason may be neglected,
prejudiced, and deceived, so also may our moral under-
standing be impaired and perverted, and the dictates of it
not impartially attended to. This indeed proves nothing
against the reality of our speculative or practical faculties
of perception ; against their being intended by nature,
to inform us in the theory of things, and instruct us how
we are to behave, and what we are to expect in consequence
of our behaviour. Yet our liableness, in the degree we
are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious
admonition to us to be upon our guard, with respect to
what is of such consequence, as our determinations con-
cerning virtue and religion : and particularly not to take
custom, and fashion, and slight notions of honour, or
imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to
mankind, for the only moral rule °.
§ 20. Suppose the fatalist to argue against religion that
punishment of necessary action is incredible,
The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of
the thing, and the histoiy of religion, amount, when taken
together, to a real practical proof of it, not to be confuted :
such a proof as, considering the infinite importance of the
0 Dissert. II.
1 Videlicet, that of history, monu- some reference has already been
ments, and traditions ; to which made.
§§ i9-2i] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE 129
thing, I apprehend, would be admitted fully sufficient,
in reason, to influence the actions of men, who act upon
thought and reflection ; if it were admitted that there
is no proof of the contrary. But it may be said : ' There
are many probabilities, which cannot indeed be confuted,
i. e. shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be over-
balanced by greater probabilities on the other side ; much
more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to
object against particular arguments alleged for an opinion,
when the opinion itself may be clearly shown to be false,
without meddling with such arguments at all, but leaving
them just as they arei'. Now the method of government
by rewards and punishments, and especially rewarding
and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively,
must go upon supposition, that we are free and not neces-
sary agents l. And it is incredible, that the Author of
nature should govern us upon a supposition as true, which
he knows to be false ; and therefore absurd to think, he
will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter ; espe-
cially that he will do it under the notion, that they are
of good or ill desert.'
§ 21. Necessary action is not punishable : but ice have
the experimental fact of moral government ;
Here then the matter is brought to a point. And
the answer to all this is full, and not to be evaded :
that the whole constitution and course of things, the
whole analogy of Providence, shows beyond possibility of
doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning is false ;
P Pages i, 10 [corresponding with Introd. §§ i, 2, 14-16, in the
present edition. I fail, however, to trace the reference intended
by the author.— ED.].
1 Fitzgerald thinks it important that there is a persuasion of our
to distinguish between the ' reli- being free, though a false per-
gious necessitarian,' who in regard suasion. But Butler's argu-
to a particular action denies that ment strikes alike both of these
he could have willed otherwise, unfounded and mischievous opi-
and the irreligious, who allows nions.
VOL. I. K
130 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY [l. VI.
wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom indeed
clearly shows where : in supposing ourselves necessary,
when in truth we are free agents. But upon the supposi-
tion of necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted, that
it is incredible necessary agents should be rewarded and
punished. But that, somehow or other, the conclusion
now mentioned is false, is most certain. For it is fact,
that God does govern even brute creatures by the method
of rewards and punishments, in the natural course of things.
And men are rewarded and punished for their actions,
punished for actions mischievous to society as being so,
punished for vicious actions as such ; by the natural instru-
mentality of each other, under the present conduct of
Providence. Nay even the affection of gratitude, and the
passion of resentment, and the rewards and punishments
following from them, which in general are to be considered
as natural, i. e. from the Author of nature ; these rewards
and punishments, being naturally o annexed to actions con-
sidered as implying good intention and good desert, ill
intention and ill desert ; these natural rewards and punish-
ments, I say, are as much a contradiction to the conclusion
above, and show its falsehood, as a more exact and com-
plete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert
as such.
§ 22. Which consequently shows our actions not to le
necessary.
So that if it be incredible, that necessary agents should
be thus rewarded and punished ; then, men are not neces-
sary but free ; since it is matter of fact, that they are thus
rewarded and punished. But if, on the contrary, which is
the supposition we have been arguing upon, it be insisted,
that men are necessary agents ; then, there is nothing in-
credible in the further supposition of necessary agents being
thus rewarded and punished : since we ourselves are thus
dealt with.
i Serm. viii. at the Rolls.
§§ 22-24] 4S INFLUENCING PRACTICE 131
§ 23. So, as an opinion referable to practice, it is false.
From the whole therefore it must follow, that a necessity
supposed possible, and reconcilable with the constitution
of things, does in no sort prove that the Author of Nature
will not, nor destroy the proof that he will, finally and
upon the whole, in his eternal government, render his
creatures happy or miserable, by some means or other, as
they behave well or ill. Or, to express this conclusion in
words conformable to the title of the chapter, the analogy
of nature shows us, that the opinion of necessity, con-
sidered as practical, is false. And if necessity, upon the
supposition above mentioned, doth not destroy the proof
of natural religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the
proof of revealed.
§ 24. But, if at peace ivitli fact, it would be at peace
with relief ion.
From these things likewise \ve may learn, in what sense
to understand that general assertion, that the opinion of
necessity is essentially destructive of all religion. First,
in a practical sense ; that by this notion, atheistical men
pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves in vice, and
justify to others their disregard to all religion. And
secondly, in the strictest sense ; that it is a contradiction
to the whole constitution of nature, and to what we may
every moment experience in ourselves, and so overturns
every thing1. But by no means is this assertion to be
understood, as if necessity, supposing it could possibly
be reconciled with the constitution of things and with what
we experience, were not also reconcilable with religion : for
upon this supposition, it demonstrably is so.
1 Some commentators on Butler such a sense : and surely as vision
hold that 'necessity' is admissible is a thing totally separate from
and just, in the sense of foreknow- causation, so is prevision : and it
ledge. So Angus and Chalmers. is a confusion of ideas to mix
But he nowhere acknowledges certainty with necessity.
K 2
132 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [l. VII.
CHAPTER VII.
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME
OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
§ i. Analogy proves the fact rather than the right of
the divine government.
rPHOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, that
J- the analogy of nature gives a strong credibility to the
general doctrine of religion, and to the several particular
things contained in it, considered as so many matters of
fact ; and likewise that it showrs this credibility not to be
destroyed by any notions of necessity : yet still, objections
may be insisted upon, against the wisdom, equity, and
goodness of the divine government implied in the notion
of religion, and against the method by which this govern-
ment is conducted ; to which objections analogy can be no
direct answer. For the credibility, or the certain truth, of
a matter of fact, does not immediately prove any thing con-
cerning the wisdom or goodness of it : and analogy can do
no more, immediately or directly, than show such and such
things to be true or credible, considered only as matters
of fact.
§ 2. Effects something, if showing it to be (a) a scheme,
(b) imperfectly comprehended.
But still, if, upon supposition of a moral constitution of
nature and a moral government over it, analogy suggests
and makes it credible that this government must be
a scheme, system, or constitution of government, as dis-
tinguished from a number of single unconnected acts of
distributive justice and goodness ; and likewise, that it
must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and
of such a sort in other respects, as to aiford a direct
general answer to all objections against the justice and
goodness of it : then analogy is, remotely, of great service
in answering those objections ; both by suggesting the
answer, and showing it to be a credible one.
§§ i-5] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED 133
§ 3. So much it effects.
Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case.
For, First, Upon supposition that God exercises a moral
government over the world, the analogy of his natural
government suggests and makes it credible, that his
moral government must be a scheme, quite beyond our
comprehension : and this affords a general answer to all
objections against the justice and goodness of it. And,
Secondly, A more distinct observation of some particular
things contained in God's scheme of natural government,
the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be contained
in his moral government, will further show, how little
weight 1 is to be laid upon these objections.
§ 4. In Mil points the moral government is analogous
to the natural.
[I.] Upon supposition that God exercises a moral govern-
ment over the world, the analogy of his natural government
suggests and makes it credible, that his moral government
must be a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension : and
this affords a general answer to all objections against the
justice and goodness of it. It is most obvious, analogy
renders it highly credible, that, upon supposition of a moral
government, it must be a scheme ; for the world, and the
whole natural government of it, appears to be so : to be
a scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts correspond
to each other, and to a whole ; as really as any work of art,
or as any particular model of a civil constitution and
government. In this great scheme of the natural world,
individuals have various peculiar relations to other in-
dividuals of their own species. And whole species are,
we find, variously related to other species, upon this earth.
§ 5. Earthly relations may extend beyond earth.
Nor do we know, how much further these kinds of
relations may extend 2. And, as there is not any action
1 Compare Introd. § 17. Butler's disposition to refer to
2 Inf. viii. i. It seems as if portions of the universe outside
134 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [I. VII.
or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single
and unconnected, as not to have a respect to some other
actions and events : so possibly each of them, when it has
not an immediate, may yet have a remote, natural relation
to other actions and events, much beyond the compass of
this present world. There seems indeed nothing, from
whence we can so much as make a conjecture, whether
all creatures, actions, and events, throughout the whole
of nature, have relations to each other. But, as it
is obvious, that all events have future unknown conse-
quences ; so if we trace any, as far as we can go, into
what is connected with it, we shall find, that if such event
were not connected with somewhat further in nature
unknown to us, somewhat both past and present, such
event could not possibly have been at all.
§6. We cannot glee cm entire account of any one thing*.
Nor can we give the whole account of any one thing
whatever : of all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts ;
those adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not have been.
By this most astonishing connection, these reciprocal corre-
spondencies and mutual relations, every thing which we see
in the course of nature is actually brought about. And things
seemingly the most insignificant imaginable are perpetually
observed to be necessary conditions to other things of the
greatest importance : so that any one thing whatever may,
for ought we know to the contrary, be a necessary condition
to any other. The natural world then, and natural govern-
ment of it, being such an incomprehensible scheme ; so
incomprehensible, that a man must, really in the literal
sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of his igno-
this earth as possibly concerned creation at large,
in an earthly dispensation, may l Butler's views of human igno-
have been due to his considering ranee are set forth in Serm. xv,
the vastness and weight of the which deals professedly with the
Divine Incarnation in relation to subject : much of it in the manner
the smallness of this world, and of the Analogy. See particularly
possibly of its inhabitants, as com- Serm. xv. §§ 3-9, and 12 with its
pared with the immense range of note.
§§6-8] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED 135
ranee in it : this immediately suggests, and strongly shows
the credibility, that the moral world and government of it
may be so too.
§ 7. Natural government may be subservient to moral,
and blent with it.
Indeed the natural and moral constitution and govern-
ment of the world are so connected, as to make up together
but one scheme : and it is highly probable, that the first
is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the
latter ; as the vegetable world is for the animal, and or-
ganized bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is,
without inquiring how far the administration of the natural
world is subordinate to that of the moral, only to ojbserve
the credibility, that one should be analogous or similar to
the other :
§ 8. Each part of moral government may be subservient
to other parts, or to the ichole.
That therefore every act of divine justice and goodness
may be supposed to look much beyond itself, and its
immediate object T ; may have some reference to other
parts of God's moral administration, and to a general moral
plan : and that every circumstance of this his moral govern-
ment may be adjusted beforehand with a view to the whole
of it. Thus for example : the determined length of time,
and the degrees and ways, in which virtue is to remain
in a state of warfare and discipline, and in which wicked-
ness is permitted to have its progress ; the times appointed
for the execution of justice ; the appointed instruments of
it ; the kinds of rewards and punishments, and the manners
of their distribution ; all particular instances of divine
justice and goodness, and every circumstance of them, may
have such respects to each other, as to make up altogether
a whole, connected and related in all its parts : a scheme or
1 This is in fact proved by the of a scheme necessarily has refer-
proof of a scheme, since each part ence to the other parts.
136 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [I. vil.
system, which is as properly one as the natural world is,
and of the like kind.
§ 9. Our ignorance of the whole precludes judgments
upon the parts ;
And supposing this to be the case ; it is most evident,
that we are not competent judges of this scheme, from the
small parts of it which come within our view in the present
life : and therefore no objections against any of these parts
can be insisted upon by reasonable men.
§ 10. And ansivers objections against Providence,
This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from
it, are universally acknowledged upon other occasions ; and
though scarce denied, yet are universally forgot, when
persons come to argue against religion. And it is not
perhaps easy, even for the most reasonable men, always
to bear in mind the degree of our ignorance, and make due
allowances for it. Upon these accounts, it may not be
useless to go on a little further, in order to show more
distinctly, how just an answer our ignorance is. to
objections against the scheme of Providence.
§ ii. And ivouU hold in the main even were there
no scheme, or the scheme a defect.
Suppose then a person boldly to assert, that the things
complained of, the origin and continuance of evil, might
easily have been prevented by repeated interpositions a ;
interpositions so guarded and circumstanced, as would
preclude all mischief arising from them ; or, if this were
impracticable, that a scheme of government is itself an
imperfection ; since more good might have been produced,
without any scheme, system, or constitution at all, by
continued single unrelated acts of distributive justice and
goodness; because these would have occasioned no irre-
gularities. And further than this, it is presumed, the
a Inf. §§ 17-19.
§§9-i3] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED 137
objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious :
that were these assertions true, still the observations above,
concerning our ignorance in the scheme of divine govern-
ment, and the consequence drawn from it, would hold, in
great measure ; enough to vindicate religion, against all
objections from the disorders of the present state. Were
these assertions true, yet the government of the world
might be just and good notwithstanding ; for, at the most,
they would infer nothing more than that it might have
been better.
§ 12, Which are indeed fait arbitrary untested
assertions.
But indeed they are mere arbitrary assertions : no man
being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities of things,
to bring any proof of them, to the lowest degree of proba-
bility. For however possible what is asserted may seem ;
yet many instances may be alleged, in things much less
out of our reach, of suppositions absolutely impossible, and
reducible to the most palpable self-contradictions, which,
not every one by any means would perceive to be such, nor
perhaps any one at first sight suspect.
§ 13. The ansiver may lie in some unknown
relation, or impossibility.
From these things, it is easy to see distinctly, how our
ignorance, as it is the common,- is really a satisfactory
answer to all objections against the justice and goodness
of Providence. If a man, contemplating any one provi-
dential dispensation, which had no relation to any others,
should object, that he discerned in it a disregard to justice,
or a deficiency of goodness ; nothing would be less an
answer to such objection, than our ignorance in other
parts of Providence, or in the possibilities of things, no
way related to what he was contemplating. But when
we know not but the parts objected against may be relative
to other parts unknown to us ; and when we are unacquainted
with what is, in the nature of the thing, practicable in the
138 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [I. VII.
case before us ; then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer :
because, some unknown relation, or some unknown impos-
sibility, may render what is objected against, just and good ;
nay good in the highest practicable degree.
§ 14. Experience slioivs us ends are siibservcd by
means we should think unlikely ;
[II.] And how little weight is to be laid upon such
objections, will further appear, by a more distinct observa-
tion of some particular things contained in the natural
government of God, the like to which may be supposed,
from analogy, to be contained in his moral government.
First, As in the scheme of the natural world, no ends
appear to be accomplished without means : so we find
that means very undesirable, often conduce to bring about
ends in such a measure desirable, as greatly to overbalance
the disagreeableness of the means. And in cases where
such means are conducive to such ends, it is not reason,
but experience, which shows us, that they are thus con-
ducive. Experience also shows many means to be conducive
and necessary to accomplish ends, which means, before
experience, we should have thought, would have had even
a contrary tendency.
§ 15. And such provisions of the moral scheme may
le good, even indispensable.
Now from these observations relating to the natural
scheme of the world, the moral being supposed analogous
to it, arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery
in each other s power to the degree it is, and making men
liable to vice to the degree we are; and in general, that
those things which are objected against the moral scheme
of Providence, may be, upon the whole, friendly and
assistant to virtue, and productive of an overbalance of
happiness : i. e. the things objected against may be means,
by which an overbalance of good will, in the end, be found
produced. And from the same observations, it appears to
be no presumption against this, that we do not, if indeed
§§ i4-i6] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED 139
we do not, see those means to have any such tendency ;
or that they seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus
those things, which we call irregularities, may not be so
at all : because they may be means of accomplishing wise
and good ends more considerable. And it may be added,
as above b, that they may also be the only means, by which
these wise and good ends are capable of being accomplished.
§ 1 6. Evils may work for good, though ice might
have l)cen letter without them*.
After these observations it may be proper to add, in order
to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from any of
them, that though the constitution of our nature, from
whence we are capable of vice and misery, may, as it
undoubtedly does, contribute to the perfection and happi-
ness of the world ; and though the actual permission of
evil may be beneficial to it : (i. e. it would have been
more mischievous, not that a wicked person had himself
abstained from his own wickedness, but that any one
had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted :)
yet notwithstanding, it might have been much better for
the world, if this veiy evil had never been done. Nay,
it is most clearly conceivable, that the very commission
of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, and yet,
that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to
refrain from it.
b Sup. § 13.
1 Not that vice contributes, but (6) That if so, God must choose
that freedom of choice between it, and with a wise and holy choice,
good and evil contributes, to ele- (c) That men will sin as sin,
vate our condition. Fitzgerald which God does not.
shows how Jonathan Edwards, But is it not rather true that
overleaping all barriers, carries us men do not will sin as sin, but for
into peril, teaching as follows : the sake of obtaining enjoyment
(a) That no sensible man will by it ? The whole speculation,
declare it, for certain, to be im- however, is on forbidden ground,
possible that it is best for the useless as to results ; and we see
world that there should be such a pious man on the borders, at
a thing as moral evil in it. the least, of sheer impiety.
140 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [I. VII.
§ 17. Like those disorders ^vh^ch bring their own ewe.
For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the natural
world, there are disorders which bring their own cures ;
diseases, which are themselves remedies. Many a man
would have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever ;
yet it would be thought madness to assert, that sickness is
a better or more perfect state than health : though the like,
with regard to the moral world, has been asserted. But,
§ 1 8. Natural government, worked under general laivs,
thus alloivs action ivith forethought.
Secondly, The natural government of the world is carried
on by general laws !. " For this there may be wise and good
reasons : the wisest and best, for ought we know to the
contrary. And that there are such reasons, is suggested
to our thoughts by the analogy of nature : by our being
made to experience good ends to be accomplished, as indeed
all the good which we enjoy is accomplished, by this means,
that the laws, by which the world is governed, are general.
For we have scarce any kind of enjoyments, but what we
are, in some way or other, instrumental in procuring our-
selves, by acting in a manner which we foresee likely to
procure them : now this foresight could not be at all,
were not the government of the world carried on by
general laws. And though, for ought we know to the
contrary, every single case may be, at length, found to
have been provided for even by these : yet to prevent
all irregularities, or remedy them as they arise, by the
wisest and best general laws, may be impossible in the
nature of things ; as we see it is absolutely impossible
in civil government.
§ 19. Irregular interpositions might do more harm
than good.
But then we are ready to think, that, the constitution
of nature remaining as it is, and the course of things being
1 Comp. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, pp. 30, 31.
§§ 17-19] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED 141
permitted to go on, in other respects, as it does, there
might be interpositions to prevent irregularities ; though
they could not have been prevented or remedied by any
general laws. And there would indeed be reason to wish,
which, by the way, is veiy different from a right to claim,
that all irregularities were prevented or remedied by present
interpositions, if these interpositions would have no other
effect than this. But it is plain they would have some
visible and immediate bad effects : for instance, they would
encourage idleness and negligence ; and they would render
doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascertained by
this very thing, that the course of the world is carried
on by general laws. And further, it is certain they would
have distant effects, and very great ones too ; by means
of the wonderful connections before mentioned c. So that
we cannot so much as guess, what would be the whole
result of the interpositions desired. It may be said, any
bad result might be prevented by further interpositions,
whenever there was occasion for them : but this again is
talking quite at random, and in the darkd. Upon the
whole then, we see wise reasons, why the course of the
world should be carried on by general laws, and good ends
accomplished by this means : and, for ought we know,
there may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best
ends accomplished by it. We have no ground to believe,
that all irregularities could be remedied as they arise,
or could have been precluded, by general laws. We find
that interpositions would produce evil, and prevent good :
and, for ought we know, they would produce greater evil
than they would prevent ; and prevent greater good than
they would produce. And if this be the case, then the
not, jnterposing is so far from being a ground of complaint,
that it is an instance of goodness. This is intelligible and
sufficient : and going further, seems beyond the utmost
reach of our faculties.
Sup. §§ 5-9- d Sup. §§ 12, 13.
142 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [I. vii.
§ 20. Our ignorance, not being total, need not Hind
us to the positive proofs of religion \
But it may be said, that 'after all, these supposed
impossibilities and relations are what we are unacquainted
with ; and we must judge of religion, as of other things,
by what we do know, and look upon the rest as nothing :
or however, that the answers here given to what is objected
against Religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate
the proof of it ; since their stress lies so very much upon
our ignorance.' But,
First, Though total ignorance in any matter does indeed
equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning
it, and objections against it ; yet partial ignorance does
not. For we may in any degree be convinced, that a
person is of such a character, and consequently will
pursue such ends ; though we are greatly ignorant, what
is the proper way of acting, in order the most effectually to
obtain those ends : and in this case, objections against his
manner of acting, as seemingly not conducive to obtain
them, might be answered by our ignorance ; though the
proof that such ends were intended, might not at all be
invalidated by it. Thus, the proof of religion is a proof
of the moral character of God, and consequently that
his government is moral, and that every one upon the
whole shall receive according to his deserts ; a proof that
this is the designed end of his government. But we are
not competent judges, what is the proper way of acting,
in order the most effectually to accomplish this end6.
Therefore our ignorance is an answer to objections against
the conduct of Providence, in permitting irregularities,
as seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so
obvious, that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer
to objections against a thing, and yet not affect the proof
of it ; till it can be shown, it is frivolous to assert, that
e Introd. § 12.
1 Our ignorance, being in the presumptively blind us within
nature of a limitation, does not the range still permitted to us.
§§ 20-22] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED 143
our ignorance invalidates the proof of religion, as it does
the objections against it.
§ 21. Were religion unknown, moral duties would remain,
(a) as right, (b) as perhaps rcirardalle.
Secondly, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and un-
known relations, might justly be urged to invalidate the
proof of religion, as well as to answer objections against
it : and that in consequence of this, the proof of it were
doubtful. Yet still, let the. assertion be despised, or let it
be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that moral obligations
would remain certain, though it were not certain what
would, upon the whole, be the consequences of observing or
violating them. For, these obligations arise immediately and
necessarily from the judgment of our own mind, unless
perverted, which we cannot violate without being self-con-
demned. And they would be certain too, from considerations
of interest. For though it were doubtful, what will be the
future consequences of virtue and vice ; yet it is, how-
ever, credible, that they may have those consequences,
which Religion teaches us they will : and this credibility
is a certain f obligation in point of prudence, to abstain from
all wickedness, and to live in the conscientious practice of
all that is good. But,
§ 22. Shotvs hoiv ignorance, while ansicering objections,
need not injure proofs '.
Thirdly, The answers above given to the objections
against Religion cannot equally be made use of to invalidate
the proof of it. For, upon supposition that God exercises
a moral government over the world, analogy does most
strongly lead us to conclude, that this moral government
f Introd. § 5 ; and Part II. ch. vi.
1 That ignorance may be a plea which in ignorance we might con-
valid to exclude objection without demn, may prove to be themselves
marring proof is almost self- actual goods, which would bring
evident : but in this section Butler them to be not merely neutralised,
further shows that the very things, but actual witnesses in favour.
144 THE GOVERNMENT OF COD, ETC. [I. VII. § 23
must be a scheme, or constitution, beyond our comprehen-
sion. And a thousand particular analogies show us, that
parts of such a scheme, from their relation to other parts,
may conduce to accomplish ends, which we should have
thought they had no tendency at all to accomplish : nay
ends, which, before experience, we should have thought
such parts were contradictory to, and had a tendency to
prevent. And therefore all these analogies show, that the
way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion
is delusive : because they show it is not at all incredible,
that, could we comprehend the whole, we should find
the permission of the disorders objected against to be
consistent with justice and goodness ; and even to be in-
stances of them. Now this is not applicable to the proof
of Keligion, as it is to the objections against it e ; and
therefore cannot invalidate that proof, as it does these
objections *.
§ 23. The ignorance is such ignorance, as experience
shoivs to disable in like cases.
Lastly, From the observation now made, it is easy to
see, that the answers above given to the objections against
Providence, though, in a general way of speaking, they
may be said to be taken from our ignorance ; yet are
by no means taken merely from that, but from somewhat
which analogy shows us concerning it. For analogy shows
us positively, that our ignorance in the possibilities of
things, and the various relations in nature, renders us
incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclusions,
in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge
and to object. So that the things above insisted upon
g Serm. at the Rolls, p. 312, 2nd ed.
1 The objections are inadmis- to the matters which have been
sible because it is plain that the alleged in proof of religion,
things objected to may not be bad, The proofs may be fully known :
but even good ; and the objection whereas the disability of objection
may be subverted, even reversed. comes from this, that we know only
But no similar observation applies in part, and that a very small part.
VIII. §§ i, 2] CONCLUSION 145
are not mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities
and relations : but they are suggested to our thoughts,
and even forced upon the observation of serious men, and
rendered credible too, by the analogy of nature. And
therefore, to take these things into the account, is to
judge by experience and what we do know : and it is
not judging so, to take no notice of them.
CHAPTER VIII.
CONCLUSION.
§ i. This scene of human life is (a) related to something
beyond it, (b) progressive, (c) not fully comprehensible.
HPHE observations of the last chapter lead us to consider
-*- this little scene of human life, in which we are so
busily engaged, as having a reference, of some sort or
other, to a much larger plan of things. Whether we are,
any way, related to the more distant parts of the boundless
universe, into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain.
But it is evident, that the course of things, which comes
within our view, is connected with somewhat past, present,
and future, beyond ita. So that we are placed, as one
may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not a fixed but
a progressive one, every way incomprehensible : incompre-
hensible, in a manner equally, with respect to what has
been, what now is, and what shall be hereafter. And this
scheme cannot but contain in it somewhat as wonderful,
and as much beyond our thought and conception b, as any
thing in that of religion.
§ 2. No escape found by denying an intelligent Author;
For, will any man in his senses say, that it is less difficult
to conceive, how the world came to be and to continue as it
a Svp. eh. vii. §§ 5, 6. b See Part II. ch. ii.
VOL. I, L
I46 CONCLUSION [I. VIII.
is, without, than with, an intelligent Author and Governor
of it? Or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, that
there is some other rule of government more natural, and
of easier conception, than that which we call moral ? In-
deed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of nature,
no account at all can be given, how this universe, or the
part of it particularly in which we are concerned, came to
be, and the course of it to be carried on, as it is : nor any,
of its general end and design, without a moral Governor of
it. That there is an intelligent Author of nature, and
natural Governor of the world, is a principle gone upon
in the foregoing Treatise ; as proved, and generally known
and confessed to be proved.
§ 3. WJiose character and goodness give us an interest
in his scheme.
And the very notion of an intelligent Author of nature,
proved by particular final causes, implies a will and a char-
acter0. Now, as our whole nature, the nature which he
has given us, leads us to conclude his will and character
to be moral, just, and good : so we can scarce in imagination
conceive, what it can be otherwise. However, in con-
sequence of this his will and character, whatever it be,
he formed the universe as it is, and carries on the course
of it as he does, rather than in any other manner ; and has
assigned to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a lot
in it. Irrational creatures act this their part, and enjoy and
undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted them, without
any reflection. But one would think it impossible, that
creatures endued with reason could avoid reflecting some-
times upon all this : reflecting, if not from whence we came,
yet, at least, whither we are going ; and what the mysterious
scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves, will, at
length, come out and produce : a scheme in which it is
certain we are highly interested, and in which we may be
interested even beyond conception.
c Sup. ch. vi. § 13.
§§ 3-5] CONCLUSION 147
§ 4. To presume extinction at death is no\\ax^s irrational.
For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude,
that we shall cease to be, at death. Particular analogies
do most sensibly show us, that there is nothing to be
thought strange, in our being to exist in another state of
life. And that we are now living beings, affords a strong
probability that we shall continue so ; unless there be some
positive ground, and there is none from reason or analogy,
to think death will destroy us \ Were a persuasion of this
kind ever so well grounded, there would, surely, be little
reason to take pleasure in it. But indeed it can have no
other ground, than some such imagination, as that of our gross
bodies being ourselves 2 ; which is contrary to experience.
Experience too most clearly shows us the folly of concluding,
from the body and the living agent affecting each other
mutually, that the dissolution of the former is the destruc-
tion of the latter. And there are remarkable instances of
their not affecting each other, which lead us to a contrary
conclusion. The supposition then, which in all reason we
are to go upon, is, that our living nature will continue after
death.
§ 5. Hence a scope for hope and fear in the future ; ivliicli,
like as in the present, may It ear upon conduct.
And it is infinitely unreasonable to form an institution of
life, or to act, upon any other supposition. No wall expecta-
tion of immortality, whether more or less certain, opens
an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears : since
we see the constitution of nature is such, as to admit of
misery as well as to be productive of happiness, and expe-
rience ourselves to partake of both in some degree ; and
since we cannot but know, what higher degrees of both
1 See I. i. 4. Butler would probably have dis-
2 I.e. our whole selves : or our- tinguished between the body here
selves so far as to determine the mentioned, and the sensuous or
fate of the whole. Still the body ; gross ' bodies which he denies to
of the Christian is a temple of the be ' ourselves.'
Holy Ghost (i Cor. iii. 16 ; vi. 19).
L 2
I48 CONCLUSION [I. Vin.
we are capable of. And there is no presumption against
believing further, that our future interest depends upon our
present behaviour : for we see our present interest doth ;
and that the happiness and misery, which are naturally
annexed to our actions, very frequently do not follow, till
long after the actions are done, to which they are respectively
annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain,
whether it were likely, that the Author of nature, in giving
happiness and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their
actions or not : yet, since we find by experience that he
hath such regard, the whole sense of things which he has
given us, plainly leads us, at once and without any elaborate
inquiries, to think, that it may, indeed must, be to good
actions chiefly that he hath annexed happiness, and to bad
actions misery ; or that he will, upon the whole, reward
those who do well, and punish those who do evil.
§ 6. Natural government has a moral clement, leaning
to virtue, operative in part,
To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has
been observed, that some sort of moral government is ne-
cessarily implied in that natural government of God, which
we experience ourselves under : that good and bad actions,
at present, are naturally rewarded and punished, not only
as beneficial and mischievous to society, but also as virtuous
and vicious : and that there is, in the very nature of the
thing, a tendency to their being rewarded and punished in
a much higher degree than they are at present. And
though this higher degree of distributive justice, which
nature thus points out and leads towards, is prevented
for a time from taking place : it is by obstacles, which
the state of this world unhappily throws in its way, and
which therefore are in their nature temporary. Now, as
these things in the natural conduct of Providence are
• observable on the side of virtue ; so there is nothing to
be set agianst them on the side of vice. A moral scheme *
See sup. iii. 4, 5.
§§ 6-8] CONCLUSION 149
of government then is visibly established, and, in some
degree, carried into execution :
§ 7. And, subject to risk and lalour, promises an
enlarged action in a future state.
And this, together with the essential tendencies of virtue
and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us an apprehen-
sion, that it will be carried on further towards perfection in
a future state, and that every one shall there receive according
to his deserts. And if this be so, then our future and
general interest, under the moral government of God, is
appointed to depend upon our behaviour ; notwithstanding
the difficulty, which this may occasion, of securing it, and
the danger of losing it : just in the same manner as our
temporal interest, under his natural government, is appointed
to depend upon our behaviour ; notwithstanding the like
difficulty and danger. For, from our original constitution,
and that of the world which we inhabit, we are naturally
trusted with ourselves ; with our own conduct and our own
interest. And from the same constitution of nature, espe-
cially joined with that course of things which is owing to
men, we have temptations to be unfaithful in this trust ;
to forfeit this interest, to neglect it, and run ourselves
into misery and ruin. From these temptations arise the
difficulties of behaving so as to secure our temporal interest,
and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in it. There
is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be
the like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and
final good, which religion lays before us.
§ 8. We can partly give the why of our position ;
l}ut not fully.
Indeed the whole account, how it came to pass that we
were placed in such a condition as this, must be beyond our
comprehension. But it is in part accounted for by what
religion teaches us, that the character of virtue and piety
must be a necessary qualification for a future state of security
and happiness, under the moral government of God ; in
I50 CONCLUSION [I. VIII.
like manner, as some certain qualifications or other are
necessary for every particular condition of life, under his
natural government : and that the present state was intended
to be a school of discipline, for improving in ourselves that
character.
§ 9. ire observe an intention for our improvement.
Now this intention of nature is rendered highly credible
by observing ; that we are plainly made for improvement of
all kinds : that it is a general appointment of Providence,
that we cultivate practical principles, and form within
ourselves habits of action, in order to become fit for what
we were wholly unfit for before : that in particular, child-
hood and youth is naturally appointed to be a state of
discipline for mature age : and that the present world is
peculiarly fitted for a state of moral discipline.
§ 10. Fatalism is disabled from objecting.
And, whereas objections are urged against the whole
notion of moral government and a probation-state, from
the opinion of necessity ; it has been shown, that God has
given us the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all
objections against religion, on this head, are vain and
delusive.
§ ii. Natural government is a buttress to moral
He has also, in his natural government, suggested an
answer to all our short-sighted objections, against the equity
and goodness of his moral government : and in general he
has exemplified to us the latter by the former.
§ 12. Hence we are bound to self-discipline and piety.
These things, which, it is to be remembered, are matters
of fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken mankind ; to
induce them to consider in earnest their condition, and
what they have to do. It is absurd, absurd to the degree
of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so serious
a kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious
§§ 9-is] CONCLUSION 151
life ; or even in that immoral thoughtlessness, which far
the greatest part of them are fallen into. And the credi-
bility of religion, arising from experience and facts here
considered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to engage them to
live in the general practice of all virtue and piety ; under
the serious apprehension, though it should be mixed with
some doubt d, of a righteous administration established
in nature, and a future judgment in consequence of it :
especially when we consider, how very questionable it is,
whether any thing at all can be gained by vice e ; how
unquestionably little, as well as precarious, the pleasures
arid profits of it are at the best ; and how soon they must
be parted with at the longest1. For, in the deliberations
of reason, concerning what we are to pursue and what to
avoid, as temptations to any thing from mere passion are
supposed out of the case : so inducements to vice, from
cool expectations of pleasure and interest so small and
uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as, in the
view of reason, to be almost nothing in themselves ; and
in comparison with the importance of religion, they quite
disappear and are lost.
§ 13. Temporal regards, adverse to vice; coincide with
virtue.
Mere passion indeed may be alleged, though not as
a reason, yet as an excuse, for a vicious course of life. And
how sorry an excuse it is, will be manifest by observing,
that we are placed in a condition, in which we are unavoid-
ably inured to govern our passions, by being necessitated
to govern them ; and to lay ourselves under the same kind
of restraints, and as great ones too, from temporal regards,
as virtue and piety, in the ordinary course of things, require.
The plea of ungovernable passion then, on the side of
vice, is the poorest of all things : for it is no reason, and
but a poor excuse.
d Part II. ch. vi. e Sup. ch. iii. §§ 5-7.
1 Argued more at length in Serm. iii. on Human Nature, §§ 9-11.
152 CONCLUSION
§ 14. Religious proofs are religions motives.
But the proper motives to religion are the proper proofs
of it, from our moral nature, from the presages of conscience,
and our natural apprehension of God under the character
of a righteous Governor and Judge; a nature and conscience
and apprehension given us by him : and from the confirma-
tion of the dictates of reason, by life and immortality brought
to light ~by the Gospel; and the uratli of God revealed from
heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men.
THE END OF THE FIRST PART.
THE
ANALOGY OF RELIGION
TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE
PART II
OF REVEALED RELIGION
CHAPTER I.
OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.
§ i. A Revelation ivas (a) required, (b) serviceable.
OOME persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the
^ light of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, as, in
its very notion, incredible, and what must be fictitious.
And indeed it is certain, no revelation would have been
given, had the light of nature been sufficient in such a sense,
as to render one not wanting and useless. But no man, in
seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it
so, who considers the state of religion in the heathen world
before revelation, and its present state in those places which
have borrowed no light from it : particularly the doubt-
fulness of some of the greatest men, concerning things of
the utmost importance, as well as the natural inattention
and ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to
I54 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. I.
say, who would have been able to have reasoned out that
whole system, which we call natural religion, in its genuine
simplicity, clear of superstition : but there is certainly no
ground to affirm that the generality could \ If they could,
there is no sort of probability that they would. Admitting
there were, they would highly want a standing admonition
to remind them of it, and inculcate it upon them2. And
further still, were they as much disposed to attend to
religion, as the better sort of men are : yet even upon
this supposition, there would be various occasions for
supernatural instruction and assistance, and the greatest
advantages might be afforded by them. So that to say
revelation is a thing superfluous, what there was no need
of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite
wildly and at random. Nor would it be more extravagant
to affirm, that mankind is so entirely at ease in the present
state, and life so completely happy, that it is a contradiction
to suppose our condition capable of being, in any respect,
better.
§ 2. Weiyli ivett Christianity as to (a) its importance,
(b) its credibility, as added to natural religion.
There are other persons, not to be ranked with these,
who seem to be getting into a way of neglecting, and, as
it were, overlooking revelation, as of small importance,
provided natural religion be kept to. With little regard
either to the evidence of the former, or to the objections
against it, and even upon supposition of its truth ; t the
only design of it,' say they, 'must be, to establish a belief
of the moral system of nature, and to enforce the practice
1 For the origin of natural re- would lie partly in the sins and
ligion see sup. I. vi. 18, and inf. ii. shortcomings of the individual?,
10. partly in the degradation of the
* Fitzgerald refers, for the de- current religions of the heathen
velopment of this argument, to world, which had sunk far below
Leland's Advantage and Necessity of the level of natural religion.
the Christian Revelation ; shown from Butler's propositions do not stand
the state of Religion in the ancient in need of particular illustrations,
heathen icorld. and ed., Dublin, but such illustrations, infinite in
1765. The ground of this necessity detail, are of the deepest interest.
§§ a, 3] OF CHRISTIANITY 155
of natural piety and virtue. The belief and practice of
these things were, perhaps, much promoted by the first
publication of Christianity : but whether they are believed
and practised, upon the evidence and motives of nature
or of revelation, is no great matter3.' This way of con-
sidering revelation, though it is not the same with the
former1, yet borders nearly upon it, and very much, at
length, runs up into it : and requires to be particularly
considered, with regard to the persons who seem to be
getting into this way. The consideration of it will like-
wise further show the extravagance of the former opinion,
and the truth of the observations in answer to it, just men-
tioned. And an inquiry into the importance of Christianity,
cannot be an improper introduction to a Treatise concerning
the credibility of it.
§ 3. If its commands be divine, it is certain.
Now if God has given a revelation to mankind, and com-
manded those things which are commanded in Christianity ;
it is evident, at first sight, that it cannot in any wise be an
indifferent matter, whether we obey or disobey those com-
mands : unless we are certainly assured, that we know all
the reasons for them, and that all those reasons are now
ceased, with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves
in particular. And it is absolutely impossible we can be
assured of this. For our ignorance of these reasons proves
nothing in the case : since the whole analogy of nature
shows, what is indeed in itself evident, that there may
be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not
acquainted.
a Invents multos propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi
sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid milii
praecepturus est Christus ? Ut bene vivam ? Jam bene vivo. Quid
inihi necessarius est Christus? Nullum homicidium, nullum furtum,
nullam rapinain facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio con-
taminor. Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur,
et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. Aug. in Psal. xxxi.
1 Viz. (§ i) ' to say revelation is a thing superfluous.'
156 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. I.
§ 4. It purports to teach religion, as (a) natural,
(b) revealed.
But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly
appear, by considering it more distinctly : first, as a repub-
lication, and external institution, of natural or essential
religion, adapted to the present circumstances of mankind,
and intended to promote natural piety and virtue: and
secondly, as containing an account of a dispensation of things
not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which, several
distinct precepts are enjoined us. For though natural
religion is the foundation and principal part of Christianity,
it is not in any sense the whole of it.
§ 5. Vi2. as a ^publication \
[I.] Christianity is a republication of natural religion. It
instructs mankind in the moral system of the world : that
it is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and under his
government ; that virtue is his law ; and that he will
finally judge mankind in righteousness, and render to all
according to their works, in a future state. And, which
is very material, it teaches natural religion in its genuine
simplicity ; free from those superstitions, with which it was
totally corrupted, and under which it was in a manner lost.
§ 6. With fresh authority.
Revelation is further, an authoritative publication of
natural religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony
for the truth of it. Indeed the miracles and prophecies
recorded in scripture, were intended to prove a particular
dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world by
the Messiah : but this does not hinder, but that they may
also prove God's general providence over the world, as our
moral Governor and Judge. And they evidently do prove
it ; because this character of the Author of nature, is neces-
sarily connected with and implied in that particular revealed
1 See, on this republication, the first of the Six Sermons, § 3.
§§ 4-8] OF CHRISTIANITY 157
dispensation of things : it is likewise continually taught
expressly, and insisted upon, by those persons who wrought
the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So that indeed
natural religion seems as much proved by the scripture reve-
lation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation
been nothing else than to prove it.
§ 7. For miracle (including prophecy) adds to
credibility.
But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can
prove natural religion ; and notable objections may be
urged against this proof of it, considered as a matter of
speculation : but considered as a practical thing, there can
be none. For suppose a person to teach natural religion
to a nation, who had lived in total ignorance or forgetful-
ness of it ; and to declare he was commissioned by God so
to do : suppose him , in proof of his commission, to foretell
things future, which no human foresight could have guessed
at ; to divide the sea with a word ; feed great multitudes
with bread from heaven ; cure all manner of diseases ; and
raise the dead, even himself, to life : would not this give
additional credibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond
what that of a common man would have ; and be an authori-
tative publication of the law of nature, i. e. a new proof of
it ? It would be a practical one, of the strongest kind,
perhaps, which human creatures are capable of having given
them. The law of Moses then, and the gospel of Christ,
are authoritative publications of the religion of nature ; they
afford a proof of God's general providence, as moral Gover-
nor of the world, as well as of his particular dispensations
of providence towards sinful creatures, revealed in the law
and the gospel. As they are the only evidence of the latter,
so they are an additional evidence of the former.
§ 8. Has force in confirming a wavering mind.
To show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest
and most improved capacity, who had never heard of reve-
lation, convinced upon the whole, notwithstanding the
158 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. I.
disorders of the world, that it was under the direction and
moral government of an infinitely perfect Being ; but ready
to question, whether he were not got beyond the reach of
his faculties : suppose him brought, by this suspicion, into
great danger of being carried away by the universal bad
example of almost every one around him, who appeared to
have no sense, no practical sense at least, of these things :
and this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a situation with
regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed any man in.
What a confirmation now must it be to such a person, all
at once, to find, that this moral system of things was re-
vealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom
he had from principles of reason believed in ; and that the
publishers of the revelation proved their commission from
him, by making it appear, that he had entrusted them with
a power of suspending and changing the general laws of
nature.
§ 9. Eminently brings life and immortality to light.
Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing
of the utmost importance, that life and immortality are
eminently brought to light by the gospel '. The great
doctrines of a future state, the danger of a course of wicked-
ness, and the efficacy of repentance, are not only confirmed
in the gospel, but are taught, especially the last is, with a
degree of light, to which that of nature is but darkness.
§ 10. Miracle, taken up and recorded l)y tlie church,
has advanced natural religion.
Further : As Christianity served these ends and purposes,
when it was first published, by the miraculous publication
1 But if immortality were known Butler's position would be far
already and independent of the stronger if, with many Christian
gospel, it is only in a feeble and writers of the earliest centuries,
secondary sense that we can say he had been liberated from the
of it (as e.g. of right and wrong) belief that the soul was inde-
that it was brought to light by feasibly immortal,
the gospel. Seel, i. 31. Evidently
§§ 9> 10] OF CHRISTIANITY 159
itself ; so it was intended to serve the same purposes in
future ages, by means of the settlement of a visible church ] :
of a society, distinguished from common ones, and from the
rest of the world, by peculiar religious institutions ; by an
instituted method of instruction, and an instituted form of
external religion. Miraculous powers were given to the
first preachers of Christianity, in order to their introducing
it into the world : a visible church was established, in order
to continue it, and carry it on successively throughout all
ages. Had Moses and the Prophets, Christ and his Apostles,
only taught, and by miracles proved, religion to their contem-
poraries ; the benefits of their instructions would have reached
but to a small part of mankind2. Christianity must have
been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages.
To prevent this, appears to have been one reason why a
visible church was instituted : to be, like a city upon an hill,
a standing memorial to the world of the duty which we owe
our Maker : to call men continually, both by example and
instruction, to attend to it, and, by the form of religion,
ever before their eyes, remind them of the reality : to be
the repository of the oracles of God : to hold up the light
of revelation in aid to that of nature, and propagate it
throughout all generations to the end of the world — the
light of revelation, considered here in no other view, than
as designed to enforce natural religion. And in proportion
as Christianity is professed and taught in the world, religion,
natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly and advan-
tageously laid before mankind, and brought again and again
to their thoughts, as a matter of infinite importance.
1 For the 'development of this of these bodies, upon which their
idea see Sermon before the S. P. G., vitality depends, is in truth in-
§ 4. eluded within the creeds of the
2 At first sight a doubt may be universal church (with some small
suggested as to the validity of this allowance perhaps for partial ex-
argument from the prolonged aggerations). So that they are, so
existence in modern times of sects to speak, in tow of the visible
who can hardly be said to have church, carried onwards with and
collectively a visible church, such by it. At least, it supplies for
as Congregationalistsand Quakers. them that portion of Christian
But the answer is, I think, con- evidence, in which they seem to
elusive. All the positive teaching be defective.
!6o OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. I.
§11. Especially as a cliurcli implies positive teaching
institutions.
A visible church has also a further tendency to promote
natural religion, as being an instituted method of education,
originally intended to be of more peculiar advantage to
those who would conform to it. For one end of the
institution was, that by admonition and reproof, as well
as instruction ; by a general regular discipline, and public
exercises of religion ; the body of Christ, as the scripture
speaks, should be edified ; i. e. trained up in piety and virtue
for a higher and better state. This settlement then appearing
thus beneficial ; tending in the nature of the thing to answer,
and in some degree actually answering, those ends ; it is to
be remembered, that the very notion of it implies positive
institutions ; for the visibility of the church consists in them.
Take away every thing of this kind, and you lose the very
notion itself. So that if the things now mentioned are ad-
vantages, the reason and importance of positive institutions
in general is most obvious ; since without them these
advantages could not be secured to the world. And it is
mere idle wantonness, to insist upon knowing the reasons,
why such particular ones were fixed upon rather than others.
§ 12. Thus natural religion has had supernatural aid.
The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance,
which Christianity affords to natural religion, is what
some persons are very slow in apprehending. And yet
it is a thing distinct in itself,' and a very plain obvious
one. For will any in good earnest really say, that the
bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advan-
tageous a situation with regard to natural religion, as they
are now amongst us : that it was laid before them, and
enforced upon them, in a manner as distinct, and as much
tending to influence their practice?
§ 13. Despite perversions of Christianity,
The objections against all this, from the perversion of
Christianity, and from the supposition of its having had
§§ 11-14] OF CHRISTIANITY 161
but little good influence, however innocently they may
be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as conclusive,
upon any principles, but such as lead to downright atheism :
because the manifestation of the law of nature by reason,
which, upon all principles of theism, must have been from
God, has been perverted and rendered ineffectual in the
same manner. It may indeed, I think, truly be said, that
the good effects of Christianity have not been small ; nor
its supposed ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly
speaking. Perhaps too the things themselves done have
been aggravated ; and if not, Christianity hath been often
only a pretence ; and the same evils in the main would
have been done upon some other pretence. However, great
and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it have really
been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments against it,
upon principles of theism.
§ 14. Divine government leaves its provisions open to abuse.
For one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon
natural religion, any more than upon Christianity, without
laying it down as a first principle, that the dispensations of
Providence are not to be judged of by their perversions,
but by their genuine tendencies : not by what they do
actually seem to effect, but by what they would effect
if mankind did their part ; that part which is justly put
and left upon them. It is altogether as much the language
of one as of the other ; He that is unjust, let liim l)e unjust
still : and lie that is holy, let him be holy still b. The light
of reason does not, any more than that of revelation, force
men to submit to its authority ; both admonish them of
what they ought to do and avoid, together with the con-
sequences of each ; and after this, leave them at full liberty
to act just as they please, till the appointed time of judg-
ment. Every moment's experience shows, that this is
God's general rule of government.
b Rev. xxii. n.
VOL. I. M
1 62 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. I.
§ 15. As such a r&publication, Christianity has a title to
l)e examined.
To return then : Christianity being a promulgation of
the law of nature ; being moreover an authoritative pro-
mulgation of it ; with new light, and other circumstances
of peculiar advantage, adapted to the wants of mankind ;
these things fully show its importance. And it is to be
observed further, that as the nature of the case requires,
so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their
profession of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and
render it such a promulgation and enforcement of religion.
Tor it is the very scheme of the gospel, that each Christian
should, in his degree, contribute towards continuing and
carrying it on : all by uniting in the public profession and
external practice of Christianity ; some by instructing, by
having the oversight and taking care of this religious com-
munity, the church of God. Now this further shows the
importance of Christianity ; and, which is what I chiefly
intend, its importance in a practical sense : or the high
obligations we are under, to take it into our most serious
consideration ; and the danger there must necessarily be,
not only in treating it despitefully, which I am not now
speaking of, but in disregarding and neglecting it. For
this is neglecting to do what is expressly enjoined us, for
continuing those benefits to the world, and transmitting
them down to future times. And all this holds, even
though the only thing to be considered in Christianity,
were its subserviency to natural religion. But,
§ 16. Is also a new plan of recovery for a world in ruins.
[II.] Christianity is to be considered in a further view :
as containing an account of a dispensation of things, not
at all discoverable by reason, in consequence of which
several distinct precepts are enjoined us. Christianity is
not only an external institution of natural religion, and a
new promulgation of God's general providence, as righteous
Governor and Judge of the world ; but it contains also
a revelation of a particular dispensation of Providence,
§§ i5-i8] OF CHRISTIANITY 163
carrying 011 by his Son and Spirit, for the recovery and
salvation of mankind, who are represented, in scripture, to
be in a state of ruin.
§ 17. 'Revelation is especially of the Son and Spirit.
And in consequence of this revelation being made, we are
commanded to be baptized, not only in the name of the Father,
but also, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost : and other
obligations of duty, unknown before, to the Son and the
Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of these
duties may be judged of, by observing that they arise, not
from positive command merely, but also from the offices,
which appear, from scripture, to belong to those divine
persons in the gospel dispensation ; or from the relations,
which, we are there informed, they stand in to us. By
reason is revealed the relation, which God the Father
stands in to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty
which we are under to him. In scripture are revealed the
relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us.
Hence arise the obligations of duty, which we are under
to them.
§ 1 8. Hence baptism is triune.
The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of these
three respects being admitted : that God is the Governor
of the world, upon the evidence of reason ; that Christ is
the Mediator between God and man, and the Holy Ghost
our Guide and Sanctifier, upon the evidence of revelation :
the truth of the case, I say, in each of these respects being-
admitted ; it is no more a question, why it should be com-
manded, that we be baptized in the name of the Son and of
the Holy Ghost, than that we be baptized in the name of
the Father. This matter seems to require to be more
fully stated c.
c See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy qf the Christian Sacraments, &c.
[by Archdeacon Waterland, 1734], and Colliber, Of revealed Religion t as
there quoted.
M 2
164 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. I.
§ 19. Christianity has two parts, loth essential: (a) Inward,
(b) outward.
Let it be remembered then, that religion comes under
the twofold consideration of internal and external : for the
latter is as real a part of religion, of true religion, as
the former. Now when religion is considered under the
first notion, as an inward principle, to .be exerted in such
and such inward acts of the mind and heart ; the essence
of natural religion may be said to consist in religious
regards to God the Father Almighty : and the essence of
revealed religion, as distinguished from natural, to consist
in religious regards to the Son, and to the Holt/ Ghost. And
the obligation we are under, of paying these religious
regards to each of these divine persons respectively, arises
from the respective relations which they each stand in to
us. How these relations are made known, whether by
reason or revelation, makes no alteration in the case :
because the duties arise out of the relations themselves,
not out of the manner in which we are informed of them.
§ 20. Dictates religious regards to Son and Spirit.
The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that
great dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the
world ; the one our Mediator, the other our Sanctifier.
Does not then the duty of religious regards to both these
divine persons, as immediately arise, to the view of reason,
out of the very nature of these offices and relations ;
as the inward good-will and kind intention, which we owe
to our fellow-creatures, arises out of the common relations
between us and them? But it will be asked, 'What are
the inward religious regards, appearing thus obviously due
to the Son and Holy Spirit ; as arising, not merely from
command in scripture, but from the very nature of the
revealed relations, which they stand in to us ?' I answer,
the religious regards of reverence, honour, love, trust,
gratitude, fear, hope.
§§ 19-22] OF CHRISTIANITY 165
§ 21. Form of flic outward is governed by command.
In what external manner this inward worship is to
be expressed, is a matter of pure revealed command ; as
perhaps the external manner, in which God the Father is
to be worshipped, may be more so, than we are ready to
think : but the worship, the internal worship itself, to the
Son and Holy Ghost, is no further matter of pure revealed
command, than as the relations they stand in to us are matter
of pure revelation : for the relations being known, the
obligations to such internal worship are obligations of reason,
arising out of those relations themselves. In short, the
history of the gospel as immediately shows us the reason of
these obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the words,
Son and Holy Ghost.
§ 22. Our relation to Christ is strictly moral, and under
moral sanctions.
If this account of the Christian religion be just ; those
persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little consequence,
provided natural religion be kept to, plainly forget, that
Christianity, even what is peculiarly so called, as distin-
guished from natural religion, has yet somewhat very im-
portant, even of a moral nature. For the office of our Lord
being made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the
obligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral, as
much as charity to mankind is ; since this obligation arises,
before external command, immediately out of that his
office and relation itself. Those persons appear to forget,
that revelation is to be considered, as informing us of
somewhat new, in the state of mankind, and in the
government of the world : as acquainting us with some
relations we stand in, which could not otherwise have been
known. And these relations being real, (though before
revelation we could be under no obligations from them,
yet upon their being revealed,) there is 110 reason to think,
but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be
attended with the same kind of consequences under God's
government, as neglecting to behave suitably to any other
relations made known to us by reason. And ignorance.
166 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. I.
whether unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can possibly
see, will just as much, and just as little, excuse in one
case as in the other : the ignorance being supposed equally
unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both cases.
' § 23. Disregard whereof may entail penalty in a natural
way.
If therefore Christ be indeed the Mediator between God
and man, i. e. if Christianity be true ; if he be indeed our
Lord, our Saviour, and our God ; no one can say, what
may follow, not only the obstinate, but the careless dis-
regard to him, in those high relations. Nay no one can
say, what may follow such disregard, even in the way of
natural consequence (1. For, as the natural consequences
of vice in this life are doubtless to be considered as judicial
punishments inflicted by God ; so likewise, for ought we
know, the judicial punishments of the future life may be,
in a like way or a like sense, the natural consequence of
vice e : of men's violating or disregarding the relations which
God has placed them in here, and made known to them.
§ 24. Same is true as to use of enjoined means of grace.
Again : If mankind are corrupted and depraved in their
moral character, and so are unfit for that state, which
Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples ; and if the
assistance of God's Spirit be necessary to renew their nature,
in the degree requisite to their being qualified for that
state ; all which is implied in the express, though figura-
tive declaration, Except a man be lorn of the Spirit, he cannot
enter into the kingdom of God f : supposing this, is it possible
any serious person can think it a slight matter, whether or
no he makes use of the means, expressly commanded by God,
for obtaining this divine assistance ? Especially since the
whole analogy of nature shows, that we are not to expect
any benefits without making use of the appointed means for
obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us nothing,
of the particular immediate means of obtaining either tem-
d Sup. I. i. 31. e Chap. v. f John iii. 5.
§§23-26] OF CHRISTIANITY 167
poral or spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn,
either from experience or revelation. And experience, the
present case does not admit of.
§ 25. Conclusion : that to treat Christianity with levity is
wildly rash.
The conclusion from all this evidently is, that, Chris-
tianity being supposed either true or credible, it is unspeak-
able irreverence, and really the most presumptuous rashness,
to treat it as a light matter. It can never justly be
esteemed of little consequence, till it be positively supposed
false. Nor do I know a higher and more important obliga-
tion which we are under, than that of examining most
seriously into the evidence of it, supposing its credibility ;
and of embracing it, upon supposition of its truth.
§ 26. Commands distinguished as (a) positive, (b) moral.
The two following deductions may be proper to be added,
in order to illustrate the foregoing observations, and to
prevent their being mistaken.
First, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinc-
tion between what is positive and what is moral in religion.
Moral precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we see :
positive precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we
do not see £. Moral duties arise out of the nature of the
case itself, prior to external command. Positive duties do
not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external
command ; nor would they be duties at all, were it not
for such command, received from him whose creatures and
subjects we are.
% This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts con-
sidered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter
have somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason
of them, considered in this view. Moral and positive ag™e> an
precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects
different. So far as they are alike, we discern the reasons of both ;
so far as they are different, we discern the reasons of the former, but
not of the latter. See sup. § 10 sqq. [But I do not see the relevancy of
the reference. — ED.], and inf. § 27.
168 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. I.
§ 27. But the positive have a moral force ; and may rest
either on natural or revealed religion.
But the manner in which the nature of the case, or the fact
of the relation, is made known, this doth not denominate
any duty either positive or moral. That we be baptized in
the name of the Father, is as much a positive duty, as that
we be baptized in the name of the Son ; because both arise
equally from revealed command : though the relation which
we stand in to God the Father is made known to us by
reason ; the relation we stand in to Christ, by revelation only.
On the other hand, the dispensation of the gospel admitted,
gratitude as immediately becomes due to Christ, from his
being the voluntary minister of this dispensation, as it is
due to God the Father, from his being the fountain of all
good ; though the first is made known to us by revelation
only, the second by reason. Hence also we may see, and,
for distinctness sake, it may be worth mentioning, that
positive institutions come under a twofold consideration.
They are either institutions founded on natural religion, as
baptism in the name of the Father ; though this has also a
particular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in
the name of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ : or
they are external institutions founded on revealed religion ;
as baptism in the name of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.
§ 28. In principle they have a moral basis : but take the
second place.
Secondly, From the distinction between what is moral
and what is positive in religion, appears the ground of
that peculiar preference, which the scripture teaches us
to be due to the former.
The reason of positive institutions in general is very
obvious ; though we should not see the reason, why such
particular ones are pitched upon rather than others. Who-
ever therefore, instead of cavilling at words, will attend to
the thing itself, may clearly see, that positive institutions
in general, as distinguished from this or that particular
one, have the nature of moral commands ; since the
§§27-3o] OF CHRISTIANITY 169
reasons of them appear. Thus, for instance, the external
worship of God is a moral duty, though no particular mode
of it be so. Care then is to be taken, when a comparison
is made between positive and moral duties, that they be
compared no further than as they are different ; no further
than as the former are positive, or arise out of mere
external command, the reasons of which we are not
acquainted with ; and as the latter are moral, or arise out
of the apparent reason of the case, without such external
command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run
into endless confusion.
§ 29. In case of conflict, the moral precept prevails.
Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts
enjoined by the same authority ; that, in certain con-
junctures, it is impossible to obey both ; that the former
is moral, i. e. a precept of which we see the reasons, and
that they hold in the particular case before us ; but that the
latter is positive, i. e. a precept of which we do not see
the reasons : it is indisputable that our obligations are to
obey the former ; because there is an apparent reason for
this preference, and none against it. Further, positive in-
stitutions, I suppose all those which Christianity enjoins,
are means to a moral end : and the end must be acknow-
ledged more excellent than the means. Nor is observance
of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of
any value, otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral
principle. This seems to be the strict logical way of
stating and determining this matter ; but will, perhaps,
be found less applicable to practice, than may be thought
at first sight.
§ 30. Has double title, from (a) scripture, (b) natural law.
And therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way
of consideration, and taking the words, moral law and
positive institutions, in the popular sense ; I add, that the
whole moral law is as much matter of revealed command,
as positive institutions are : for the scripture enjoins every
moral virtue, In this respect then they are both upon
170 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. I.
a level. But the moral law is, moreover, written upon
our hearts ; interwoven into our very nature. And this
is a plain intimation of the Author of it, which is to be
preferred, when they interfere.
§ 31. Men strive to substitute rite for virtiie ; l)ut in vain.
But there is not altogether so much necessity for the
determination of this question, as some persons seem to
think. Nor are we left to reason alone to determine it.
For, first, Though mankind have, in all ages, been greatly
prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way
of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts ; yet, without
making any comparison at all between them, and con-
sequently without determining which is to have the prefer-
ence, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all notions
of that kind to be utterly subversive of tiye religion : as
they are, moreover, contraiy to the whole general tenor of
scripture ; and likewise to the most express particular
declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of
God, without moral virtue. Secondly, Upon the occasion
of mentioning together positive and moral duties, the
scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the latter,
and never upon the former: which, though no sort of*
allowance to neglect the former, when they do not interfere
with the latter, yet is a plain intimation, that when they
do, the latter are to be preferred.
§ 32. Our Lord lias settled the matter, by his teaching on
the Sabbath.
And further, as mankind are for placing the stress of
their religion any where, rather than upon virtue ; lest
both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of
Christianity, appearing in the intimation now mentioned,
should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly : our
Lord himself, from whose command alone the obligation
of positive institutions arises, has taken occasion to make
the comparison between them and moral precepts ; when
the Pharisees censured him, for eating with publicans and
sinners; and also when they censured his disciples, for
plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath-day. Upon this
§§ 31-33] OF CHRISTIANITY 171
comparison, he has determined expressly, and in form,
which shall have the preference when they interfere. And
by delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial
manner of expression, he has made it general : I ivill have
wcrcy\ and not sacrifice**. The propriety of the word proverbial
is not the thing insisted upon : though I think the manner
of speaking is to be called so. But that the manner of
speaking veiy remarkably renders the determination general,
is surely indisputable. For, had it, in the latter case, been
said only, that God preferred mercy to the rigid observance
of the Sabbath ; even then, by parity of reason, most
justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy
likewise, to the observance of other ritual institutions ; and
in general, moral duties, to positive ones. And thus the
determination would have been general ; though its being
so were inferred and not expressed. But as the passage
really stands in the gospel, it is much stronger. For the
sense and the very literal words of our Lord's answer are
as applicable to any other instance of a comparison, be-
tween positive and moral duties, as to this upon which
they were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy
is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be
thought, that justice is to give place to them.
§ 33- Superiority of virtue to observance taught by the Old
Testament.
It is remarkable too, that, as the words are a quota-
tion from the Old Testament, they are introduced, on both
the forementioned occasions, with a declaration, that the
Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them. This,
I say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce possible,
for the most ignorant person, not to understand the literal
sense of the passage, in the prophet1 ; and since under-
h Matt. ix. 13 and xii. 7. * Hos. vi.
1 ' Obedience to positive com- spring from a principle of natural
mand, it will be noticed, is often morality; the former, if not the re-
a more decisive test of religious suit of hypocrisy or of mechanical
character, than the practice of habit, is an evidence of reverence
moral duties. The latter may for the divine will.' Angus.
172 OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY
standing the literal sense would not have prevented their
condemning the guiltless k ; it can hardly be doubted, that
the thing which our Lord really intended in that declaration
was, that the Pharisees had not learnt from it, as they
might, wherein the general spirit of religion consists : that it
consists in moral piety and virtue, as distinguished from
forms, and ritual observances. However, it is certain we
may learn this from his divine application of the passage,
in the gospel.
§ 34. The obligation to obey positive precepts is moral.
But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human
nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, one is found
to be of greater importance than the other, to consider this
other as of scarce any importance at all : it is highly
necessary that we remind ourselves, how great presumption
it is, to make light of any institutions of divine appoint-
ment ; that our obligations to obey all God's commands
whatever are absolute and indispensable ; and that com-
mands merely positive, admitted to be from him, lay us
under a moral obligation to obey them : an obligation moral
in the strictest and most proper sense.
§ 35- WG arc t° accept the sense of scripture, not import it.
To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account
now given of Christianity most strongly shows and en-
forces upon us the obligation of searcliing the scriptures,
in order to see, what the scheme of revelation really is ;
instead of determining beforehand, from reason, what the
scheme of it must be1. Indeed if in revelation there be
found any passages, the seeming meaning of which is
contrary to natural religion ; we may most certainly con-
clude, such seeming meaning not to be the real one. But
it is not any degree of a presumption against an interpreta-
tion of scripture, that such interpretation contains a doctrine,
which the light of nature cannot discover m ; or a precept,
which the law of nature does not oblige to.
k See Matt. xii. 7. * See chap. iii. m Inf. ii. 3, 4.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION,
CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.
§ i. Witt deal (a) wltli presumption, (b) with positive
evidence.
TTAVING shown the importance of the Christian revela-
A* tion, and the obligations which we are under seriously
to attend to it, upon supposition of its truth, or its credi-
bility : the next thing in order, is to consider the supposed
presumptions against revelation in general ; which shall be
the subject of this chapter : and the objections against
the Christian in particular ; which shall be the subject of
some following onesa. For it seems the most natural
method, to remove these prejudices against Christianity,
before we proceed to the consideration of the positive
evidence for it, and the objections against that evidence b.
§ 2. He discusses under protest a plea lie deems frivolous.
It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some
peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against
the Christian scheme of things ; at least against miracles :
so as that stronger evidence is necessaiy to prove the truth
and reality of them, than would be sufficient to convince us
of other events, or matters of fact. Indeed the considera-
tion of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought
very insignificant, by many persons. Yet, as it belongs to
the subject of this Treatise; so it may tend to open the
mind, and remove some prejudices : however needless the
consideration of it be, upon its own account.
a Chaps, iii, iv, v, vi. b Chap. vii.
174 SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST [II. II.
§ 3. Nature sustains no presumption against the gospel idea,
[I.] I find no appearance of a presumption, from the
analogy of nature, against the general scheme of Chris-
tianity, that God created and invisibly governs the world
by Jesus Christ ; and by him also will hereafter judge it
in righteousness, i. e. render to every one according to his
works : and that good men are under the secret influence
of his Spirit. Whether these things are, or are not, to be
called miraculous, is, perhaps, only a question about words ;
or however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy of
nature raises any presumption against this general scheme
of Christianity, it must be, either because it is not discover-
able by reason or experience ; or else, because it is unlike
that course of nature, which is. But analogy raises no pre-
sumption against the truth of this scheme, upon either of
these accounts.
§ 4. (a) Because it is undiseoverable ; like so mueh else ;
First, There is no presumption, from analogy, against
the truth of it, upon account of its not being discoverable
by reason or experience. For suppose one who never heard
of revelation, of the most improved understanding, and
acquainted with our whole system of natural philosophy
and natural religion : such an one could not but be
sensible, that it was but a very small part of the natural
and moral system of the universe, which he was acquainted
with. He could not but be sensible, that there must be
innumerable things, in the dispensations of Providence
past, in the invisible government over the world at present
carrying on, and in what is to come ; of which he was
wholly ignorant0, and which could not be discovered
without revelation. Whether the scheme of nature be,
in the strictest sense, infinite or not ; it is evidently
vast, even beyond all possible imagination. And doubt-
less that part of it, which is opened to our view, is but
as a point, in comparison of the whole plan of Providence,
0 Sup. I. vii. 2-4.
§§3-6] A REVELATION WITH MIRACLE 175
reaching throughout eternity past and future ; in com-
parison of what is even now going on in the remote parts
of the boundless universe ; nay in comparison of the whole
scheme of this world. And therefore, that things lie
beyond the natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of
presumption against the truth and reality of them : because
it is certain, there are innumerable things, in the con-
stitution and government of the universe, which are thus
beyond the natural reach of our faculties.
§ 5. Or (b) because not always like nature : which is not
uniform; nor is moral government.
Secondly, Analogy raises no presumption against any of
the things contained in this general doctrine of scripture
now mentioned, upon account of their being unlike the
known course of nature. For there is no presumption at
all from analogy, that the tvhole course of things, or divine
government, naturally unknown to us, and every tiling in
it, is like to any thing in that which is known ; and there-
fore no peculiar presumption against any thing1 in the
former, upon account of its being unlike to any thing in
the latter. And in the constitution and natural govern-
ment of the world, as well as in the moral government
of it, we see things, in a great degree, unlike one another :
and therefore ought not to wonder at such unlikeness
between things visible and invisible. However, the scheme
of Christianity is by no means entirely unlike the scheme of
nature ; as will appear in the following part of this Treatise.
§ 6. So that analogy supplies no adverse presumption'1.
The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a divine
mission, has been stated with great exactness by divines ;
1 That is, against any particular that the fact of their having been
thing. For, were there an uni- used to prove Christianity raises
versal or general unlikeness, it no presumption against its truth,
would contradict the purpose of The definition of a miracle had
this work as declared in the title. not been perhaps as closely ex-
2 Butler's argument is not con- amined in mediaeval, or even in
cerned with proving the Christian Butler's, days, as in our own.
miracles, but only with showing Aliquid dititur esse miraculum, quod fit
176 SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST [II. II.
and is, I think, sufficiently understood by every one. There
are also invisible miracles, the Incarnation of Christ, for
instance, which, being secret, cannot be alleged as a proof
of such a mission ; but require themselves to be proved by
visible 1 miracles. Revelation itself too is miraculous ; and
miracles are the proof of it : and the supposed presumption
against these shall presently be considered. All which I
have been observing here is, that, whether we choose to call
every thing in the dispensations of Providence, not dis-
coverable without revelation, nor like the known course
of things, miraculous ; and whether the general Christian
dispensation now mentioned is to be called so, or not ; the
foregoing observations seem certainly to show, that there is
no presumption against it from the analogy of nature.
§ 7. Was there a primaeval revelation ? is a question
of common fact,
[II.] There is no presumption, from analogy, against
some operations, which we should now call miraculous ;
particularly none against a revelation at the beginning of
the world : nothing of such presumption against it, as is
supposed to be implied or expressed in the word miraculous.
For a miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a course
of nature ; and implies somewhat different from it, con-
sidered as being so. Now, either there was no course of
nature at the time which we are speaking of: or if there
were, we are not acquainted what the course of nature is,
upon the first peopling of worlds. And therefore the
question, whether mankind had a revelation made to them
at that time, is to be considered, not as a question con-
cerning a miracle, but as a common question of fact. And
praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. age might, owing to the advance
So Aquinas, Sumnia, I. Qu. ex. of natural knowledge and re-
Art. 4. What seems the essence source, cease to be a miracle for
is perhaps this, that the act should another.
reasonably convey to the human ' Evidently meaning sensible :
mind the belief that it could only cf. the miracle of the 'rushing
be done by an exertion of the mighty wind/ and the speech in
divine power above and beyond tongues previously unknown to
the settled order of things. It is the speaker (Acts ii. 4) on the day
conceivable, that a miracle of one of Pentecost, and thereafter.
§§7-io] A REVELATION WITH MIRACLE 177
we have the like reason, be it more or less, to admit the
report of tradition, concerning this question, and concerning
common matters of fact of the same antiquity ; for instance,
what part of the earth was first peopled.
§ 8. Certainly foreign to the present course of nature.
Or thus : When mankind was first placed in this state,
there was a power exerted, totally different from the present
course of nature. Now, whether this power, thus wholly
different from the present course of nature, for we cannot
properly apply to it the word miraculous l ; whether this
power stopped immediately after it had made man, or went
on, and exerted itself further in giving him a revelation, is
a question of the same kind, as whether an ordinary power
exerted itself in such a particular degree and manner, or not.
§ 9. Our Lord's miracles not a question of degree.
Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the
world be considered as miraculous, or rather, be called by
that name ; the case will not be different : since it must
be acknowledged, that such a power was exerted. For
supposing it acknowledged, that our Saviour spent some
years in a course of working miracles : there is no more
presumption, worth mentioning, against his having exerted
this miraculous power, in a certain degree greater, than in
a certain degree less ; in one or two more instances, than in
one or two fewer ; in this, than in another manner.
It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar pre-
sumption, from the analogy of nature, against supposing
a revelation, when man was first placed upon the earth.
§ 10. Upon the evidences, religion first came by revelation.
Inferred doubly*.
Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in
history or tradition, that religion was first reasoned out :
1 The following up of creation ' course of nature ' from which
by revelation can hardly be called it could be (see § 7) i somewhat
miraculous : for there was not at different.'
the time, so far as known to us, 2 On the origin of natural reli-
and perhaps hardly could be, any gion, comp. I. vi. 18.
VOL. I. N
178 SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST [II. II.
but the whole of history and tradition makes for the other
side, that it came into the world by revelation. Indeed the
state of religion in the first ages, of which we have any
account, seems to suppose and imply, that this was the
original of it amongst mankind. And these reflections
together, without taking in the peculiar authority of scrip-
ture, amount to real and a very material degree of evidence,
that there was a revelation at the beginning of the world.
Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, and
therefore mentioned in the former part of this Treatise d :
so likewise it has a tendency to remove any prejudices
against a subsequent revelation.
§ ii. Strong presumptions lie against many known facts.
[III.] But still it may be objected, that there is some
peculiar presumption, from analogy, against miracles ;
particularly against revelation, after the settlement and
during the continuance of a course of nature.
Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to
be observed in general, that before we can have ground
for raising what can, with any propriety, be called an
argument from analogy, for or against revelation considered
as somewhat miraculous, we must be acquainted with a
similar or parallel case. But the history of some other
world, seemingly in like circumstances with our own, is
no more than a parallel case : and therefore nothing short
of this can be so. Yet, could we come at a presumptive
proof, for or against a revelation, from being informed,
whether such world had one, or not ; such a proof, being
drawn from one single instance only, must be infinitely
precarious. More particularly : First of all ; There is a
very strong presumption against common speculative truths,
and against the most ordinary facts, before the proof of
them ; which yet is overcome by almost any proof \ There
d Sup. I. vi. 18.
1 It is difficult to comprehend ler founds probability upon like-
Butler's mode of arrival at this ness (Iiitrod. § 3). Improbability
proposition, and the proposition therefore requires an unlikeness
itself seems hard to defend. But- of the same kind. But there is
A REVELATION WITH MIRACLE
179
is a presumption of millions to one, against the story of
Caesar, or of any other man. For suppose a number of
common facts so and so circumstanced, of which one had
no kind of proof, should happen to come into one's thoughts ;
every one would, without any possible doubt, conclude them to
be false. And the like may be said of a single common fact.
no such unlikeness in these most
ordinary facts, which are here
declared improbable. True, the
improbability spoken of is one
before proof. But surely it is a
startling assertion that very high
improbability can be overcome by
almost any thing in the nature
of proof ; which I take to be the
meaning of Butler's words. Sup-
pose it autumn : I am looking
at a great tree with an hundred
thousand leaves, and the fall of
the leaf has commenced at what
may be called an uniform rate.
A leaf falls : the chances (appre-
ciable by me) that that particular
leaf would fall at that particular
moment was one to ten thousand.
Still these ch'ances, as I should
say, constituted something in its
nature different from an improb-
ability. But could I have seen
into the physical condition of the
ligaments which connected each
leaf with the tree, according as
they .still lived or came near to
death, I might then have said the
early fall of this leaf is probable,
of that one improbable. But the
improbability to be real must be
somewhat in the thing itself and
in its relation to other things.
There is improbability, antecedent
to proof, in the life of Alexander
the Great or of Mahomet, but it
is because those lives are so unlike
the lives of common men, or the
ordinary course of nature. Ac-
cordingly BishopFitzgerald quotes
with a just approval the conten-
tion of Mill (Logic, ii. 192, 194)
that these observations of Butler
afford no answer to the argument
of Hume against miracles, because
that argument proceeds upon
' contrariety to the uniform course
of experience.' Chance, on which
Butler here rests, can only be
predicated where there is no sub-
stantial unlikeness, as in the case
of the tickets in a lottery. The case
of Caesar (standing alone) imports
an element of improbability,
founded on unlikeness: but an
improbability removable by proof
(see Fitzgerald's Analogy, p. 184 n. \
The word presumption, then,
appears, as well as improbability,
to be inapplicable to the case now
before us.
Mill takes his distinction in a
convenient form between improb-
ability before the fact, and im-
probability after the fact.
All this is quite independent of
the validity of Hume's argument.
If we set up contrariety to the
uniform law of nature it may
surely be observed, (i) that nature
is extremely various ; (2) that we
are not entitled to assert that we
know the limit of these variations ;
(3) that as by our will we can set
in motion forces antagonistic to
other known natural forces, so it
is possible that, by will-power
other and greater than ours, other
natural forces may be contra-
vened ; (4) that this action of
will is as much a part of the law
and course of nature as any other>
portion of the operations estab-'
lished by experience.
This subject is discussed in Mr.
Leslie Stephen's History of English
Thought in the Eighteenth Century,
ch. viii. § 28.
N 2
l8o SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST [II. n.
§ 12. (a) The real question : Is there a presumption against
miracles, such as to make them incredible?
And from hence it appears, that the question of impor-
tance, as to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree
of the peculiar presumption supposed against miracles ; not
whether there be any peculiar presumption at all against
them. For, if there be the presumption of millions to one,
against the most common facts ; what can a small presump-
tion, additional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar ? It
cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material
question is, whether there be any such presumption against
miracles, as to render them in any sort incredible.
§ 13. (b) Antecedent to proof, the presumption against
miracles in general less than against particular facts.
Secondly, If we leave out the consideration of religion,
we are in such total darkness, upon what causes, occasions,
reasons, or circumstances, the present course of nature
depends ; that there does not appear any improbability
for or against supposing, that five or six thousand years
may have given scope for causes, occasions, reasons, or
circumstances, from whence miraculous interpositions may
have arisen. And from this, joined with the foregoing
observation, it will follow, that there must be a presump-
tion, beyond all comparison, greater, against the particular
common facts just now instanced in, than against miracles
in general ; before any evidence of either *.
§ 14. (c) But religion supplies particular reasons for them.
But, thirdly, Take in the consideration of religion, or the
moral system of the world, and then we see distinct parti-
cular reasons for miracles : to afford mankind instruction
additional to that of nature, and to attest the truth of it.
And this gives a real credibility to the supposition, that it
might be part of the original plan of things, that there
should be miraculous interpositions.
1 This argument appears to be entangled in the fallacious idea
propounded in § n.
§§ia-i6] A REVELATION WITH MIRACLE 181
§ 15. (d) They are to be compared witli the cxtraordinaries
of nature.
Then, lastly, Miracles must not be compared to common
natural events ; or to events which, though uncommon, are
similar to what we daily experience : but to the extraordinary
phenomena of nature. And then the comparison will be
between the presumption against miracles, and the presump-
tion against such uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets,
and against there being any such powers in nature as mag-
netism and electricity, so contrary to the properties of other
bodies not endued with these powers \ And before any one
can determine, whether there be any peculiar presumption
against miracles, more than against other extraordinary
things ; he must consider, what, upon first hearing, would
be the presumption against the last-mentioned appearances
and powers, to a person acquainted only with the daily,
monthly, and annual course of nature respecting this earth,
and with those common powers of matter which we eveiy
day see.
§ 1 6. Thus they appear rather to have a degree of positive
title to belief.
Upon all this- 1 conclude ; That there certainly is no such
presumption against miracles, as to render them in any wise
incredible : that on the contrary, our being able to discern
reasons for them, gives a positive credibility to the history
of them, in cases where those reasons hold : and that it is
by no means certain, that there is any peculiar presumption
at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree, against
miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary phenc-
1 The;e powers differ from the them and other laws, which were
case of miracles in that they are not always known, prepare us
capable of systematic verification; to anticipate other differences of
but are available for Butler's pur- great breadth and strangeness,
pose in that, as we learn new Fitzgerald observes, that miracles
effects and characteristics of these maybe regarded as physical events
laws, we find the bounds of nature having moral antecedents : which
wider than we had supposed ; and fall under Butler's reference to
the broad differences between i reasons.'
182 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [ll. HI.
meua : though it is not worth while to perplex the reader
with inquiries into the abstract nature of evidence, in order
to determine a question, which, without such inquiries, we
see e is of no importance.
CHAPTER III.
OF OUll INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE
EXPECTED IN A REVELATION; AND THE CREDIBILITY,
FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS
APPEARING LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.
§ i. Enumerates dicers objections taken to the Christian
scheme.
"OESIDES the objections against the evidence for Chris-
•*-* tianity, many are alleged against the scheme of it ;
against the whole manner in which it is put and left with
the world ; as well as against several particular relations in
scripture : objections drawn from the deficiencies of revela-
tion ; from things in it appearing to men foolishmss a ; from
its containing matters of offence, which have led, and it
must have been foreseen would lead, into strange enthusiasm
and superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of
tyranny and wickedness ; from its not being universal ;
and, which is a thing of the same kind, from its evidence
not being so convincing and satisfactory as it might have
been : for this last is sometimes turned into a positive
argument against its truth b. It would be tedious, indeed
impossible, to enumerate the several particulars compre-
hended under the objections here referred to ; they being
so various, according to the different fancies of men. There
are persons, who think it a strong objection against the
authority of scripture, that it is not composed by rules of
e P. 169 [in edition of 1844. But the reference appears to be to
p. 210, § 2.]
a i Cor. i. 23. b See chap. vi.
§§ r-3] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS 183
art, agreed upon by critics, for polite and correct writing.
And the scorn is inexpressible, with which some of the
prophetic parts of scripture are treated : partly through the
rashness of interpreters ; but very much also, on account of
the hieroglyphical and figurative language, in which they
are left us. Some of the principal things of this sort shall
be particularly considered in following chapters.
§ 2. Mostly frivolous ; except those against the evidence.
But my design at present is to observe in general, with
respect to this whole way of arguing, that, upon supposition
of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand, we should
be incompetent judges of it to a great degree : and that it
would contain many things appearing to us liable to great
objections ; in case we judge of it otherwise, than by the
analogy of nature. And therefore, though objections against
the evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be con-
sidered ; yet objections against Christianity itself are, in
a great measure, frivolous : almost all objections against it,
excepting those which are alleged against the particular
proofs of its coming from God.
§ 3. Cautious not to vilify reason, ivhereby we judge even of
revelation.
I express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken
to vilify reason * ; which is indeed the only faculty we have
wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even revelation
itself: or be misunderstood to assert, that a supposed
revelation cannot be proved false, from internal characters.
For, it may contain clear immoralities or contradictions ;
and either of these would prove it false. Nor will I take
upon me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly render
any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still the observation
above is, I think, true beyond doubt ; that objections against
Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its
evidence, are frivolous. To make out this, is the general
design of the present chapter.
1 See inf. ix. 7.
184 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. ill.
§ 4. Dislike of consequences no relevant pica.
And with regard to the whole of it, I cannot but par-
ticularly wish, that the proofs might be attended to ;
rather than the assertions cavilled at, upon account of any
unacceptable consequences, whether real or supposed, which
may be drawn from them. For, after all, that which is
true, must be admitted, though it should show us the
shortness of our faculties ; and that we are in no wise
judges of many things, of which we are apt to think
ourselves very competent ones. Nor will this be any
objection with reasonable men, at least upon second
thought it will not be any objection with such, against
the justness of the following observations.
§ 5. Taking objection to nature, we are likely to object
to revelation.
As God governs the world, and instructs his creatures,
according to certain laws or rules, in the known course of
nature, known by reason together with experience : so the*
scripture informs us of a scheme of divine Providence,
additional to this. It relates, that God has, by revelation,
instructed men in things concerning his government, which
they could not otherwise have known ; and reminded them
of things, which they might otherwise know : and attested
the truth of the whole by miracles. Now if the natural
and the revealed dispensation of things are both from God,
if they coincide with each other, and together make up one
scheme of Providence ; our being incompetent judges of
one, must render it credible, that we may be incompetent
judges also of the other. Since, upon experience, the
acknowledged constitution and course of nature is found
to be greatly different from what, before experience, would
have been expected ; and such as, men fancy, there lie
great objections against : this renders it beforehand highly
credible, that they may find the revealed dispensation
likewise, if they judge of it as they do of the constitution
of nature, very different from expectations formed before,
hand ; and liable, in appearance, to great objections :
§§ 4-7] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS 185
objections against the scheme itself, and against the degrees
and manners of the miraculous interpositions, by which it
was attested and carried on.
§ 6. As a bad judge of ordinary temporal government
would le the like of extraordinary.
Thus suppose a prince to govern his dominions in the
wisest manner possible, by common known laws ; and that
upon some exigencies he should suspend these laws ; and
govern, in several instances, in a different manner : if one
of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand, by
what common rules the government should or would be
carried on ; it could not be expected, that the same person
would be a competent judge, in what exigencies, or in
what manner, or to what degree, those laws commonly
observed would be suspended or deviated from. If he
were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordinary administra-
tion, there is no reason to think he would be a judge of
the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he had
objections against the former ; doubtless, it is highly
supposable, he might think also, that he had objections
against the latter. And thus, as we fall into infinite follies
and mistakes, whenever we pretend, otherwise than from
experience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and
course of nature ; it is evidently supposable beforehand,
that we should fall into as great, in pretending to judge,
in like manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there any
more ground to expect that this latter should appear to
us clear of objections, than that the former should.
§ 7. What inspiration, or revelation, would or should
le, we are lad judges.
These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity,
are applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in
no sort judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what
degree, or by what means, it were to have been expected,
that God would naturally instruct us : so upon supposition
of his affording us light and instruction by revelation,
additional to what he has afforded us by reason and
experience, we are in no sort judges, by what methods,
III.
186 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [n.
and in what proportion, it were to be expected, that this
supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us.
We know not beforehand, what degree or kind of natural
information, it were to be expected God would aiford men.
each by his own reason and experience: nor how far he
would enable and effectually dispose them to communicate
it, whatever it should be, to each other : nor whether the
evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or
doubtful: nor whether it would be given with equal
clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon
any good ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or
even the faculty itself, by which we are capable of attaining
it, reason, would be given us at once, or gradually. In
like manner, we are wholly ignorant, what degree of new
knowledge, it were to be expected, God would give mankind
by revelation, upon supposition of his affording one : or
how far, or in what way, he would interpose miraculously,
to qualify them, to whom he should originally make the
revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it ;
and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should
live ; and to secure its being transmitted to posterity. We
are equally ignorant, whether the evidence of it would be
certain, or highly probable, or doubtful c : Or whether all
who should have any degree of instruction from it, and
any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the same :
or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or
unfolded gradually. Nay we are not in any sort able to
judge, whether it were to have been expected, that the
revelation should have been committed to writing; or
left to be handed down, and consequently corrupted, by
verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind
so pleased, and during such time as they are permitted, in
the degree they evidently are, to act as they will.
§ 8. E. g. as letiveen written and oral forms.
But it may be said, < that a revelation in some of the
>ove mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, which
c See chap. vi.
§§8-io] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS 187
was not committed to writing, and thus secured against
danger of corruption, would not have answered its purpose.'
I ask, what purpose ? It would not have answered all the
purposes, which it has now answered, and in the same
degree : but it would have answered others, or the same
in different degrees. And which of these were the purposes
of God, and best fell in with his general government, we
could not at all have determined beforehand.
§ 9. 27ms ignorant a parte ante, lue are Incompetent
a parte post.
Now since it has been shown, that we have no principles
of reason, upon which to judge beforehand, how it were to
be expected revelation should have been left, or what was
most suitable to the divine plan of government, in any of
the forementioned respects ; it must be quite frivolous to
object afterwards as to any of them, against its being left
in one way, rather th'an another : for this would be to object
against things, upon account of their being different from
expectations, which have been shown to be without reason.
And thus we see, that the only question concerning the
truth of Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation : not
whether it be attended with every circumstance which we
should have looked for : and concerning the authority of
scripture, whether it be what it claims to be ; not whether
it be a book of such sort, and so promulged, as weak men
are apt to fancy a book containing a divine revelation should.
And therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy
of style, nor various readings, nor early disputes about the
authors of particular parts ; nor any other things of the
like kind, though they had been much more considerable
in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority of
the scripture : unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord,
had promised, that the book containing the divine revelation
should be secure from those things.
§ 10. Attack feasible only on (a) proofs of miracle,
(b) prophecy.
Nor indeed can any objections overthrow such a kind of
revelation as the Christian claims to be, since there are no
188 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. III.
objections against the morality of it l\ but such as can show,
that there is no proof of miracles wrought originally in
attestation of it ; no appearance of any thing miraculous
in its obtaining in the world ; nor any of prophecy, that
is, of events foretold, which human sagacity could not
foresee.
§ ii. If lut partially proven, their authority will abide.
If it can be shown, that the proof alleged for all these is
absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned '. But
were it allowed, that the proof of any one or all of them
is lower than is allowed ; yet, whilst any proof of them
remains, revelation will stand upon much the 'same foot
it does at present, as to all the purposes of life and practice,
and ought to have the like influence upon our behaviour.
§ 12. Arguments yood for ordinary looks ivill not always hold
in the case of scripture.
From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and
those who will thoroughly examine into revelation will find
it worth remarking ; that there are several ways of arguing,
which, though just with regard to other writings, are not
applicable to scripture : at least not to the prophetic parts
of it. We cannot argue, for instance, that this cannot be
the sense or intent of such a passage of scripture ; for, if
it had, it would have been expressed more plainly, or have
been represented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic :
yet we may justly argue thus, with respect to common
books. And the reason of this difference is very evident ;
that in scripture we are not competent judges, as we
are in common books, how plainly it were to have been
expected, what is the true sense should have been expressed,
d Inf. § 26.
1 I suppose we may fill up the but not destroyed, we should not,
argument thus. The disproof in under the rules of probability and
this or that case would not affect good sense, be discharged from all
the credit generally due. If the duty in regard to them,
general proof of all were weakened
§§ "-
LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS
189
or under how apt an image figured. The only question is,
what appearance there is, that this is the sense ; and scarce
at all, how much more determinately or accurately it might
have been expressed or figured.
§ 13. Internal improbabilities (a) hard to establish, (b) may
be set aside by evidence,
i But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities
of all kinds weaken external probable proof ? ' Doubtless.
But to what practical purpose can this be alleged here, when
it has been proved before61, that real internal improbabilities
which rise even to moral certainty, are overcome by the
most ordinary testimony ; and when it now has been made
appear, that we scarce know what are improbabilities, as
to the matter we are here considering : as it will further
appear from what follows.
§ 14. Why preconceived notions are sure to mislead.
For though from the observations above made it is
manifest, that we are not in any sort competent judges,
what supernatural instruction were to have been expected ;
and though it is self-evident, that the objections of an
incompetent judgment must be frivolous : yet it may be
proper to go one step further, and observe ; that if men
will be regardless of these things, and pretend to judge of
0 Sup. ii. n, 12.
1 Again we appear to be en-
tangled in the argument of §§ ir
and 12, ch. ii. Still, the state-
ment there does not go beyond
propounding that an adverse pre-
sumption of millions to one may
be overcome by almost any proof.
That such a presumption, as But-
ler there has in view, does not
'rise to moral certainty' is plain
at once from the fact that the
things referred to are ('the most
common facts') such as do actually
happen. These are not 'real
internal improbabilities,' for they
do not grow out of any thing in
the things themselves, but are
a mere conjecture as to the num-
ber of possibilities, any one of
which might have become fact,
instead of that which did become
so. This discussion must turn
not upon mere adverse chances,
but on improbabilities which are
intrinsic. The closing lines of
the section stand clear of this
difficulty. See sup. § 1 1 of ch. ii.
I90 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. III.
the scripture by preconceived expectations ; the analogy of
nature shows beforehand not only that it is highly credible
they may, but also probable that they will, imagine they
have strong objections against it, however really unexcep-
tionable : for so, prior to experience, they would think they
had, against the circumstances and degrees and the whole
manner of that instruction, which is afforded by the ordinary
course of nature. Were the instruction which God affords
to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and to
mankind by these together with reason, matter of probable
proof, and not of certain observation ; it would be rejected
as incredible, in many instances of it, only upon account
of the means by which this instruction is given, the seeming
disproportions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and
circumstances of it.
§ 15. E. g. as to (a) comparative access to different kinds
of knowledge, (b) invention, (c) language.
For instance : Would it not have been thought highly
improbable, that men should have been so much more
capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws
of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions of
the heavenly bodies ; than the occasions and cures of
distempers, and many other things, in which human life
seems so much more nearly concerned, than in astronomy ?
How capricious and irregular a way of information, would
it be said, is that of invention, by means of wrhich nature
instructs us in matters of science, and in many things,
upon which the affairs of the world greatly depend : that
a man should, by this faculty, be made acquainted with
a thing in an instant, when perhaps he is thinking of
somewhat else, which he has in vain been searching after,
it may be, for years. So likewise the imperfections attend-
ing the only method, by which nature enables and directs
us to communicate our thoughts to each other, are in-
numerable. Language is, in its very nature, inadequate,
ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence ;
and so liable to it from design, that every man can deceive
and betray by it.
§§ i5-i8] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS 191
§ 1 6. Greater certainty of brutes in their mental
operations.
And, to mention but one instance more ; that brutes,
without reason, should act, in many respects, with a sagacity
and foresight vastly greater than what men have in those
respects, would be thought impossible. Yet it is certain
they do act with such superior foresight: whether it be
their own indeed, is another question.
§ 17. Case would probably be similar in any (supposed)
further revelation.
From these things, it is highly credible beforehand, that
upon supposition God should afford men some additional
instruction by revelation, it would be with circumstances,
in manners, degrees, and respects, which we should be apt
to fancy we had great objections against the credibility of.
Nor are the objections against the scripture, nor against
Christianity in general, at all more or greater, than the
analogy of nature would beforehand— not perhaps give
ground to expect ; for this analogy may not be sufficient,
in some cases, to ground an expectation upon ; but no more
nor greater, than analogy would show it, beforehand, to be
supposable and credible, that there might seem to lie against
revelation.
§ 1 8. Objection from the disorderly use of miraculous
gifts futile.
By applying these general observations to a particular
objection, it will be more distinctly seen, how they are
applicable to others of the like kind : and indeed to almost
all objections against Christianity, as distinguished from
objections against its evidence. It appears from scripture,
that, as it was not unusual in the apostolic age, for persons,
upon their conversion to Christianity, to be endued with
miraculous gifts ; so, some of those persons exercised these
gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly manner; and
this is made an objection against theii being really
miraculous, Now the foregoing observations quite remove
192 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. III.
this objection, how considerable soever it may appear at
first sight. For, consider a person endued with any of
these gifts ; for instance, that of tongues : it is to be
supposed, that he had the same power over this miraculous
gift, as he would have had over it, had it been the effect
of habit, of study and use, as it ordinarily is ; or the same
power over it, as he had over any other natural endowment '.
Consequently, he would use it in the same manner he did
any other ; either regularly, and upon proper occasions
only, or irregularly, and upon improper ones : according
to his sense of decency, and his character of prudence.
Where then is the objection? Why, if this miraculous
power was indeed given to the world to propagate Chris-
tianity, and attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have
expected, that other sort of persons should have been
chosen to be invested with it ; or that these should, at the
same time, have been endued with prudence ; or that they
should have been continually restrained and directed in
the exercise of it: i.e. that God should have miraculously
interposed, if at all, in a different manner, or higher degree.
But, from the observations made above, it is undeniably
evident, that we are not judges in what degrees and
manners it were to have been expected he should miracu-
lously interpose ; upon supposition of his doing it in some
degree and manner.
§ 19. Similar risk in other gifts.
Nor, in the natural course of Providence, are superior
gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other talents
of great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence
and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest
use of them. Nor is the instruction and admonition
naturally afforded us for the conduct of life, particularly
in our education, commonly given in a manner the most
suited to recommend it ; but often with circumstances apt
to prejudice us against such instruction.
1 This seems to be expressly the spirits of the prophets are
declared in i Cor. xiv. 32, <and subject to the prophets.'
§§ i9-2i] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS 193
§ 20. Analogy of nature and revelation in the relations
of lower to higher Jcnozvledge.
One might go on to add, that there is a great resemblance
between the light of nature and of revelation, in several
other respects. Practical Christianity, or that faith and
behaviour which renders a man a Christian, is a plain and
obvious thing : like the common rules of conduct, with
respect to our ordinary temporal affairs. The more distinct
and particular knowledge of those things, the study of
which the apostle calls going on unto perfection f, and of the
prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of natural
and even civil knowledge, may require very exact thought,
and careful consideration. The hindrances too, of natural,
and of supernatural light and knowledge, have been of the
same kind.
§ 21. So it is as to the further opening of scripture.
And as it is owned the whole scheme of scripture is not
yet understood ; so, if it ever comes to be understood,
before the restitution of all things », and without miraculous
interpositions ; it must be in the same way as natural
knowledge is come at : by the continuance and progress
of learning and of liberty ; and by particular, persons
attending to, comparing and pursuing, intimations scattered
up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded by
the generality of the world. For this is the way, in which
all improvements are made ; by thoughtful men's tracing
on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature
accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by
chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book, which has
been so long in the possession of mankind, should contain
many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all the same
phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation, from
which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have
been made in the present and last age, were equally in
the possession of mankind, several thousand years before.
f Heb. vi. i. f Acts iii. ai.
VOL. I. 0
194
THINGS UNEXPECTED OR
[II. III.
And possibly it might be intended, that events, as they
come to pass, should open and ascertain the meaning of
several parts of scripture.
§ 22. Natural Icnoicledge sometimes of high stamp: is given
not as tee expect, but differently1.
It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material
respect : for that natural knowledge is of little or no
consequence. But I have been speaking of the general
instruction which nature does or does not afford us. And
besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the more
common restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest
consequence to the ease and convenience of life. But
suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this respect ;
yet it might be abundantly supplied, from the whole
constitution and course of nature : which shows, that God
does not dispense his gifts according to our notions of the
advantage and consequence they would be of to us. And
this in general, with his method of dispensing knowledge
in particular, would together make out an analogy full to
the point before us.
§ 23. That the supply of light is only partial.
But it may be objected still further and more generally ;
1 The scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin,
and Christianity as an expedient to recover it, to help in
these respects where nature fails : in particular, to supply
the deficiencies of natural light. Is it credible then, that
so many ages should have been let pass, before a matter
of such a sort, of so great and so general importance, was
made known to mankind ; and then that it should be made
1 Dr. Angus in his analysis of
the chapter brings oat the numer-
ous points of this short section :
(a', Objection is taken to natural
knowledge as unimportant.
(6) That is, irreleyant
(c Ako untrue.
(<T) The argument is that God
gives not as we expect, but
differently.
(«) Herein a full analogy be-
tween nature and revelation
is exhibited.
See Butler's Analogy, edited by
Dr. Angus, p. 180.
§§22-24] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS 195
known to so small a part of them ? Is it conceivable, that
this supply should be so very deficient, should have the like
obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable to the like perversions,
in short, lie open to all the like objections, as the light of
nature itself h?'
§ 24. In ~both schemes, remedies are incomplete.
Without determining how far this in fact is so, I answer ;
it is by no means incredible, that it might be so, if the light
of nature and of revelation be from the same hand. Men
are naturally liable to diseases : for which God, in his good
providence, has provided natural remedies1. But remedies
existing in nature have been unknown to mankind for many
ages : are known but to few now : probably many valuable
ones are not known yet. Great has been and is the
obscurity and difficulty, in the nature and application of
them. Circumstances seem often to make them very im-
proper, where they are absolutely necessary. It is after
long labour and study, and many unsuccessful endeavours,
that they are brought to be as useful as they are ; after
high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful
we have ; and after disputes and doubts, which have seemed
to be endless. The best remedies too, when unskilfully,
much more if dishonestly applied, may produce new diseases :
and with the lightest application the success of them is often
doubtful. In many cases they are not at all effectual :
where they are, it is often very slowly : and the application
of them, and the necessary regimen accompanying it, is,
not uncommonly, so disagreeable, that some will not submit
to them ; and satisfy themselves with the excuse, that, if
they would, it is not certain whether it would be successful.
And many persons, who labour under diseases, for which
there are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to
be always, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the
remedies which nature has provided for diseases are neither
certain, perfect, nor universal.
h Chap. vi. i See chap, v,
O 2
100 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [\\.\\\.
§ 25. // we ask perfect remedies, why not ask banishment
of disease ?
And indeed the same principles of arguing, which would
lend us to conclude, that they must be so, would lead us
likewise to conclude, that there could be no occasion for
them ; i. e. that there could be no diseases at all. And
therefore our experience that there are diseases shows,
that it is credible beforehand, upon supposition nature
has provided remedies for them, that these remedies may
be, as by experience we find they are, not certain, nor
perfect, nor universal ; because it shows, that the principles
upon which we should expect the contrary are fallacious.
§ 26. //* revelation, reason is to judge (a) the meaning,
(b) the morality, (c) the evidence.
And now, what is the just consequence from all these
things? Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to
us as being of divine revelation. For this would be to infer,
that we are unable to judge of any thing, because we are
unable to judge of all things. Reason can, and it ought to
judge, not only of the meaning, but also of the morality
and the evidence, of revelation. First, It is the province of
reason to judge of the morality of the scripture ; i. e. not
whether it contains things different from what we should
have expected from a wise, just, and good Being ; for objec-
tions from hence have been now obviated : but whether it
contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or
goodness ; to what the light of nature teaches us of God.
And I know nothing of this sort objected against scripture,
excepting such objections as are formed upon suppositions,
which would equally conclude, that the constitution of nature
is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which most
certainly it is not.
§ 27. Some precepts, not contrary to immutable morality,
are made moral only by command.
Indeed there are some particular precepts in scripture,
given to particular persons, requiring actions, which would
$§25-s8] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS 197
bo immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But
it is easy to see, that all these are of such a kind, as that
the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of
the action ; and both constitutes and shows that not to
be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the precept, must
have appeared and really have been so: which may well
be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable
morality. If it were commanded, to cultivate the principles
mid act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty ;
the command would not alter the nature of the case or
of the action, in any of these instances. But it is quite
otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing an
external action : for instance, taking away the property or
life of any. For men have no right to either life or property,
but what arises solely from the grant of God : when this
grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either:
and when this revocation is made known, as surely it is
possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them
of either. And though a course of external acts, which
without command would be immoral, must make an im-
moral habit ; yet a few detached commands have no such
natural tendency \
§ 28. Objection urged against these lies against nature at
large, and trial of all kinds.
I thought proper to say thus much of the few scripture
precepts, which require, not vicious actions, but actions
which would have been vicious had it not been for such
precepts ; because they are sometimes weakly urged as
immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn
from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all
in these precepts, but what arises from their being offences :
i. e. from their being liable to be perverted '2, as indeed they
1 I suppose that violence offered separate essay On the Censors of
by order of law may help to illus- Butler. See Coleridge's account of
trate Butler's meaning: especially Executioners in Germany : tellers
as in the case of an executioner. 1,1895), vol. i. p. 294.
I deal more fully with this subject * Perverted, that is, seemingly,
in my reply to Miss Hennell in a by unwarranted imitation. We
198 THINGS UNEXPECTED, ETC. [n. in. § 29-
are, by wicked designing men, to serve the most horrid pur-
poses ; and, perhaps, to mislead the weak and enthusiastic.
And objections from this head are not objections against
revelation ; but against the whole notion of religion, as
a trial ; and against the general constitution of nature.
Secondly1, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the
evidence of revelation, and of the objections urged against
that evidence: which shall be the subject of a following
chapter k.
§ 29. Oilier objections being frivolous, let us try those
against the proofs.
But the consequence of the foregoing observations is, that
the question upon which the truth of Christianity depends
is scarce at all, what objections there are against its scheme,
since there are none against the morality of it ; but ivliat
objections there are against its evidence : or, ivhat proof there
remains of it, after due allowances made for the objections
against that proof: because it has been shown, that the
objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections
against its evidence, are frivolous. For surely veiy little
weight, if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing
and objecting, which, when applied to the general consti-
tution of nature, experience shows not to be conclusive :
and such, I think, is the whole way of objecting treated of
throughout this chapter. It is resolvable into principles,
and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to think, that
the Author of nature would not act, as we experience he
does ; or would act, in such and such cases, as we experience
he does not in like cases. But the unreasonableness of this
way of objecting will appear yet more evidently from hence,
k Chap. vii.
need not examine the precise pro- given a few centuries ago to some
priety of the word offences, since of the Old Testament commands
Butler hasgiven his own definition may perhaps serve here as an
of it pro hdc vice, as acts liable illustration,
to be perverted. The application * On this head see inf., ch. vii.
IV. § i] CHRISTIANITY, AS A SCHEME 199
that the chief things thus objected against are justified, as
shall be further shown1, by distinct, particular, and full
analogies, in the constitution and course of nature.
§ 30. We can judge whether a revelation (a) tends to
virtue and (b) is due to mere human motive.
But it is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as objections
of the foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a
supposed revelation is more consistent with itself, and has
a more general and uniform tendency to promote virtue,
than, all circumstances considered, could have been expected
from enthusiasm and political views ; this is a presumptive
proof of its not proceeding from them, and so of its truth :
because we are competent judges, what might have been
expected from enthusiasm and political views.
CHAPTER IV.
OF CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR
CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
§ i. Objections against nature have been answered: same
answer may serve for Christianity \
IT hath been now shown a, that the analogy of nature
renders it highly credible beforehand, that supposing
a revelation to be made, it must contain many things very
different from what we should have expected, and such as
1 Chap. iv. latter part, and chaps, v, vi.
a In the foregoing chapter.
1 To show this distinctly, But- threefold argument that he is en-
ler, as if foreseeing the objection titled to bar the objections as they
of those who now hold that he has are in themselves, and not only
only shifted the burden to the by showing that they apply else-
shoulders of Nature, expressly de- where.
clines in this section to expose He has already done the same
that line of defence to the attack : for Nature, not only in I. vii., but
and holds it his duty, on the in his Introduction. § 17.
merits of the case, to show by a
200 CHRISTIANITY, AS A SCHEME, [II. IV.
appear open to great objections : and that this observation,
in good measure, takes off the force of those objections, or
rather precludes them. But it may be alleged, that this is
a veiy partial answer to such objections, or a very unsatis-
factory way of obviating them : because it doth not show
at all, that the things objected against can be wTise, just,
and good ; much less, that it is credible they are so. It
will therefore be proper to show this distinctly ; by applying
to these objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness
of Christianity, the answer above l) given to the like objec-
tions against the constitution of nature : before we consider
the particular analogies in the latter, to the particular things
objected against in the former. Now that which affords a
sufficient answer to objections against the wisdom, justice,
and goodness of the constitution of nature, is its being
a constitution, a system, or scheme, imperfectly compre-
hended ; a scheme in which means are made use of to
accomplish ends ; and which is carried on by general laws.
For from these things it has been proved, not only to be
possible, but also to be credible, that those things which
are objected against may be consistent with wisdom, justice,
and goodness ; nay, may be instances of them : and even
that the constitution and government of nature may be
perfect in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then
be a scheme, and of the like kind ; it is evident, the like
objections against it must admit of the like answer. And,
§ 2. It is Imperfectly comprehended ; and our ignorance
bars our objections.
[I.] Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our compre-
hension. The moral government of God is exercised, by
gradually conducting things so in the course of his pro-
vidence, that every one, at length and upon the whole,
shall receive according to his deserts ; and neither fraud
nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally prevail.
Christianity is a particular scheme under this general plan
b Part I. ch. vii. to which this all along refers.
§a] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED 2OI
of Providence, and a part of it, conducive to its completion,
with regard to mankind : consisting itself also of various
parts, and a mysterious economy, which has been carrying
011 from the time the world came into its present wretched
state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a divine
person, the Messiah ; who is to gather together in one the
children of God that are scattered abroad c, and establish an
everlasting kingdom, 'wherein dwelleth righteousness d. .And in
order to it ; after various manifestations of things, relating
to this great and general scheme of Providence, through
a succession of many ages : (for the Spirit of Christ which was
in the prophets, testified beforehand his sufferings, and the
f/lort/ that should follow : unto whom it was revealed, that not
(into themselves, but unto ^ls they did minister the things which
arc now reported unto us by them that have preached the gospel ;
which things the angels desire to look into e :) — after various
dispensations, looking forward, and preparatory, to this
Unal salvation : in the fulness of time, when infinite wisdom
thought fit ; he, being in the form of God, made himself of
no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was
made in the likeness of men : and being found in fashion as
a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient to death, even
the death of the cross : wherefore God also hath highly exalted
him, and given him a name, which is above evert/ name : that at
the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and
things in the earth, and things under the earth ; and that every
tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of
God the Fat her f. Parts likewise of this economy are the
miraculous mission of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary
assistances given to good men : the invisible government,
which Christ at present exercises over his church : that
which he himself refers to in these words ; In my Fathers
house are many mansions 1 go to prepare a place for you s :
and his future return to judge the world in righteousness, and
completely re-establish the kingdom of God. For the Father
judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son :
c John xi. 52. d 2 Pet. iii. 13. e i Pet. i. n, 12.
f Phil. ii. 6-n. B Johnxiv. 2.
202 CHRISTIANITY, AS A SCHEME, [II. IV.
that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the
Father^. All power is given unto him in heaven and in earth*.
And he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. Then
cometh the end, ivlien he shall have delivered up the kingdom to
God, even the Father ; tvhen he shall have put down all rule and
all authority and power. And when all things shall he subdued
unto him, then shall the Son also himself l>e subject unto Mm
that put all things under him, that God may be all in all*.
Now little, surely, need be said to show, that this system,
or scheme of things, is but imperfectly comprehended by
us. The scripture expressly asserts it to be so. And indeed
one cannot read a passage relating to this great mystery of
godliness^, but what immediately runs up into something
which shows us our ignorance in it ; as every thing in nature
shows us our ignorance in the constitution of nature. And
whoever will seriously consider that part of the Christian
scheme, which is revealed in scripture, will find so much
more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the
purposes of judging and objecting, we know as little of it, as
of the constitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as
much an answer to our objections against the perfection of
one, as against the perfection of the other ni.
§ 3. Here, as in nature, means to attain ends are used ;
which may both be the very best.
[II.] It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispensation,
as much as in the natural scheme of things, means are made
use of to accomplish ends. And the observation of this
furnishes us with the same answer, to objections against the
perfection of Christianity, as to objections of the like kind,
against the constitution of nature. It shows the credibility,
that the things objected against, how foolish n soever they
appear to men, may be the very best means of accomplishing
the very best ends. And their appearing foolishness is no
h John v. 22, 23. i Matt, xxviii. 18. k i Cor. xv. 24-28.
1 i Tim. iii. 16. m Sup. I. vii. 13 sqq. n i Cor. i.
§§3-5] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED 203
presumption against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond
our comprehension °.
§ 4. Nature operates ly general laws, hard to trace out.
[III.] The credibility, that the Christian dispensation
may have been, all along, carried on by general laws i', no
less than the course of nature, may require to be more
distinctly made out. Consider then, upon what ground it
is we say, that the whole common course of nature is carried
on according to general foreordained laws. We know indeed
several of the general laws of matter : and a great part of the
natural behaviour of living agents is reducible to general
laws. But we know in a manner nothing, by what laws,
storms and tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become
the instruments of destruction to mankind. And the laws,
by which persons born into the world at such a time and
place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers ; the laws, by
which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of
cases ; and by which innumerable things happen, of the
greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the world ;
these laws are so wholly unknown to us, that we call the
events which come to pass by them, accidental : though all
reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality,
be any such thing as chance ; and conclude, that the things
which have this appearance are the result of general laws, and
may be reduced into them. It is then but an exceeding
little way, and in but a very few respects, that we can trace
up the natural course of things before us, to general laws.
And it is only from analogy, that we conclude the whole
of it to be capable of being reduced into them : only from
our seeing, that part is so. It is from our finding, that
the course of nature, in some respects and so far, goes on
by general laws, that we conclude this of the rest.
§ 5. The same may hold as to revelation.
And if that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it
is a just ground also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend,
Sup. I. vii. 13 sqq. P Sup. I. vii. 18.
204 CHRISTIANITY, AS A SCHEME, [II. IV.
to render it supposable and credible, which is sufficient for
answering objections, that God's miraculous interpositions
may have been, all along in like manner, by general laws
of wisdom. Thus, that miraculous powers should be
exerted, at such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees
and manners, and with regard to such persons, rather than
others ; that the affairs of the world, being permitted to
go on in their natural course so far, should, just at such
a point, have a new direction given them by miraculous
interpositions ; that these interpositions should be exactly
in such degrees and respects only ; all this may have been
by general laws. These laws are unknown indeed to us :
but no more unknown, than the laws from whence it is,
that some die as soon as they are born, and others live to
extreme old age ; that one man is so superior to another
in understanding ; with innumerable more things, which,
as was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or
rules at all, though it is taken for granted, they are as
much reducible to general ones, as gravitation. Now, if
the revealed dispensations of Providence, and miraculous
interpositions, be by general laws, as well as God's ordinary
government in the course of nature, made known by reason
and experience ; there is no more reason to expect, that
every exigence, as it arises, should be provided for by these
general laws of miraculous interpositions, than that every
exigence in nature should, by the general laws of nature :
yet there might be wrise and good reasons, that miraculous
interpositions should be by general laws : and that these
laws should not be broken in upon, or deviated from, by
other miracles.
§ 6. As to apparent (japs and anomalies, the tiro
arc parallel.
Upon the whole then : The appearance of deficiencies
and irregularities in nature is owing to its being a scheme
but in part made known, and of such a certain particular
kind in other respects. Now we see 110 more reason why
the frame and course of nature should be such a scheme,
than why Christianity should. And that the former is
§§ 6, 7] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED 205
such a scheme, renders it credible, that the latter, upon
supposition of its truth, may be so too. And as it is
manifest, that Christianity is a scheme revealed but in part,
and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish
ends, like to that of nature : so the credibility, that it may
have been all along carried on by general laws, no less than
the course of nature, has been distinctly proved. And from
all this it is beforehand credible that there might, I think
probable that there would, be the like appearance of defi-
ciencies and irregularities in Christianity, as in nature : i. e.
that Christianity would be liable to the like objections, as
the frame of nature. And these objections are answered
by these observations concerning Christianity ; as the like
objections against the frame of nature are answered by the
like observations concerning the frame of nature.
§ 7. Obj. Christianity uses means that are cumbrous and
roundabout. Ans. We arc not fit judges ; and why.
objections against Christianity, considered as
a matter of fact'i, having, in general, been obviated
in the preceding chapter ; and the same, considered as
made against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been
obviated in this : the next thing, according to the method
proposed, is to show, that the principal objections, in
particular, against Christianity, may be answered, by
particular and full analogies in nature. And as one
of them is made against the whole scheme of it together,
as just now described, I choose to consider it here, rather
than in a distinct chapter by itself. The thing objected
against this scheme of the gospel is, 'that it seems to
suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a long series
of intricate means, in order to accomplish his ends, the
recovery and salvation of the world : in like sort as men,
* [This sign of reference is left by me as I found it, except that, as
elsewhere, I substitute for the variable paging the actual place in the
Treatise as fixed in this Edition, viz. I. vii. i sqq. But the sign ought,
I think, to be attached to the last words of the sentence, ' analogies in
nature.' — ED.]
206 CHRISTIANITY, AS A SCHEME, ETC. [II. IV. § 8
for want of understanding or power, not being able to come
at their ends directly, are forced to go roundabout ways,
and make use of many perplexed contrivances to arrive
at them.' Now every thing which we see shows the folly
of this, considered as an objection against the truth of
Christianity. For, according to our manner of conception,
God makes use of variety of means, what we often think
tedious ones, in the natural course of providence, for the
accomplishment of all his ends. Indeed it is certain there is
somewhat in this matter quite beyond our comprehension :
but the mystery is as great in nature as in Christianity.
We know what we ourselves aim at, as final ends : and
what courses we take, merely as means conducing to those
ends. But we are greatly ignorant how far things are
considered by the Author of nature, under the single notion
of means and ends ; so as that it may be said, this is merely
an end, and that merely means, in his regard. And whether
there be not some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of
conception, concerning this matter, somewhat contradictory
arising from our extremely imperfect views of things, it is
impossible to say.
§ 8. Herein it plainly corresponds with nature.
However, thus much is manifest, that the whole natural
world and government of it is a scheme or system ; not
a fixed, but a progressive one : a scheme, in which the
operation of various means takes up a great length of time,
before the ends they tend to can be attained. The change
of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the earth, the very
history of a flower, is an instance of this : and so is human
life. Thus vegetable bodies, and those of animals, though
possibly formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a mature
state. And thus rational agents, who animate these latter
bodies, are naturally directed to form each his own manners
-and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and
experience, and by a long course of action. Our existence
is not only successive, as it must be of necessity ; but one
state of our life and being is appointed by God, to be
a preparation for another; and that, to be the means of
V. § i] OF REDEMPTION BY A MEDIATOR 207
attaining to another succeeding one : infancy to child-
hood ; childhood to youth ; youth to mature age. Men are
impatient, and for precipitating things : but the Author
of nature appears deliberate throughout his operations ;
accomplishing his natural ends by slow successive steps.
And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out, which,
from the nature of it, requires various systems of means,
as well as length of time, in order to the carrying on its
several parts into execution. Thus, in the daily course of
natural providence, God operates in the very same manner,
as in the dispensation of Christianity : making one thing
subservient to another : this, to somewhat further ; and so
on, through a progressive series of means, which extend,
both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view. Of
this manner of operation, every thing we see in the course
of nature is as much an instance, as any part of the
Christian dispensation.
CHAPTER V.
OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY; THE
APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION
OF THE WORLD BY HIM.
§ i. Mediation, or the instrumentality of others, met
everywhere in nature.
rpHERE is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity,
-*- which has been more objected against, than the media-
tion of Christ, in some or other of its parts. Yet, upon
thorough consideration, there seems nothing less justly
liable to it. For,
[I.] The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined
presumption against the general notion of a mediator between
God and man a. For we find all living creatures are brought
into the world, and their life in infancy is preserved, by the
instrumentality of others : and every satisfaction of it, some
» i Tim, ii. 5.
208 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. V.
way or other, is bestowed by the like means. So that the
visible government, which God exercises over the world,
is by the instrumentality and mediation of others. And
how far his invisible government be or be not so, it is
impossible to determine at all by reason. And the supposi-
tion, that part of it is so, appears, to say the least, altogether
as credible as the contrary. There is then no sort of objec-
tion, from the light of nature, against the general notion of
a mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine
of Christianity, or as an appointment in this dispensation :
since we find by experience, that God does appoint medi-
ators, to be the instruments of good and evil to us ; the
instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the objec-
tion here referred to is urged, not against mediation in that
high, eminent, and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our
Mediator ; but absolutely against the whole notion itself of
a mediator at all.
§ 2. Punishment may come of course, i.e. in the
way of natural consequence.
[II. ] As we must suppose, that the world is under the
proper moral government of God, or in a state of religion,
before we can enter into consideration of the revealed
doctrine, concerning the redemption of it by Christ ; so
that supposition is here to be distinctly taken notice of.
Now the divine moral government which religion teaches
us, implies, that the consequence of vice shall be misery,
in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God.
That such consequent punishment shall take effect by his
appointment, is necessarily implied. But, as it is not in
any sort to be supposed, that we are made acquainted with
all the ends or reasons, for which it is fit future punish-
ments should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such
and such consequent misery should follow vice ; and as we
are altogether in the dark, how or in what manner it shall
follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the instrumen-
tality of what means ; there is no absurdity in supposing it
may follow in a way analogous to that, in which many
§§2, 3] A MEDIATOR 209
miseries follow such and such courses of action at present ;
poverty, sickness, infamy, untimely death by diseases, death
from the hands of civil justice. There is no absurdity in
supposing future punishment may follow wickedness of
course, as we speak, or in the way of natural consequence
from God's original constitution of the world ; from the
nature he has given us, and from the condition in which
he places us : or in a like manner, as a person rashly trifling
upon a precipice, in the way of natural consequence, falls
down ; in the way of natural consequence, breaks his limbs,
suppose ; in the way of natural consequence of this, without
help perishes.
§ 3. And natural consequence is the act of God.
Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it
spoken of as a supposable thing, that the future punishments
of wickedness may be in the way of natural consequence :
as if this were taking the execution of justice out of the
hands of God, and giving it to nature. But they should
remember, that when things come to pass according to the
course of nature, this does not hinder them from being his
doing, who is the God of nature : and that the scripture
ascribes those punishments to divine justice, which are
known to be natural ; and which must be called so, when
distinguished from such as are miraculous. But after all,
this supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here
made use of only by way of illustration of the subject before
us. For since it must be admitted, that the future punish-
ment of wickedness is not a matter of arbitrary appointment,
but of reason, equity, and justice ; it comes, for ought I see,
to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted in
a way analogous to that, in which the temporal punishments
of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And
though there were a difference, it is allowable, in the present
case, to make this supposition, plainly not an incredible one ;
that future punishment may follow wickedness in the way
of natural consequence, or according to some general laws
of government already established in the universe.
VOL. i. p
210 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. V.
§ 4. Partial impunity or relief in familiar to us
in nature.
[III.] Upon this supposition, or even without it, we
may observe somewhat, much to the present purpose, in
the constitution of nature or appointments of Providence :
the provision which is made, that all the bad natural con-
sequences of men's actions should not always actually follow ;
or that such bad consequences, as, according to the settled
course of things, would inevitably have followed, if not
prevented, should, in certain degrees, be prevented. We
are apt presumptuously to imagine, that the world might
have been so constituted, as that there would not have been
any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary we find
the Author of nature permits it : but then he has provided
reliefs, and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after some
pains and difficulties : reliefs and remedies even for that evil,
which is the fruit of our own misconduct ; and which, in
the course of nature, would have continued, and ended in
our destruction, but for such remedies. And this is an in-
stance both of severity and of indulgence, in the constitution
of nature. Thus all the bad consequences, now mentioned,
of a man's trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented.
And though all were not, yet some of them might, by
proper interposition, if not rejected : by another's coming
to the rash man's relief, with his own laying hold on that
relief, in such sort as the case required. Persons may do a
great deal themselves towards preventing the bad conse-
quences of their follies : and more may be done by them-
selves, together with the assistance of others their fellow-
creatures; which assistance nature requires and prompts
us to. This is the general constitution of the world. Now
suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions
were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them
misery to the doer, it should have been no more in human
power to have prevented that naturally consequent misery,
in any instance, than it is, in all ; no one can say, whether
such a more severe constitution of things might not yet
have been really good. But, that, on the contrary, pro-
"§§4-6] A MEDIATOR 21 1
vision is made by nature, that we may and do. to so great
degree, prevent the bad natural effects of our follies ; this
may be called mercy or compassion in the original con-
stitution of the world: compassion, as distinguished from
goodness in general. And, the whole known constitution
and course of things affording us instances of such com-
passion, it would be according to the analogy of nature,
to hope, that, however ruinous the natural consequences
of vice might be, from the general laws of God's govern-
ment over the universe ; yet provision might be made,
possibly might have been originally made, for preventing
those ruinous consequences from inevitably following : at
least from following universally, and in all cases.
§ 5. Total impunity Is often reckoned on.
Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made
a question, or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The
generality of mankind are so far from having that awful
sense of things, which the present state of vice and misery
and darkness seems to make but reasonable, that they
have scarce any apprehension or thought at all about this
matter, any way : and some serious persons may have
spoken unadvisedly concerning it '.
§ 6. Yet neglect lias grave consequences; sin, probably,
awful ones.
But let us observe, what we experience to be, and what,
from the very constitution of nature, cannot but be, the
consequences of irregular and disorderly behaviour ; even
of such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as we scarce call
vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend, that the bad
consequences of irregularity will be greater, in proportion
as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison
between these irregularities, and the greater instances of
vice, or a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion ; if
there be any thing at all in religion. For consider what
1 Butler seems to have had here are now so much more widely pro-
in view those unhappy devices of mulgated.
what is called Universalism, that
P 2
212 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. V.
it is for creatures, moral agents, presumptuously to intro-
duce that confusion and misery into the kingdom of God,
which mankind have in fact introduced ; to blaspheme
the Sovereign Lord of all ; to contemn his authority ; to
be injurious, to the degree they are, to their fellow-
creatures, the creatures of God. Add that the effects
of vice in the present world are often extreme misery,
irretrievable ruin, and even death. And upon putting
all this together, it will appear, that as no one can say,
in what degree fatal the unprevented consequences of
vice may be, according to the general rule of divine
government ; so it is by no means intuitively certain,
how far these consequences could possibly, in the nature
of the thing, be prevented, consistently with the eternal
rule of right, or with what is, in fact, the moral con-
stitution of nature. However, there would be large ground
to hope, that the universal government was not so severely
strict, but that there was room for pardon, or for having
those penal consequences prevented. Yet,
§ 7. Nor docs subsequent good behaviour cancel the past
in nature ;
[IV.] There seems no probability, that any thing we
could do would alone and of itself prevent them : prevent
their following, or being inflicted. But one would think,
at least, it were impossible that the contraiy should be
thought certain. For we are not acquainted with the
whole of the case. We are not informed of all the reasons,
which render it fit that future punishments should be in-
flicted : and therefore cannot know, whether any thing
we could do would make such an alteration, as to render
it fit that they should be remitted. We do not know what
the whole natural or appointed consequences of vice are ;
nor in what way they would follow, if not prevented : and
therefore can in no sort say, whether we could do any
thing which would be sufficient to prevent them. Our
ignorance being thus manifest, let us recollect the analogy
of nature or providence. For, though this may be but
a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon, in this
§§ 7-9] A MEDIA TOR 213
matter ; yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary
assertion, without any kind of evidence, urged by way
of objection against a doctrine, the proof of which is not
reason, but revelation. Consider then : people ruin their
fortunes by extravagance ; they bring diseases upon them-
selves by excess ; they incur the penalties of civil laws ;
and surely civil government is natural ; will sorrow for
these follies past, and behaving well for the future, alone
and of itself prevent the natural consequences of them?
On the contrary, men's natural abilities of helping them-
selves are often impaired : or if not, yet they are forced
to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon several
accounts, and in different ways : assistance which they
would have had no occasion for, had it not been for
their misconduct ; but which, in the disadvantageous con-
dition they have reduced themselves to, is absolutely
necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs.
§ 8. And probably not under revelation.
Now since this is our case, considering ourselves merely
as inhabitants of this world, and as having a temporal
interest here, under the natural government of God, which
however has a great deal moral in it : why is it not sup-
posable that this may be our case also, in our more
important capacity, as under his perfect moral government,
and having a more general and future interest depending ?
If we have misbehaved in this higher capacity, and
rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment,
which God has annexed to vice: it is plainly credible,
that behaving well for the time to come may be — not
useless, God forbid — but wholly insufficient, alone and of
itself, to prevent that punishment ; or to put us in the
condition, which we should have been in, had we preserved
our innocence.
§ 9. The wide early prevalence of sacrifices shoivs hoiv
repentance ivas held insufficient.
And though we ought to reason with all reverence, when-
ever we reason concerning the divine conduct : yet it may
214 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. V.
be added, that it is clearly contrary to all our notions of
government, as well as to what is, in fact, the general
constitution of nature, to suppose that doing well for the
future should, in all cases, prevent all the judicial bad
consequences of having done evil, or all the punishment
annexed to disobedience. And we have manifestly nothing
from whence to determine, in what degree, and in what
cases, reformation would prevent this punishment, even
supposing that it \vould in some. And though the efficacy
of repentance itself alone, to prevent what mankind had
rendered themselves obnoxious to, and recover what they
had forfeited, is now insisted upon, in opposition to Chris-
tianity : yet, by the general prevalence of propitiatory
sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion, of repentance
alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary
to the general sense of mankind.
§ 10. Punishment, then, ivas to be expected.
Upon the whole, then : Had the laws, the general laws
of God's government, been permitted to operate, without
any interposition in our behalf, the future punishment,
for ought we know to the contrary, or have any reason
to think, must inevitably have followed, notwithstanding
any thing we could have done to prevent it. Now,
§ ii. Mediation, then, ivas (a) appropriate, (b) requisite,
(c) effectual.
[V.] In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which
you please, revelation comes in ; confirms every doubting
fear, which could enter into the heart of man, concerning
the future unprevented consequence of wickedness ; supposes
the world to be in a state of ruin ; (a supposition which
seems the very ground of the Christian dispensation, and
which, if not provable by reason, yet is in no wise
contrary to it ;) teaches us too, that the rules of divine
government are such, as not to admit of pardon immedi-
ately and directly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy
of it : but then teaches at the same time, what nature
might justly have hoped, that the moral government of
§§io, n] A MEDIATOR 215
the universe was not so rigid, but that there was room
for an interposition, to avert the fatal consequences of
vice ; which therefore, by this means, does admit of
pardon. Revelation teaches us, that the unknown laws
of God's more general government, no less than the par*
ticular laws by which we experience he governs us at
present, are compassionate b, as well as good in the more
general notion of goodness : and that he hath mercifully
provided, that there should be an interposition to prevent
the destruction of human kind ; whatever that destruction
unprevented would have been. God so loved the world,
that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth,
not, to be sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense,
that whosoever leliereth in him should not perisli c : gave
his Son in the same way of goodness to the world, as
he affords particular persons the friendly assistance of
their fellow- creatures ; when, without it, their temporal
ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies : in
the same way of goodness, I say ; though in a transcen-
dent and infinitely higher degree. And the Son of God
loved us and gave himself for us, with a love, which he
himself compares to that of human friendship : though,
in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely short
of the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He
interposed in such a manner as was necessary and effectual
to prevent that execution of justice upon sinners, which
God had appointed should otherwise have been executed
upon them : or in such a manner, as to prevent that
punishment from actually following, which, according to
the general laws of divine government, must have fol-
lowed the sins of the world, had it not been for such
interposition d.
b Sup. § 4. c John iii. 16.
d It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory reader,
that it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in any
thing said in this chapter, that none can have the benefit . ^^e ^UfSf.
of the general redemption, but such as have the ad- aside
vantage of being made acquainted with it in the present
life. But it may be needful to mention, that several questions, which
have been brought into the subject before us, and determined, and not in
2l6 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. v.
§ 12. Our sad pliglit lias the sin m Paradise for
its occasion.
If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought,
inconsistent with divine goodness ; a second, I am persuaded,
will entirely remove that appearance. For were we to suppose
the constitution of things to be such, as that the whole creation
must have perished, had it not been for somewhat, which God
had appointed should be, in order to prevent that ruin : even
this supposition would not be inconsistent, in any degree, with
the most absolutely perfect goodness. But still it may be
thought, that this whole manner of treating the subject
before us supposes mankind to be naturally in a very strange
state. And truly so it does. But it is not Christianity,
which has put us into this state. Whoever will consider
the manifold miseries, and the extreme wickedness of the
world : that the best have great wrongnesses within them-
selves, which they complain of, and endeavour to amend ;
but that the generality grow more profligate and corrupt
with age : that heathen moralists thought the present state
to be a state of punishment : and, what might be added, that
the earth our habitation has the appearances of being a ruin :
whoever, I say, will consider all these, and some other
obvious things, will think he has little reason to object
against the scripture account, that mankind is in a state of
degradation ; against this being the fact : how difficult
soever he may think it to account for, or even to form
the least entered into here : questions which have been, I fear, rashly
determined, and perhaps with equal rashness contrary ways. For in-
stance, whether God could have saved the world by other means than
the death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his government.
And had not Christ come into the world, what would have been the
future condition of the better sort of men ; those just persons over the
face of the earth, for whom, Manasses in his prayer asserts, repentance
was not appointed. The meaning of the first of these questions is
greatly ambiguous : and neither of them can properly be answered,
without going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the
whole of the case. And perhaps the very inquiry, What would have
followed if God had not clone as he has ? may have in it some very great im-
propriety ; and ought not to be carried on any further, than is necessary
to help our partial and inadequate conceptions of things.
§§12,13] A MEDIATOR 217
a distinct conception of the occasions and circumstances
of it. But that the crime of our first parents was the
occasion of our being placed in a more disadvantageous
condition, is a thing throughout and particularly analogous
to what we see in the daily course of natural Providence ;
as the recovery of the world by the interposition of Christ
has been shown to be so in general.
H
§ 13. The mediation is by a forcshadoived Priest-victim ;
[VI.] The particular manner in which Christ interposed
in the redemption of the world, or his office as Mediator, in
the largest sense, between God and man, is thus represented to
us in the scripture. He is the light of the world e ; the revealer
of the will of God in the most eminent sense. He is a
propitiatory sacrifice f ; the Lamb of Gods : and, as he volun-
tarily offered himself up, he is styled our High-Priest h.
And, which seems of peculiar weight, he is described before-
hand in the Old Testament, under the same characters of
a priest, and an expiatory victim1'. And whereas it is
objected, that all this is merely by way of allusion to the
sacrifices of the Mosaic law, the apostle on the contrary
affirms, that the law was a shadotv of good things to come, and
not the very image of the thingsk : and that the priests that offer
gifts according to the law — serve unto the example and shadow of
heavenly things, as Moses was admonished of God when he ivas
about to make the tabernacle : for See, saith he, that thou make
all things according to the pattern showed to thee in the mount1 :
i. e. the Levitical priesthood was a shadow of the priesthood
of Christ ; in like manner as the tabernacle made by Moses
was according to that showed him in the mount. The
priesthood of Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount, were
the originals : of the former of which the Levitical priesthood
e John i. and viii. 12.
r Rom. iii. 25 and v. n ; i Cor. v. 7 ; Eph. v. 2 ; i John ii. 2 ;
Matt, xx vi. 28.
g John i. 29, 36 ; and throughout the Book of Revelation.
h Throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews.
5 Isa. liii ; Dan. ix. 24 ; Ps. ex. 4. k Heb. x. j,
1 Heb, viii. 4, 5.
2l8 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. v.
was a type ; and of the latter the tabernacle made by Moses
was a copy. The doctrine of this Epistle then plainly is,
that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great and final
atonement to be made by the blood of Christ ; and not that
this was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more
express and determinate, than the following passage. It is
not possible that the blood of lulls and of goats should take away
s'm. Wherefore ivhen he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice
and offering, i. e. of bulls and of goats, thou wouldest not, but
a body hast thou prepared me Lo, I come to do thy will,
0 God By which will ice arc sanctified, through the offering of
the body of Jesus Christ once for all n>. And to add one passage
more of the like kind : Christ was once offered to bear the sins
of many ; and unto them that look for him shall he appear the
second time, without sin ; i. e. without bearing sin, as he did
at his first coming, by being an offering for it ; without
having our iniquities again laid upon him, without being any
more a sin offering : — unto them that look for him shall he
appear the second time, without sin, unto salvation n.
§ 14. With an efficacy transcending that of example,
instruction, or government.
Nor do the inspired writers at all confine themselves to
this manner of speaking concerning the satisfaction of
Christ ; but declare an efficacy in what he did and suffered
for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, example,
and government, in great variety of expression : That Jesus
should die for that nation, the Jews : and not for that nation
only, but that also, plainly by the efficacy of his death, he
should gather together in one the children of God that were
scattered abroad ° : that he suffered for sins, the just for the
unjust v : that he gave his life, himself, a ransom^: that tve are
bought, bought with a price r : that he redeemed us with his blood ;
redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for
m Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. n Heb. ix. 28.
0 John xi. 51, 52. i' i Pet. iii. 18.
1 Matt. xx. 28 ; Mark x. 45 ; i Tim. ii. 6.
r 2 Pet. ii. i ; Rev. xiv. 4 ; i Cor. vi. 20.
§§ 14, 15] A MEDIATOR 219
us * : that he is our advocate, intercessor, and propitiation { :
that lie was made perfect, or consummate, through sufferings :
and being thus made perfect, lie became the author of salvation r:
that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself; by the
death of his Son, by the cross ; not imputing their trespasses unto
them x : and lastly, that through death he destroyed him that
had the power of death y. Christ then having thus humbled
himself, and become obedient to death, even the death of the
cross ; God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name,
trhich is above every name : hath given all things into his hand :
hath committed all judgment unto him ; that all men should
honour the Son, even as they honour the Father z. For. Worthy is
the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and riches, andivisdom,
and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing. And every
creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, heard I, saying,
Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto him
that sittcth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever
and ever9-.
§ 15. It was also (a) by a Prophet,
These passages of scripture seem to comprehend and
express the chief parts of Christ's office, as Mediator between
God and man, so far, I mean, as the nature of this his
office is revealed ; and it is usually treated of by divines
under three heads.
First, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet : that
Prophet that should come into the world l), to declare the divine
will. He published anew the law of nature, which men had
corrupted ; and the very knowledge of which, to some degree,
was lost among them. He taught mankind, taught us
authoritatively, to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this
present world, in expectation of the future judgment of
s i Pet. i. 19 ; Rev. v. 9 ; Gal. iii. 13.
* Heb. vii. 25 ; i John ii. i, 2. " Heb. ii. TO and v. 9.
x 2 Cor. v. 19; Rom. v. 10 ; Eph. ii. 16.
y Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the Book of Job.
xxxiii. 24.
z Phil. ii. 8, 9 ; John iii. 35 and v. 22, 23. ft Rev. v. 12, 13.
b John vi. 14.
220 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. V.
God. He confirmed the truth of this moral system of
nature, and gave us additional evidence of it ; the evidence
of testimony c. He distinctly revealed the manner in which
God would be worshipped, the efficacy of repentance, and
the rewards and punishments of a future life. Thus he was
a prophet in a sense in which no other ever was. To which
is to be added, that he set us a perfect example, that ice should
follow his steps.
§ 1 6. (b) Who had a Church or kingdom.
Secondly, He has a kingdom which is not of this world He
founded a church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of
religion, and invitation to it ; which he promised to be with
always even to the end. He exercises an invisible govern-
ment over it, himself, and by his Spirit : over that part of
it, which is militant here on earth, a government of discipline,
for the perfecting of the saints, for the edifying his body : till we all
come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of
God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the
fulness of Christ d. Of this church, all persons scattered over
the world, who live in obedience to his laws, are members.
For these he is gone to prepare a place, and will come again to
receive them unto himself, that where he is, there they may be also ;
and reign with him for ever and ever e : and likewise to take
vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not his gospeV.
Against these parts of Christ's office I find no objections,
but what are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter.
§ 1 7. (c) By an expiation ;
Lastly, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and
made atonement for the sins of the world ; which is men-
tioned last, in regard to what is objected against it. Sacrifices
of expiation were commanded the Jews, and obtained amongst
most other nations, from tradition, whose original probably
was revelation. And they were continually repeated, both
c Sup. II. i. 4 sqq. d Eph. iv. 12, 13.
e John xiv. 2, 3 ; Rev. iii. 21 and xi. 15. ' 2 Thess. i. 8.
§§ 16-19] A MEDIATOR 221
occasionally, and at the returns of stated times ; and made
up great part of the external religion of mankind. But now
once in the end of the icorld Christ appeared to put aivay sin Ijy
the sacrifice of himself %. And this sacrifice was, in the highest
degree and with the most extensive influence, of that efficacy
for obtaining pardon of sin, which the heathens may be
supposed to have thought their sacrifices to have been, and
which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some degree, and
with regard to some persons.
§ 1 8. Whereof the mode is not revealed to us.
How and in what particular way it had this efficacy,
there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured to
explain : but I do not find that the scripture has explained
it. We seem to be very much in the dark concerning the
manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be
made, i. e. pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. And if the
scripture has, as surely it has, left this matter of the satis-
faction of Christ, mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed,
all conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, yet
at least uncertain. Nor has any one reason to complain for
want of further information, unless he can show his claim
to it.
§ 19. Some have exaggerated expiation, others reduce
it to example.
Some have endeavoured to explain the efficacy of what
Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what the
scripture has authorized : others, probably because they
could not explain it, have been for taking it away, and
confining his office as Redeemer of the world to his
instruction, example, and government of the church.
Whereas the doctrine of the gospel appears to be, not only
that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but rendered it
of the efficacy which it is, by what he did and suffered for
us : that he obtained for us the benefit of having our
Heb. ix. 26.
222 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. V.
repentance accepted unto eternal life : not only that he
revealed to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation,
and how they might obtain it ; but moreover that he put
them into this capacity of salvation, by what he did and
suffered for them ; put us into a capacity of escaping future
punishment, and obtaining future happiness. And it is our
wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by performing the
conditions, upon which it is offered, on our part, without
disputing how it was procured on his. For,
§ 20. Whether (a) means other than mediation could
have been used, tve cannot judge.
[VII.] Since we neither know by what means punishment
in a future state would have followed wickedness in this ;
nor in what manner it would have been inflicted, had it not
been prevented ; nor all the reasons why its infliction
would have been needful ; nor the particular nature of that
state of happiness, which Christ is gone to prepare for his
disciples : and since we are ignorant how far any thing
which we could do, would, alone and of itself, have been
effectual to prevent that punishment, to which we were
obnoxious, and recover that happiness, which we had
forfeited ; it is most evident we are not judges, antecedently
to revelation, whether a mediator was or was not necessary,
to obtain those ends : to prevent that future punishment,
and bring mankind to the final happiness of their nature.
§ 21. Nor (b) of the particulars of the mediatorial work.
And for the very same reasons, upon supposition of the
necessity of a mediator, we are no more judges, antecedently
to revelation, of the whole nature of his office, or the several
parts of which it consists ; of what was fit and requisite to
be assigned him, in order to accomplish the ends of divine
Providence in the appointment. And from hence it follows,
that to object against the expediency or usefulness of
particular things, revealed to have been done or suffered by
him, because we do not see how they were conducive to
§§20-22] A MEDIATOR 223
those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing is more common
to be met with, than this absurdity. But if it be acknow-
ledged beforehand, that we are not judges in the case, it is
evident that no objection can, with any shadow of reason,
be urged against any particular part of Christ's mediatorial
office revealed in scripture, till it can be shown positively
not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be
accomplished ; or that it is in itself unreasonable.
§ 22. Vicarious suffering is an ordained appointment of
everyday experience ; anterior to the final adjustment.
And there is one objection made against the satisfaction
of Christ, which looks to be of this positive kind : that the
doctrine of his being appointed to suffer for the sins of the
world, represents God as being indifferent whether he
punished the innocent or the guilty. Now from the fore-
going observations we may see the extreme slightness of all
such objections ; and (though it is most certain all who
make them do not see the consequence) that they conclude
altogether as much against God's whole original constitution
of nature, and the whole daily course of divine Providence
in the government of the world, i. e. against the whole
scheme of theism and the whole notion of religion, as against
Christianity. For the world is a constitution or system,
whose parts have a mutual reference to each other : and
there is a scheme of things gradually carrying on, called
the course of nature, to the carrying on of which God has
appointed us, in various ways, to contribute. And when,
in the daily course of natural Providence, it is appointed
that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the
guilty, this is liable to the very same objection, as the
instance we are now considering. The infinitely greater
importance of that appointment of Christianity, which is
objected against, does not hinder but it may be, as it plainly
is, an appointment of the very same kind, with what the
world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there were
any force at all in the objection, it would be stronger,
in one respect, against natural Providence, than against
224 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. V.
Christianity : because under the former we are in many
cases commanded, and even necessitated whether we will or
no, to suffer for the faults of others ; whereas the sufferings
of Christ were voluntary. The world's being under the
righteous government of God does indeed imply, that finally
and upon the whole every one shall receive according to his
personal deserts : and the general doctrine of the whole
scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine
government. But during the progress, and, for ought we
know, even in order to the completion of this moral scheme,
vicarious punishments may be fit, and absolutely necessary1.
Men by their follies run themselves into extreme distress :
into difficulties which would be absolutely fatal to them,
were it not for the interposition and assistance of others.
God commands by the law of nature, that we afford them
this assistance, in many cases where we cannot do it
without very great pains, and labour, and sufferings to
ourselves. And we see in what variety of ways one person's
sufferings contribute to the relief of another : and how, or
by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows,
from the constitution and laws of nature, which come under
our notice : and, being familiarized to it, men are not
shocked with it. So that the reason of their insisting upon
objections of the foregoing kind against the satisfaction of
Christ is, either that they do not consider God's settled and
uniform appointments as his appointments at all : or else
they forget that vicarious punishment is a providential
appointment of every day's experience : and then, from
their being unacquainted with the more general laws of
nature or divine government over the world, and not seeing
how the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the redemp-
tion of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will ; they
conclude his sufferings could not contribute to it any other
way.
1 Punishments materially : not ideas, (a) that there has been sin
punishments 'formally.' I take it in the case, (&) that the penalty
for granted that in this phrase due to it has been voluntarily
Butler only means to superadd to undergone by another. But this
the idea of vicarious suffering these may be disputed.
§§ 23-24] A MEDIA TOR 225
§ 23. Notice its tendency to vindicate the laws of God.
And yet, what has been often alleged in justification of
this doctrine, even from the apparent natural tendency of
this method of our redemption ; its tendency to vindicate
the authority of God's laws, and deter his creatures from
sin ; this has never yet been answered, and is, I think,
plainly unanswerable : though I am far from thinking it an
account of the whole of the case. But without taking this
into consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observa-
tions above made, that this objection is, not an objection
against Christianity, but against the whole general constitu-
tion of nature. And if it were to be considered as an
objection against Christianity, or considering it as it is, an
objection against the constitution of nature ; it amounts to
no more in conclusion than this, that a divine appointment
cannot be necessary or expedient, because the objector does
not discern it to be so : though he must own that the nature
of the case is such, as renders him incapable of judging,
whether it be so or not ; or of seeing it to be necessary,
though it were so.
§ 24. This cavil, i We see not why, ergo it cannot be,'
almost more foolish than guilty.
It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men,
to find people arguing in this manner : objecting against the
credibility of such particular things revealed in scripture,
that they do not see the necessity or expediency of them.
For though it is highly right, and the most pious exercise
of our understanding, to inquire with due reverence into
the ends and reasons of God's dispensations : yet when
those reasons are concealed, to argue from our ignorance,
that such dispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely
absurd. The presumption of this kind of objections seems
almost lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them
is yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they are,
against things in Christianity analogous or like to thole
natural dispensations of Providence, which are matter of
experience. Let reason be kept to : and if any part of the
VOL. I.
226 OF REDEMPTION BY A MEDIATOR [II. V. § 25
scripture account of the redemption of the world by Christ
can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the scripture,
in the name of God, be given up : but let not such poor
creatures as we go on objecting against an infinite scheme,
that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its
parts, and call this reasoning ; and, which still further
heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which
we are not actively concerned in. For it may be worth
mentioning.
§ 25. We cannot expect information on the divine conduct,
as large as on our own duty.
Lastly, That not only the reason of the thing, but the
whole analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to
have the like information concerning the divine conduct, as
concerning our own duty. God instructs us by experience,
(for it is not reason, but experience which instructs us, ) what
good or bad consequences will follow from our acting in
such and such manners : and by this he directs us, how we
are to behave ourselves. But, though we are sufficiently
instructed for the common purposes of life : yet it is but an
almost infinitely small part of natural providence, which we
are at all let into. The case is the same with regard to
revelation. The doctrine of a mediator between God and
man, against which it is objected, that the expediency of
some things in it is not understood, relates only to what
was done on God's part in the appointment, and on the
mediator's in the execution of it. For what is required of
us, in consequence of this gracious dispensation, is another
subject, in which none can complain for want of informa-
tion. The constitution of the world, and God's natural
government over it, is all mystery, as much as the Christian
dispensation. Yet under the first he has given men all
things pertaining to life ; and under the other, all things
pertaining unto godliness. And it may be added, that there
is nothing hard to be accounted for in any of the common
precepts of Christianity: though if there were, surely a
divine command is abundantly sufficient to lay us under
the strongest obligations to obedience. But the fact is, that
VI. §§ r, 2] WANT OF UNIVERSALITY, ETC. 227
the reasons of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive
institutions are manifestly necessary to keep up and pro-
pagate religion amongst mankind. And our duty to Christ,
the internal and external worship of him ; this part of
the religion of the gospel, manifestly arises out of what he
has done and suffered, his authority and dominion, and the
relation which he is revealed to stand in to us h.
CHAPTER VI.
OF THE \VANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION: AND
OF THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT.
§ i. These two objections do not justify rejection,
IT has been thought by some persons, that if the evidence
of revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into a
positive argument against it : because it cannot be supposed,
that, if it were true, it would be left to subsist upon
doubtful evidence. And the objection against revelation
from its not being universal is often insisted upon as of
great weight.
Now the weakness of these opinions may be shown, by
observing the suppositions on which they are founded :
which are really such as these ; that it cannot be thought
God would have bestowed any favour at all upon us,
unless in the degree, which, we think, he might, and
which, we imagine, would be most to our particular ad-
vantage ; and also that it cannot be thought he would
bestow a favour upon any, unless he bestowed the same
upon all : suppositions which we find contradicted, not
by a few instances in God's natural government of the
world, but by the general analogy of nature together.
§ 2. In temporal matters ; nor, therefore, in spiritual ;
as regards (a) imperfect communication,
Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful,
and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument
Sup. II. i. 16-18.
228 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. VI.
against it, should be put upon considering, what that evi-
dence indeed is, which they act upon with regard to their
temporal interests. For, it is not only extremely difficult,
but in many cases absolutely impossible, to balance pleasure
and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to be able to say
on which side the overplus is. There are the like difficulties
and impossibilities in making the due allowances for a
change of temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill health :
any of which render men incapable of enjoying, after they
have obtained what they most eagerly desired. Numberless
too are the accidents, besides that one of untimely death,
which may even probably disappoint the best concerted
schemes : and strong objections are often seen to lie against
them, not to be removed or answered, but which seem
overbalanced by reasons on the other side ; so as that the
certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit are, by every
one, thought justly disregarded, upon account of the ap-
pearing greater advantages .in case of success, though there
be but little probability of it. Lastly, every one observes
our liableness, if we be not upon our guard, to be deceived
by the falsehood of men, and the false appearances of things:
and this danger must be greatly increased, if there be a
strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion, to favour
the deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubt-
fulness of proof, wherein our temporal interest really consists ;
what are the most probable means of attaining it; and
whether those means will eventually be successful. And
numberless instances there are, in the daily course of life, in
which all men think it reasonable to engage in pursuits,
though the probability is greatly against succeeding ; and
to make such provision for themselves, as it is supposable
they may have occasion for, though the plain acknowledged
probability is, that they never shall.
§ 3. Or (b) want of universality in the gift.
Then those who think the objection against revelation,
from its light not being universal, to be of weight, should
observe, that the Author of nature, in numberless instances,
bestows that upon some, which he does not upon others,
SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF 229
who seem equally to stand in need of it. Indeed he appears
to bestow all his gifts with the most promiscuous variety
among creatures of the same species : health and strength,
capacities of prudence and of knowledge, means of improve-
ment, riches, and all external advantages. And as there
are not any two men found, of exactly like shape and
features : so it is probable there are not any two, of an
exactly like constitution, temper and situation, with regard
to the goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these
uncertainties and varieties, God does exercise a natural
government over the world : and there is such a thing as
a prudent and imprudent institution of life, with regard to
our health and our aifairs, under that his natural govern-
ment.
§ 4. Diverse degrees of evidence have here been combined
with diversity of time ;
As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have
been universal ; and as they have been afforded to a
greater or less part of the world, at different times : so
likewise, at different times, both revelations have had
different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived during
the succession of prophets, that is, from Moses till after
the Captivity, had higher evidence of the truth of their
religion, than those had, who lived in the interval between
the last-mentioned period, and the coming of Christ. And
the first Christians had higher evidence of the miracles
wrought in attestation of Christianity, than what we have
now. They had also a strong presumptive proof of the
truth of it, perhaps of much greater force, in way of argu-
ment, than many think, of which we have very little
remaining ; I mean the presumptive proof of its truth,
from the influence which it had upon the lives of the
generality of its professors. And we, or future ages,
may possibly have a proof of it, which they could not
have, from the conformity between the prophetic history,
and the state of the world and of Christianity.
230 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [n. vi.
§ 5. Also of persons, places, circumstances.
And further : If we were to suppose the evidence, which
some have of religion, to amount to little more than seeing
that it may be true ; but that they remain in great doubts
and uncertainties about both its evidence and its nature,
and great perplexities concerning the rule of life : others
to have a full conviction of the truth of religion, with
a distinct knowledge of their duty : and others severally
to have all the intermediate degrees of religious light
and evidence, which lie between these two If we put
the case, that for the present, it was intended, revelation
should be no more than a small light, in the midst of
a world greatly overspread, notwithstanding it, with
ignorance and darkness : that certain glimmerings of
this light should extend, and be directed, to remote
distances, in such a manner as that those who really
partook of it should not discern from whence it originally
came : that some in a nearer situation to it should have
its light obscured, and, in different ways and degrees,
intercepted : and that others should be placed within its
clearer influence, and be much more enlivened, cheered,
and directed by it ; but yet that even to these it should be
no more than a light shining in a dark place : all this
would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with the
conduct of Providence, in the distribution of its other
blessings. If the fact of the case really were, that some
have received no light at all from the scripture ; as many
ages and countries in the heathen world : that others,
though they have, by means of it, had essential or natural
religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have never
had the genuine scripture-revelation, with its real evidence,
proposed to their consideration ; and the ancient Persians *
and modern Mahometans 2 may possibly be instances of
1 The author probably had in a considerable force of aggressive
his mind the comparative purity energy,
of Zoroastrian doctrine. (b) That its proclamation of the
* There are three things here to divine unity is a fact of gigantic
be borne in mind : moment.
(a) That Mahometanism, among (c) That the worst of all its de-
undeveloped races, still manifests velopments, in the terrible wicked-
§§ 5-7] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF 231
people in a situation somewhat like to this : that others,
though they have had the scripture laid before them as
of divine revelation, yet have had it with the system and
evidence of Christianity so interpolated1, the system so
corrupted, the evidence so blended with false miracles,
as to leave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness and
uncertainty about the whole ; which may be the state
of some thoughtful men, in most of those nations who
call themselves Christian : and lastly, that others have
had Christianity offered to them in its genuine simplicity,
and with its proper evidence, as persons in countries and
churches of civil and of Christian liberty ; .but however
that even these persons are left in great ignorance in many
respects, and have by 110 means light afforded them enough
to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regulate their life, to
teach them their duty, and encourage them in the careful
discharge of it :
§ 6. All these cases have parallels in nature.
I say, if we were to suppose this somewhat of a general
true account of the degrees of moral and religious light and
evidence, which were intended to be afforded mankind, and
of what has actually been and is their situation, in their
moral and religious capacity ; there would be nothing in all
this ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty, in all these
varieties, and supposed disadvantages of some in comparison
of others, respecting religion, but may be paralleled by
manifest analogies in the natural dispensations of Providence
at present, and considering ourselves merely in our temporal
capacity.
§ 7. But God's plan is one of allowances, and so
of universal equity.
Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which
would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in
ness of the government of Turkey, portion of the nineteenth cen-
has only been exhibited in full tury.
to the world during the latter 1 See svp. II. i. 13.
232 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. VI.
nature, if we would really keep in mind, that every one
shall be dealt equitably with : instead of forgetting this,
or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in words.
All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances, in
this various economy of Providence, would be lost ; if we
would keep in mind, that every merciful allowance shall be
made, and no more be required of any one, than what might
have been equitably expected of him, from the circumstances
in which he was placed ; and not what might have been
expected, had he been placed in other circumstances : i. e. in
scripture language, that every man shall be accepted according
to what he had, not according to tvhat lie had not*. This
however doth not by any means imply, that all persons'
condition here is equally advantageous with respect to
futurity. And Providence's designing to place some in
greater darkness with respect to religious knowledge, is no
more a reason why they should not endeavour to get out of
that darkness, and others to bring them out of it ; than why
ignorant and slow people in matters of other knowledge
should not endeavour to learn, or should not be instructed.
§ 8. Unlikeness of creatures makes probable unlikcness
of situations for like creatures.
It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and
good principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author
of nature to make different kinds and orders of creatures,
disposed him also to place creatures of like kinds in different
situations1 : and that the same principle which disposed
him to make creatures of different moral capacities, dis-
posed him also to place creatures of like moral capacities in
different religious situations ; and even the same creatures,
11 2 Cor. viii. 12.
1 * Of like kinds ' may mean, I clay, to confront an objector, lie
presume, likeness of kind, class, does not proceed to any assertion
property, or quality, short of like- that the potter, in selecting clay
ness in every particular of each for different vessels, has no regard
property or quality. It is observ- to the suitableness of the material
able that when St. Paul pleads the for each respectively. Kom. ix.
dominion of the potter over his 21-23.
§§ 8-io] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF 233
in different periods of their being. And the account or
reason of this is also most probably the account why the
constitution of things is such, as that creatures of moral
natures or capacities, for a considerable part of that duration
in which they are living agents, are not at all subjects of
morality and religion ; but grow up to be so, and grow
up to be so more and more, gradually from childhood to
mature age.
§ 9. The complexity of nature infers per se
great varieties.
What, in particular, is the account or reason of these
things, we must be greatly in the dark, were it only that we
know so very little even of our own case. Our present state
may possibly be the consequence of somewhat past, which
we are wholly ignorant of : as it has a reference to somewhat
to come, of which we know scarce any more than is necessary
for practice. A system or constitution, in its notion, implies
variety ; and so complicated an one as this world, very great
variety. So that were revelation universal, yet from men's
different capacities of understanding, from the different
lengths of their lives, their different educations and other
external circumstances, and from their difference of temper
and bodily constitution ; their religious situations would be
widely different, and the disadvantage of some in comparison
of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present. And
the true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such
a part of mankind, are placed in this condition of ignorance,
must be supposed also the true account of our further ignor-
ance, in not knowing the reasons why, or whence it is, that
they are placed in this condition. But the following prac-
tical reflections may deserve the serious consideration of those
persons, who think the circumstances of mankind or their
own, in the forementioned respects, a ground of complaint.
§ 10. (a) Doubtfulness of evidence may constitute a part
of moral probation.
First, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious,
may constitute one particular part of some men's trial in the
234 WANT Of UNIVERSALITY AND [II. VI.
religious sense : as it gives scope for a virtuous exercise, or
vicious neglect of their understanding, in examining or not
examining into that evidence. There seems no possible
reason to be given, why we may not be in a state of moral
probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding
upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our
behaviour in common affairs. The former is as much a thing
within our power and choice as the latter. And I suppose
it is to be laid down for certain, that the same character, the
same inward principle, which, after a man is convinced
of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the precepts
of it, would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an
examination of it, upon its system and evidence being offered
to his thoughts : and that in the latter state his examination
would be with an impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude,
proportionable to what his obedience is in the former.
§ ii. (b) Neglect of evidence is a form of depravity.
And as inattention, negligence, want of all serious concern,
about a matter of such a nature and such importance, when
offered to men's consideration, is, before a distinct conviction
of its truth, as real immoral depravity and dissoluteness ; as
neglect of religious practice after such conviction : so active
solicitude about it, and fair impartial consideration of its
evidence before such conviction, is as really an exercise
of a morally right temper ; as is religious practice after.
Thus, that religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of
deduction and inference ; that a conviction of its truth is not
forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected with
heedful attention t6 premises ; this as much constitutes reli-
gious probation, as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity,
for right and wrong behaviour, as any thing whatever does.
And their manner of treating this subject, when laid before
them, shows what is in their heart, and is an exertion of it.
§ 12. (a) In this subject, that matter ( may be true ' obliges,
as well as if it ' is true.'
Secondly, It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is
not so much attended to, that if, upon consideration of reli-
§§ ir, is] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS Of- PROOF 235
gion, the evidence of it should seem to any persons doubtful,
in the highest supposable degree ; even this doubtful evi-
dence will, however, put them into a general state of probation
in the moral and religious sense. For, suppose a man to be
really in doubt, whether such a person had not done him
the greatest favour ; or, whether his \vhole temporal interest
did not depend upon that person : no one, who had any
sense of gratitude and of prudence, could possibly consider
himself in the same situation, with regard to such person, as
if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as just to say, that
certainty and doubt are the same ; as to say, the situations
now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty
in point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, were
he certain he had received no favour from such person, or
that he no way depended upon him. And thus, though the
evidence of religion which is afforded to some men should
be little more than that they are given to see, the system of
Christianity, or religion in general, to be supposable and
credible ; this ought in all reason to beget a serious practical
apprehension, that it may be true !. And even this will
afford matter of exercise for religious suspense and delibera-
tion, for moral resolution and self-government ; because the
apprehension that religion may be true does as really lay
men under obligations, as a full conviction that it is true.
It gives occasion and motives to consider further the impor-
tant subject ; to preserve attentively upon their minds
a general implicit sense that they may be under divine
moral government, an awful solicitude about religion,
whether natural or revealed. Such apprehension ought to
turn men's eyes to every degree of new light which may be
had, from whatever side it comes ; and induce them to
refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live
in the conscientious practice of every common virtue2.
1 This obligation in cases of occasion to deal with it.
partial proof seems to extend to 2 The idea of the author seems
all matters (a bearing upon moral to be that conveyed in the Psalms :
conduct, v&) of grave interest ; but 'I will wash my hands in inno-
to abstract and speculative matter cency, 0 Lord ; and so will I go to
only if, and when, we have special thine altar ' (xxvi. 6).
236 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. VI.
Especially are they bound to keep at the greatest distance
from all dissolute profaneness ; for this the very nature of
the case forbids ; and to treat with highest reverence
a matter, upon which their own whole interest and being,
and the fate of nature, depends.
§ 13. (b) Doubters in religion are bound to conform to
its moral laws.
This behaviour, and an active endeavour to maintain
within themselves this temper, is the business, the duty,
and the wisdom of those persons, who complain of the
doubtfulness of religion : is what they are under the most
proper obligations to. And such behaviour is an exertion
of, and has a tendency to improve in them, that character,
which the practice of all the several duties of religion, from
a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of, and has
a tendency to improve in others : others, I say, to whom
God has afforded such conviction. Nay, considering the
infinite importance of religion, revealed as well as natural,
I think it may be said in general, that whoever will weigh
the matter thoroughly may see, there is not near so much
difference, as is commonly imagined, between what ought
in reason to be the rule of life, to those persons who are
fully convinced of its truth, and to those who have only
a serious doubting apprehension, that it may be true. Their
hopes, and fears, and obligations, will be in various degrees :
but, as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the
same ; so the subject-matter of their obligations, what they
are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike.
§ 14. (c) The obligation is enhanced l>y the weight attaching
to example.
It is to be observed further, that, from a character of
understanding, or a situation of influence in the world, some
persons have it in their power to do infinitely more harm
or good, by setting an example of profaneness and avowed
disregard to all religion, or, on the contrary, of a serious,
though perhaps doubting, apprehension of its truth, and of
§§ i3-!5] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF 237
a reverend regard to it under this doubtfulness ; than they
can do, by acting well or ill in all the common intercourses
amongst mankind. And consequently they are most highly
accountable for a behaviour, which, they may easily foresee,
is of such importance, and in which there is most plainly
a right and a wrong ; even admitting the evidence of religion
to be as doubtful as is pretended.
§ 15. (d) Doubt implies the existence of some degree of
evidence for the thing doubted.
The ground of these observations, and that which renders
them just and true, is, that doubting necessarily implies
some degree of evidence for that, of which we doubt. For
no person would be in doubt concerning the truth of a
number of facts so and so circumstanced, which should
accidentally come into his thoughts, and of which he had
no evidence at all. And though in the case of an even
chance, and where consequently we were in doubt, we should
in common language say, that we had no evidence at all for
either side ; yet that situation of things, which renders it an
even chance and no more, that such an event will happen,
renders this case equivalent to all others, where there is
such evidence on both sides of a question b, as leaves the
mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed in all these
cases, there is no more evidence on one side than on the
other ; but there is (what is equivalent to) much more for
either, than for the truth of a number of facts which come
into one's thoughts at random. And thus, in all these
cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, lower degrees of
evidence, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher
still. Any one, who will a little attend to the nature of
evidence, will easily carry this observation on, and see,
that between no evidence at all, and that degree of it which
, affords ground of doubt, there are as. many intermediate
degrees, as there are, between that degree which is the
ground of doubt, and demonstration. And though we
have not faculties to distinguish these degrees of evidence
b Introduction, §§ 5, 6.
238 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. vi.
with any sort of exactness; yet, in proportion as they are
discerned, they ought to influence our practice. For it is
as real an imperfection in the moral character, not to be
influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence when
discerned, as it is in the understanding, not to discern it.
§ 1 6. (e) Corruption of the heart operates forcibly where
the evidence is short of overbearing.
And as, in all subjects which men consider, they discern
the lower as well as higher degrees of evidence, proportion-
ably to their capacity of understanding : so, in practical
subjects, they are influenced in practice, by the lower as
well as higher degrees of it, proportionally to their fairness
and honesty. And as, in proportion to defects in the
understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees of
evidence, are in danger of overlooking evidence when it
is not glaring, and are easily imposed upon in such cases :
so, in proportion to the corruption of the heart, they seem
capable of satisfying themselves with having no regard in
practice to evidence acknowledged real, if it be not over-
bearing. From these things it must follow, that doubting
concerning religion implies such a degree of evidence for it,
as, joined with the consideration of its importance, unques-
tionably lays men under the obligations before mentioned,
to have a dutiful regard to it in all their behaviour.
§ 1 7. (a) The duty of effort is en/tamed, aft by doubt'
fulness in rclif/ion, so by temptations in conduct.
Thirdly, The difficulties in which the qvidence of religion
is involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground
of complaint, than the external circumstances of temptation,
which others are placed in ; or than difficulties in the practice
of it, after a full conviction of its truth. Temptations render
our state a more improving state of discipline (;, than it would
be otherwise : as they give occasion for a more attentive
exercise of the virtuous principle, which confirms and
strengthens it more, than an easier or less attentive exercise
Part I. chap. v.
or r/toor
of it could. Now speculative diflicultios are, in (his respect,
of the very same nature with these external temptations.
For the evidence of religion not appearing obvious, is to
some persons a temptation to reject it, without any con-
sideration at all : and therefore requires such an attentive
exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to consider that,
evidence, as there would l>e no occasion for, hut for such
temptation. And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence,
after it has been in some sort considered, affords opportunity
to an unfair mind of explaining away, and deceitfully hiding
from itself, that evidence which it might see ; and also for
IIH-II'S encouraging themselves in vice, from hopes of
impunity, though they do clearly see thus much at least,
that these hopes are uncertain: in like manner as the
<• ion temptation to many instances of folly, which
end in temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for hope
of not being detected, and of escaping with impunity; i.e.
the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that such foolish
behaviour \\ill thus end in infamy and ruin. On the
contrary, supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion
calls for a more ra.ireful and attentive exercise of the virtuous
principle, in fairly yielding themselves up to the proper
influence of any real evidence, though doubtful ; and in
practising conscientiously all virtue, though under Homo
uncertainty, whether the government in the universe may
not possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity.
And in general, temptation, moaning by thin word the lesser
allurements to wrong and dilliculties in the discharge of our
duty, as well as the greater ones ; temptation, I say, as such
and of every kind and degree, as if calls forth some virtuous
efforts, additional to what would otherwise have been wanting,
cannot but be an additional discipline and improvement of
virtue, as well as probation of it in the other senses of that
won I «'. So that the very same account is to be given, why
the evidence of religion should be left in such a manner,
as to require, in some, an attentive, solicitous, perhaps
painful exercise of their understanding about it ; as why
ll I'urt I. chap. iv. and I. v, 40.
240 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. VI.
others should be placed in such circumstances, as that the
practice of its common duties, after a full conviction of the
truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, and pains :
or, why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to afford
matter of temptation to some ; as why external difficulties
and allurements should be permitted to afford matter of
temptation to others. The same account also is to be given,
why some should be exercised with temptations of both
these kinds ; as why others should be exercised with the
latter in such very high degrees, as some have been, par-
ticularly as the primitive Christians were.
§ 18. (b) As in nature, so in religion, doubts may con-
stitute for some the capital article of trial
Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that
the speculative difficulties in which the evidence of religion
is involved, may make even the principal part of some per-
sons' trial. For, as the chief temptations of the generality
of the world are, the ordinary motives to injustice or un-
restrained pleasure ; or to live in the neglect of religion
from that frame of mind, which renders many persons
almost without feeling as to any thing distant, or which
is not the object of their senses : so there are other persons
without this shallowness of temper, persons of a deeper
sense as to what is invisible and future ; who not only see,
but have a general practical feeling, that what is to corne
will be present, and that things are not less real for their
not being the objects of sense ; and who, from their natural
constitution of body and of temper, and from their external
condition, may have small temptations to behave ill,
small difficulty in behaving well, in the common course
of life. Now when these latter persons have a distinct full
conviction of the truth of religion, without any possible
doubts or difficulties, the practice of it is to them unavoid-
able, unless they will do a constant violence to their own
minds ; and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them,
than it is to creatures in a state of perfection. Yet these
persons may possibly stand in need of moral discipline and
exercise in a higher degree, than they would have by such
§§ i8, 19] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF 24!
an easy practice of religion. Or it may be requisite, for
reasons unknown to us, that they should give some further
manifestation e what is their moral character, to the creation
of God, than such a practice of it would be. Thus in the
great variety of religious situations in which men are placed,
what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes,
the probation, in all senses, of some persons, may be the*
difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved :
and their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they
will behave under and with respect to these difficulties.
Circumstances in men's situation in their temporal capacity,
analogous in good measure to this respecting religion, are to
be observed. We find some persons are placed in such a
situation in the world, as that their chief difficulty with
regard to conduct, is not the doing what is prudent when
it is known ; for this, in numberless cases, is as easy as the
contrary : but to some the principal exercise is, recollection
and being upon their guard against deceits, the deceits
suppose of those about them ; against false appearances of
reason and prudence. To persons in some situations, the
principal exercise with respect to conduct is, attention in
order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really
the reasonable and prudent part to act.
§ 19. Also the doubts may le due to faults in the
examinant.
But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that men's
dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing to
their neglects or prejudices ; it must be added, 011 the other
hand, in all common reason, and as what the truth of the
case plainly requires should be added, that such dissatis-
faction possibly may be owing to those, possibly may be
men's own fault. For,
If there are any persons, who never set themselves heartily
and in earnest to be informed in religion : if there are
any, who secretly wish it may not prove true ; and are
less attentive to evidence than to difficulties, and more to
e Sup. I. v. 42.
VOL. 1. R
242 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. VI.
objections than to what is said in answer to them : these
persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing the
evidence of religion, though it were most certainly true,
and capable of being ever so fully proved. If any accustom
themselves to consider this subject usually in the way of
mirth and sport : if they attend to forms and representations,
and inadequate manners of expression, instead of the real
things intended by them : (for signs often can be no more
than inadequately expressive of the things signified :) or if
they substitute human errors in the room of divine truth :
why may not all, or any of these things, hinder some men
from seeing that evidence, which really is seen by others ;
as a like turn of mind, with respect to matters of common
speculation and practice, does, we find by experience, hinder
them from attaining that knowledge and right understanding,
in matters of common speculation and practice, which more
fair and attentive minds attain to ? And the effect will be
the same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the
evidence of religion, and their indirect behaviour with regard
to it, proceed from mere carelessness, or from the grosser
vices ; or whether it be owing to this, that forms and figura-
tive manners of expression, as well as errors, administer
occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and the
truth itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn
so far as to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly
affairs, and even, as it seems, to impair their faculty of
reason. And in general, levity, carelessness, passion, and
prejudice, do hinder us from being rightly informed, with
respect to common things : and they may, in like manner,
and perhaps in some further providential manner, with
respect to moral and religious subjects : may hinder evidence
from being laid before us, and from being seen when
it is. The scripture f does declare, that every one shall not
f Dan. xii. 10. See also Is. xxix. 13, 14 ; Matth. vi. 23, and xi. 25, and
Trxts - inrl C'rotiv* Xlii' "' I2 J J°hn iiL *9 and V> 44 >
.t CXto . Ct/frCl' Or/ Oil ttS s* * m. ... i , i < /M* i •
on the purpose of 2 Cor' 1V' 4» * Tira' m- J3 » and that affectionate as
restricted evidence. we^ as authoritative admonition, so very many
times inculcated, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.
Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in these and other passages
§ 20] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF 243
understand. And it makes no difference, by what provi-
dential conduct this conies to pass : whether the evidence of
Christianity was originally and with design, put and left so,
as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations
should not see it ; and that honest-minded persons should :
or, whether it comes to pass by any other means.
§ 20. The proof of religion, in both kinds, upon
inquiry, lies level to common men.
Further : The general proof of natural religion and of
Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men ; even
those, the greatest part of whose time, from childhood to old
age, is taken up with providing for themselves and their
families the common conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of
life : those, I mean, of this rank, who ever think at all
of asking after proof, or attending to it. Common men,
were they as much in earnest about religion, as about their
temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real
evidence, that there is a God who governs the world : and
they feel themselves to be of a moral nature, and account-
able creatures. And as Christianity entirely falls in with
this their natural sense of things, so they are capable, not
only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that there
is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and
many appearing completions of prophecy. But though
this proof is real and conclusive, yet it is liable to objections,
and may be run up into difficulties ; which, however, persons
who are capable, not only of talking of, but of really seeing,
are capable also of seeing through : i. e. not of clearing up
and answering them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for
of such knowledge we are not capable with respect to any
one thing in nature ; but capable of seeing that the proof
is noj: lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by these objec-
tions. But then a thorough examination into religion, with
regard to these objections, which cannot be the business
of scripture of the like sense, as to say, that the proof given us of
Christianity was less than it might have been, for this very purpose :
Ut ila sermo Evangeln tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad quern ingenia sanabilia
explorarentur. De Ver. R C. lib. ii. towards the end.
K 2
244 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. VI.
of eveiy man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and, from
the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as time
and attention ; to see, how the evidence comes out, upon
balancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole,
is the amount of it. Now if persons who have picked up
these objections from others, and take for granted they are
of weight, upon the word of those from whom they received
them, or, by often retailing of them, come to see or fancy
they see them to be of weight ; will not prepare themselves
for such an examination, with a competent degree of know-
ledge ; or will not give that time and attention to the
subject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for
attaining such information : in this case, they must remain
in doubtfulness, ignorance, or error ; in the same way as
they must, with regard to common sciences, and matters
of common life, if they neglect the necessary means of being
informed in them.
§ 21. Accrediting an ambassador is not a parallel case, as
it aims only at a formal act.
But still perhaps it will be objected, that if a prince or
common master were to send directions to a servant,
he would take care, that they should always bear the certain
marks, who they came from, and that their sense should be
always plain : so as that there should be no possible doubt,
if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning of
them. Now the proper answer to all this kind of objections
is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we can-
iiot argue thus with respect to him, who is the Governor of
the world : and particularly that he does not afford us such
information, with respect to our temporal affairs and interests,
as experience abundantly shows. However, there is a full
answer to this objection, from the very nature of religion.
For, the reason why a prince would give his directions in
this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires such an
external action should be done, without concerning himself
with the motive or principle upon which it is done: i. e. he
regards only the external event, or the thing's being done ;
and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or the
§§ 21-23] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF 245
action. Whereas the whole of morality and religion con-
sisting merely in action itself, there is no sort of parallel
between the cases. But if the prince be supposed to regard
only the action ; i. e. only to desire to exercise, or in any
sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant ; he
would not always give his orders in such a plain manner.
§ 22. Whether God's will be regarded, herein, as absolute,
or as conditional, the argument remains.
It may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting
morality and religion, may be considered either as absolute,
or as only conditional. If it be absolute, it can only be thus,
that we should act virtuously in such given circumstances ;
not that we should be brought to act so, by his changing of
our circumstances. And if God's will be thus absolute, then
it is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense, to do
or to contradict his will ; which is a most weighty considera-
tion. Or his will may be considered only as conditional,
that if we act so and so, we shall be rewarded ; if otherwise,
punished : of which conditional will of the Author of nature,
the whole constitution of it affords most certain instances.
§ 23. Sums up the foregoing Sections-
Upon the whole : That we are in a state of religion
necessarily implies, that we are in a state of probation : and
the credibility of our being at all in such a state being-
admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in supposing our
probation to be, just as it is, in those respects which are
above objected against. There seems no pretence, from the
reason of the thing, to say, that the trial cannot equitably be
any thing, but whether persons will act suitably to certain
information, or such as admits no room for doubt ; so as
that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either from
their not attending to what they certainly know, or from
overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it.
For, since ignorance and doubt afford scope for probation in
all senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty ; and
since the two former are to be put to the same account
246
WANT OF UNIVERSALITY, ETC. [II. VI. § 24
as difficulties in practice ; men's moral probation may also
be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves
by impartial consideration, and afterwards whether they will
act as the case requires, upon the evidence which they have,
however doubtful. And this, we find by experience, is
frequently our probation s, in our temporal capacity. For,
the information which we want with regard to our worldly
interests is by no means always given us of course, without
any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to self-deceit
from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of
others. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part,
often requires much and difficult consideration. Then after
we have judged the very best wre can, the evidence upon
which we must act, if we will live and act at all, is
perpetually doubtful to a veiy high degree. And the con-
stitution and course of the world in fact is such, as that
want of impartial consideration what we have to do, and
venturing upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful
what will be the consequence, are often naturally, i. e.
providentially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct occasioned
by heedless inattention to what we certainly know, or
disregarding it from overbearing passion.
§ 24. Invites the objector to consider whether the
obstacle lies within himself.
Several of the observations here made may well seem
strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men. But
if the persons for whose sake they are made think so ;
persons who object as above, and throw off all regard
to religion under pretence of want of evidence ; I desire
them to consider again, whether their thinking so be
owing to any thing unintelligible in these observations,
or to their own not having such a sense of religion and
serious solicitude about it, as even their state of scepticism
does in all reason require ? It ought to be forced upon
the reflection of these persons, that our nature and con-
dition necessarily require us, in the daily course of life,
g I. ii. 12, and sup. {§ 17-19.
VII. §§ i, 2] EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY
247
to act upon evidence much lower l than what is commonly
called probable ; to guard, not only against what we fully
believe will, but also against what we think it supposable
may, happen ; and to engage in pursuits when the probability
is greatly against success, if it be credible, that possibly we
may succeed in them.
CHAPTER VII.
OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.
§ i. WiH now try the evidences for Christianity
by our rules of temporal action.
rPHE presumptions against revelation, and objections
against the general scheme of Christianity, and par-
ticular things relating to it, being removed ; there remains
to be considered, what positive evidence we have for the
truth of it : chiefly in order to see, what the analogy of
nature suggests with regard to that evidence, and the
objections against it : or to see what is, and is allowed to
be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action, in
our temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same
kind of evidence, and the same kind of objections against
it, that we have in the case before us.
§ 2. These evidences are (a) direct and particular,
(b) general and resulting.
Now in the evidence of Christianity there seem to be
several things of great weight, not reducible to the head,
either of miracles, or the completion of prophecy, in the
common acceptation of the words2. But these two are
1 Comp. Introd. §§ 3, 6.
2 After the discussions of the
hist century and a half, Butler
would perhaps have somewhat
altered what he has written re-
specting the twin office of miracle
and prophecy as evidences of re-
vealed religion.
As regards miracle, we may do
well to remember —
1. The apostles were not con-
verted by miracles as commonly
understood.
2. The miracles of our Lord were
248
OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VI I.
its direct and fundamental proofs : and those other things,
however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged
apart from its direct proofs, but always to be joined with
them. Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a long
series of things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning
of the world to the present time, of great variety and
compass, taking in both the direct, and also the collateral,
proofs ; and making up, all of them together, one argument :
the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be
compared to what they call the effect in architecture or
other works of art ; a result from a great number of things
so and so disposed, and taken into one view. I shall there-
of wide local notoriety, but we
have no evidence of their having
led to extended conversions. They
may have had more powerful and
extended operation through the
preaching of the apostles.
3. The great miracle of Lazarus
is noted for the specialty of its
effect (John xi. 45'.
4. There were three miracles
which may be denominated as of
the first order : —
(a) The Incarnation itself;
which, as Butler observes, is
not available as proof, but
requires to be proved.
(ft) The miracle of the Resur-
rection ; which, after it had
happened, became powerfully
available, and may be taken
us sustaining very broadly
this declaration of Butler's.
(<0 The miracle of our Lord's
own person and character ;
which was too spiritual for
the mass, but operated mar-
vellously on a few.
It is well to observe that the
apostles largely converted without
miracle: and, in his address to
the Athenians (Acts xvii. 31),
St. Paul appeals to no miracle
except the Resurrection. This
appeal brought about an inter-
ruption, and he desisted from
further speech.
With regard to prophecy —
1. It seems to imply the action
of divine power operating with
large combinations, such as belong
to the government of the ages as
a whole.
2. There are miracles ascribed
to preternatural agencies of evil,
as well as of good. But we have
no similar recognition in Holy
Writ of prophecy as being placed
at the command of any evil agent.
It is obvious that the evidential
force of the existence of the
Church, and its operation on the
world and on society, has grown
progressively with the lapse of
time, and the development of the
varying conditions of life. In
Great Britain, especially, it was
to be expected that this idea
should become more prominent
and vivid with the great exten-
sion and increased efficiency of
Christian missions during the
nineteenth century. Also Chris-
tianity and the Church are far
larger and weightier facts than
heretofore in comparison with the
rest of the world : nor is the
great increase in the numerical
proportion of Christians wholly
without bearing on the case.
§3] FOR CHRISTIANITY 249
fore, first, make some observations relating to miracles, and
the appearing completions of prophecy ; and consider what
analogy suggests, in answer to the objections brought against
this evidence. And, secondly, I shall endeavour to give
some account of the general argument now mentioned,
consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, con-
sidered as making up one argument : this being the kind
of proof, upon which wre determine most questions of
difficulty, concerning common facts, alleged to have hap-
pened, or seeming likely to happen ; especially questions
relating to conduct.
§ 3. On the direct. (A) The miracles are told in narratives
plain and unadorned;
First, I shall make some observations upon the direct
proof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon
the objections alleged against it.
[I.] Now the following observations relating to the
historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of
Christianity, appear to be of great weight.
f i.] The Old Testament affords us the same historical
evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets,
as of the common civil history of Moses and the kings
of Israel ; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. And
the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same historical
evidence of the miracles of Christ and the apostles, as of
the common matters related in them \ This indeed could
not have been affirmed by any reasonable man, if the authors
of these books, like many other historians, had appeared
to make an entertaining manner of writing their aim ;
though they had interspersed miracles in their works, at
proper distances and upon proper occasions. These might
1 Fitzgerald cites Bolingbroke, connected with all the civil affaiis,
Posthumous Works, iii. 279: < The and make a necessary and insepar-
miracles in the Bible are not like able part. The whole history is
those in Livy, detached pieces that founded in them : it consists of
do not disturb the civil history, little else ; and, if it were not
which goes on very well without a history of them, it would be
them. But the miracles of the a history of nothing.'
Jewish historian are intimately
250 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
have animated a dull relation, amused the reader, and
engaged his attention. And the same account would
naturally have been given of them, as of the speeches
and descriptions of such authors : the same account, in
a manner, as is to be given, why the poets make use of
wonders and prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous
and natural, in scripture, are related in plain unadorned
narratives : and both of them appear, in all respects, to
stand upon the same foot of historical evidence.
§ 4. Sustained by, and accounting for, great knmcn
consequent events ;
Further : Some parts of scripture, containing an account
of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity,
are quoted as genuine, from the age in which they are said
to be written, down to the present : and no other parts of
them, material in the present question, are omitted to be
quoted in such manner, as to afford any sort of proof of
their not being genuine. And, as common history, when
called in question in any instance, may often be greatly
confirmed by contemporary or subsequent events more
known and acknowledged ; and as the common scripture-
history, like many others, is thus confirmed : so likewise is
the miraculous history of it, not only in particular instances,
but in general. For, the establishment of the -Jewish and
Christian religions, which were events contemporary with
the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or
subsequent to them; these events are just what we should
have expected, upon supposition such miracles were really
wrought to attest the truth of those religions. These
miracles are a satisfactory account of those events : of which
110 other satisfactory account can be given ; nor any account
at all, but what is imaginary merely and invented.
§ 5. Hard to account for, except by supposing them true.
It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy
and direct account of this history, how it came to be written
and to be received in the world, as a true history, is, that
§§ 4-7] FOR CHRISTIANITY 251
it really is so : nor can any other account of it be easy and
direct. Now, though an account, not at all obvious, but
very far-fetched and indirect, may indeed be, and often is,
the true account of a matter ; yet it cannot be admitted on
the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, supposition,
and possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, prove
nothing, but that historical evidence is not demonstrative.
§ 6. Not mere objection, but disproof is here required.
Now the just consequence from all this, I think, is, that
the scripture -history in general is to be admitted as an
authentic genuine history, till somewhat positive be alleged
sufficient to invalidate it. But no man will deny the con-
sequence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or thrown by as
of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none ; even
though the evidence now mentioned for its authority wrere
doubtful. This evidence may be confronted by historical
evidence on the other side, if there be any : or general
incredibility in the things related, or inconsistence in the
general turn of the history, would prove it to be of no
authority. But since, upon the face of the matter, upon
a first and general view, the appearance is, that it is an
•authentic history ; it cannot be determined to be fictitious
without some proof that it is so. And the following
observations in support of these and coincident with them,
will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth
of Christianity.
§ 7. The Epistles of St. Paid possess distinct verifying
evidences.
[2.] The Epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of epistolary
writing, and moreover from several of them being written,
not to particular persons, but to churches, carry in them
evidences of their being genuine, beyond what can be in
a mere historical narrative, left to the world at large. This
evidence, joined with that which they have in common with
the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave so much
as any particular pretence for denying their genuineness
considered, as an ordinary matter of fact, or of criticism :
252 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
I say particular pretence, for denying it ; because any single
fact, of such a kind and such antiquity, may have general
doubts raised concerning it, from the very nature of human
affairs and human testimony. There is also to be mentioned
a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of the
Epistle chiefly referred to here, the First to the Corinthians ;
from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Bomanus,
in an epistle of his own to that church a. Now these epistles
afford a proof of Christianity, detached from all others, which
is, I think, a thing of weight ; and also a proof of a nature
and kind peculiar to itself. For,
In them the author declares, that he received the gospel
in general, and the institution of the communion in par-
ticular, not from the rest of the apostles, or jointly together
with them, but alone, from Christ himself; whom he
declares likewise, conformably to the history in the Acts,
that he saw after his ascension l). So that the testimony of
St. Paul is to be considered, as detached from that of the
rest of the apostles.
And he declares further, that he was endued with a
power of working miracles, as what was publicly known to
those very people, speaks of frequent and great variety of
miraculous gifts as then subsisting in those very churches, to
which he was writing ; which he was reproving for several
irregularities ; and where he had personal opposers : he
mentions these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner
and without effort ; by way of reproof to those who had
them, for their indecent use of them ; and by way of depre-
ciating them, in comparison of moral virtues ; in short he
speaks to these churches, of these miraculous powers, in the
manner any one would speak to another cf a thing, which
was as familiar and as much known in common to them
both, as any thing in the World c. And this, as hath been
observed by several persons, is surely a very considerable
thing.
a Clem. Rom. Ep. I. c. 47.
b Gal. i ; i Cor. xi. 23, &c , xv. 8.
c Rom. xv. 19; i Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, &c. and xiii. i, 2, 8, and the
whole fourteenth chapter ; 2 Cor. xii, 12, 13 ; Gal. iii. 2, 5.
§8] FOR CHRISTIANITY 253
§ 8. Christianity and Judaism alone allege miracles
publicly wrought.
[3.] It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Chris-
tianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be
received, upon the allegation, i. e. as unbelievers would
speak, upon the pretence, of miracles, publicly wrought to
attest the truth of it, in such an age ; ancl that it was
actually received by great numbers in that very age, and
upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles.
And Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old
Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other
religions. I mean, that this does not appear to be the case
with regard to any other : for surely it will not be sup-
posed to lie upon any person, to prove by positive historical
evidence, that it was not. It does in no sort appear that
Mahometanism was first received in the world upon the foot
of supposed miracles dl, i. e. public ones: for, as revelation
is itself miraculous, all pretence to it must necessarily imply
some pretence of miracles. And it is a known fact, that
it was immediately, at the very first, propagated by other
means. And as particular institutions, whether in paganism
or popeiy, said to be confirmed by miracles after those
institutions had obtained, are not to the purpose : so, were
there what might be called historical proof, that any of them
were introduced by a supposed divine command, believed
to be attested by miracles ; these would not be in any
wise parallel. For single things of this sort are easy to be
accounted for, after parties are formed, and have power in
their hands ; and the leaders of them are in veneration
with the multitude ; and political interests are blended with
religious claims, and religious distinctions. But before any
thing of this kind, for a few persons, and those of the lowest
rank, all at once, to bring over such great numbers to a
d See the Koran, chap, xiii and chap. xvii.
1 See the argument hereupon from the Arabic by Sir W. Muir.
in The Beacon of Truth, translated chap. i. (1895).
254 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
new religion, and get it to be received upon the particular
evidence of miracles ; this is quite another thing. And
I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the
fact now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances of it, is
peculiar to the Christian religion. However, the fact itself
is allowed, that Christianity obtained, i. e. was professed
to be received in the world, upon the belief of miracles,
immediately in the age in which it is said those miracles
were wrought : or that this is what its first converts would
have alleged, as the reason for their embracing it.
§ 9. The converts, who sacrificed interest and pleasure,
must be believed sincere.
Now certainly it is not to be supposed, that such numbers
of men, in the most distant parts of the world, should
forsake the religion of their country, in which they had
been educated ; separate themselves from their friends, par-
ticularly in their festival shows and solemnities, to which
the common people are so greatly addicted, and which were
of a nature to engage them much more, than any thing of
that sort amongst us ; and embrace a religion, which could
not but expose them to many inconveniences, and indeed
must have been a giving up the world in a great degree,
even from the very first, and before the empire engaged
in form against them : it cannot be supposed, that such
numbers should make so great, and, to say the least, so
inconvenient a change in their whole institution of life,
unless they were really convinced of the truth of those
miracles, upon the knowledge or belief of which they pro-
fessed to make it. And it will, I suppose, readily be
acknowledged, that the generality of the first converts to
Christianity must have believed them : that as by becoming-
Christians they declared to the world, they were satisfied of
the truth of those miracles ; so this declaration was to be
credited. And this their testimony is the same kind of
evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing,
and these writings had come down to us. And it is real
evidence, because it is of facts, which they had capacity and
§§ 9, io] FOR CHRISTIANITY 255
full opportunity to inform themselves of. It is also distinct
from the direct or express historical evidence, though it is
of the same kind : and it would be allowed to be distinct in
all cases. For were a fact expressly related by one or more
ancient historians, and disputed in after ages ; that this fact
is acknowledged to have been believed by great numbers of
the age in which the historian says it was done, would be
allowed an additional proof of such fact, quite distinct from
the express testimony of the historian. The credulity of
mankind is acknowledged : and the suspicions of mankind
ought to be acknowledged too ; and their backwardness even
to believe, and greater still to practise, what makes against
their interest. And it must particularly be remembered,
that education, and prejudice, and authority, were against
Christianity, in the age I am speaking of. So that the
immediate conversion of such numbers is a real presump-
tion of somewhat more than human in this matter : I say
presumption, for it is not alleged as a proof alone and by
itself. Nor need any one of the things mentioned in this
chapter be considered as a proof by itself : and yet all of
them together maybe one of the strongest6.
§ io. The onus probandi lies upon the objector.
Upon the whole : As there is large historical evidence,
both direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in
attestation of Christianity, collected by those who have writ
upon the subject ; it lies upon unbelievers to show, why
this evidence is not to be credited. This way of speaking
is, I think, just ; and what persons who write in defence
of religion naturally fall into. Yet, in a matter of such
unspeakable importance, the proper question is, not whom
it lies upon, according to the rules of argument, to maintain
or confute objections : but whether there really are aiiy,
against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to destroy the
credit of it. However, unbelievers seem to take upon them
the part of showing that there are.
6 Inf. § 60.
256 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VI 1.
§ ii. He says (a) other enthusiasts liace borne erroneous
witness. Yes : but to opinions, not facts.
They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in
different ages and countries, expose themselves to the same
difficulties which the primitive Christians did ; and are ready
to giye up their lives for the most idle follies imaginable.
But it is not very clear, to what purpose this objection is
brought. For every one, surely, in every case, must dis-
tinguish between opinions and facts. And though testimony
is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any opinions at
all ; yet it is allowed, in all other cases, to be a proof of
facts. And a person's laying down his life in attestation
of facts or of opinions, is the strongest proof of his believing
them. And if the apostles and their contemporaries did
believe the facts, in attestation of which they exposed them-
selves to sufferings and death ; this their belief, or rather
knowledge, must be a proof of those facts : for they were
such as came under the observation of their senses.
§ 12. Martyrs of the sub-apostolic age.
And though it is not of equal weight, yet it is of weight,
that the martyrs of the next age, notwithstanding they were
not eye-witnesses of those facts, as were the apostles and
their contemporaries, had, however, full opportunity to
inform themselves, whether they were true or not, and gave
equal proof of their believing them to be true.
§ r3- W Enthusiasm weakens even testimony to facts.
But were these tvitnesses enthusiasts?
But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence
of testimony even for facts, in matters relating to religion :
some seem to think it totally and absolutely destroys the
evidence of testimony upon this subject. And indeed the
powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases too, which operate in
a like manner, are very wonderful, in particular instances.
But if great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar
degree weak, nor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence,
affirm that they saw and heard such things plainly with
§§ 11-15] FOR CHRISTIANITY 257
their eyes and their ears, and are admitted to be in earnest ;
such testimony is evidence of the strongest kind we can
have, for any matter of fact. Yet possibly it may be over-
come, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus
attested, or by contrary testimony. And in an instance
where one thought it was so overcome, it might be just to
consider, how far such evidence could be accounted for, by
enthusiasm : for it seems as if no other imaginable account
were to be given of it. But till such incredibility be shown,
or contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be expected,
that so far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of
such testimony, as that of enthusiasm must be ; an account
so strange, that the generality of mankind can scarce be
made to understand what is meant by it : it cannot, I say,
be expected, that such account will be admitted of such
evidence ; when there is this direct, easy, and obvious
account of it, that people really saw and heard a thing not
incredible, which they affirm sincerely and with full assurance,
they did see and hear.
§ 14. The tilings not being incredible, the charye of
enthusiasm is not to be entertained.
Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking)
an absurd, but a possible account of such testimony :'it is
manifest, that the very mention of it goes upon the previous
supposition that the things so attested are incredible ; and
therefore need not be considered, till they are shown to be
so. Much less need it be considered, after the contrary has
been proved. And I think it has been proved, to full satis-
faction, that there is no incredibility in a revelation, in
general ; or in such an one as the Christian, in particular.
§ 15. Many prejudices operate like enthusiasm; yet testimony
prevails.
However ; as religion is supposed peculiarly liable to
enthusiasm, it may just be observed, that prejudices ' almost
1 On the connection between Aristotle, Eth. Nic. I. iv. 6 ; III. iv.
virtue and sound judgment, see 4 ; X. ix. 6.
VOL. I.
258 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. Vll.
without number and without name, romance, affectation,
humour, a desire to engage attention or to surprise, the
party-spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable
likings and dislikings, these influence men strongly in
common matters. And as these prejudices are often scarce
known' or reflected upon by the persons themselves who are
influenced by them, they are to be considered as influences
of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet human testimony in
common matters is naturally and justly believed notwith-
standing.
§ 1 6. So it will, even if we assume partial untruth,
exaggeration, or reticence1.
It is intimated further, in a more refined way of observa-
tion, that though it should be proved, that the apostles and
first Christians could not, in some respects, be deceived
themselves, and, in other respects, cannot be thought to
have intended to impose upon the world ; yet it will not
follow, that their general testimony is to be believed, though
truly handed down to us : because they might still in part,
i. e. in other respects, be deceived themselves, and in part
also designedly impose upon others ; which, it is added, is
a thing very credible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm,
and real knavery, to be met with in the same characters.
And, I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained
in this observation upon mankind is not to be denied ; and
that somewhat very much akin to it is often supposed in
scripture as a very common case, and most severely reproved 2.
But it were to have been expected, that persons capable of
applying this observation as applied in the objection, might
also frequently have met with the like mixed character, in
1 In estimating what Butler of an individual, where detection
here says of the effect of partial of untruth in a part is held
untruth, we must bear in mind to render the whole unavailable
that we are dealing with the case for carrying penal consequences
of statements supposed to be made home.
in the general interests, where the 2 As in the case of Balaam. fSee
subject to be elucidated is truth Serm. vii, on Balaam, and Serm.
at large ; and not with evidence x, on Self-Deceit,
hostile to the life and property
§§ i6-i8] FOR CHRISTIANITY 259
instances where religion was quite out of the case. The
thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued with
reason, or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and
falsehood ; and as naturally they are endued with veracity,
or a regard to truth in what they say : but from many
occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and biassed and
deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive
others, in eveiy different degree : insomuch that, as we are
all liable to be deceived by prejudice, so likewise it seems to
be not an uncommon thing, for persons, who, from their
regard to truth, would not invent a lie entirely without any
foundation at all, to propagate it with heightening circum-
stances1, after it is once invented and set a-going. And
others, though they would not propagate a lie, yet, which is
a lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contra-
diction. But, notwithstanding all this, human testimony
remains still a natural ground of assent ; and this assent
a natural principle of action.
§ 1 7. No proof that danyer here is more than ordinary.
It is objected further, that however it has happened, the
fact is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely
deluded with pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is
by no means to be admitted, that they have been oftener, or
are at all more liable to be deceived by these pretences, than
by others.
§ 18. Nor does failure of like evidence in other cases prove
this evidence fabulous. .
It is added, that there is a veiy considerable degree of
historical evidence for miracles, which are, on all hands,
acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose there were even
the tike historical evidence for these, to what there is for
those alleged in proof of Christianity, which yet is in no
1 Evidently we must under- falsify. And, again, the reticence
.stand this to 'refer to incidental glanced at can only apply to
exaggeration : not to what is sys- secondary matters, or it might
tematic, which would go far to totally falsify*
S 2
260 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
wise allowed, but suppose this ; the consequence would not
be, that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted.
Nor is there a man in the world, who, in common cases,
would conclude thus. For what would such a conclusion
really amount to but this, that evidence, confuted by con-
trary evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys the
credibility of other evidence, neither confuted, nor over-
balanced? To argue, that because there is, if there were,
like evidence from testimony, for miracles acknowledged
false, as for those in attestation of Christianity, therefore
the evidence in the latter case is not to be credited ; this is
the same as to argue, that if two men of equally good
reputation had given evidence in different cases 110 way
connected, and one of them had been convicted of perjury,
this confuted the testimony of the other.
§ 19. Testimony always Halle to be weakened without bciiuj
destroyed.
Upon the whole then, the general observation that human
creatures are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in
religion, and principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common
matters, and in both from negligence ; and that they are so
capable of dishonestly endeavouring to deceive others ; this
does indeed weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases,
but does not destroy it in any. And these things will
appear, to different men, to weaken tho evidence of testi-
mony, in different degrees : in degrees proportionable to
the observations they have made, or the notions they have
any way taken up, concerning the weakness and negligence
and dishonesty of mankind ; or concerning the powers of
enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But it seems
to me, that people do not know what they say, who affirm
these things to destroy the evidence from testimony, which
we have of the truth of Christianity. Nothing can destroy
the evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof or
probability, that persons are not competent judges of the
facts to which they give testimony ; or that they are actually
under some indirect influence in giving it, in such particular
§§ i9-2i] FOR CHRISTIANITY 261
case. Till this be made out, the natural laws of human
actions require, that testimony be admitted. It can never
be sufficient to overthrow direct historical evidence, in-
dolently to say, that there are so many principles, from
whence men are liable to be deceived themselves and dis-
posed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, that
one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising persons
can help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking sup-
poses they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the
evidence, of which they speak thus ; or that they can avoid
observing, if they do make this reflection, that it is, on such
a subject, a very material one *'.
§ 20. Liability to error, how reduced in the Christian
witnesses.
And over against all these objections is to be set the
importance of Christianity, as what must have engaged the
attention of its first converts, so as to have rendered them
less liable to be deceived from carelessness, than they would
in common matters ; and likewise the strong obligations to
veracity, which their religion laid them under : so that the
first and most obvious presumption is, that they could not
be deceived themselves, nor would deceive others. And
this presumption, in this degree, is peculiar to the testimony
we have been considering.
§ 21. The objector is bound in limine to abate his
objections.
In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and
have an air of positiveness, which sometimes is not very
easy : yet they are necessary, and necessary to be repeated ;
in order to connect a discourse, and distinctly to lay before
the view of the reader, what is proposed to be proved, and
what is left as proved. Now the conclusion from the fore-
going observations is, I think, beyond all doubt, this : that
unbelievers must be forced to admit the external evidence
for Christianity, i. e. the proof of miracles wrought to attest
f See the foregoing chapter.
262 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn.
it, to be of real weight and very considerable ; though they
cannot allow it to be sufficient, to convince them of the
reality of those miracles. And as they must, in all reason,
admit this ; so it seems to me, that upon consideration they
would, in fact, admit it ; those of them, I mean, who know
any thing at all of the matter : in like manner as persons,
in many cases, own they see strong evidence from testimony,
for the truth of things, which yet they cannot be convinced
are true : cases, suppose, where there is contrary testimony :
or things which they think, whether with or without reason,
to be incredible. But there is no testimony contrary to
that which we have been considering : and it has been fully
proved, that there is no incredibility in Christianity in
general, or in any part of it.
§ 22. (B) In prophecy, the parts understood are not
Impaired by those not understood.
[II.] As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy,
I shall only make some few general observations, which are
suggested by the analogy of nature ; i. e. by the acknow-
ledged natural rules of judging in common matters, concern-
ing evidence of a like kind to this from prophecy.
[i.] The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a
prophecy does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of
foresight, arising from the appearing completion of those
other parts which are understood. For the case is evidently
the same, as if those parts, which are not understood, were
lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown tongue.
Whether this observation be commonly attended to or not,
it is so evident, that one can scarce bring oneself to set
down an instance in common matters, to exemplify it.
However, suppose a writing, partly in cypher, and partly in
plain words at length ; and that in the part one understood,
there appeared mention of several known facts : it would
never come into any man's thoughts to imagine, that if he
understood the whole, perhaps he might find, that those
facts were not in reality known by the writer. Indeed, both
in this example and the thing intended to be exemplified by
§§22-24] FOR CHRISTIANITY 263
it, our not understanding the whole (the whole, suppose, of
a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion a
doubt, whether one understood the literal meaning of such
a part : but this comes under another consideration.
§ 23. Why general fulfilment, short of absolute, may
suffice.
For the same reason, though a man should be incapable,
for want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from
not having turned his studies this way, even so much as to
judge, whether particular prophecies have been throughout
completely fulfilled ; yet he may see, in general, that they
have been fulfilled to such a degree, as, upon very good
ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in
such prophecies, and of such events being intended by them,
For the same reason also, though, by means of the deficien-
cies in civil history, and the different accounts of historians,
the most learned should not be able to make out to satis-
faction, that such parts of the prophetic history have been
minutely and throughout fulfilled ; yet a very strong proof
of foresight may arise, from that general completion of
them, which is made out : as much proof of foresight,
perhaps, as the giver of prophecy intended should ever be
afforded by such parts of prophecy.
§ 24. Applicability is to be presumed intentional.
[2.] A long series of prophecy being applicable to such
and such events, is itself a proof that it was intended of
them : as the rules, by which we naturally judge and deter-
mine, in common cases parallel to this, will show. This
observation I make in answer to the common objection
against the application of the prophecies, that, considering
each of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear,
that they were intended of those particular events to which
they are applied by Christians ; and therefore it is to be
supposed, that, if they meant any thing, they were intended
of other events unknown to us, and not of these at all,
264 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
§ 25. Is taJien as proving intention in writings,
(a) mythological, (b) satirical.
Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great
resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the matter before
us : the mythological *, and the satirical, where the satire is,
to a certain degree, concealed. And a man might be assured,
that he understood what an author intended by a fable or
parable, related without any application or moral, merely
from seeing it to be easily capable of such application, and
that such a moral might naturally be deduced from it. And
he might be fully assured, that such persons and events
were intended in a satirical writing, merely from its being
applicable to them. And, agreeably to the last observation,
he might be in a good measure satisfied of it, though he
were not enough informed in affairs, or in the stoiy of such
persons, to understand half the satire. For, his satisfaction,
that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of
these writings, would be greater or less in proportion as he
saw the general turn of them to be capable of such applica-
tion : and in proportion to the number of particular things
capable of it. And thus, if a long series of prophecy is
applicable to the present state of the church, and to the
political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some
thousand years after these prophecies were delivered, and
a long series of prophecy delivered before the coming of
Christ is applicable to him ; these things are in themselves
a proof, that the prophetic history was intended of him, and
of those events : in proportion as the general turn of it is
capable of such application, and to the number and variety
of particular prophecies capable of it. And though, in all
just way of consideration, the appearing completion of pro-
phecies is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of, and to
determine their meaning ; yet it is to be remembered
further, that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to
a Messiah before his coming, in much the s:ime manner as
1 The word is used by Butler as relating not to mythology, but to
fable.
§§ 25-27] FOR CHRISTIANITY 265
Christians do now: and that the primitive Christians inter-
preted the prophecies respecting the state of the church and
of the world in the last ages, in the sense which the event
seems to confirm and verify. And from these things it may
be made appear :
§ 26. Intentional, lint not necessarily with the uttercr,
[3.] That the showing even to a high probability, if that
could be, that the prophets thought of some other events,
in such and such predictions, and not those at all which
Christians allege to be completions of those predictions ; or
that such and such prophecies are capable of being applied
to other events than those, to which Christians apply them
—that this would not confute or destroy the force of the
argument from prophecy, even with regard to those very
instances. For, observe how this matter really is. If one
knew such a person to be the sole author of such a book,
and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree, that
one knew the whole of what he intended in it ; one should
be assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew the
whole meaning of that book : for the meaning of a book is
nothing but the meaning of the author. But if one knew
a person to have compiled a book out of memoirs, which he
received from another, of vastly superior knowledge in the
subject of it, especially if it were a book full of great
intricacies and difficulties ; it would in no wise follow, that
one knew the whole meaning of the book, from knowing
the whole meaning of the compiler : for the original memoirs,
i. e. the author of them, might have, and there would be no
degree of presumption, in many cases, against supposing him
to have, some further meaning than the compiler saw.
§ 27. But with the Inspirer.
To say then, that the scriptures and the things contained
in them can have no other or further meaning than those
persons thought or had, who first recited or wrote them ;
is evidently saying, that those persons were the original,
proper, and sole authors of those books, i. e. that they are
266 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
not inspired : which is absurd, whilst the authority of these
books is under examination ; i. e. till you have determined
they are of no divine authority at all. Till this be deter-
mined, it must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that
they have, for this is taking for granted that they are
inspired, but that they may have, some further meaning
than what the compilers saw or understood. And upon this
supposition, it is supposable also, that this further meaning
may be fulfilled. Now events corresponding to prophecies,
interpreted in a different meaning from that, in which the
prophets are supposed to have understood them ; this affords,
in a manner, the same proof, that this different sense was
originally intended, as it would have afforded, if the pro-
phets had not understood their predictions in the sense it is
supposed they did : because there is no presumption of their
sense of them being the whole sense of them. And it has
been already shown, that the apparent completions of pro-
phecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning.
So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy has
been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, i. e. in any real, sense
of the words of it. For such completion is equally a proof
of foresight more than human, whether the prophets are, or
are not, supposed to have understood it in a different sense.
I say, supposed : for, though I think it clear, that the
prophets did not understand the full meaning of their pre-
dictions ; it is another question, how far they thought they
did, and in what sense they understood them.
§ 28. Merely proving capability of some oilier interpretation
is wasted labour.
Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons
busy themselves, who endeavour to prove, that the pro-
phetic history is applicable to events of the age in which it
was written, or of ages before it. Indeed to have proved
this before there was any appearance of a further completion
of it, might have answered some purpose ; for it might have
prevented the expectation of any such further completion.
Thus could Porphyry have shown, that some principal parts
§28] 7^07? CHRISTIANITY 267
of the Book of Daniel, for instance, the seventh verse of the
seventh chapter, which the Christians interpreted of the latter
ages, was applicable to events, which happened before or
about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes ; this might have
prevented them from expecting any further completion of
it. And, unless there was then, as I think there must have
been, external evidence concerning that book, more than is
come down to us ; such a discovery might have been
a stumbling-block in the way of Christianity itself: con-
sidering the authority which our Saviour has given to the
Book of Daniel1, and how much the general scheme of
Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even this
discovery, had there been any such*, would be of very
little weight with reasonable men now ; if this passage,
thus applicable to events before the age of Porphyry, appears
to be applicable also to events, which succeeded the dissolu-
tion of the Roman empire. I mention this, not at. all as
intending to insinuate, that the division of this empire into
ten parts, for it plainly was divided into about that number,
were, alone and by itself, of any moment in verifying the
prophetic history : but only as an example of the thing
I am speaking of. And thus upon the whole, the matter
of inquiry evidently must be, as above put, Whether the
prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state
of the world and of the church ; applicable in such a degree,
as to imply foresight : not whether they are capable of any
e It appears, that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this
way. For Jerome on the place says, Duas poster iores bestias in uno
Macedonnm regno ponit. And as to the ten kings ; Decem reges enumerat,
qui fuerunt saevissimi : ipsosque reges non unius ponit regni, verbi gratia,
Macedoniae, Syrian, Asiae, et Aegypti ; seel de diversis regnis unum efficit reguni,
ordinem. And in this way of interpretation, any thing may be made
of any thing.
1 St. Matt. xxiv. 15 ; St. Mark marked with a rather peculiar
xiii. 14. Two reports of the same solemnity, as in each case we find
incident: 'the abomination of appended to it the words, <who-
desolation, spoken of by Daniel so readeth, let him understand'
the prophet, standing in the holy (Matt.); 'let him that readeth
place.' Our Lord's reference is understand' (Mark).
268 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [IT. VII.
other application ; though I know no pretence for saying the
general turn of them is capable of any other.
§ 29. Men shrink from laborious inquiries ivith indeterminate
result; prefer summary rejection.
These observations are, I think, just ; and the evidence
referred to in them real : though there may be people who
will not accept of such imperfect information from scripture.
Some too have not integrity and regard enough to truth, to
attend to evidence, which keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps
perplexity, arid which is much of a different sort from what
they expected. And it plainly requires a degree of modesty
and fairness, beyond what every one has, for a man to say,
not to the world, but to himself, that there is a real appear-
ance of somewhat of great weight in this matter, though he
is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it ; but it
shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its
appearing reality and weight. It is much more easy, and
more falls in with the negligence, presumption, and wilful-
ness of the generality, to determine at once, with a decisive
air, There is nothing in it. The prejudices arising from
that absolute contempt and scorn, with which this evidence
is treated in the world, I do not mention. For what indeed
can be said to persons, who are weak enough in their under-
standings to think this any presumption against it; or, if
they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper to be
influenced by such prejudices, upon such a subject?
§ 30. The evidence, (a) direct, and (b) circumstantial to be
iceighed as a whole.
I shall now, secondly, endeavour to give some account of
the general argument for the truth of Christianity, consist-
ing both of the direct and circumstantial evidence, considered
as making up one argument. Indeed to state and examine
this argument fully, would be a work much beyond the
compass of this whole Treatise : nor is so much as a proper
abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet the present
subject requires to have some brief account of it given.
§§29-3'] FOR CHRISTIANITY 269
For it is the kind of evidence, upon which most questions
of difficulty, in common practice, are determined : evidence
arising from various coincidences, which support and confirm
each other, and in this manner prove, with more or less
certainty, the point under consideration. And I choose to
do it also : first, because it seems to be of the greatest
importance, and not duly attended to by every one, that the
proof of revelation is, not some direct and express things
only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also ; and
that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is
indeed to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards
to be joined together; for that the proper force of the
evidence consists in the result of those several things, con-
sidered in their respects to each other, and united into one
view : and in the next place, because it seems to me, that
the matters of fact here set down, which are acknowledged
by unbelievers, must be acknowledged by them also to
contain together a degree of evidence of great weight, if
they could be brought to lay these several things before
themselves distinctly, and then with attention consider
them together ; instead of that cursory thought of them, to
which we are familiarized. For being familiarized to the
cursory thought of things as really hinders the weight of
them from being seen, as from having its due influence upon
practice.
§ 31. Ocer ami above our reason and affections, God has
given its (a) natural religion ; and, further,
The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be
inquired into, is this : That over and above our reason and
affections, which God has given us for the information of our
judgment and the conduct of our lives, he has also, by
external revelation, given us an account of himself and his
moral government over the world, implying a future state of
rewards and punishments ; i.e. hath revealed the system of
natural religion: for natural religion may be externally11
h Sup. II. i. 5, 6 ; also ii. 10.
270 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it by man-
kind their fellow-creatures :
§ 32. (b) A revealed dispensation for the recovery of
mankind.
That God, I say, has given us the evidence of revelation,
as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this moral
system ; together with an account of a particular dispensa-
tion of Providence, which reason could no way have
discovered, and a particular institution of religion founded
on it, for the recovery of mankind out of their present
wretched condition, and raising them to the perfection and
final happiness of their nature.
§ 33. This revelation atone stands upon matters of fact,
(a) past, or (b) alleged in the future.
This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be con*
sidered as wholly historical *. For prophecy is nothing but
the history of events before they come to pass : doctrines
also are matters of fact : and precepts come under the same
notion. And the general design of scripture, which contains
in it this revelation, thus considered as historical, may be
said to be, to give us an account of the world, in this one
single view, as God's world : by which it appears essentially
distinguished from all other books, so far as I have found,
except such as are copied from it. It begins with an account
of God's creation of the world, in order to ascertain, and
distinguish from all others, who is the object of our worship,
by what he has done : in order to ascertain, who he is,
concerning whose providence, commands, promises, and
1 The connection of Christianity of the common experience of man-?
with fact is one of its most dis- kind. Thus the recorded facts
tinctive characteristics. In one become a guarantee for those not
sense ' doctrines are matters of yet recorded. It is in quite another
fact ' ; but the great bulk of essen- sense that, e. g., the freedom of the
tial Christian doctrine, as set will, or the Calvinian doctrine of
forth in the Apostles' Creed, rests reprobation, may be handled as
on matters of fact already past, matters of fact,
and subjected to the testing power
§? 32, 33J FOR CHRISTIANITY 27!
threatening^ this sacred book, all along, treats ; the Maker
and Proprietor of the world, he whose creatures we are, the
God of nature : in order likewise to distinguish him from
the idols of the nations, which are either imaginary beings,
i. e. no beings at all ; or else part of that creation, the
historical relation of which is here given '. And St. John,
not improbably, with an eye to this Mosaic account of the
creation, begins his gospel with an account of our Saviour's
pre-existence, and that all things ivere made \)y him ; and
without him was not any thing made that ivas made * : agree-
ably to the doctrine of St. Paul, that God created all things
l)y Jesus Christ k. This being premised, the scripture, taken
together, seems to profess to contain a kind of an abridgment
of the history of the world, in the view just now mentioned :
that is, a general account of the condition of religion and its
professors, during the continuance of that apostasy from
God, and state of wickedness, which it every where supposes
the world to lie in. And this account of the state of religion
carries with it some brief account of the political state of
things, as religion is aifected by it. Revelation indeed con-
siders the common affairs of this world, and what is going
on in it, as a mere scene of distraction ; and cannot be
supposed to concern itself with foretelling at what time
Rome, or Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should
be the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissolute-
ness, which all places equally aspire to be ; cannot, I say, be
supposed to give any account of this wild scene for its own
sake. But it seems to contain some very general account
of the chief governments of the world, as the general state of
religion has been, is, or shall be, affected by them, from the
first transgression, and during the whole interval of the
1 John i. 3. k Eph. iii. 9.
1 There seems now to be little Creator and Redeemer : to which
room for doubt that the greater we may add (a) impersonations of
gods of the ancient religions are the abstract or of external nature,
to a large extent deteriorated and (6) deifications of the deceased,
corrupted reproductions of the (c) personified conceptions of the
original divine idea; as to both evil agent or agents.
272 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. Vll.
world's continuing in its present state, to a certain future
period, spoken of both in the Old and New Testament, very
distinctly, and in great variety of expression : The times of
the restitution of all things1 : when the mystery of God shall be
finished, as he hath declared to his servants the prophets ** i
when the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom, which shall
never l>c destroyed : and the kingdom shall not be left to other
people ", as it is represented to be during this apostasy, but
judgment shall le given to the saints0, and they shall reign v :
and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom
under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints
of the Most High^.
§ 34. That in so long a time it has not been confuted,
gives a presumption that it cannot be.
Upon this general view of the scripture, I would remark,
how great a length of time the whole relation takes up, near
six thousand years 1 of which are past : and how great
a variety of things it treats of; the natural and moral
system or history of the world, including the time when
it was formed, all contained in the veiy first book, and
evidently written in a rude and unlearned age ; and in
1 Acts iii. 21. in Kev. x. 7. " Dan. ii. 44.
0 Dan. vii. 22. P Rev. xxii. 5. « Dan. vii. 27.
1 Obviously to be taken as an which are as old as, or older than.
obiter dictum, which assumes the Christianity. We are dealing
popular and most accepted chrono- here with presumption only. But
•logy, that of the Hebrew text, but even as to presumption the case
is not to be construed as an is by no means parallel. For (i)
authoritative judgment upon the Christianity has stimulated the
age of the world in its present forces and faculties of human
condition. There seems, however, nature into an effective vitality
to be no tendency in scientific and activity quite unknown under
opinion to any wholesale or vast other now current religions. (2)
extension of the term. Butler's It has been the only religion
argument in no way demands an which has constantly practised
exact specification. aggression, and this as a rule by
From another point of view, legitimate, that is to say by non-
this passage is open to the remark coercive, means : and has thus
that the favourable presumption delivered a perpetual challenge
applies to other religions also, to all other creeds.
§§34~35] FOR CHRISTIANITY 273
subsequent books, the various common and prophetic history,
and the particular dispensation of Christianity. Now all
this together gives the largest scope for criticism ; and for
confutation of what is capable of being confuted, either from
reason, or from common history, or from any inconsistence
in its several parts. And it is a thing which deserves,
I think, to be mentioned, that whereas some imagine the
supposed doubtfulness of the evidence for revelation implies
a positive argument that it is not true ; it appears, on the
contrary, to imply a positive argument that it is true. For,
could any common relation, of such antiquity, extent, and
variety, (for in these things the stress of what I am now
observing lies, ) be proposed to the examination of the world :
that it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be
confuted, or shown to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction
of reasonable men ; this would be thought a strong pre-
sumptive proof of its truth. And indeed it must be a proof
of it, just in proportion to the probability, that if it were
false, it might be shown to be so : and this, I think, is
scarce pretended to be shown, but upon principles and in
ways of arguing, which have been clearly obviated1". Nor
does it at all appear, that any set of men who believe
natural religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has
been thus confuted. But to proceed :
§ 35. TJie Old Testament gives a detailed history of
God's covenant with the Jews;
Together with the moral system of the world, the Old
Testament contains a chronological account of the beginning
of it, and from thence, an unbroken genealogy of mankind
for many ages before common history begins ; and carried
on as much further as to make up a continued thread of
history of the length of between three and four thousand
years. It contains an account of God's making a covenant
with a particular nation, that they should be his people, and
he would be their God, in a peculiar sense ; of his often
interposing miraculously in their affairs ; giving them the
r Chap, ii, iii, &c.
VOL. I. T
274 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
promise, and, long after, the possession, of a particular
country ; assuring them of the greatest national prosperity
in it, if they would worship him, in opposition to the idols
which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his com-
mands ; and threatening them with unexampled punish-
ments, if they disobeyed him, and fell into the general
idolatry ; insomuch that this one nation should continue to
be the observation and the wonder of all the world.
§ 36. Threat of dispersion, and promise of restoration ;
It declares particularly, that God would scatter them among
all people, from one end of the earth unto the other : but that
when they should return unto the Lord their God, he icould
have compassion upon them, and gather them from all the
nations, whither he had scattered them : that Israel should l)C
saved in the Lord, with an everlasting salvation ; and not he
ashamed or confounded ivorld without end. And as some of
these promises are conditional, others are as absolute, as any
thing can be expressed : that the time should come, when
the people should he all righteous, and inherit the land for ever :
that though God ivould make a full end of all nations whither he
had scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of them :
that he ivould bring again the captivity of his people Israel, and
plant them upon their land, and they should he no more pulled
up out of their land : that the seed of Israel should not cease
from being a nation for ever s.
§ 37. It predicts a Messiah ;
It foretells, that God would raise them up a particular
person, in whom all his promises should finally be fulfilled ;
the Messiah, who should be, in an high and eminent sense,
their anointed Prince and Saviour. This was foretold in
such a manner, as raised a general expectation of such
a person in the nation, as appears from the New Testament,
and is an acknowledged fact ; an expectation of his coming
s Deut. xxviii. 64, xxx. 2, 3; Isa. xlv. 17, Ix. 21; Jer. xxx. u,
xlvi. 28 ; Amos ix. 14, 15 ; Jer. xxxi. 36.
§§ 36-39]
FOR CHRISTIANITY
275
at such a particular time before any one appeared claiming
to be that person, and when there was no ground for such
an expectation but from the prophecies : which expectation,
therefore, must in all reason be presumed to be explanatory
of those prophecies, if there were any doubt about their
meaning. It seems moreover to foretell, that this person
should be rejected by that nation, to whom he had been
so long promised, and though he was so much desired by
them t.
§ 38. And a redemption reaching far beyond the
Jeivish race.
And it expressly foretells, that he should be the Saviour
of the Gentiles ; and even that the completion of the
scheme, contained in this book, and then begun, and in its
progress, should be somewhat so great, that, in comparison
with it, the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of
small account. It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my
servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the
preserved of Israel : I will also give thee for a light to the
Gentiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto the end of
the earth. And, In the last days, the mountain of the Lord's
house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall
be exalted above the hills ; and all nations shall flow into it
for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord
from Jerusalem. And he shall judge among the nations
and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day, and the idols he
shall utterly abolish ".
§ 39. Messiah ivas expected ; came ; and fulfilled his mission.
The scripture further contains an account, that at the
time the Messiah was expected, a person rose up, in this
nation, claiming to be that Messiah, to be the person, whom
4 Isa. viii. 14, 15, xlix. 5, ch. liii ; Mai. i. 10, n, and ch. iii.
" Isa. xlix. 6, ch. ii, ch. xi, ch. Ivi. 7; Mai. i. n. To which must
be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, Add other pro-
several in the New Testament, and very many in pheciesfrom botk
the Old ; which describe what shall be the com- Testaments.
pletion of the revealed plan of Providence.
T 2
276 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
all the prophecies referred to, and in whom they should
centre : that he spent some years in a continued course of
miraculous works ; and endued his immediate disciples and
followers with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the
truth of that religion, which he commissioned them to
publish : that, invested with this authority and power, they
made numerous converts in the remotest countries, and
settled and established his religion- in the world ; to the end
of which, the scripture professes to give a prophetic account
of the state of this religion amongst mankind.
§ 40. Suppose an inquirer, at first vieiv :
Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history,
to have all this related to him out of the scripture. Or
suppose such an one, having the scripture put into his
hands, to remark these things in it, not knowing but that
the whole, even its civil history, as well as the other parts
of it, might be, from beginning to end, an entire invention ;
and to ask, What truth was in it, and whether the revelation
here related wras real, or a fiction ? And, instead of a direct
answer, suppose him, all at once, to be told the following
confessed facts ; and then to unite them into one view.
i
§ 41. Finds (a) lioiv much of the force of natural religion
is clue to scripture :
Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession
and establishment of natural religion, the belief that there is
one God to be worshipped, that virtue is his law, and that
mankind shall be rewarded and punished hereafter, as they
obey and disobey it here ; in how very great a degree, I say,
the profession and establishment of this moral system in the
world is owing to the revelation, whether real or supposed,
contained in this book : the establishment of this moral
system, even in those countries which do not acknowledge
the proper authority of the scripture x.
Sup, II. vi. 5.
§§ 40-44] FOR CHRISTIANITY 277
•
§ 42. (b) That the establishment of Christianity is the
greatest event in history.
Let him be told also, what number of nations do acknow-
ledge its proper authority. Let him then take in the
consideration, of what importance religion is to mankind.
And upon these things he might, I think, truly observe,
that this supposed revelation's obtaining and being received
in the world, with all the circumstances and effects of it,
considered together as one event, is the most conspicuous
and important event in the story of mankind : that a book
of this nature, and thus promulged and recommended to our
consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to
have its claims most seriously examined into : and that,
before such examination, to treat it with any kind of scoffing
and ridicule, is an offence against natural piety.
§ 43. (But revelation imports no disparagement to any proof
from reason.)
But it is to be remembered, that how much soever the
establishment of natural religion in the world is owing to
the scripture-revelation, this does not destroy the proof of
religion from reason ; any more than the proof of Euclid's
Elements is destroyed, by a man's knowing or thinking, that
he should never have seen the truth of the several proposi-
tions contained in it, nor had those propositions come into
his thoughts, but for that mathematician.
§44. (c) The antiquity of scripture; (d) its corroborations ;
Let such a person as we are speaking of, be, in the next
place, informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first
parts of this book : and that its chronology, its account of
the time when the earth, and the several parts of it, were
first peopled with human creatures, is no way contradicted,
but is really confirmed, by the natural and civil history of
the world, collected from common historians, from the state
278 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
of the earth, and from the late invention of arts and sciences1.
And as the scripture contains an unbroken thread of common
and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, for
between three and four thousand years : let the person we
are speaking of be told, in the next place, that this general
history, as it is not contradicted, but is confirmed by profane
history as much as there would be reason to expect, upon
supposition of its truth ; so there is nothing in the whole
history itself, to give any reasonable ground of suspicion of
its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally true
genealogy of men, and series of things.
§45. (e) Its selfaongruity.
I speak here only of the common scripture-history, or of
the course of ordinary events related in it ; as distinguished
from miracles, and from the prophetic history. In all the
scripture-narrations of this kind, following events arise out
of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There appears
nothing related as done in any age, not conformable to the
manners of that age : nothing in the account of a succeeding
age, which, one would say, could not be true, or was improb-
able, from the account of things in the preceding one. There
is nothing in the characters, which would raise a thought of
their being feigned ; but all the internal marks imaginable
of their being real.
1 This confirmation has been with by the discovery of the geo-
immensely enlarged sines Butler logic man ; for there seems to be
wrote, for monuments and scieu- no reason for associating him
tific results are histories. How- with the Adamic race, jind much
ever, while in itse'.f a most solid reason, perhaps some of it pos-
and weighty fact, it is not exact *ibly derived from scripture, to
and particular on behalf of the assume the existence of other
Hebrew chronology, or of any of races of men, some of them per-
the three competing chronologies haps less perfect or less capable
of the Old Testament : but it con- of perfection.
firms the Old Testament history It is needless to dwell upon the
in its basis, from which we learn marked concurrence between the
that the history of the Adamic belief now generally received as
race is confined to a very few to the origin of our solar system,
millennia before the Advent. This and the general framework of the
proposition is in no way interfered first chapter of Genesis.
§§ 45-48] FOR CHRISTIANITY 279
§ 46. (f) Its neutrality as to ornament : its frank encountering
of facts.
It is to be added also, that mere genealogies, bare narra-
tives of the number of years, which persons called by such
and such names lived, do not carry the face of fiction ;
perhaps do carry some presumption of veracity : and all
unadorned narratives, which have nothing to surprise, may
be thought to carry somewhat of the like presumption
too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly
credible.
§ 47. (It has strange incidents ; as have most lives, or many ;
but nothing to destroy credit.)
There may be incidents in scripture, which, taken alone
in the naked way they are told, may appear strange ;
especially to persons of other manners, temper, education :
but there are also incidents of undoubted truth, in many or
most persons' lives, which, in the same circumstances, would
appear to the full as strange. There may be mistakes of
transcribers, there may be other real or seeming mistakes,
not easy to be particularly accounted for : but there are
certainly no more things of this kind in the scripture, than
what were to have been expected in books of such antiquity ;
and nothing, in any wise, sufficient to discredit the general
narrative.
§ 48. (g) Divers points : and hoiv. in scripture, proof of the
common goes to support the miraculous.
Now, that a history, claiming to commence from the
creation, and extending in one continued series, through so
great a length of time, and variety of events, should have
such appearances of reality and truth in its whole contexture,
is surely a very remarkable circumstance in its favour. And
as all this is applicable to the common history of the New
Testament, so there is a further credibility, and a very high
one, given to it by profane authors : many of these writing
of the same times, and confirming the truth of customs and
280 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vil.
events which are incidentally as well as more purposely
mentioned in it1. And this credibility of the common
scripture-history, gives some credibility to its miraculous
history : especially as this is interwoven with the common,
so as that they imply each other, and both together make up
one relation.
§ 49. (h) Add the grand sign, viz. the Jews, a nationality
dependent on belief.
Let it then be more particularly observed to this person,
that it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed
implied in the foregoing observation, that there was such
a nation as the Jews, of the greatest antiquity, whose govern-
ment and general polity was founded on the law, here
related to be given them by Moses as from heaven : that
natural religion, though with rites additional yet no way
contrary to it, was their established religion, which cannot
be said of the Gentile world : and that their very being as
a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment of one God,
the God of the universe. For, "suppose in their captivity in
Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of their con-
querors, there would have remained no bond of union, to
keep them a distinct people. And whilst they were under
their own kings, in their own country, a total apostasy from
God would have been the dissolution of their whole govern-
ment. They, in such a sense, nationally acknowledged and
worshipped the Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of
the world were sunk in idolatry, as rendered them, in fact,
the peculiar people of God. And this so remarkable an
establishment and preservation of natural religion '2 amongst
them, seems to add some peculiar credibility to the historical
evidence for the miracles of Moses and the prophets :
1 This appears to be included in eludes in natural religion. But
the prior allegation, § 44. with this deduction, not only was
2 The expression seems not the Jewish religion a manifesta-
absolutely correct, because the tion of natural religion ; but it is
religion of the Jews in no way the only one known to history;
rested upon future rewards and which is rarely borne in mind. '
punishments, which Butler in-
§§49-51] FOR CHRISTIANITY 281
because these miracles are a full satisfactory account of
this event, which plainly wants to be accounted for, and
cannot otherwise.
§ 50. (i) Then the advent of the Messiah and rapid
rooting of his religion ;
Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be
acquainted further, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of
Jewish extraction, rose up at the time when this nation,
from the prophecies above mentioned, expected the Messiah :
that he was rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold he
should, by the body of the people, under the direction of
their rulers : that in the course of a very few years, he was
believed on and acknowledged as the promised Messiah, by
great numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the pro-
phecies of scripture, yet not upon the evidence of prophecy,
but of miracles y, of which miracles we also have strong
historical evidence ; (by which I mean here no more than
must be acknowledged by unbelievers ; for let pious frauds
and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they
destroy, our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of
Christianity55:) that this religion approving itself to the
reason of mankind, and carrying its own evidence with it,
so far as reason is a judge of its system, and being no way
contrary to reason, in those parts of it which require to be
believed upon the mere authority of its Author ; that this
religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself, for
some hundred years, not only without any assistance from
temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and
often the bitterest persecutions from it ; and then became
the religion of the world.
§51. (k) With the dispersion and standing isolation of
the Jews ;
That in the mean time, the Jewish nation and government
were destroyed, in a very remarkable manner, and the
people carried away captive and dispersed through the most
Sup. §§ 7, 8. z Sup. §§ 18 sqq.
282 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
distant countries ; in which state of dispersion they have
remained fifteen hundred years : and that they remain a
numerous people, united amongst themselves, and distin-
guished from the rest of the world, as they were in the days
of Moses, by the profession of his law ; and eveiy where
looked upon in a manner, which one scarce knows how
distinctly to express, but in the words of the prophetic
account of it, given so many ages before it came to pass ;
Thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb, and a byword,
among all nations tvhither the Lord shall lead thce a.
§ 52. Insufficiency accounted for as a mere fact, by
secondary provisions.
The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews re-
maining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the
confirmation which this event appears to give to the truth
of revelation, may be thought to be answered, by their
religion's forbidding them intermarriages with those of any
other, and prescribing them a great many peculiarities in
their food, by which they are debarred from the means of
incorporating with the people in whose countries they live 1.
This is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that which it
pretends to account for. But what does it pretend to account
for? The correspondence between this event and the pro-
phecies ; or the coincidence of both, with a long dispensation
of Providence, of a peculiar nature, towards that people
formerly ? No. It is only the event itself, which is offered
to be thus accounted for ; which single event, taken alone,
abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence,
perhaps would not have appeared miraculous : but that cor-
respondence and coincidence may be so, though the event
itself be supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our Saviour's
Dent, xxviii. 37.
1 Now let us suppose that these from the original divine appoint-
prohibitions were sufficient to ment, so that the entire chain
account for the isolation. The of phenomena would hang, im-
argument perhaps would not be broken, upon that appointment.
weakened ; because they spring
; 53]
FOR CHRISTIANITY
283
being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of
prophecy and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous ;
the series of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the
event, being admitted : though the event itself, his birth at
that place, appears to have been brought about in a natural
way; of which, however, no one can be certain1.
§ 53. The part-fulfilment of historical prophecy seems
to foreshadow the entire,
And as several of these events seem, in some degree
expressly, to have verified the prophetic history already; so
likewise they may be considered further, as having a peculiar
aspect towards the full completion of it ; as affording some
presumption that the whole of it shall, one time or other,
be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have been so wonder-
fully preserved in their long and wide dispersion ; which is
indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now
mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat yet to
come : that natural religion came forth from Juda3a, and
spread, in the degree it has done over the world, before lost
in idolatry; which, together with some other things, have
distinguished that very place, in like manner as the people
of it are distinguished : that this great change of religion
over the earth was brought about under the profession and
acknowledgment, that Jesus was the promised Messiah :
things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious
men towards the full completion of the prophetic history,
concerning the final restoration of that people ; concerning
the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them,
the kingdom of the Messiah ; and the future state of the
world, under this sacred government. Such circumstances
and events, compared with these prophecies, though no
completions of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of
as nothing in the argument, by a person upon his first being
1 In this section, the word mi-
raculous appears to imply marked
adjustments in the order of na-
ture, but not any variance from
it ; differing from other places
where miracle does imply such,
a variance, either self-attested, by
the evidence of the human senses ;
or i as in the Incarnation) without
that kind of attestation
284 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
informed of them. They fall in with the prophetic history
of things still future, give it some additional credibility, have
the appearance of being somewhat in order to the full com-
pletion of it.
§ 54. For those capable of handling the question.
Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great
calmness and consideration, to be able to judge, thoroughly,
of the evidence for the truth of Christianity, from that part
of the prophetic history, which relates to the situation of
the kingdoms of the world, and to the state of the Church,
from the establishment of Christianity to the present time.
But it appears, from a general view of it, to be very material.
And those persons who have thoroughly examined it, and
some of them were men of the coolest tempers, greatest
capacities, and least liable to imputations of prejudice, insist
upon it as determinately conclusive \
§ 55. But also the many, large, and plain coincidences
ivill weigh much with any impartial mind:
Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first to
recollect the passages above mentioned out of scripture,
without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then
to be informed of the correspondent facts now mentioned,
and to unite them all into one view : that the profession
and establishment of natural religion in the world is greatly
owing, in different ways, to this book, and the supposed
revelation which it contains ; that it is acknowledged to be
of the earliest antiquity ; that its chronology and common
history are entirely credible ; that this ancient nation, the
Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, appear to have been, in
fact, the people of God, in a distinguished sense ; that, as
there was a national expectation amongst them, raised from
the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a time, so one
at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah ; that he
1 'Ho had probably in his mind Sir Isaac Newton and Dr. Clarke.' —
Fitzgerald.
§§54-5?] FOR CHRISTIANITY 285
was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles,
not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles ; that
the religion he taught supported itself under the greatest
difficulties, gained ground, and at length became the religion
of the world ; that in the mean time the Jewish polity was
utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the face of
the earth ; that notwithstanding this, they have remained
a distinct numerous people for so many centuries, even to
this day ; which not only appears to be the express com-
pletion of several prophecies concerning them, but also
renders it, as one may speak, a visible and easy possibility,
that the promises made to them as a nation, may yet be
fulfilled.
§ 56. Extending to facts beyond Jewish and Christian
history.
And to these acknowledged truths, let the person we
have been supposing add, as I think he ought, whether
every one will allow it or no, the obvious appearances which
there are, of the state of the world, in other respects besides
what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian Church,
having so long answered, and still answering to the pro-
phetic history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against
the things before mentioned out of the scripture, and
seriously compared with them ; the joint view of both
together must, I think, appear of very great weight to
a considerate reasonable person : of much greater indeed,
upon having them first laid before him, than is easy for us,
who are so familiarized to them, to conceive, without some
particular attention for that purpose.
§ 57. Even this rude sketch shoivs something more
than human;
All these things, and the several particulars contained
under them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly
examined into ; that the weight of each may be judged of,
upon such examination, and such conclusion drawn as
results from their united force. But this has not been
286 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII.
attempted here. I have gone no further than to show, that
the general imperfect view of them now given, the confessed
historical evidence for miracles, and the many obvious
appearing completions of prophecy, together with the col-
lateral things b here mentioned, and there are several others
of the like sort ; that all this together, which, being fact,
must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to real
evidence of somewhat more than human in this matter :
evidence much more important, than careless men, who
have been accustomed only to transient and partial views
of it, can imagine ; and indeed abundantly sufficient to act
upon. And these things, I apprehend, must be acknow-
ledged by unbelievers.
§ 58. And with claims upon unbelievers.
For though they may say, that the historical evidence of
miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, is not
sufficient to convince them that such miracles were really
wrought ; they cannot deny, that there is such historical
evidence, it being a known matter of fact that there is.
They may say, the conformity between the prophecies and
events is by accident : but there are many instances in
which such conformity itself cannot be denied. They may
say, with regard to such kind of collateral things as those
above mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without
meaning, will have a meaning found in them by fanciful
people : and that such as are fanciful in any one certain way,
will make out a thousand coincidences, which seem to favour
their peculiar follies.
§ 59. To competent judges, circumstantial evidence often as
strong as direct.
Men, I say, may talk thus : but no one who is serious,
can possibly think these things to be nothing, if he considers
the importance of collateral things, and even of lesser cir-
b All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible
to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of pro-
phecy. See sup. §§2 sqq.
§§ 58-6 1] FOR CHRISTIANITY 287
cumstances, in the evidence of probability, as distinguished,
in nature, from the evidence of demonstration. In many
cases indeed it seems to require the truest judgment, to
determine with exactness the weight of circumstantial
evidence 1 : but it is very often altogether as convincing, as
that which is the most express and direct.
§ 60. Serious men, taking aggregate account, will find a high
probable proof.
This general view of the evidence for Christianity, con-
sidered as making one argument, may also serve to
recommend to serious persons, to set down every thing
which they think may be of any real weight at all in proof
of it, and particularly the many seeming completions of
prophecy : and they will find, that, judging by the natural
rules, by which we judge of probable evidence in common
matters, they amount to a much higher degree of proof,
upon such a joint review, than could be supposed upon con-
sidering them separately, at different times ; how strong
soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such
separate views' of it. For probable proofs, by being added,
not only increase the evidence, but multiply it.
§ 6 1. And should examine which is the safest side.
Nor should I dissuade any one from setting down, what
he thought made for the contrary side. But then it is to
be remembered, not in order to influence his judgment, but
his practice, that a mistake on one side may be, in its con-
sequences, much more dangerous, than a mistake on the
other. And what course is most safe, and what most
dangerous, is a consideration thought very material, when
we deliberate, not concerning events, but concerning conduct
in our temporal aifairs. To be influenced by this considera-
tion in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is
1 Meaning in this place not according to the etymology of the
evidence from fact as opposed to word ; or col lateral evidence, which
evidence from testimony : but evi- evidently gives scope for largeness
dence from matter circumjacent, of view in the inquirer.
288 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. VII. §62-
indeed as much prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like
other prejudices, it operates contrary ways, in different
men ; for some are inclined to believe what they hope, and
others what they fear. And it is manifest unreasonableness
to apply to men's passions in order to gain their assent.
But in deliberations concerning conduct, there is nothing
which reason more requires to be taken into the account,
than the importance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what
would be the consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary
manner : still, that taking one side could be attended with
little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be
attended with the greatest, must appear, to unprejudiced
reason, of the highest moment towards determining, how we
are to act.
§ 62. The stress of our argument lies here : this cannot as
a whole (a) be accident, or (b) be otherwise set aside.
But the truth of our religion, like the truth of common
matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence taken
together. And unless the whole series of things which may
be alleged in this argument, and every particular thing in
it, can reasonably be supposed to have been by accident ;
(for here the stress of the argument for Christianity lies ;)
then is the truth of it proved : in like manner, as if in any
common case, numerous events acknowledged, were to be
alleged in proof of any other event disputed ; the truth of
the disputed event would be proved, not only if any one
of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly imply it, but,
though no one of them singly did so, if the whole of the
acknowledged events taken together could not in reason be
supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one were
true.
§ 63. Advantages given by attack in detail
It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this
evidence gives to those persons who attack Christianity,
especially in conversation. For it is easy to show, in a short
and lively manner, that such and such things are liable to
objection, that this and another thing is of little weight in
VIII. § i] FOR CHRISTIANITY 289
itself; but impossible to show, in like manner, the united
force of the whole argument in one view.
§ 64. Summary in three propositions.
However, lastly, as it has been made appear *, that there
is no presumption against a revelation as miraculous ; that
the general scheme of Christianity, and the principal parts of
it, are conformable to the experienced constitution of things,
and the whole perfectly credible : so the account now given
of the positive evidence for it, shows, that this evidence is
such, as, from the nature of it, cannot be destroyed, though
it should be lessened.
CHAPTER VIII.
OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST
ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE, TO
RELIGION.
§ i. Chief objections of thinking and unthinking men ;
TF every one would consider, with such attention as they
are bound, even in point of morality, to consider, what
they judge and give characters of ; the occasion of this
chapter would be, in some good measure at least, super-
seded. But since this is not to be expected ; for some we
find do not concern themselves to understand even what
they write against : since this Treatise, in common with
most others, lies open to objections, which may appear very
material to thoughtful men at first sight ; and, besides that,
seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can judge
without thinking, and of such as can censure without judging;
it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these objections
which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. And
they are such as these :
1 Especially in chapters ii, iv, v, vii.
VOL. I. U
290 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. VIII.
§ 2. (a) To the plan of meeting difficulties ~by showing the
like elsctvhere.
1 That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation,
by saying, that there are the same in natural religion ; when
what is wanting is to clear both of them of these their
common, as well as other their respective, difficulties ; but
that it is a strange way indeed of convincing men of the
obligations of religion, to show them, that they have as
little reason for their worldly pursuits : and a strange way
of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of
nature, and of removing the objections against both, to
which the system of religion lies open, to show, that the
like objections lie against natural providence ; a way of
answering objections against religion, without so much as
pretending to make out, that the system of it, or the particular
things in it objected against, are reasonable especially,
perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add, must this
be thought strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no
answer to such objections : that when this sort of reasoning
is carried to the utmost length it can be imagined capable
of, it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state :
and that it must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to
imagine they will be prevailed with to forego their present
interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful
evidence V
§ 3. Such pleas may partially affect considerate men.
Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that
appearance will be found in a great measure owing to half-
views, which show but part of an object, yet show that
indistinctly, and to undeterminate language. By these
means weak men are often deceived by others, and ludi-
1 No adversary or critic within himself to bring that argument
my knowledge has ever stated to a head :
the objections against Butler's i. I show you, on the basis of
argument with as much force as experience, what is true (§ 6) ;
Butler himself has given them 2. And, in the way of induce-
in this section. Also, he exerts ment, what is useful (§7).
§§2-6] ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION 291
crous men, by themselves. And even those, who are
serious and considerate, cannot always readily disentangle,
and at once clearly see through the perplexities, in which
subjects themselves are involved ; and which are heightened
by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter
sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this
objection severally, may be of some assistance ; as it may
also tend a little to stop and silence others.
§ 4. Removal of all difficulties would mean comprehension
of God's entire plan.
First, The thing wanted, i. e. what men require, is to
have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or, at least for
any thing we know to the contraiy, it may be, the same,
as requiring to comprehend the divine nature, and the
whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting.
§ 5. The method is one of regular use in common life.
But it hath always been allowed to argue, from what is
acknowledged, to what is disputed. And it is in no other
sense a poor thing, to argue from natural religion to revealed,
in the manner found fault with, than it is to argue in
numberless other ways of probable deduction and inference,
in matters of conduct, which we are continually reduced to
the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet poor may be
applied, I fear, as properly to great part or the whole of
human life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objec-
tion. Is it not a poor thing, for a physician to have so
little knowledge in the cure of diseases, as even the most
eminent have ? to act upon conjecture and guess, where the
life of man is concerned ? Undoubtedly it is : but not in
comparison of having no skill at all in that useful art, and
being obliged to act wholly in the dark.
§6. His principal recourse is to the course of providence
experimentally ascertained.
Further : since it is as unreasonable, as it is common,
to urge objections against revelation, which are of equal
weight against natural religion ; and those who do this, if
u 2
292 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. VIII.
they are not confused themselves, deal unfairly with others,
in making it seem, that they are arguing only against
revelation, or ["particular doctrines of it, when in reality
they are arguing against moral providence ; it is a thing
of consequence to show, that such objections are as much
levelled against natural religion as against revealed. And
objections, which are equally^applicable to both, are properly
speaking answered, by its being shown that they are so,
provided the former be admitted to be true. And, without
taking in the consideration how distinctly this is admitted,
it is plainly very material to observe, that as the things
objected against in natural religion are of the same kind
with what is certain matter of experience in the course of
providence, and in the information which God affords us
concerning our temporal interest under his government ;
so the objections against the system of Christianity, and the
evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which
are made against the system and evidence of natural
religion. However, the reader upon review may see, that
most of the analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part
of this Treatise, do not necessarily require to have more
taken for granted than is in the former ; that there is an
Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world : and
Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural
religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced
constitution of nature.
§ 7. Shows also that our interest is profoundly involved
Secondly, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in
such a determinate course of life ; as being what, there is
reason to think, is commanded by. the Author of nature,
and will, upon the whole, be our happiness under his
government. Now if men can be convinced, that they have
the like reason to believe this, as to believe, that taking
care of their temporal affairs will be to their advantage ;
such conviction cannot but be an argument to them for the
practice of religion. And if there be really any reason for
believing one of these, and endeavouring to preserve life,
§§7-9] ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION 293
and secure ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of
it : then there is reason also for believing the other, and
endeavouring to secure the interest it proposes to us. And
if the interest, which religion proposes to us, be infinitely
greater than our whole temporal interest ; then there must
be proportionably greater reason for endeavouring to secure
one, than the other : since, by the supposition, the prob-
ability of our securing one is equal to the probability of our
securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable ; and
has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what
our condition really is, or upon what evidence we are
naturally appointed to act ; and who are disposed to ac-
quiesce in the terms upon which we live, and attend to
and follow that practical instruction, whatever it be, which
is afforded us.
§ 8. The main objection is : i the evidence is doubt/til,
therefore the claim is unfounded.'
But the chief and proper force of the argument referred
to in the objection, lies in another place. For, it is said
that the proof of religion is involved in such inextricable
difficulties, as to render it doubtful ; and that it cannot be
supposed, that, if it were true, it would be left upon doubt-
ful evidence. Here then, over and above the force of each
particular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objec-
tions taken together are turned into a positive argument
against the truth of religion ; which argument would stand
thus. If religion were true, it would not be left doubtful,
and open to objections to the degree in which it is : there-
fore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it
weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight of
such objections ; but also shows it to be false, or is a general
presumption of its being so.
§ 9. Like doubt is frequent in matters of high temporal
interest.
Now the observation, that, from the natural constitution
and course of things, we must in our temporal concerns,
294 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. VIII.
almost continually, and in matters of great consequence,
act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence
of religion, is an answer to this argument : because it shows,
that it is according to the conduct and character of the
Author of nature to appoint we should act upon evidence
like to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be
supposed to appoint we should act upon : it is an instance,
a general one made up of numerous particular ones, of
somewhat in his dealing with us, similar to what is said to
be incredible. And as the force of this answer lies merely
in the parallel, which there is between the evidence for
religion and for our temporal conduct ; the answer is equally
just and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, by
showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the
evidence of the latter to be lower.
§ 10. His aim is, not to vindicate God, but to point out
our duty as men.
Thirdly, The design of this Treatise is not to vindicate the
character of God, but to show the obligations of men : it is
not to justify his providence, but to show what belongs to
us to do. These are two subjects, and ought not to be
confounded. And though they may at length run up into
each other, yet observations may immediately tend to make
out the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate con-
nection, to the purpose of the former ; which is less our
concern than many seem to think. For, first, it is not
necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence
against objections, any further than to show, that the things
objected against may, for ought we know, be consistent with
justice and goodness.
§ ii. Things, unjust if taken alone, may lc vindiedble
by tilings circumjacent.
Suppose then, that there are things in the system of this
world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which taken
alone would be unjust : yet it has been shown unanswer-
ably, that if we could take in the reference, which these
§§io-i3] ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION 295
things may have, to other things present, past, and to come ;
to the whole scheme, which the things objected against are
parts of ; these very things might, for ought we know, be
found to be, not only consistent with justice, but instances
of it. Indeed it has been shown, by the analogy of what
we see, not only possible that this may be the case, but
credible that it is. And thus objections, drawn from such
things, are answered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as
religion makes its vindication necessary.
§ 12. He leaves none but inconclusive objections to lie
against nature.
Hence it appears, secondly, that objections against the
divine justice and goodness are not endeavoured to be
removed, by showing that the like objections, allowed to
be really conclusive, lie against natural Providence : but
those objections being supposed and shown not to be con-
clusive, the things objected against, considered as matters
of fact, are further shown to be credible, from their con-
formity to the constitution of nature ; for instance, that
God will reward and punish men for their actions here-
after, from the observation, that he does reward and punish
them for their actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of
weight.
§ 13. If the objections remain unanswered, so does religion,
ivitli its proofs.
And I add, thirdly, it would be of weight, even though
those objections were not answered. For, there being the
proof of religion above set down ; and religion implying
several facts ; for instance again, the fact last mentioned,
that God will reward and punish men for their actions
hereafter ; the observation, that his present method of
government is by rewards and punishments, shows that
future fact not to be incredible : whatever objections men
may think they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful,
according to their notions of justice and mercy; or as
improbable from their belief of necessity. I say, as
296 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. VIII.
improbable : for it is evident no objection against it, as
unjust, can be urged from necessity; since this notion as
much destroys injustice, as it does justice.
§ 14. The credibility of a religion based on fact may be
proved apart from its reasonableness.
Then, fourthly, Though objections against the reasonable-
ness of the system of religion cannot indeed be answered
without entering into consideration of its reasonableness ;
yet objections against the credibility or truth of it may.
Because the system of it is reducible into what is properly
matter of fact : and the truth, the probable truth, of facts,
may be shown without consideration of their reasonableness.
Nor is it necessary, though, in some cases and respects, it is
highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary, to give
a proof of the reasonableness of eveiy precept enjoined us,
and of every particular dispensation of Providence, which
comes into the system of religion.
§ 15. Unless relief ion lias been disproved, the practice of
it is reasonable.
Indeed the more throughly a person of a right disposition
is convinced of the perfection of the divine nature and con-
duct, the further he will advance towards that perfection of
religion, which St. John speaks of a. But the general obli-
gations of religion are fully made out, by proving the
reasonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice
of religion is reasonable, may be shown, though no more
could be proved, than that the system of it may be so, for
ought we knowr to the contrary : and even without entering
into the distinct consideration of this.
§ 1 6. Repeats § 14.
And from hence, fifthly, it is easy to see, that though the
analogy of nature is not an immediate answer to objections
against the wisdom, the justice, or goodness, of any doctrine
i John iv. 1 8.
§§ 14-17] ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION 297
or precept of religion : yet it may be, as it is, an immediate
and direct answer to what is really intended by such objec-
tions ; which is, to show that the things objected against
are incredible.
§ 17. Proof in religion does not reach to satisfaction ; nor
in temporal affairs ; c. g. as to health *.
Fourthly, It is most readily acknowledged, that the fore-
going Treatise is by no means satisfactory ; very far indeed
from it : but so would any natural institution of life appear,
if reduced into a system, together with its evidence. Leaving
religion out of the case, men are divided in their opinions,
whether our pleasures overbalance our pains : and whether
it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world. And were
all such controversies settled, which perhaps, in speculation,
would be found involved in great difficulties ; and were it
determined upon the evidence of reason, as nature has
determined it to our hands, that life is to be preserved : yet
still, the rules which God has been pleased to afford us, for
escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its satisfactions,
the rules, for instance, of preserving health, and recovering
it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but very
far from being exact. Nor are we informed by nature, in
future contingencies and accidents, so as to render it at all
certain, what is the best method of managing our affairs.
What will be the success of our temporal pursuits, in the
common sense of the word success, is highly doubtful. And
what will be the success of them, in the^ proper sense of the
word ; i. e. what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain
1 Butler seems to use the word with regard to sufficiency of
satisfaction, or its adjective satisfac- evidence.
tory, in the following senses : — He supplies in the next section
(a) In a popular manner, as the a subjective definition of the
equivalent of comfort or enjoy- words ' satisfactory evidence,' viz.
ment. what, we wish it. In itself it seems
(6) With regard to our Saviour's to be the equivalent of the Greek
sacrifice, as the equivalent of avTafKrjs, that is to say, self-
atonement. See sup. II. vi. 17, sufficing or ideally complete, not
!8, 22. requiring aid or supplement from
(c) In a more scientific way, without,
298 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. VIII,
by them, is doubtful in a much higher degree. Indeed the
unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, with which we are
obliged to take up, in the daily course of life, is scarce to be
expressed. Yet men do not throw away life, or disregard
the interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulness.
§ 18. The demand is to change ' the very condition
of our 'being,'
The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those
who object against it, as not satisfactory, i. e. as not being
what they wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our
being : for satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to
such a creature as man. And, which is more material, they
forget also the very nature of religion.
§ 19. And the probative poiver of religious evidences.
For, religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace
it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty ; which it was
intended to try whether men have or not, and to exercise in
such as have it, in order to its improvement. Religion pre-
supposes this as much, and in the same sense, as speaking
to a man presupposes he understands the language in which
you speak ; or as warning a man of any danger presupposes
that he hath such a regard to himself, as that he will
endeavour to avoid it. And therefore the question is not
at all, Whether the evidence of religion be satisfactory : but
Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove and discipline
that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it
is fully sufficient for all those purposes of probation ; how
far soever it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of
curiosity, or any other : and indeed it answers the purposes
of the former in several respects, which it would not do, if
it were as overbearing as is required.
§ 20. Ask, not, does it satisfy ? but, does it bind
to action ?
One might add farther ; that whether the motives or the
evidence for any course of action be satisfactory, meaning
here, by that word, what satisfies a man, that such a course
§§ i8-22] ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION 299
of action will in event be for his good ; this need never be,
and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical ques-
tion in common matters. But the practical question in all
cases is, Whether the evidence for a course of action be
such, as, taking in all circumstances, makes the faculty
within us, which is the guide and judge of conduct13, deter-
mine that course of action to be prudent. Indeed, satisfac-
tion that it will be for our interest or happiness, abundantly
determines an action to be prudent : but evidence almost
infinitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too ;
even in the conduct of every day.
§ 21. His object is to show how men ought in reason
to behave;
Fifthly, As to the objection concerning the influence
which this argument, or any part of it, may, or may not, be
expected to have upon men ; I observe, as above, that
religion being intended for a trial and exercise of the
morality of every person's character, who is a subject of it ;
and there being, as I have shown, such evidence for it, as is
sufficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace it : to
object, that it is not to be imagined mankind will be in-
fluenced by such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of the
foregoing Treatise. For the purpose of it is not to inquire,
what sort of creatures mankind are ; but what the light and
knowledge, which is afforded them, requires they should
be : to show how, in reason, they ought to behave ; not
how, in fact, they will behave. This depends upon them-
selves, and is their own concern ; the personal concern of
each man in particular.
§ 22. And so to put them into probation ; with some
he may succeed.
And how little regard the generality have to it, experience
indeed does too fully show. But religion, considered as
a probation, has had its end upon all persons, to whom it
b See Dissert. II. § 8.
300 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. VIII.
has been proposed with evidence sufficient in reason to
influence their practice : for by this means they have been
put into a state of probation ; let them behave as they will
in it. And thus, not only revelation, but reason also,
teaches us, that by the evidence of religion being laid
before men, the designs of Providence are carrying on, not
only with regard to those who will, but likewise with
regard to those who will not, be influenced by it. How-
ever, lastly, the objection here referred to, allows the things
insisted upon in this Treatise to be of some weight : and if
so, it may be hoped it will have some influence. And if
there be a probability that it will have any at all, there is
the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay it
before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have
a greater influence.
§ 23. Has all along worked from points of departure not
chosen ~by him.
And further, I desire it may be considered, with respect
to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in this
Treatise I have argued upon the principles of others n, not
my own : and have omitted what I think true, and of the
utmost importance, because by others thought unintelligible,
or not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of the
Fatalists, which I do not believe :
§ 24. Has waived the two great principles, (a) of moral
fitness, (b) of liberty ;
And have omitted a thing of the utmost importance which
I do believe, the moral fitness and unntness of actions, prior
to all will whatever ; which I apprehend as certainly to
determine the divine conduct, as speculative truth and false-
hood necessarily determine the divine judgment. Indeed
the principle of liberty, and that of moral fitness, so force
c By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will observe is
meant ; not proving any thing from those principles, but notwithstanding
them. Thus religion is proved, not from the opinion of necessity ;
which is absurd : but, notwithstanding or even though that opinion were
admitted to be true.
§§23-25] ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION 301
themselves upon the mind, that moralists, the ancients as
well as moderns, have formed their language upon it. And
probably it may appear in mine : though I have endeavoured
to avoid it ; and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes been
obliged to express myself in a manner, which will appear
strange to such as do not observe the reason for it : but the
general argument here pursued does not at all suppose or
proceed upon these principles.
§ 25. And has treated religion only as matter of fact.
Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral
fitness being omitted, religion can be considered in no other
view, than merely as a question of fact : and in this view
it is here considered. It is obvious, that Christianity, and
the proof of it, are both historical. And even natural
religion is, properly, a matter of fact. For, that there is
a righteous Governor of the world, is so : and this proposi-
tion contains the general system of natural religion. But
then, several abstract truths, and in particular those two
principles, are usually taken into consideration in the proof
of it : whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of fact.
To explain this : that the three angles of a triangle are equal
to two right ones, is an abstract truth : but that they appear
so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. And this last must
have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient
sceptics, who would not have admitted, the former ; but
pretended to doubt, Whether there were any such thing as
truth, or Whether we could certainly depend upon our
faculties of understanding for the knowledge of it in any
case. So likewise, that there is, in the nature of things, an
original standard of right and wrong in actions, independent
upon all will, but which unalterably determines the will of
God, to exercise that moral government over the world,
which religion teaches, i. e. finally and upon the whole to
reward and punish men respectively as they act right or
wrong 1 ; this assertion contains an abstract truth, as well
as matter of fact. But suppose, in the present state, every
1 Comp. sup. I. vi. 16 n.
302 UPON ARGUING, ETC. [II. VIII. 26-
nian, without exception, was rewarded and punished, in exact
proportion as he followed or transgressed that sense of right
and wrong, which God has implanted in the nature of every
man : this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only
a matter of fact. And though this fact were acknowledged
by every one ; yet the very same difficulties might be raised,
as are now, concerning the abstract questions of liberty and
moral fitness : and we should have a proof, even the certain
one of experience, that the government of the world was
perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those
questions : and this proof would remain, in what way soever
they were determined.
§ 26. Has thus lost much in the proof of final reward and
2)unishment.
And thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty,
the object of which is actions, and which naturally approves
some actions as right, and of good desert, and condemns
others as wrong, and of ill desert ; that he will, finally and
upon the whole, reward the former and punish the latter, is
not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of what is as mere
a fact, as his doing so at present would be. This future fact
I have not indeed proved with the force with which it might
be proved, from the principles of liberty and moral fitness ;
but without them have given a really conclusive practical
proof of it, which is greatly strengthened by the general
analogy of nature : a proof easily cavilled at, easily shown
not to be demonstrative, for it is not offered as such ; but
impossible, I think, to be evaded, or answered. And thus
the obligations of religion are made out, exclusively of the
questions concerning liberty and moral fitness ; which have
been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as
every thing may.
§ 27. Has shotvn it absurd to denounce Christianity as false :
also that it is credible : and more.
Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the
force of this Treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced
of religion upon the proof arising out of the two last-
IX. i] CONCLUSION 303
mentioned principles, an additional proof and a confirmation
of it : to such as do not admit those principles, an original
proof of it d, and a confirmation of that proof, Those who
believe, will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of
objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner
strengthened : those who do not believe, will at least be
shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity
false, the plain undoubted credibility of it ; and, I hope,
a good deal more.
§ 28. Analogy lias a firm basis, and special claims on those
ivlio prefer facts to abstractions.
And thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that
analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid upon it ; and
ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be applied, to show the
argument from it in a disadvantageous light : yet there can
be no question, but that it is a real one. For religion, both
natural and revealed, implying in it numerous facts ;
analogy, being a confirmation of all facts to which it can
be applied, as it is the only proof of most, cannot but
be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and truly
of weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed :
and it ought to be particularly regarded by such as pro-
fess to follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract
reasonings.
CHAPTER IX.
CONCLUSION.
§ i. Upon the Moiun facts, disregard of religion would be
incredible but for experience.
TTTHATEVER account may be given of the strange in-
* ' attention and disregard, in some ages and countries,
to a matter of such importance as religion ; it would, before
experience, be incredible, that there should be the like
d Sup. I. vi. 12-14.
304 CONCLUSION [II. IX.
disregard in those, who have had the moral system of the
world laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often
inculcated upon them : because this moral system carries in
it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon its being
barely proposed to our thoughts.
§ 2. A simple matter is obscured by intricacies of
speculation.
There is no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions,
to convince an unprejudiced understanding, that there is
a God who made and governs the world, and will judge it
in righteousness ; though they may be necessary to answer
abstruse difficulties, when once such are raised : when the
very meaning of those words, which express most intelli-
gibly the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to be
uncertain ; and the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured
by the intricacies of speculation. But to an unprejudiced
mind, ten thousand thousand instances of design cannot
but prove a designer. And it is intuitively manifest, that
creatures ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker ;
and that justice and charity must be his laws, to creatures
whom he has made social, and placed in society.
§ 3. Revelation requires proofs ; offers them : to refuse inquiry
is immoral;
Indeed the truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called,
is not self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to
its being received. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed
religion, will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral
temper of mind, as inattention to natural religion : because,
when both are laid before us, in the manner they are in
Christian countries of liberty, our obligations to inquire into
both, and to embrace both upon supposition of their truth,
are obligations of the same nature. For, revelation claims
to be the voice of God : and our obligation to attend to his
voice is surely moral in all cases. And as it is insisted, that
its evidence is conclusive, upon thorough consideration of
it ; so it offers itself to us with manifest obvious appear-
§§2-5] CONCLUSION 305
ances of having something more than human in it, and
therefore in all reason requires to have its claims most
seriously examined into.
§ 4. Especially in view of its claim as miraculous.
It is to be added, that though light and knowledge, in
what manner soever afforded us, is equally from God ; yet
a miraculous revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the
first principles of our nature, to awaken mankind, and
inspire them with reverence and awe : and this is a peculiar
obligation, to attend to what claims to be so with such
appearances of truth. It is therefore most certain, that our
obligations to inquire seriously into the evidence of Chris-
tianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to embrace it, are
of the utmost importance, and moral in the highest and
most proper sense.
§ 5. Negation is apt to pass into virulent hostility.
Let us then suppose, that the evidence of religion in
general, and of Christianity, has been seriously inquired
into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet we find many
professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of
infidelity. And all of them do not content themselves with
a bare neglect of religion, and enjoying their imaginary
freedom from its restraints. Some go much beyond this.
They deride God's moral government over the world. They
renounce his protection, and defy his justice. They ridicule
and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the Author of it ;
and take all occasions to manifest a scorn and contempt of
revelation. This amounts to an active setting themselves
against religion ; to what may be considered as a positive
principle of irreligion : which they cultivate within them-
selves, and, whether they intend this effect or not, render
habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. And
others, who are not chargeable with all this profligateness,
yet are in avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to
be groundless.
VOL. i. x
306 CONCLUSION [II. IX.
§ 6. His opponents proceed on (a) prejudice against revelation ;
(b) strange things in Scripture; (c) pleas as sup. cli. vi. ;
(d) that doubt warrants denial.
Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that
these persons act upon what they think principles of reason,
and otherwise they are not to be argued with ; it is really
inconceivable, that they should imagine they clearly see the
whole evidence of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all :
nor do they pretend this. They are far indeed from having
a just notion of its evidence : but they would not say its
evidence was nothing, if they thought the system of it, with
all its circumstances, were credible, like other matters of
science or history. So that their manner of treating it must
proceed, either from such kind of objections against all
religion, as have been answered or obviated in the former
part of this Treatise ; or else from objections, and difficulties,
supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they enter-
tain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation, and
miraculous interpositions. They find things in scripture,
whether in incidental passages, or in the general scheme
of it, which appear to them unreasonable. They take for
granted, that if Christianity were true, the light of it must
have been more general, and the evidence of it more satis-
factory, or rather overbearing : that it must and would have
been, in some way, otherwise put and left, than it is. Now
this is not imagining they see the evidence itself to be
nothing, or inconsiderable ; but quite another thing. It is
being fortified against the evidence, in some degree acknow-
ledged, by thinking they see the system of Christianity, or
somewhat which appears to them necessarily connected with
it, to be incredible or false : fortified against that evidence,
which might, otherwise, make great impression upon them.
Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in
doubt concerning the truth of Christianity ; their behaviour
seems owing to their taking for granted, through strange
inattention, that such doubting is, in a manner, the same
thing, as being certain against it.
§§ 6-8] CONCLUSION 307
§ 7. Tliis treatise meets them by (a) establishing a moral
government ; (b) removing presumptions against Chris-
tianity as fact ;
To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning
religion, the foregoing Treatise is adapted. For, all the
general objections against the moral system of nature having
been obviated, it is shown, that there is not any peculiar
presumption at all against Christianity, either considered as
not discoverable by reason, or as unlike to what is so dis-
covered ; nor any worth mentioning against it as miraculous,
if any at all ; none, certainly, which can render it in the
least incredible. It is shown, that, upon supposition of
a divine revelation, the analogy of nature renders it before-
hand highly credible, I think probable, that many things in
it must appear liable to great objections ; and that wre must
be incompetent judges of it, to a great degree. This obser-
vation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very
utmost importance : but it is urged, as I hope it will be
understood, with great caution of not vilifying the faculty
of reason 1, which is the candle of the Lord within us a ; though
it can afford no light, where it does not shine ; nor judge,
where it has no principles to judge upon.
§ 8. (c) As against its goodness, by shoicing their failure
as against nature.
The objections here spoken of, being first answered in the
view of objections against Christianity as a matter of fact,
are in the next place considered as urged more immediately
against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian
dispensation. And it is fully made out, that they admit of
exactly the like answer, in every respect, to what the like
objections against the constitution of nature admit of : that,
as partial views give the appearance of wrong to things,
which, upon further consideration and knowledge of their
a Prov. xx. 27.
1 Sup. II. iii. 3.
. X 2
308 CONCLUSION [II. ix.
relations to other things, are found just and good ; so it
is perfectly credible, that the things objected against the
wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensation, may be
rendered instances of wisdom and goodness, by their refer-
ence to other things beyond our view : because Christianity
is a scheme as much above our comprehension, as that of
nature ; and like that, a scheme in which means are made
use of to accomplish ends, and which, as is most credible,
may be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be
attended to, that this is not an answer taken merely or
chiefly from our ignorance ; but from somewhat positive,
which our observation shows us. For, to like objections,
the like answer is experienced to be just, in numberless
parallel cases.
§ 9. Particular objections are next met : c. g. that the
remedy was not summary.
The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the
method by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated,
in general and together ; the chief of them are considered
distinctly, and the particular things objected to are shown
credible, by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the consti-
tution of nature. Thus, if man be fallen from his primitive
state, and to be restored, and infinite wisdom and power
engages in accomplishing our recoveiy : it were to have
been expected, it is said, that this should have been effected
at once ; and not by such a long series of means, and such
a vaiious economy of persons and things ; one dispensation
preparatory to another, this to a further one, and so on
through an indefinite number of ages, before the end of the
scheme proposed can be completely accomplished : a scheme
conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty
power. But now, on the contrary, our finding that every
thing in the constitution and course of nature is thus carried
on, shows such expectations concerning revelation to be
highly unreasonable ; and is a satisfactoiy answer to them,
when urged as objections against the credibility, that the
great scheme of Providence in the redemption of the world
§§ 9-13] CONCLUSION 309
may be of this kind, and to be accomplished in this
manner.
§ 10. As to operating through a mediator.
As to the particular method of our redemption, the ap-
pointment of a mediator between God and man : this has
been shown to be most obviously analogous to the general
conduct of nature, i.e. the God of nature, in appointing
others to be the instruments of his mercy, as we experience
in the daily course of Providence.
§ ii. Heathen recognition of our fallen state.
The condition of this world, which the doctrine of our
redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with
natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it from
those appearances : inferred, that human nature was fallen
from its original rectitude, and, in consequence of this,
degraded from its primitive happiness. Or, however this
opinion came into the world, these appearances must have
kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it.
§ 12. As to the insufficiency of repentance ;
And as it was the general opinion under the light of
nature, that repentance and reformation, alone and by itself,
was not sufficient to do away sin, and procure a full remis-
sion of the penalties annexed to it ; and as the reason of the
thing does not at all lead to any such conclusion : so every
day's experience shows us, that reformation is not, in any
sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and
miseries, which, in the natural course of things, God has
annexed to folly and extravagance.
§ 13. And the further provision made ;
Yet there may be ground to think, that the punishments,
which, by the general laws of divine government, are an-
nexed to vice, may be prevented : that provision may have
been, even originally, made, that they should be prevented
310 CONCLUSION [II. IX.
by some means or other, though they could not by reforma-
tion alone. For we have daily instances of such mercy, in
the general conduct of nature : compassion provided for
misery'1, medicines for diseases, friends against enemies.
There is provision made, in the original constitution of the
world, that much of the natural bad consequences of our
follies, which persons themselves alone cannot prevent, may
be prevented by the assistance of others ; assistance, which
nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to afford.
By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world
lay in wickedness, and consequently in ruin, God so loved
the ivorld, that lie gave his only begotten Son to save it : and he
bting made perfect by suffering, became the Author of eternal
salvation to all them that obey him c.
§ 14. Beyond comprehension in its mode, but efficacious,
agreeably to experience.
Indeed neither reason nor analogy would lead us to
think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the
manner in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy
for recovery of the world, which the scripture teaches us it
was : but neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think,
that other particular means would be of the efficacy, which
experience shows they are, in numberless instances. And
therefore, as the case before us does not admit of experience ;
so, that neither reason nor analogy can show how, or in
what particular way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed
in scripture, is of that efficacy, which it is there represented
to be ; this is no kind nor degree of presumption against its
being really of that efficacy.
§ 15. As to partial propagation, and imperfect evidence.
Further : the objections against Christianity, from the
light of it not being universal, nor its evidence so strong as
might possibly be given us, have been answered by the
b Sermons V, VI, at the Rolls. c John iii. 16; Heb. v. 9.
§§ 1 4-i 8] CONCLUSION 311
general analogy of nature. That God has made such variety
of creatures, is indeed an answer to the former : but that he
dispenses his gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds,
amongst creatures of the same species, and even to the same
individuals at different times ; is a more obvious and full
answer to it. And it is so far from being the method of
Providence in other cases, to afford us such overbearing
evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity ; that, on
the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally
appointed to act in common matters, throughout a very
great part of life, is doubtful in a high degree. And
admitting the fact, that God has afforded to some no more
than doubtful evidence of religion : the same account may
be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations with regard
to practice.
§ 1 6. The doubtfulness may be due to ourselves;
But as it is not impossible d, surely, that this alleged doubt-
fulness may be men's own fault ; it deserves their most
serious consideration, whether it be not so.
§ 17. And doubtful evidence binds.
However, it is certain, that doubting implies a degree of
evidence for that of which we doubt : and that this degree
of evidence, as really lays us under obligations, as demon-
strative evidence.
§ 1 8. Religion varies from nature not more than nature
from herself.
The whole then of religion is throughout credible : nor is
there, I think, any thing relating to the revealed dispensa-
tion of things, more different from the experienced constitu-
tion and course of nature, than some parts of the constitution
of nature are from other parts of it.
d Sup. II. vi. 19.
312 CONCLUSION [II. IX.
§ 19. Reason almost intuitively approves of natural religion,
taken up by the gospel: so the guilt of immorality is
aggravated.
And if so, the only question which remains is, What
positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of Christianity?
This too in general has been considered, and the objections
against it estimated. Deduct, therefore, what is to be
deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight
which may be thought to remain in these objections, after
what the analogy of nature has suggested in answer to
them : and then consider, what are the practical con-
sequences from all this, upon the most sceptical principles
one can argue upon : (for I am writing to persons who
entertain these principles :) and upon such consideration it
will be obvious, that immorality, as little excuse as it admits
of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons who have been
made acquainted with Christianity, whether they believe
it or not : because the moral system of nature, or natural
religion, which Christianity lays before us, approves itself,
almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it
proposed.
§ 20. The sceptic must own that Christianity may be true ;
by this he is bound.
In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be
observed ; that there is a middle between a full satisfaction
of the truth of it, and a satisfaction of the contrary. The
middle state of mind between these two consists in a serious
apprehension, that it may be true ; joined with doubt
whether it be so. And this, upon the best judgment I am
able to make, is as far towards speculative infidelity, as any
sceptic can at all be supposed to go, who has had true
Christianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid before
him, and has in any tolerable measure considered them.
For I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have
ever heard of it : because it seems evident, that in many
countries called Christian, neither Christianity, nor its
evidence, are fairly laid before men. And in places where
§§ i9-22] CONCLUSION 313
both are, there appear to be some, who have very little
attended to either, and who reject Christianity with a scorn
proportionate to their inattention ; and yet are by no means
without understanding in other matters. Now it has been
shown, that a serious apprehension that Christianity may be
true, lays persons under the strictest obligations of a serious
regard to it, throughout the whole of their life : a regard
not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the
same, with what a full conviction of its truth wrould lay
them under.
§ 21. Blasphemy is without excuse.
Lastly, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness,
I mean with regard to Christianity, are absolutely without
excuse. For there is no temptation to it, but from the
wantonness of vanity or mirth : and these, considering the
infinite importance of the subject, are no such temptations
as to afford any excuse for it.
§ 22. For it, and for disregard, even demonstration might
fail as remedy1.
If this be a just account of things, and yet men can go on
to vilify or disregard Christianity, which is to talk and act
as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood ; there is
no reason to think they would alter their behaviour to
any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its
truth.
1 If we project the following will range from (2) down to (4).
classification: (The distinction between (2), (3),
1. Things demonstrated ; (4), is taken by Maurice, Mor. and
2. of moral certainty; Met. Phil. ch. viii. § 31.) Butler's
likely; complaint is that men so irra-
not unlikely ; tional as to place it in (7) are
neutral ; such offenders against reason, that
improbable ; they would probably defy even
7. ,, demonstrated false ; a demonstration on behalf of
Butler's arguments for religion religion.
THE END OF THE SECOND PABT
TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS
i.
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
II.
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE
ADVERTISEMENT
IN the first copy of these Papers, I had inserted the two
following Dissertations into the chapters, Of a Future Life,
and, Of tlip Moral Government of God ; with which they are
closely connected. But as they do not directly fall under
the title of the foregoing Treatise, and would have kept the
subject of it too long out of sight ; it seemed more proper to
place them by themselves.
DISSERTATION I
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
§ i . There are misleading subtleties on personal identity ;
"1T7HETHEE we are to live in a future state, as it is the
* * most important question which can possibly be asked,
so it is the most intelligible one which can be expressed in
language. Yet strange perplexities have been raised about
the meaning of that identity or sameness of person, which
is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or
in any two successive moments. And the solution of these
difficulties hath been stranger than the difficulties them-
selves. For, personal identity has been explained so by
some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no
consequence at all to us the persons who are making it.
And though few men can be misled by such subtleties ; yet
it may be proper a little to consider them.
§ 2. An idea, which definition can only perplex :
Now when it is asked, wherein personal identity consists,
the answer should be the same, as if it were asked, wherein
consists similitude, or equality ; that all attempts to define
would but perplex it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in
ascertaining the idea. For as, upon two triangles being
compared or viewed together, there arises to the mind the
idea of similitude ; or upon twice two and four, the idea of
equality : so likewise, upon comparing the consciousnesses
of one's self, or one's own existence, in any two moments,
there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal
identity. And as the two former comparisons not only
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
[Diss. I.
give us the ideas of similitude and equality ; but also show
us, that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are
equal : so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea
of personal identity, but also showrs us the identity of our-
selves in those two moments ; the present, suppose, and
that immediately past ; or the present, and that a month,
a year, or twenty years past. Or in other words, by reflect-
ing upon that, which is my self now, and that, which was
my self twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but
one and the same self \
§ 3. Not constituted by, but presupposed in, recollection (or
consciousness of the past).
But though consciousness of what is past does thus
ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that
it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the
same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single
moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember ;
indeed none but what he reflects upon. And one should
really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal
identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, per-
sonal identity ; any more than knowledge, in any other case,
can constitute truth, which it presupposes.
This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from
hence ; that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable
from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. For, this
might be expressed inaccurately thus, that consciousness
makes personality : and from hence it might be concluded
to make personal identity 2. But though present conscious-
1 Reflection on the past, or re-
collection, is for us, consciousness
of the past. But brutes have
memory, perhaps not recollection,
without consciousness proper.
2 This is a bold description of
personality. But can a better be
supplied ? As to dictionaries,
Johnson gives, ' The existence or
individuality of any one.' Latham
and Webster withdraw the first
phrase. Locke says, * Person be-
longs only to intelligent agents,
capable of a law, and happiness
and misery.' This definition, or
account, seems to go beyond the
personality of God. For a law is
something extrinsic ; and capa-
bility of misery is surely here a
thing utterly beyond our power
to predicate. What is conscious-
ness? It is a developed intelli
§§ 3, 4] OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 319
ness of what we at present do and feel is necessary to our
being the persons we now are ; yet present consciousness
of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being
the same persons who performed those actions, or had those
feelings.
§ 4. Differs from sameness in vegetables ; where all the
parts may be different :
The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same in the com-
mon acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any
relation to this of personal identity : because, the word same,
when applied to them and to person, is not only applied
to different subjects, but it is also used in different senses.
For when a man swears to the same tree, as having stood
fifty years in the same place, he means only the same as to
all the purposes of property and uses of common life, and
not that the tree has been all that time the same in the
strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does not
know, whether any one particle of the present tree be the
same with any one particle of the tree which stood in the
same place fifty years ago1. And if they have not one
common particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree
in the proper philosophic sense of the word same : it being
evidently a contradiction in terms, to say they are, when
gence, in act or habit ; it is a 1 May there not, however, re-
doubled mental function : it pre- . main behind, and untouched by
sents to us an active and a passive this argument, the question, What
function, or perhaps a reciproca- is it that constitutes life in a veget-
tion of activities implying dual- able, and wherein and whereby
ism. Not two intelligences, but is it transmitted ? If we look to
one, gifted with the power of parts alone, how does a vegetable
turning back upon itself. The differ from any mineral, subject
personality of brutes is defective ; only to mechanical or chemical
is not this because their con- action ? But the total absence of
sciousness is defective? Do we consciousness seems of itself to
gain anything by adding to But- supply the immeasurable separa-
ler's succinct phrase ? Conscious- tion, which Butler's argument re-
ness is, at the least, personality quires. He uses below the phrase
in action, and is the basis and 'same life': but this life cannot
distinctive mark of all that be regarded as exchangeable,
belongs to personality.
320 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY [DlSS. I.
no part of their substance, and no one of their properties
is the same : no part of their substance, by the sup-
position: no one of their properties, because it is allowed,
that the same property cannot be transferred from one
substance to another. And therefore, when we say the
identity or sameness of a plant consists in a continuation of
the same life, communicated under the same organization,
to a number of particles of matter, whether the same or
not ; the word same, when applied to life and to organiza-
tion, cannot possibly be understood to signify, what it
signifies in this very sentence, when applied to matter. In
a loose and popular sense then, the life and the organization
and the plant are justly said to be the same, notwithstand-
ing the perpetual change of the parts. But in a strict and
philosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode
of being, no anything, can be the same with that, with
which it hath indeed nothing the same. Now sameness is
used in this latter sense, when applied to persons. The
identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of
substance.
§ 5. And consciousness, if at different times, is different.
The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as I think,
determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words,
Whether it, i. e. the same self or person, be the same identical
substance ? And he has suggested \vhat is a much better
answer to the question, than that which he gives it in form.
For he defines Person, a thinking intelligent being^ &c., and
personal identity, the sameness of a rational being*. The
question then is, whether the same rational being is the
same substance : which needs no answer, because Being and
Substance, in this place, stand for the same idea. The
ground of the doubt, whether the same person be the same
substance, is said to be this ; that the consciousness of our
own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two joint
a Locke's Works, vol. i. p. 146.
§§ 5; 6] OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 321
successive moments, is not l the same individual action ]), i. e.
not the same consciousness, but different successive con-
sciousnesses2. Now it is strange that this should have
occasioned such perplexities. For it is surely conceivable,
that a person may have a capacity of knowing some object
or other to be the same now, which it was when he contem-
plated it formerly : yet in this case, where, by the supposi-
tion, the object is perceived to be the same, the perception
of it in any two moments cannot be one and the same
perception. And thus though the successive conscious-
nesses, which we have of our own existence, are not the
same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and the same
thing or object ; of the same person, self, or living agent.
The person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt
now, and was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be,
not two persons, but one and the same person ; and there-
fore is one and the same.
§ 6. Locke's hasty ideas pushed by others to confusion.
Mr. Locke's observations upon this subject appear hasty :
and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with supposi-
tions, which he has made relating to it c. But some of those
hasty observations have been carried to a strange length by
others, whose notion, when traced and examined to the
bottom, amounts, I think, to thisd: 'That personality is
not a permanent, but a transient thing : that it lives and
dies, begins and ends continually : that no one can any
more remain one and the same person two moments
together, than two successive moments can be one and the
same moment : that our substance is indeed continually
b Locke, pp. 146, 147. c Locke, p. 152.
d See an Answer to Dr. Clarke's Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell,
and edit. pp. 44, 56, &c.
1 See Anal. I. i. i. B this year, it should be argued
'2 The argument ascribed to that the faculty or affection of
Locke is frivolous : as if, because love is in rne not the same.
I saw and loved A last year and
VOL. I. Y
322 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY [Diss. I.
changing ; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems,
nothing to the purpose ; since it is not substance, but
consciousness alone, which constitutes personality ; which
consciousness, being successive, cannot be the same in any
two moments, nor consequently the personality constituted
by it.' And from hence it must follow, that it is a fallacy
upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any thing
we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any
thing which befell us yesterday ; or that our present self
will be interested in what will befall us to-morrow : since
our present self is not, in reality, the same with the self of
yesterday, but another like self or person coming in its
room, and mistaken for it ; to which another self will
succeed to-morrow. This, I say, must follow : for if the
self or person of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not the
same, but only like persons ; the person of to-day is really
no more interested in what will befall the person of
to-morrow, than in what will befall any other person. It
may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just represen-
tation of the opinion we are speaking of : because those who
maintain it allow, that a person is the same as far back as
his remembrance reaches. And indeed they do use the
words, identity and same person. Nor will language permit
these words to be laid aside ; since if they were, there must
be I know not what ridiculous periphrasis substituted in the
room of them. But they cannot, consistently with ihem-
selves, mean, that the person is really the same. For it is
self-evident, that the personality cannot be really the same,
if, as they expressly assert, that in which it consists is not
the same. And as, consistently with themselves, they cannot,
so, I think it appears, they do not, mean, that the person is
really the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense :
in such a sense only as they assert, for this they do assert,
that any number of persons whatever may be the same
person. The bare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus
naked and open, seems the best confutation of it. However,
since great stress is said to be put upon it, I add the follow-
ing things.
§§ 7-9] OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 323
§ 7. It is imagination against conviction ;
First, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that
certain conviction, which necessarily and every moment
rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves,
when we reflect upon what is past, and look forward upon
what is to come. All imagination of a daily change of that
living agent which each man calls himself, for another, or
of any such change throughout our whole present life, is
entirely borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is
it possible for a person in his wits to alter his conduct, with
regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion, that, though
he should live to-morrow, he should not, however, be the
same person he is to-day. And yet, if it be reasonable to
act, with respect to a future life, upon this notion, that
personality is transient ; it is reasonable to act upon it, with
respect to the present.
§ 8. As all perceive in temporal concerns.
Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion and
to our temporal concerns ; and every one sees and feels the
inexpressible absurdity of it in the latter case. If, therefore,
any can take up with it in the former, this cannot proceed
from the reason of the thing, but must be owing to an
inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart.
§ 9. The experiences of a being supply a lond independent
of memory.
Secondly, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality,
but a being only, which is capable of life and action, of
happiness and misery. Now all beings confessedly continue
the same, during the whole time of their existence. Con-
sider then a living being now existing, and which has
existed for any time alive : this living being must have
done and suffered and enjoyed, what it has done and
suffered and enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I say,
and not another,) as really as it does and suffers and enjoys,
what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant. All these
Y 2
324 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY [Diss. I.
successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions,
enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And
they are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or
forgetting : since remembering or forgetting can make no
alteration in the truth of past matter of fact. And suppose
this being endued with limited powers of knowledge and
memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it to have
a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which
it was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions,
sufferings, and enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in
conceiving it to know or remember or forget any thing else.
§ 10. Whether the self be property or substance, consciousness
declares its identity;
Thirdly, Every person is conscious, that he is now the
same person or self he was as far back as his remembrance
reaches : since when any one reflects upon a past action of
his own, he is just as certain of the person who did that
action, namely, himself, the person who now reflects upon
it, as he is certain that the action was at all done. Nay,
veiy often a person's assurance of an action having been
done, of which he is absolutely assured, arises wholly from
the consciousness that he himself did it. And this he,
person, or self, must either be a substance, or the property
of some substance. If he, if person, be a substance ; then
consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness
that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be
the property of a substance, still consciousness that he is
the same property is as certain a proof that his substance
remains the same, as consciousness that he remains the
same substance would be : since the same property cannot
be transferred from one substance to another.
§ ii. And is deed cable in all, if in this.
But though we are thus certain, that we are the same
agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were
as far back as our remembrance reaches ; yet it is asked,
whether we may not possibly be deceived in it ? And this
§§ io, n] OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 325
question may be asked at the end of any demonstration
whatever : because it is a question concerning the truth
of perception by memory. And he who can doubt, whether
perception by memory can in this case be depended upon,
may doubt also, whether perception by deduction and reason-
ing, which also include memory, or indeed whether intuitive
perception can. Here then we can go no further. For it is
ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions,
whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other per-
ceptions of exactly the same kind with them, and which
there is just the same ground to suspect ; or to attempt to
prove the truth of our faculties, which can no otherwise
be proved, than by the use or means of those very sus-
pected faculties themselves.
DISSEETATION II
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE
§ i. We have powers of reflection and approval, and ly this
become capable of moral government \
THAT which renders beings capable of moral government,
is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of
perception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed
and actuated by various instincts and propensions : so also
are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity of reflect-
ing upon actions and characters, and making them an object
to our thought : and on doing this, we naturally and un-
avoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of
1 I extract from Dr. Angus (in
Zoc.) portions of his concise ac-
count of the tacit references of
Butler in this Dissertation to
the doctrines of immediately pre-
ceding writers :
' Within a hundred years,
Hobbes had published his Theory
of Human Nature, in which he
taught that personal gratification
was the sole end of every act,
that every exercise of passion or
faculty was equally authorita-
tive, and that man has no moral
faculties of perception or action.
. . . The first and last part of
Hobbes's theory Butler here re-
futes ; the second he notices in
his Sermons. . . .
' By denying that prudence is
the whole of virtue, he meets the
abuse which Hobbes committed,
and which some modern writers
have revived. Benevolence he
reckons a most important virtue
and yet denies, against Leibnitz,
that all virtue is resolvable int<
it. In his doctrine of a moral
sense, he agrees substantially witl
Hutcheson, his contemporary, an<
in the importance he attaches
the distinction between mere act
and the dispositions or principle
from which they spring, h<
condemns Hobbes and sanctioi
Malebranche.'
Diss. II. §§ i, 2] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 327
their being virtuous and of good desert ; and disapprove
others, as vicious and of ill desert. That we have this
moral approving and disapproving a faculty, is certain from
our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in each
other.
§ 2. Shown ~by our common language, judgments, behaviour;
and by moral systems.
It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the
approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters :
from the words, right and wrong, odious and amiable, base
and worthy, with many others of like signification in all
languages, applied to actions and characters l : from the
many written systems of morals which suppose it ; since
it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, throughout
all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their
words, or a meaning merely chimerical : from our natural
sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction between
merely being the instrument of good, and intending it :
from the like distinction, every one makes, between injury
and mere harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to man-
ft This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus *, and is made use
Phrase of Epictetus,
why employed.
of as seeming the most full, and least liable to
cavil. And the moral faculty may be understood
to have these two epithets, 8otti]j.aoTiKr) and diroSo-
], upon a double account : because, upon a survey of actions,
whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good
or evil ; and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action
and of life, in contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural
principles of action : in the very same manner as speculative reason
directly and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood ; and at
the same time is attended with a consciousness upon reflection, that the
natural right to judge of them belongs to it.
* Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. i.
1 We may add the cacuvos and upon a basis merely subjective, and
^0705 of Aristotle ; but it is char- to look rather for tests founded in
acteristic of Butler not to rest the nature of the thing itself.
328 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE [DiSF. II.
kind 1 ; and between injury and just punishment, a distinc-
tion plainly natural, prior to the consideration of human
laws 2. It is manifest great part of common language, and
of common behaviour over the world, is formed upon suppo-
sition of such a moral faculty 3 ; whether called conscience,
moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason ; whether con-
sidered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a percep-
tion of the heart 4 ; or, which seems the truth, as including
both. '
§ 3. It lias an aclmoidcdycd standard; and conclusive tests.
Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what course of
action this faculty, or practical discerning power within us,
approves, and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has
been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground
for doubt there may be about particulars ; yet, in general,
there is in reality an universally acknowledged standard of
it. It is that, which all ages and all countries have made
profession of in public : it is that, which every man you
meet puts on the show of : it is that, which the primary
and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face
of the earth make it their business and endeavour to enforce
the practice of upon mankind : namely, justice, veracity,
and regard to common good. It being manifest then, in
general, that we have such a faculty or discernment as this,
it may be of use to remark some things more distinctly
concerning it.
1 Evidently Butler's intention of first instance, we discern good
is rather to record as against rnd evil. When the perception
Hobbes generally this valuable thus acquired has passed under
admission, than to imply that the view, and received the judicial
the opposite opinion was one sanction, of the conscience, it has
anywhere held. passed under the view of the court
a On the distinction see Serm. cf appeal,
viii. 6, 8. This sentence is one in which
3 Comp. Serm. xii. 6. Butler allows himself more elasti-
4 Is this not an exercise of the city in the use of terms than is
faculty by which, as in a court quite usual with him.
§§ 3-5] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 329
§ 4. Has action for its object, apart from (a) mere truth,
(b) con-sequences.
First, It ought to be observed, that the object of this
faculty is actions b, comprehending under that name active
or practical principles : those principles from which men
would act, if occasions and circumstances gave them power ;
and which, when fixed and habitual in any person, we call
his character. It does not appear, that brutes have the least
reflex sense of actions, as distinguished from events : or that
will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions
as such, are at all an object to their perception. But to
ours they are : and they are the object, and the only one,
of the approving and disapproving faculty. Acting, conduct,
behaviour, abstracted from all regard to what is, in fact and
event, the consequence of it, is itself the natural object of
the moral discernment ; as speculative truth and falsehood
is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such conse-
quences, indeed, is always included ; for it is part of the
action itself : but though the intended good or bad conse-
quences do not follow, we have exactly the same sense of
the action as if they did. In like manner we think well
or ill of characters, abstracted from all consideration of the
good or the evil, which persons of such characters have it
actually in their power to do. We never1, in the moral way,
applaud or blame either ourselves or others, for what we
enjoy or what we suffer, or for having impressions made
upon us which we consider as altogether out of our power :
but only for what we do, or would have done had it been in
our power ; or for what we leave undone which we might
have done, or would have left undone though we could have
done it.
§ 5. By nature, we link vice with misery for ill desert.
Secondly, Our sense or discernment of actions as morally
good or evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as
b Oube fj aptTi) real fcanla . . . . €»/ wttfftl, uAAd fvepyfiq. M. Anton,
lib. ix. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. Cio. Off. lib. i.
cap. 6.
330 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE [Diss. II.
of good or ill desert. It may be difficult to explain this
perception, so as to answer all the questions which may be
asked concerning it : but every one speaks of such and such
actions as deserving punishment ; and it is not, I suppose,
pretended that they have absolutely no meaning at all to
the expression. Now the meaning plainly is not, that we
conceive it for the good of society, that the doer of such
actions should be made to suffer. For if unhappily it were
resolved, that a man, who, by some innocent action, was
infected with the plague, should be left to perish, lest, by
other people's coming near him, the infection should spread ;
no one would say he deserved this treatment. Innocence
and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always
supposes guilt : and if one be no part of the other, yet they
are evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The
sight of a man in misery raises our compassion towards him ;
and, if this misery be inflicted on him by another, our
indignation against the author of it. But when we are
informed, that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished
only for his treachery or cruelty ; our compassion exceed-
ingly lessens, and in many instances our indignation wholly
subsides. Now what produces this effect is the conception
of that in the sufferer, which we call ill-desert. Upon con-
sidering then, or viewing together, our notion of vice and
that of misery, there results a third, that of ill-desert. And
thus there is in human creatures an association of the two
ideas, natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment.
If this association were merely artificial or accidental, it were
nothing : but being most unquestionably natural, it greatly
concerns us to attend to it, instead of endeavouring to explain
it away.
§ 6. Desert is higher or lower according to circumstances.
It may be observed farther, concerning our perception of
good and of ill desert, that the former is very weak with
respect to common instances of virtue. One reason of which
may be, that it does not appear to a spectator, how far such
instances of virtue proceed from a virtuous principle, or in
§§6, 7] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 331
what degree this principle is prevalent : since a very weak
regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men act well in
many common instances. And on the other hand, our per-
ception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion
to the temptations men are thought to have had to such
vices. For, vice in human creatures consisting chiefly in
the absence or want of the virtuous principle ; though a man
be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does not from thence
appear to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting.
All that appears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as
to prevail over the temptation : but possibly he had it in
a degree, which' would have rendered him proof against
common temptations.
§ 7. Judgment on acts must measure them by the agent1.
Thirdly, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from,
and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature
and capacities of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing
what we ought to do would, in many cases, be determined
by all men to be in the highest degree vicious. And this
determination must arise from such comparison, and be the
result of it ; because such neglect would not be vicious in
creatures of other natures and capacities, as brutes. And it
is the same also with respect to positive vices, or such as
consist in doing what we ought not. For, every one has
a different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or
child, and b^ one of mature and common understanding ;
though the action of both, including the intention, which is
part of the action, be the same : as it may be, since idiots
and madmen, as well as children, are capable not only of
doing mischief, but also of intending it. Now this difference
must arise from somewhat discerned in the nature or
capacities of one, which renders the action vicious ; and
the want of which, in the other, renders the same action
innocent or less vicious : and this plainly supposes a com-
parison, whether reflected upon or not, between the action
1 Comp. Serm. ii. 15, iii. 13.
332 OF THE NATURE- OF VIRTUE [Diss. II.
and capacities of the agent, previous to our determining an
action to be vicious. And hence arises a proper application
of the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate,
unfit, to actions which our moral faculty determines to
be vicious.
§ 8. Prudence, or a due regard to our otvn welfare, is a part
of virtue.
Fourthly, It deserves to be considered, whether men are
more at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves
miserable without reason, than to make other people so : or
dissolutely to neglect their own greater good, for the sake
of a present lesser gratification, than they are to neglect the
good of others, whom nature has committed to their care.
It should seem, that a due concern about our own interest
or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and
promote it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of
the word prudence, in our language ; it should seem, that
this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and blam-
able : since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve
of the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in our-
selves and others '. This approbation and disapprobation
are altogether different from mere desire of our own, or of
their happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the
object or occasion of this last kind of perception is satisfaction
1 I suppose it indisputable that not of B, but of A ? So that But-
the study and prosecution of good ler's contention appears perfectly
with a practical aim is virtuous. just. It undergoes perhaps some
Let us suppose then that it is disadvantage from the fact that
done for the benefit of a-. If x prudence, as the wise choice of
mean another person than our- means for an end, extends to all
selves, this is benevolence, and common matters lying beyond the
benevolence is a virtue. But let territory of vice and virtue,
a- mean a man's own self. The This may well be considered
act is still the same, done to the classical passage of Butler
one person instead of another ; it on prudence. Compare Aristotle
continues to be the study and (Eth. Nic. VI. v. 4) on typovrjais :
prosecution of good with a prac- AenrfTcu apa avrty dvai t(iv
tical aim : how can the act have d\r}6fj utra \6yov irpaKnn^v TTC/M TO.
changed its own essential nature, avOpwitw d-yafld /cat KOLKCL.
because it is now for the benefit,
§§ 8-io] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 333
or uneasiness : whereas the object of the first is active be-
haviour. In one case, what our thoughts fix upoii is our
condition : in the other, our conduct.
§ 9. Why not fortified so strongly, as other parts, with
disapproval of the contrary.
It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible
a disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in ourselves
or others, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty : I suppose,
because that constant habitual sense of private interest and
good, which we always carry about with us, renders such
sensible disapprobation less necessary, less wanting, to keep
us from imprudently neglecting our own happiness, and
foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is necessary and want-
ing to keep us from injuring others, to whose good we
cannot have so strong and constant a regard : and also
because imprudence and folly, appearing to bring its own
punishment more immediately and constantly than injurious
behaviour, it less needs the additional punishment, which
would be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same
sensible indignation against it, as against injustice, and
fraud, and cruelty. Besides, unhappiness being in itself
the natural object of compassion ; the unhappiness which
people bring upon themselves, though it be wilfully, excites
in us some pity for them : and this of course lessens our
displeasure against them.
§ 10. Still disapproval is strong in grave cases.
But still it is matter of experience, that we are formed so
as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of
imprudent neglects and foolish rashness, both in ourselves
and others. In instances of this kind, men often say of
themselves with remorse, and of others with some indigna-
tion, that they deserved to suffer such calamities, because
they brought them upon themselves, and would not take
warning. Particularly when persons come to poverty and
distress by a long course of extravagance, and after frequent
admonitions, though without falsehood or injustice ; we
334 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE [Diss. II.
plainly do not regard such people as alike objects of com-
passion with those, who are brought into the same condition
by unavoidable accidents. From these things it appears,
that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice :
meaning by folly, somewhat quite different from mere in-
capacity ; a thoughtless want of that regard and attention
to our own happiness, which we had capacity for. And
this the word properly includes ; and, as it seems, in
its usual acceptation ; for we scarce apply it to brute
creatures.
§ ii. We may dispense tvith vice and virtue as predicates.
However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter,
I shall veiy willingly give him up the words virtue and
vice, as not applicable to prudence and folly ; but must beg
leave to insist, that the faculty within us, which is the judge
of actions, approves of prudent actions, and disapproves
imprudent ones ; I say prudent and imprudent actions as
such, and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery
which they occasion. And, by the way, this observation
may help to determine what justness there is in that
objection against religion, that it teaches us to be interested
and selfish.
§ 12. Benevolence, and its op2>osite, are only parts of
virtue and vice ;
Fifthly, Without inquiring how far, and in what sense,
virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want
of it ; it may be proper to observe, that benevolence, and
the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole
of virtue and vice l. For if this were the case, in the review
of one's own character, or that of others, our moral under-
standing and moral sense would be indifferent to every
thing, but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and
the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we should
1 On benevolence see Anal. I. iii. from a different point of view,
3. Also compare the statement Serm. xii. 18, 19, 22.
§§n-i3] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 335
neither approve of benevolence to some persons rather than
to others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood upon any
other account, than merely as an overbalance of happiness
was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and of
misery by the second. But now, on the contrary, suppose
two men competitors for any thing whatever, which would
be of equal advantage to each of them : though nothing
indeed would be more impertinent, than for a stranger to
busy himself to get one of them preferred to the other ; yet
such endeavour would be virtue, in behalf of a friend or
benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant con-
sequences : as that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation
of friendship, would be of general good to the world. Again,
suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from
another the frnit of his labour, 'with intent to give it to
a third, who he thought would have as much pleasure from
it as would balance the pleasure which the first possessor-
would have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the
loss of it ; suppose also that no bad consequences wrould
follow : yet such an action would surely be vicious. Nay
farther, were treachery, violence and injustice, no otherwise
vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce an overbalance of
misery to society ; then, if in any case a man could procure
to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice, as the
whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon
others by it, would amount to ; such a piece of injustice
would not *be faulty or vicious at all : because it would be
no more than, in any other case, for a man to prefer his own
satisfaction to another's in equal degrees.
§ 13. Which include matter other than the overbalance
of enjoyment or suffering.
The fact then appears to be, that we are constituted so as
to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and
to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others,
abstracted from all consideration, which conduct is like-
liest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery.
And therefore, were the Author of nature to propose nothing
336 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE [Diss. II.
to himself as an end but the production of happiness, were
his moral character merely that of benevolence ; yet ours is
not so. Upon that supposition indeed the only reason of
his giving us the above-mentioned approbation of benevo-
lence to some persons rather than others, and disapprobation
of falsehood, unprovoked violence, and injustice, must be,
that he foresaw this constitution of our nature would pro-
duce more happiness, than forming us with a temper of
mere general benevolence. But still, since this is our con-
stitution ; falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us,
and benevolence to some, preferably to others, virtue ;
abstracted from all consideration of the overbalance of evil
or good, which they may appear likely to produce.
§ 14. Moral government makes awards by a moral ndc.
Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral
nature as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty,
the natural object of which is actions ; moral government
must consist in rendering them happy and unhappy, in
rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect, or
depart from, the moral rule of action interwoven in their
nature, or suggested and enforced by this moral faculty c ;
in rewarding and punishing them upon account of their so
doing.
§ 15. Some authors are open to misapprehension on
benevolence.
I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation,
contradicted what any author designed to assert. But some
of great and distinguished merit have, I think, expressed
themselves in a manner, which may occasion some danger,
to careless readers, of imagining the whole of virtue to
consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their
judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in the
c Page 121. [So stands the reference in the edition of 1844.
reference seems really to be to I. iii. 2, 3. — ED.]
§§ i4-i6] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 337
present state 1 ; and the whole of vice, in doing what they
foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance
of unhappiness in it : than which mistakes, none can be
conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that some of the
most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, per-
jury, and even of persecution, may, in many supposable
cases, not have the appearance of being likely to produce
an overbalance of misery in the present state : perhaps
sometimes may have the contrary appearance. For this
reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear.
§ 1 6. We are to promote happiness, not simpliciter, but
within bounds, and according to likelihoods.
The happiness of the world is the concern of him, who is
the Lord and the Proprietor of it : nor do we know what
we are about, when we endeavour to promote the good of
mankind in any ways, but those which he has directed ;
that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and
justice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons really
endeavouring, in some sort, to do good without regard to
these. But the truth seems to be, that such supposed
endeavours proceed, almost always, from ambition, the
spirit of party, or some indirect principle, concealed perhaps
in great measure from persons themselves. And though it
is our business and our duty to endeavour, within the
bounds of veracity and justice, to contribute to the ease,
convenience, and even cheerfulness and diversion of our
fellow-creatures : yet, from our short views, it is greatly
uncertain, whether this endeavour will, in particular in-
stances, produce an overbalance of happiness upon the
whole ; since so many and distant things must come into
the account. And that which makes it our duty is, that
there is some appearance that it will, and no positive appear-
ance sufficient to balance this, on the contrary side ; and
also, that such benevolent endeavour is a cultivation of that
1 Is the allusion to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson ? See Leslie Stephen,
English Thought, ix. 60.
VOL. I. Z
338 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE [Diss. II. § 17
most excellent of all virtuous principles, the active principle
of benevolence.
§ 17. Veracity is part of tlie rule of life, but not easy
in application.
However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our
rule of life ; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be
laid in the way of some .plain men, that the use of common
forms of speech, generally understood, cannot be falsehood ;
and, in general, that there can be no designed falsehood
without designing to deceive. It must likewise be observed,
that in numberless cases, a man may be under the strictest
obligations to what he foresees will deceive, without his
intending it. For it is impossible not to foresee, that the
words and actions of men, in different ranks and employ-
ments, and of different educations, will perpetually be
mistaken by each other : and it cannot but be so, whilst
they will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily
do, of what they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be
competent judges of, even though they considered it with
great attention.
CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN
DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE
[The Letters are numbered consecutively, and the references in the Index
are to Corr. I., Corr. II., and so forth.]
I.
THE FIRST LETTER.
(A.)
Butler, apparently admitting place to be a condition or incident of divine exist-
ence, conceives that Clarke has offered, as proving the divine omnipresence, this :
that if absent somewhere, He might be absent everywhere ; which contradicts His
self- existence being non-existence. No, says Butler : partial absence might le
possible, yet universal impossible.
Further, to prove the unity of the self-existent, Clarke says, were there two,
each might be supposed existing alone, so that the other might be conceived not to
exist. Butler denies this consequence : whether we take alone as independent,
or as solitary.
REVEREND SIR,
T SUPPOSE you will wonder at the present trouble from one who is
-*- a perfect stranger to you, though you are not so to him ; but
I hope the occasion will excuse my boldness. I have made it, sir,
my business, ever since I thought myself capable of such sort of
reasoning, to prove to myself the being and attributes of God. And
being sensible that it is a matter of the last consequence, I endeavoured
after a"Tte«ionstrative proof; not only more fully to satisfy my own
mind, but also in order to defend the great truths of natural religion,
and those of the Christian revelation which follow from them, against
all opposers ; but must own with concern, that hitherto I have been
unsuccessful ; and though I have got very probable arguments, yet
Z 2
340 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [CoRR.
I can go but a very little way with demonstration in the proof of those
things. When first your book on those subjects (which by all, whom
I have discoursed with, is so justly esteemed) was recommended to
me, I was in great hopes of having all my inquiries answered. But
since in some places, either through my not understanding your mean-
ing, or what else I know not, even that has failed me, I almost
despair of ever arriving to such a satisfaction as I aim at, unless by the
method I now use. You cannot but know, sir, that of two different
expressions of the same thing, though equally clear to some persons,
yet to others one of them is sometimes very obscure, though the other
be perfectly intelligible. Perhaps this may be my case here ; and
could I see those of your arguments, of which I doubt, differently
proposed, possibly I might yield a ready assent to them. This, sir,
I cannot but think a sufficient excuse for the present trouble ; it
being such an one as I hope may prevail for an answer, with one who
seems to aim at nothing more than that good work of instructing
others.
In your Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, Prop. VI. a
[edit, and, pp. 69, 70] you propose to prove the infinity of omnipres-
ence of the self-existent Being. The former part of the proof seems
highly probable ; but the latter part, which seems to aim at demon-
stration, is not to me convincing. The latter part of the paragraph is,
if I mistake not, an entire argument of itself, which runs thus : ' To
suppose a finite being to be self-existent, is to say that it is a contradic-
tion for that being not to exist, the absence of which may yet be con-
ceived without a contradiction ; which is the greatest absurdity in the
world.' The sense of these words [' the absence of which '] seems
plainly to be determined by the following sentence, to mean its
absence from any particular place. Which sentence is to prove it
to be an absurdity ; and is this : i For if a being can, without a contra-
diction, be absent from one place, it may, without a contradiction, be
absent from another place, and from all places.' Now supposing this
to be a consequence, all that it proves is, that if a being can, without
a contradiction, be absent from one place at one time, it may, without
a contradiction, be absent from another place, and so from all places, at
different times ; (for I cannot see, that if a being can be absent from
one place at one time, therefore it may, without a contradiction, be
absent from all places at the same time, i.e. may cease to exist.) Now,
if it proves no more than this, I cannot see that it reduces the supposi-
tion to any absurdity. Suppose I could demonstrate, that any par-
ticular man should live a thousand years ; this man might, without
a contradiction, be absent from one and from all places at different
times ; but it would not from thence follow, that he might be absent
fl P. 45, edit. 4 ; p. 4r, edit. 6 ; p. 43, edit. 7 ; p. 44, edit, 8.
I] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE 34!
from all places at the same time, i.e. that he might cease to exist.
No ; this would be a contradiction, because I am supposed to have
demonstrated that he should live a thousand years. It would be
exactly the same, if, instead of a thousand years, I should say, for
ever ; and the proof seems the same, whether it be applied to a self-
existent or a dependent being.
What else I have to offer is in relation to your proof, that the self-
existent being must of necessity be but one. Which proof is as follows,
in Prop. VII. b [edit, snd, p. 74]. ' To suppose two or more different
natures existing of themselves, necessarily, and independent from each
other, implies this plain contradiction ; that, each of them being inde-
pendent from the other, they may either of them be supposed to exist
alone ; so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to
exist, and consequently neither of them will be necessarily existing.'
The supposition indeed implies, that since each of these beings is
independent from the other, they may either of them exist alone,
i. e. without any relation to, or dependence on, the other : but where
is the third idea, to connect this proposition and the following one,
viz. 'so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to
exist ' ? Were this a consequence of the former proposition, I allow
it would be demonstration, by the first corollary of Prop. III. c [2nd
edit. p. 26] but since these two propositions, ['they may cither of
them be supposed to exist alone,'] and, [' so that it will be no contra-
diction to imagine the other not to exist/] are very widely different ;
since likewise it is no immediate consequence, that because either may
be supposed to exist independent from the other, therefore the other
may be supposed not to exist at all ; how is what was proposed, proved?
That the propositions are different, I think is plain ; and whether
there be an immediate connection, every body that reads your book
must judge for themselves. I must say, for my own part, the absurdity
does not appear at first sight, any more than the absurdity of saying
that the angles below the base in an isosceles triangle are unequal ;
which though it is absolutely false, yet I suppose no one will lay down
the contrary for an axiom ; because, though it is true, yet there is
need of a proof to make it appear so.
Perhaps it may be answered, that I have not rightly explained the
words, ' to exist alone ; ' and that they do not mean only, to exist inde-
pendent from the other ; but that 'existing alone' means that nothing
exists with it. Whether this or the other was meant, I cannot deter-
mine : but, whichever it was, what I have said will hold. For if this
last be the sense of those words, ['they either of them may be sup-
posed to exist alone ; '] it indeed implies that it will be no contra dic-
b P. 48, edit. 4 ; p. 44, edit. 6 ; p. 46, edit. 7 ; p. 47, edit. 8.
c Pp. 1 6, 17, edit. 4, 6, 7, and 8.
342
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
[CoRR.
tion to suppose the other not to exist : but then I ask, how come
these two propositions to be connected ; that to suppose two different
natures existing, of themselves, necessarily and independent from
each other, implies that each of them may be supposed to exist alone
in this sense ? Which is exactly the same as I said before, only
applied to different sentences. So that if ' existing alone ' be under-
stood as I first took it, I allow it is implied in the supposition ; but
cannot see that the consequence is, that it will be no contradiction to
suppose the other not to exist. But if the words, l existing alone,' are
meant in the latter sense, I grant, that if either of them may be sup-
posed thus to exist alone, it will be no contradiction to suppose the
other not to exist : but then I cannot see, that to suppose two different
natures existing, of themselves, necessarily and independent from
each other, implies that either of them may be supposed to exist alone
in this sense of the words ; but only, that either of them may be sup-
posed to exist without having any relation to the other, and that there
will be no need of the existence of the one in order to the existence of
the other. But though upon this account, were there no other prin-
ciple of its existence, it might cease to exist ; yet on the account of the
necessity of its own nature, which is quite distinct from the other, it
is an absolute absurdity to suppose it not to exist.
Thus, sir, I have proposed my doubts, with the reasons of them.
In which if I have wrested your words to another sense than you
designed them, or in any respect argued unfairly, I assure you it was
without design. So I hope you will impute it to mistake. And, if it
will not be too great a trouble, let me once more beg the favour
of a line from you, by which you will lay me under a particular
obligation to be, what, with the rest of the world, I now am,
Reverend Sir,
Nov. 4, 1/13. Your most obliged servant, &c.
II.
THE ANSWER.
(B.)
1. C'arkc contends in reply that if necessary self-existing presence can be dis-
pensed icith anywhere, it can be dispensed icith everywhere. If so, his argument
holds.
2. Also independent self-existence may imply solitary self -existence : and here,
too, he holds his ground.
SIB,
~I~\ID men who publish controversial papers accustom themselves to
J-' write with that candour and ingenuity, with which you propose
your difficulties, I am persuaded almost all disputes might be very
II] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE 343
amicably terminated, either by men's coming at last to agree in
opinion, or at least finding reason to suffer each other friendly to
differ.
Your two objections are very ingenious, and urged with great
strength and acuteness. Yet I am not without hopes of being able
to give you satisfaction in both of them. To your first, therefore,
I answer : Whatever may, without a contradiction, be absent from
any one place, at any one time, may also, without a contradiction, be
absent from all places at all times. For, whatever is absolutely neces-
sary at all, is absolutely necessary in every part of space, and in every
point of duration. Whatever can at any time be conceived possible
to be absent from any one part of space, may for the same reason
[viz. the implying no contradiction in the nature of things] be con-
ceived possible to be absent from every other part of space at the same
time ; either by ceasing to be, or by supposing it never to have begun
to be. Your instance about demonstrating a man to live a thousand
years, is what, I think, led you into the mistake ; and is a good
instance to lead you out of it again. You may suppose a man shall
live a thousand years, or God may reveal and promise he- shall live
a thousand years ; and upon that supposition, it shall not to possible
for the man to be absent from all places in any part of that time.
Very true : but why shall it not be possible? only because it is con-
trary to the supposition, or to the promise of God ; but not contrary to
the absolute nature of things ; which would be the case, if the man
existed necessarily, as every part of space does. In supposing you
could demonstrate, a man should live a thousand years, or one year ;
you make an impossible and contradictory supposition. For though
you may know certainly (by revelation suppose) that he will live so
long ; yet this is only the certainty of a thing true in fact, not in
itself necessary : and demonstration is applicable to nothing but what
is necessary in itself, necessary in all places and at all times equally.
To your second difficulty, I answer : What exists necessarily, not only
must so exist alone, as to be independent of any thing else ; but (being
self-sufficient) may also so exist alone, as that every thing else may pos-
sibly (or without any contradiction in the nature of things) be supposed
not to exist at all : and consequently, (since that which may possibly
be supposed not to exist at all, is not necessarily existent,) no other
thing can be necessarily existent. Whatever is necessarily existing,
there is need of its existence in order to the supposal of the existence
of any other thing; so that nothing can possibly be supposed to exist,
without presupposing and including antecedently the existence of that
which is necessary. For instance ; the supposal of the existence of any
thing whatever includes necessarily a presupposition of the existence
of space and time ; and if any thing could exist without space or time,
it would follow that space and time were not necessarily existing.
344 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [CoRR.
Therefore, the supposing any thing possibly to exist alone, so as not
necessarily to include the presupposal of some other thing, proves
demonstrably that that other thing is not necessarily existing ; because,
whatever has necessity of existence cannot possibly, in any conception
whatsoever, be supposed away. There cannot possibly be any notion
of the existence of any thing, there cannot possibly be any notion of
existence at all, but what shall necessarily preinclude the notion of that
which has necessary existence. And consequently the two propo-
sitions, which you judged independent, are really necessarily con-
nected. These sorts of things are indeed very difficult to express, and
not easy to be conceived but by very attentive minds : but to such
as can and will attend, nothing, I think, is more demonstrably
convictive.
If any thing still sticks with you in this or any other part of my
books, I shall be very willing to be informed of it ; who am,
Sir,
Your assured friend and servant,
S. C.
Kov. 10, 1713.
PS. Many readers, I observe, have misunderstood my second general
proposition ; as if the words [' some one unchangeable and independent
being,'] meant [one only— being ;] whereas the true meaning, and all
that the argument there requires, is, [some one at least.] That there
can be but one, is the thing proved afterwards in the seventh propo-
sition.
III.
THE SECOND LETTER.
(C.)
Bailer aryues in reply that ubiquity and self -existence are separable ; and We
necessity of ubiquity Jias to be proved.
On the second head, demands 1he title for asserting that the necessary bcinj is
required in order to the existence of any other being.
REVEREND SIR,
T HAVE often thought that the chief occasions of men's differing so
-*- much in their opinions, were, either their not understanding each
other ; or else, that, instead of ingenuously searching after truth, they
have made it their business to find out arguments for the proof of
Ill] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE 345
what they have once asserted. However, it is certain there may be
other reasons for persons not agreeing in their opinions : and where it
is so, I cannot but think with you, that they will find reason to suffer
each other to differ friendly ; every man having a way of thinking,
in some respects, peculiarly his own.
I am sorry I must tell you, your answers to my objections are not
satisfactory. The reasons why I think them not so are as follow :
You say, 'Whatever is absolutely necessary at all is absolutely
necessary in every part of space, and in every point of duration.'
Were this evident, it would certainly prove what you bring it for ; viz.
that 'Whatever may, without a contradiction, be absent from one
place at one time, may also be absent from all places at all times.' But
I do not conceive, that the idea of ubiquity is contained in the idea of
self-existence, or directly follows from it ; any otherwise than as,
whatever exists must exist somewhere. You add, ' Whatever can at
any time be conceived possible to be absent from any one part of
space, may for the same reason [viz. the implying no contradiction in
the nature of things] be conceived possible to be absent from every
other part of space, at the same time.' Now I cannot see, that I can
make these two suppositions for the same reason, or upon the same
account. The reason why I conceive this being may be absent from
one place, is because it doth not contradict the former proof, [drawn
from the nature of things,] in which I proved only that it must neces-
sarily exist. But the other supposition, viz. that I can conceive it
possible to be absent from every part of space at one and at the same
time, directly contradicts the proof that it must exist somewhere ; and
so is an express contradiction. Unless it be said, that as, when we
have proved the three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones,
that relation of the equality of its angles to two right ones will be
wherever a triangle exists ; so, when we have proved the necessary
existence of a being, this being must exist everywhere. But there is
a great difference between these two things : the one being the proof
of a certain relation, upon supposition of such a being's existence witli
such particular properties ; and consequently, wherever this being
and these properties exist, this relation must exist too : but from the
proof of the necessary existence of a being, it is no evident consequence
that it exists everywhere. My using the word demonstration, instead of
proof which leaves no room for doubt, was through negligence, for I never
heard of strict demonstration of matter of fact.
In your answer to my second difficulty, you say, ' Whatsoever is
necessarily existing, there is need of its existence, in order to the
supposal of the existence of any other thing.' All the consequences
you draw from this proposition, I see proved dernonstrably ; and con-
sequently, that the two propositions I thought independent are closely
connected. But how, or upon what account, is there need of the
346 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [CoRR.
existence of whatever is necessarily existing, in order to the existence
cf any other thing? Is it as there is need of space and duration,
in order to the existence of any thing ; or is it needful only as the
cause of the existence of all other things? If the former he said,
as your instance seems to intimate : I answer ; space and duration are
very abstruse in their natures, and. I think, cannot properly be called
things, but are considered rather as affections which belong, and in
the order of our thoughts are antecedently necessary, to the existence
of a'l things. And I can no more conceive how a necessarily existent
being can, en the same account, or in the same manner as space and
duration are, be needful in order to the existence of any other being,
than I can conceive extension attributed to a thought ; that idea 110
more belonging to a thing existing, than extension belongs to thought.
But if the latter be said, that there is need of the existence of whatever
is a necessary being, in order to the existence of any other thing ; only
as this necessary being must be the cause of the existence of all other
things : I think this is plainly begging the question ; for it supposes
that there is no other being exists, but what is casual, and so not
necessary. And on what other account, or in what other manner than
one of these two, there can be need of the existence of a necessary
being in order to the existence of any thing else, I cannot conceive.
Thus, sir, you see I entirely agree with you in all the consequences
you have drawn from your suppositions, but cannot see the truth of
the suppositions themselves.
I have aimed at nothing in my style, but only to be intelligible ;
being sensible that it is very difficult (as you observe) to express one's
self on these sorts of subjects, especially for one who is altogether
unaccustomed to write upon them.
I have nothing at present more to add, but my sincerest thanks for
your trouble in answering my letter, and for your professed readiness
to be acquainted with any other difficulty that I may meet with in any
of your writings. I am willing to interpret this, as somewhat like
a promise of an answer to what I have now written, if there be any
thing in it which deserves one.
I am,
Reverend Sir,
Your most obliged humble servant.
Nov. 23, 1713.
IV] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE 347
IV.
THE ANSWER,
(D.)
Clarke holds in reply that necessity of existence is original, absolute, and
antecedent to all besides ; so that the necessary, if anywhere, must for the same
reason be everywhere.
Declares Butler assumes a finite necessary being.
On No. 2 : a necessary being is a sine qua non to the existence of any
( = every} other being.
SIR,
TT seems to me, that the reason why you do not apprehend ubiquity
to be necessarily connected with self-existence, is because, in the
order of your ideas, you first conceive a being, (a finite being, suppose,)
and then conceive self-existence to be a property of that being ; as the
angles are properties of a triangle, when a triangle exists : whereas, on
the contrary, necessity of existence, not being a property consequent
upon the supposition of the things existing, but antecedently the cau.-.e
or ground of that existence ; it is evident this necessity, being not
limited to any antecedent subject, as angles are to a triangle ; but
being itself original, absolute, and (in order of nature) antecedent to
all existence ; cannot but be everywhere, for the same reason that it is
anywhere. By applying this reasoning to the instance of space, you
will find, that by consequence it belongs truly to that substance,
whereof space is a property d, as duration also is. What you say about
a necessary being existing somewhere, supposes it to fce finite ; and
being finite, supposes some cause which determined that such a certain
quantity of that being should exist, neither more nor less : and that
cause must either be a voluntary cause ; or else such a necessary cause,
the quantity of whose power must be determined and limited by some
other cause. But in original absolute necessity, antecedent (in order
of nature) to the existence of any thing, nothing of all this can have
place ; but the necessity is necessarily everywhere alike.
Concerning the second difficulty, I answer : That which exists neces-
sarily, is needful to the existence of any other thing ; not considered
now as a cause, (for that indeed is begging the question,) but as a sine
qua ncn ; in the sense as space is necessary to every thing, and nothing
can possibly be conceived to exist, without thereby presupposing space :
which therefore I apprehend to be a property or mode of the self-
d Or, mode of existence.
348 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [CouR.
existent substance ; and that, by being evidently necessary itself, it
proves that the substance, of which it is a property, must also be
necessary ; necessary both in itself, and needful to the existence of any
thing else whatsoever. Extension indeed does not belong to thought,
because thought is not a being ; but there is need of extension to the
existence of every being, to a being which has or has not thought, or
any other quality whatsoever.
I am, Sir,
Your real friend and